As tension increased and U. S. antisubmarine warfare forces began stalking Soviet strategic missile submarines, the large, nuclear-propelled icebreaker Leonid Brezhnev steamed into the marginal ice zone of the Barents Sea. Fresh from overhaul at the Admiralty Shipyard in Leningrad, the 23,500-ton Leonid Brezhnev now carried 76.2-mm. antiaircraft guns, Gatling guns, and small surface-to-air missile launchers that had not been observed since her initial sea trials.
The Norwegian and U. S. P-3 Orion patrol aircraft that had attempted to trail the Soviet Typhoon-Ill submarine steaming northward toward the ice pack found the Leonid Brezhnev astride the submarine's trail. The icebreaker's noisemakers were masking the missile submarine, helping her evade the airborne pursuers.
A few days later, the U. S. hunter-killer submarine entering the area detected underwater navigation and communication signals emitted by the Leonid Brezhnev's sonar, although the U.S. submarine was unable to decipher them. Obviously, the Leonid Brezhnev was serving as a communications and navigation station in the ice for the Typhoon-III and her sister submarines.
On the icebreaker's broad flight deck, replacing the usual pair of ice-hunting helicopters, stood two Yak-38 Forger-type advanced vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) fighters, both armed with air-to-air missiles and internal rapid-fire cannon. Should the tension become conflict, these aircraft would attempt to shoot down the P-3 Orions before they could attack the Leonid BreZ11 or the Soviet undersea craft in the area.
Meanwhile, to the south, in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, several trawlers were observed steaming slowly with strange grappling gear spread out on their decks. Their position was just above the seafloor submarine-detection arrays known as SOSUS (sound surveillance system).
Farther south, steaming toward the continental shelf, were a trio of Soviet fish factory ships. When they departed the naval base at Baltiysk in the Baltic they left behind several dozen railroad flatcars on the piers. A few days earlier, according to observers, those cars had been loaded with Type-99501 naval mines.
Meanwhile, in the English Channel. . . .
In a future conflict with the West, the Soviet merchant marine will have a major military role. In particular, it is likely that Soviet merchant ships will provide direct support to submarines. This could be the greatest threat posed by Soviet merchant fleet operations in wartime or crisis.
Compared to the huge submarine fleet, the Soviet Navy's submarine support fleet appears to be disproportionately small. This would normally limit the ability of the submarine fleet to conduct sustained operations. However, the Soviets appear to be supplementing submarine support fleet with elements of the various non-naval fleets.
A quarter of a century ago, immediately after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet leaders directed their navy to greatly increase its operations on the world's oceans. Distant-area deployments increased from roughly 6,000 ship-days in 1963 to eight times that a decade later.[1]
This heightened deployment has been undertaken by a steady stream of innovative, highly capable surface-warships and submarines. However, the number of naval support ships that might be expected to maintain this fleet at sea for sustained operations in war and peace has not kept pace. This seeming disparity appears to stem in part from the Soviets' use of non-naval forces and means to support the navy.
Sine uses of civilian ships and facilities to support Soviet naval forces are well known—such as the use of merchant tankers for at-sea replenishment of surface combatants. Further, the West has known for decades that the activities of Soviet merchant and fishing ships are sometimes closely coordinated with Soviet naval exercises much like the British civilian-manned Royal Fleet Auxiliary and the U. S. civilian-manned Naval Auxiliary Force.
In addition to these operational indicators, there have been occasional hints in statements by Soviet officials. For example, in his 1976 book Sea Power of the State, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov state that the merchant and fishing fleets are important components of Soviet sea power. He emphasized that fishing ships were used widely in World Wars I and II as naval auxiliaries.
The pool of Soviet-flag, non-naval ships from which the navy might draw is large: The merchant fleet, numerically the World's second largest, consists of more than 2,500 ships; the fishing fleet, the world's largest, numbers more than 3,500 ocean-going fishing and support ships; and the civilian research fleet totals about 50 ships.[2] In addition, some East European ships could probably support Soviet naval operations. The number of ships that might be used for direct support of naval operations can only be estimated, but a 1961 U. S. Navy study of the vulnerability of U. S. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines in the Norwegian Sea area indicated Soviet ASW defenses would include 1,000 trawlers.[3]
Evidence of merchant and fishing ship coordination with submarine operations is obviously difficult to acquire, yet it is inconceivable that in the highly centralized Soviet society the advantages of support by non-naval ships would be granted to surface combatants but denied to submarines.
Assuming non-naval support for Soviet submarines may exist, what might reasonably follow? First, such support would be of little significance in a crisis or war lasting only days or weeks and hence decided by forces already on station. If the struggle is protracted and combat forces have to be resupplied and maintained, then such support would become increasingly important. The existence of substantial non-naval support, therefore, would have doctrinal implications.
Second, the promptness and scale of effort could be fine-tuned to the needs of the day. The various Soviet non-naval fleets are state property and immediately subject to state direction. This subordination, the Soviets believe, provides certain legal advantages. For instance, when British officials objected early in World War II that Soviet merchant ships were carrying raw materials to support Nazi military production, the response was that "Soviet merchant ships are state ships and cannot be subjected to any of the enforcement measures applicable to private merchant ships."[4] Currently, Soviet merchant fleets are manned at least in part by naval reserve officers, and all of the crews have had some form of military training. Operating under centralized authority and served by excellent communication systems, individual ships or groups of ships could be brought quickly under formal naval control if legal niceties so indicated.
Third, the mobilized civilian ships could be armed quickly. The concept of using civil ships to support military forces in war has a long history in the Soviet Union, thus it is likely that many of the civil ships with military potential were built in part to military specifications, and with "hard points" for weapon installation. It is likely that weapons and equipment are stockpiled for these ships.
The six diesel-electric-propelled icebreakers operated by the KGB Maritime Border Guards are already armed, as are several Soviet Navy icebreakers. Generally, these ships have a 76.2-mm. twin gun mount. The KGB ships also have a pair of 30-mm. Gatling guns, and in some navy ships there are also two 25-mm. twin gun mounts. The largest KGB icebreaker, formerly named the Purga, has four obsolete 100-mm. guns, but that ship has considerable space for lighter weapons and could be rearmed in the near future.
Fourth, peacetime operations of merchant units in support of submarine activities probably would be held to modest or training levels. Sustained, high-intensity operations would not only disrupt normal civil operations, but tend to compromise security and reduce the psychological impact of surprise during a crisis.
Non-naval submarine support in a protracted crisis probably would employ several types of ships performing a variety of functions. Because of the U. S. Navy's newly aroused concern about Soviet submarine under-ice operations and capabilities, icebreaker support is of prime interest. That support could include communications relay, navigational assistance, and Arctic repair/salvage. Communications and navigation are of utmost importance for Soviet strategic missile submarine operations. A surface ship in the Arctic with efficient systems could lower active acoustic communication devices to broadcast action messages to under-ice submarines and provide a known navigational position.
The leading candidates for such Arctic operations are the nuclear-powered, helicopter-carrying, Arktika-class icebreakers. The lead ship of the class, renamed the Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982, is the world's first surface ship to have reached the geographic North Pole. (The only other surface ship to reach the North Pole was the Soviet nuclear-powered icebreaker Sibir. She reached the Pole on 25 May 1987.) During initial sea trials in late 1974, the nominally civilian Leonid Brezhnev carried two 76.2-mm. antiaircraft guns in a twin mounting, four 30mm. Gatling guns, and associated fire control radars. Although the weapons were removed after the trials, they probably could be reinstalled quickly. Other large Arktika-class icebreakers and other modern Soviet icebreakers have similar potential.
A second support function of interest for submarines would be logistic support by merchant and fishing fleet support ships. The techniques employed generally would be the same as those now used in at-sea support of surface combatants and fishing ships. Experience with such techniques may be greater than generally recognized in the West. The use of Soviet merchant tankers to refuel East German fishing ships off the U. S. East Coast dates to at least 1974, and continues today. According to a Soviet broadcast in 1985, East German trawlers. And fish factory ships are supplied at sea by Soviet vessels with food and 50,000 tons of fuel each year, which permits them to stay at sea for two years.[5] Services available to the East Germans are likely to be available to Soviet ships as well, and even to Soviet Submarines.
The fishing Beets' support capability may be on the rise. Five large factory ships are being built in Gdansk, Poland, and the Dalniy Vostok was recently converted at Vladivostok to a depot ship—"one of the biggest in the world."[6] Each of the Polish-built ships has a crew of almost 500 and can provide services for a flotilla fishing vessels—repairs, supplies, medical care, and "social" needs.[7] Built in 1963 in West Germany as an 11,466-deadweight ton whale oil/fish factory ship, the Dalniy Vostok is expected to serve another 10-12 years.[8]
The approximately 6,000 Soviet merchant and fishing vessels are difficult if not impossible to track meaning that allied ASW forces would have problems detecting any rendezvous they might make with submarines.
A third support function would be disrupting the West's major fixed-base, hydroacoustic ASW detection. Western seabed-based sensors and their communication cables could be damaged in the manner that Soviet fishing trawls have broken commercial transoceanic cables. Soviet fishing trawlers, some classes of research ships, and cable layers would be suitable for this mission. Less-direct actions include noise making, either near the sensor or as an escort to a transiting submarine; almost any type of ship would be satisfactory for these actions, which could be accomplished with minimal cost and crew training.
A fourth function could be to serve as a general communications relay, minimizing possible exposure of submarines at the time messages are initiated. Any class of merchant, fishing, or research ship could serve this purpose effectively with minimal modification.
A fifth function could be collection intelligence about Western ASW submarines and passing it to interested Soviet units. Certain classes of research and fishing ships, now fitted with powerful active sonars, would be particularly useful in this role. According to communist publications, some Soviet research ships are fitted with sonars capable of providing high-resolution imagery of the seafloor, at great depths. The capabilities of sonars carried by some classes of Soviet fishing ships are also impressive, For example, the Polish-built, B-406 Rodina-class, helicopter-carrying tuna hunter has a hull-mounted sonar capable of detecting fish at a depth of 1,500 meters. The Polish B-407-class factory trawler reportedly can detect fish down to 4,000 meters, and the 3,300-deadeight ton East German-built Atlantik-488 class, of which 30 are being built for the Soviet Union, is described as the first ship built in Germany capable of fishing to 2,000-meter depths in the open ocean.[9] Since commercial quantities of fish areseldom found at such great depths, the deep-ranging sonars may have been designed from the outset for military purposes, as well as fishing.
A sixth function could be to provide "top-cover" defense against enemy air attack for surfaced or near-surface marines. Even the appearance of such simple equipment as chaff launchers and S A-N-5/S A-7 type antiaircraft missiles would complicate the task of Western ASW aircraft. Further, some Soviet "civil" ships, like the Arktika-class icebreakers, could be equipped quickly with even more potent air-defense weapons. Such a capability could contribute not only to self-defense, but to the defense of submarines under escort.
Indeed, a scenario could be postulated in which surface ships could escort submarines through Western ASW barriers on the surface with active sonar or noisemakers from the surface ship masking the Soviet submarine, while providing antiair and antisubmarine defenses.
The Soviet Union's "non-naval" building and repair yards must also be considered. In a protracted war, these yards would provide overhaul, maintenance, and repair services for naval ships. Under some conditions, these yards could service submarines—even nuclear units — or Provide additional trained workmen to the naval yards. The construction of nuclear-propelled merchant ships at the Baltic (Leningrad) and Butoma (Kerch) shipyards has established additional nuclear-related specialties and could be employed — augmented with submarine-experience personnel — to overhaul, repair, or refuel submarines.
In a protracted conflict, the Soviet non-naval fleets would undoubtedly contribute to the nation's military efforts. In the West, we often apply the term "force multiplier" to assets that can enhance a combat force's capability without adding more military units. It is likely that the Soviets also have force multipliers—non-naval vessels supporting prolonged submarine operations.
Norman Polmar, author of Guide to the Soviet Navy (Naval Institute Press, 1986) and The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet (Naval Institute Press, 1984), writes the Soviet Navy and U. S. Navy columns of the Proceedings. He is director of the USNI Military Database.
Author of "Incoming Ballistic Missiles at Sea" in the June 1987 Proceedings, Mr. Robinson served in the U. S. Navy from 1945 to 1948. He later served as an intelligence analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency and then with the Defense Intelligence Agency. Retired in 1984. he lives in Arlington, Virginia.
[1] Cdr. B. Watson, USN, Red Navy at Sea: Soviet Naval Operations on the High Seas, 1956-1980 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), p. 183.
[2] N. Polmar. Guide to the Soviet Navy, 4th Ed. (Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1987), pp. 348, 480, 490.
[3] Lieutenants Breux, Horn, and Foster, USN, "Polaris Survival: How to Win the Battle," The Submarine Review, January 1987, pp. 63-68.
[4] Izvestiya, 26 October 1939.
[5] British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC): Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 2, Eastern Europe SWB EE/W1339/A/10, 16 May 1985.
[6] BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 1, The USSR SWB SU/8325/C/12, 31 July 1986.
[7] Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report Eastern Europe. FBIS II, 24 April 1986, p. 68.
[8] Ambrose Greenway, Soviet Merchant Ships (White Plains, NY: Sheridan Publishing Co., 1981), p. 129.
[9] Summary of World, Broadcasts. Part II, Eastern Europe SWB EEJW1398/A/17. 10 July 1986.