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The Producer: “Gallant Eagle,” Central Command’s (CentCom’s) largest biennial multiservice field exercise, was held this year at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) in Twentynine Palms, California, 1-10 August. Gallant Eagle 88 involved 22,000 personnel from four armed services.
Although the ground combat operations were conducted in the hot, dusty desert environment of Twentynine Palms, the entire exercise involved bases and facilities throughout southern California and Arizona. Thousands of square miles of airspace were used to conduct the air war in support of the ground operations at MCAGCC.
CentCom conducts Gallant Eagle to test contingency plans, large-scale mobility and transportation plans, the air war, the ground war, fire support coordination plans, and the joint interoperability of all four service components that provide forces to CentCom, which is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. Gallant Eagle focuses on CentCom’s global area of responsibility—Southwest Asia, the Arabian Gulf area, and the east coast of Africa. The terrain and climate of southern California, especially the desert area of MCAGCC, closely parallel those of certain areas in CentCom’s arena.
The Players: CentCom’s friendly or “Blue” forces were formed by the Marine Corps’s 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) from MCAGCC and Camp Pendleton, with its ground, air, and support elements, and by a brigade of paratroopers from the U. S. Army’s 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Aviation units from the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, ground units from the 1st Marine Division, and support units from the
Bushnell, U. S. Marine Corps
1st Force Service Support Group provided additional sup* port. The Army’s airborne brigade was augmented , British Royal Parachute Company and a company a 1 Egyptian paratroopers. Blue forces numbered close 17,000 personnel.
The ground combat element (GCE) of the Blue
forc^
consisted of one Marine infantry regiment (7th Marine* ^ with two infantry battalions, reinforced by one tank ban ion (minus), one assault amphibian battalion (minus), 0 reinforced artillery battalion, and one light armored vC cle (LAV) battalion. The Army’s airborne brigade c°® sisted of two airborne battalions, plus its artillery and11
defense assets. Higher headquarters command elem1
lent*
were provided by 1st Marine Division and 1st Mar111 xpeditionary Force (I MEF), both from Camp Per CentCom’s opposing force (OpFor) was compose^
variety of Army support units, the 3d Brigade was ^ forced with several Marine units taken from the 7th M*1 , 3d Tank Battalion; Company A, 3d LAV Battalion; Company D, 3d AA (amphibious assault) Battalion. Th Marine units were essential to provide the mobility,11 power, and mechanized infantry support the light infan^ needed for this exercise. The OpFor totaled approxim3 j 5,000 personnel. The light infantry brigade consists ^ two light infantry battalions, an air cavalry squadron, a field artillery battalion, reinforced by the Marine nn ■ Additional support was provided by a wide variety Army support units, such as a psychological warfare pany, an air defense battalion, a chemical platoon, aI,°* Army antitank tube-launched, optically tracked, w guided-missile (TOW) company.
wcic piuviucu uy isi iviamic cuiu
Expeditionary Force (I MEF), both from Camp Pendlet0
the U. S. Army’s 3d Brigade, 7th Infantry Div*si|f (Light), from Fort Ord, California. In addition to a 'vl
coP
The Script: Gallant Eagle 88 was a ten-day exercise with seven days of force-on-force operations followed by a transition to live fire to conclude the exercise. Blue forces and the OpFor were equipped with MILES (multiple integrated laser engagement system) gear to enhance battlefield realism during the force-on-force portion of Gallant Eagle.
This exercise was not a “free play” exercise but rather a tightly controlled, scripted operation. For CentCom’s purposes, this was necessary to provide the conditions required for evaluations of its plans.
The first day and part of the
second were devoted to assembling forces and defensive engineer efforts to protect the two forces as they faced each other across the broiling valleys and mountains of the desert. The latter half of the second day and all of the third day were dedicated to the reconnaissance effort of both forces. Both forces were permitted to conduct ground and air reconnaissance, without decisive engagement of either force’s major combat units.
H-Hour was set for 0001 on the fourth day. At precisely one minute after midnight, dozens of C-141 aircraft roared overhead, and troops from the 82d Air
borne Division began a nigh1’ tactical parachute jump. The drop zone was behind the B* force’s friendly lines, so the ^ jump was essentially unopp°se The other units of the Blue forces remained in defensive positions. ^
The OpFor conducted its attack at exactly the same til*1 the paratroopers were jump'11- from their aircraft. While the ^ two OpFor light infantry batta ions held key terrain, the a'r cavalry squadron and the tank battalion conducted para[ deliberate night attacks aga'n^ the Blue force Marine units- Marine tank battalion had the
mam
effort and was re inf ofce'
:d
ease section, and an engineer
Maneuver were used to de-
ern Was poised nearby. How-
ipiti’w'th the exception of the t\v0a. distance put up by the JW companies, the OpFc attalion was not opposed
Mth
P^°n that had two of the ■ , y’s armored combat excava- 0r vehicles.
me OpFor brigade com- ander, Colonel George A. jh^er> realizing he held the r, <lrt end of the combat-power l0> used tactical deception l0fations at every opportunity fQ§ain an edge on the Blue rrces- In this first attack, battle- faa smoke, psychological war- operation (psy-ops) efforts, |Qc'e the Blue forces as to the t|jat|on and strength of the main ^°rt. This may have worked CoCause the air cavalry squadron ducting the supporting attack fe >nto the main Blue force dees, tying up the two infantry J*hons and the tank battalion. r1(),^e OpFor’s tank battalion, b^er, raced south along the p0s Western boundary, op- t,ieed °nly by two LAV compa- vvhich are no match for s- The OpFor’s intent was to a|0etrate the Blue force lines ary ® lhe base’s western bound- reUr'lnd threaten the Blue force’s &,ureareas, thus drawing the li0ne ^0rce reserve out of posi- 0pp he destroyed by the mta °r s tank battalion and the Hi u ^e**copter company, by any other Blue force combat units. The Blue force reserve never appeared to counterattack the OpFor’s main effort, and protect the Blue force’s rear areas. Consequently, for four hours the OpFor tank battalion roamed through these areas, destroying numerous soft targets, including a Hawk antiair guided-missile battery. The OpFor tank battalion finally withdrew for resupply.
The apparent success of the OpFor’s attack may have been the result of Colonel Fisher’s deception plan, but it may also have been aided by a unit boundary line drawn on the Blue forces’ maps that placed the OpFor’s main attack corridor outside the 7th Marines’ defensive area of responsibility. As it turned out, the OpFor’s main attack corridor was a 1st Marine Division zone of responsibility and was defended lightly by the division’s reconnaissance screen of two LAV companies. The OpFor commander had predicted his adversary’s dispositions.
During the fourth night, the OpFor’s tank battalion withdrew to behind friendly lines without any Blue force pressure. The OpFor’s air cavalry squadron, however, was not so fortunate.
It withdrew into OpFor-held mountain passes, under heavy attack by the Blue forces.
The fifth day saw OpFor units holding key mountain passes, still under heavy attack by Blue forces. The Blue airborne bri-
gade had moved by helicopter assault into positions east of the OpFor area and had prepared defensive positions in two other mountain passes. That night, the OpFor tank battalion spearheaded another night attack against one of the airborne battalions, after conducting a passage of lines with an OpFor light infantry battalion. That same light infantry battalion then passed behind the tank battalion and conducted its own night attack against the other airborne battalion.
The OpFor tank battalion expected to hit a massive antiarmor defense established by the airborne battalion defending its pass. Intelligence reports had located several armored vehicles and at least 20 TOW antitank guided-missile launchers arrayed to defend the pass. Colonel Fisher, again using tactical deception to gain a battlefield advantage, wanted to dislocate that Blue force to weaken the antiarmor defenses facing the OpFor tank battalion. Just before dark, he sent a large helicopter force to conduct a false insertion behind the enemy-held positions.
To add to this deception, he included a psy-ops helicopter playing tapes of small arms combat sounds over loudspeakers.
As before, this deception plan may have worked because, shortly after the false insertion, the OpFor tank battalion conducted its night attack against unexpectedly light antiarmor forces. The tank battalion’s OpFor infantry did run into stiff resistance from the British parachute company that actually held the inside of the mountain pass. The OpFor tank companies, however, easily drove off or destroyed the airborne TOW
Reversing traditional roles somewhat, Marines (here, from the 3d Tank Battalion) provided armor and mechanized support to U. S. Army light infantry in Gallant Eagle 88.
forced by the 3d Tank Battal'0^,
fire weapons were integrated
Tti£
equipment and personnel, al ^ movement home for participa units.
Marine tank battalion opera1'^}
vehicles and then destroyed the three M551 Sheridan armored vehicles the airborne forces had parachuted in during the fourth day. Oddly enough, the OpFor tankers’ great nighttime threat never materialized. Only one Blue force attack helicopter appeared that night to engage the OpFor tanks, but he too was driven off by OpFor Stinger missile teams before he could score a tank kill.
The OpFor’s light infantry battalion’s attack was concluded at 0200, and both OpFor battalions withdrew to friendly lines under cover of tank-generated smoke and the wonderfully effective smoke provided by the OpFor’s chemical platoon. The Blue force did not pursue during the OpFor’s withdrawals that night.
The sixth day opened with a night helicopter assault by one airborne battalion into a mountain pass held by one OpFor light infantry battalion. The Blue force Marine units conducted an all-out major attack, pushing their forces north to link up with the airborne battalion. They intended to force the pass and push major tank and infantry forces into the OpFor’s rear
48 area. They battled for the pass all day and all night, until the morning of the seventh day. During the attack, the OpFor tank battalion was held in reserve, ready to counterattack any Blue force penetration.
Shortly after dawn on the seventh day, the Blue forces succeeded in forcing open the pass. Blue force reconnaissance elements (LAVs and TOWs) pushed into the valley, where they were destroyed by the OpFor’s TOW screen established during the night as a blocking force to support the expected OpFor counterattack that morning. Then the Blue force tank battalion with TOW and infantry support attacked out of the pass. The terrain did not favor the attackers; they came out of a narrow choke point into a prepared engagement area. Before the Blue force tank battalion could gain enough maneuvering room to deploy fully and maximize its combat power, the OpFor tank battalion counterattacked with two tank companies, a mechanized infantry company, and a TOW platoon. Supported by OpFor attack helicopters,
A-10 attack aircraft, and artillery, the OpFor tank battalion blunted the Blue force attack and pushed the remnants back through the pass.
At noon that day, the force- on-force portion of Gallant Eagle ended.
operations with the 82d AifborI1 brigade. The OpFor light infa1^ try brigade prepared to return its home at Fort Ord.
The ninth day began with 1 airborne brigade, reinforced by one Marine tank battalion, at" tacking north in MCAGCC s Delta Corridor. The 7th ME$ GCE, the 7th Marines, rein conducted a parallel attack Bravo Corridor. The live-fire portion of the exercise lasted ^ only from 0700 to 2200 on lha day, but it was a valuable e* cise of fire support coordina11 | for all the units involved. D,re
with artillery and air strikes fast-paced scenario called f°r deliberate attack, a passage o lines, and a delay-and-defenn mission, concluding with a n1' defense of key terrain.
The tenth and final day devoted to maintenance of
and .
After the Final Curtain■ as a part of the OpFor enjoyc, unique opportunity to train aS heavy force with the Army s light infantry. Tactically,
Proceedings / NoveH'*,e
. n'ts were both aggressive and ^noyative. Colonel Fisher’s 0r>tinual review and use of de- Phon plan options gave the Numbered OpFor units a ^°st- The OpFor operated at a higher tempo than the forces, but that is usually .case in scripted exercises, .he two most important °'nts 1 learned as an OpFor
com ed 0rders to his subordinate al\v manders- His intent was clear. The brigade head- ‘‘fre^s issued only two written tl^k orders (short updates to ii!g asic operations order) dur- od he entire seven-day force- o„l 0rce exercise. Colonel Fisher »d sPoke °f “what” he ‘‘I, ed accomplished, never lhe ' How refreshing! This is lar0|% effective way to control C,,forces during such a fast- u operation.
desad'° communications in the Usll - at Twentynine Palms is y a nightmare, especially in the heat of the summer when radios can cook themselves right off the air. However, because of the Army’s emphasis on positive communications, radio communications was never a problem for the OpFor. The Marines’ technique of using dry ice to cool radios during the heat of the day certainly helped. But the real success rests with the Army’s command attitude toward communications planning. During reconnaissance visits to Twentynine Palms before the start of Gallant Eagle, the OpFor
commanders viewed terrain both for tactical and communications use. At least half of the conversations on those visits concerned use of terrain for communications purposes, not for tactical purposes at all. Most Marine units would have spent all that time searching for the one footpath a regiment could use to sneak up on its enemy, ignoring the need to talk to anybody. The Army’s thorough, detailed planning paid off. Throughout the force-on-force portion of Gallant Eagle, the OpFor battalion and squadron commanders enjoyed
instant, clear, positive, secure- voice radio communication with the brigade commander, 24 hours a day; this was also true for the smaller units, companies, and platoons.
There was one negative aspect of the exercise. Logistical support for the Marine and Army units of the OpFor was superb as long as the support was for like items. The Army brigade’s logistical support system provided outstanding support for Classes I, II, and III of supply. The failing occurred with Class IX, spare parts support, for unique Marine Corps items, such as the tanks, LAVs, and airborne assault vehicles supporting the OpFor. The Army’s logistic system cannot provide these types of spare parts, so an accommodation was reached with the Blue force (Marine) logistical support agencies to provide the necessary spare parts and maintenance support of the Marine units operating with the OpFor. Unfortunately, the arrangement failed and the OpFor’s Marine units received no spare part or maintenance support at all for the first five days of the exercise and only limited, sporadic support after the fifth day. If this is an example of joint service logistic support for units that are cross-attached, then the Marine Corps has a long way to go. We certainly did not take care of our own in this regard.
Operating with the U. S. Army’s light infantry during Gallant Eagle 88 was a rewarding experience for the Marines. The value of such joint service exercises cannot be overstated.
If the 7th MEB goes to war, it will be as one part of a multiservice operation. Gallant Eagle 88 has better prepared us for that day.
Colonel Bushnell is the battalion commander of Third Tank Battalion, 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Twentynine Palms, California. He was an opposing force commander during Gallant Eagle 88.