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The U. S. Navy and Marine Corps are moving rapidly toward a capability for true over-the-horizon (OTH) amphibious operations by 2000. In 1987, the first operational air cushion landing craft (LCAC) unit was activated, the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor program entered full-scale development, funds were authorized for constructing the last of the eight Whidbey Island (LSD- 41 )-class dock landing ships, and construction of the lead ship of the Wasp (LHD-1) class of amphibious assault ships was approved. As close as the Navy-Marine Corps team is to the initial operating capability of OTH amphibious operations, significant questions remain about the tactics used in these operations and, specifically, the role to
be played by the LCAC. uSas-
Consider the worst-case scenario for an amphi , sault today: an opposed landing against an enemy ^o(or. ing Soviet weapons and tactics. In this scenario, a ^ ized rifle division composed of three motorize regiments defends about 200 kilometers of coas^ ^ ^ accordance with Soviet antilanding doctrine, un three regiments mans a static defense of the mo ^j. landing site, employing motorized infantry, tan ' ^ lery, and antitank missiles. Obstacles and minsUpple- placed on the beach and in the surf zone. These are mented by a well-coordinated, indirect fire plan to ^ dense, overlapping artillery fire on the beach an
It skims the waves at more than 30 knots carrying its 70-ton payload across the surface of the amphibious objective area (AOA) and onto the beach. It brings high-tech to surface-borne gator operations, offering the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) unprecedented landing speed and flexibility in selecting a beachhead. The air cushion landing craft (LCAC) has been heralded as the most significant development in amphibious warfare since the helicopter, though its full potential has yet to be explored in an operational environment. As any other revolutionary tactical system, it has met both skepticism and enthusiasm. Nonetheless, the Navy’s first operational hovercraft and first truly amphibious assault craft is on line and forward deployed with the Pacific Fleet.
The LCAC is a gas turbine- powered craft designed to carry amphibious assault elements from wet well amphibious ships to a landing zone on the beach. Its general characteristics are shown in Table 1. It is the linchpin of a significant upgrade to our surface-launched amphibious assault capability that includes a new dock landing ship (LSD) class, designed to support the LCAC,
42
and the new Wasp (LHD-1 )-class amphibious assault ship.
The most significant tactical advantage offered by the LCAC is its ability to assault a wider range of beaches with a good chance of achieving surprise. Owing to its speed and range, the LCAC can be launched from over the horizon and can reach the beach in roughly the same time a conventional landing craft can traverse the standard 5,000-10,000-yard boat lane. Because it rides across
,. /-»f a\u
the surf zone on a cushion the LCAC can touch down on^ beaches unapproachable by c ventional displacement-hulle craft. Once it moves ashore, LCAC can maneuver to a sec dry landing zone, rapidly of load, and quickly return to lts._^s support ship for follow-on se Beach topography has been the final arbiter in amp ous operations. Beach gradient- wind, current, surf height. an the onshore area must all be ^
88 feet 47 feet 30+ knots 5 hours
200 nautical miles
4 TF-40B gas turbines g
LN-66 navigation radar with processed V1 UHF/VHF/HF communications, gyrocompass 5,000 gallons
craftmaster, navigator, engineer, loadmaster, deckhands (seaman/fireman), space for elem commander/OInC 24
60 tons (75 tons design/unit) fly-by-wire controls, air bag divided into t compartments for survivability, battery start, - - takes 400Hz shore power from ship
Troop Capacity
Payload
Miscellaneous
Length
Beam
Speed
Endurance
Range
Propulsion
Electronics
Fuel
Crew
Table 1 LCAC Characteristics
i 9»1
Proceedings / Nove01**
emPloveH °i ^0re boat ^anes- The other two regiments, other loc t” Und aS a mobde force to react to landings at engage an l0nS *n tbe ^^visi°n s zone, are positioned to the dkri 6nemy amphibious force about three hours after The re °f the landing-'
(ATF) no°St ,s!^nificant threat to the amphibious task force ATF haSe, ^ tbe mPtor*zed rifle division (assuming the massed achieved air and naval superiority) is
°r landing 6f p ^re.’ wb'cb would be devastating to ships beach Co Cra” wd^’n about 15 nautical miles of the indirect fnSlstent w*tb the worst-case scenario, all Soviet beach In WeaPons are assumed to be located on the tea lty, these weapons would probably be placed inland at a distance of two-thirds of their maximum effective range, to provide lateral beach coverage.2 Soviet battlefield support jnissiles such as the SS-1 Scud series and Frog-7, though potent long-range weapons on the battlefield, are excluded from considerations here because their inertial guidance systems are relatively ineffective against ships at sea.
Although battlefield support missiles may not present a significant threat to the ATF, the Coastal Missile Artillery Force, equipped with mobile battalions of SSC-lb Sepal antiship cruise missiles, can threaten amphibious shipping out to 250+ nautical miles, and must be quickly neutralized in any amphibious operation that anticipates the use
LCAC detachment is making its initial deployment to the western Pacific on board the Germantown (LSD-42) as part of Amphibious Squadron Five. The 13th Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) is embarked as the landing force for this historic deployment. The Germantown is the second ship of the Whidbey Island (LSD-41) class, which was specifically designed to embark, control, and support the LCAC. (See Table 2.) The ships have extensive shop repair facilities, modern troop berthing, and the largest wet well in any Navy ship class. There are nine spaces providing stowage specifically for LCAC support. Procurement of eight LSD-4 Is is planned, as is a follow-on class of
P'acerne ,°Jand our current dis Only 2o<7 hf 'fd landin§ craft. are assaiinw !he world’s beach cause of m 6 by these craft be requirPmthClr strin8cnt beachin Lcap ments-. However, the
"lately 80+8l,feu°Ver aPProxi- beachL °% °f the world’s
^drogranK^110111 the detailed !ane £aphlc survey of the boa
advanCe sTa! ^ undertaken Lr
"tando) f CA ,(sea-air-land coi assault Tk065 *n a conventiona c°nimanJ Us’ our amphibious assault ers can quickly plan t dnelv-L 0nduct it clandes- forces *ess fisk t0 our ranpe ’ ?n against a wide enoi deal ana °bjectives to ensure ta The M strategic surprise. Tb,n*t®n«l DEaVy S brst operational
LSD-49 cargo variants scheduled for the early 1990s. The LSD-41 can carry four LCACs in an assault configuration, although the correct mix for a given operation is still being studied.
The LCACs are assigned to one of two assault craft units based at both Little Creek, Virginia, and Camp Pendleton, California. The LCAC embarkation concept calls for a detachment of about 40 LCAC personnel to be assigned to a three- or four-unit detachment for an operation or deployment. This group includes two officers, three or four complete LCAC crews, and a maintenance/support detachment composed of en- ginemen, hull technicians, electronic technicians, gas-turbine technicians, and a storekeeper.
The detachment’s manning is designed to provide a routine maintenance capability for the craft with augmentation by ship’s force for more extensive on-board repairs, if necessary. Maintenance support for embarked LCACs is provided from a block of spare parts loaded when the LCACs embark and managed by an integral computer system. Unlike the typical boat haven staged on board the support ship and managed by the ship’s supply department, the LSD-41 carries virtually no spare LCAC parts. The assault craft unit provides its own stock of high-use items.
Each LCAC crew is headed by a senior boatswain’s mate craftmaster and is composed of a navigator (a chief or first-class
43
of the Sepal in a coastal defense role.
The threat to the ATF is not confined to direct and indirect fire weapons. The Soviets are estimated to have the largest stockpile of naval mines in the world: deep-water mines that can threaten the ships of the ATF out to the 100-fathom curve and shallow-water mines that can destroy landing craft and vehicles close to the beach.3 For beach defense, Soviet Army engineers can employ tracked mechanical minelayers to rapidly place antitank mines between the high- and low-water marks.
Given Soviet antilanding doctrine and the significant firepower and mobility available to the motorized rifle division, amphibious naval tactics must provide the com
manders of the amphibious task force (CATF) an^ a . eS force (CLF) with the flexibility to avoid defended e ^ and conduct the landing where the assault forces expected. These tactics must also promote the rap[1] ^ e up of combat power ashore to ensure that the landin- commander can engage the lead elements of the e „ mobile antilanding defense forces. The key is the a i achieve tactical surprise. jy a
Unfortunately, amphibious forces today have 0^jC limited ability to employ tactical surprise, for t^re^at are reasons. First, they are restricted to those beaches s hydrographically suitable for the landing of arnP 12, assault vehicles (AAVs), mechanized landing era -
operations specialist), an engineer (gas-turbine technician), load- master, and deck hands. The LCAC has seating for about 20 personnel, but is not designed to transport troops. The most effective use of the LCAC is to carry heavy rolling stock: tanks, artillery pieces, light armored vehicles (LAVs), and tracked personnel landing vehicles (LVTPs) have all been efficiently landed by LCAC.
Table 3 demonstrates the LCAC’s speed advantage in terms of cargo delivered ashore in a given time period. The key is not only speed, but the ease with which the LCAC can be loaded. The LSD does not have to ballast or deballast to embark LCACs. This allows loads to be staged in the well deck between LCAC •runs. Because of the LCAC’s drive-through capability, the two craft in Table 3 can be quickly reloaded and launched in the time it takes to ballast and deballast for the conventional-hull utility landing craft (LCU) and media"* landing craft (LCM-8). Alt 0= . both LCACs would require re ing during the two-hour win postulated in Table 3, this can done while the craft are l°a 1 f1 LCAC operations are far labor-intensive and tactically strictive for the support ship;. q well deck is kept dry for L operations, eliminating the 1 required for ballasting. LCA j are easily launched and recov under way in open seas up t0
Table 2 LSD-41 Characteristics
Dimensions | 609 x 84 feet | Amphibious |
Displacement | 15,875 tons | Assault |
Complement | Crew: 26 officers, 24 chief petty officers, 300 enlisted | Features |
| Troops: 25 officers, 8 senior noncommissioned officers, 305 enlisted | Cargo Capacity |
| LCAC: 2 officers, 5 chief petty | Vehicle Stowage |
| officers, 40 enlisted | Combat Systems |
Engineering | 4 five-valve, 15-cylinder Colt- Pielstick PC2 main propulsion engines; twin shafts with Bird- Johnson controllable-pitch propellers; 33,000 shaft horsepower; 4 Fairbanks-Morse 1,300-kilowatt generators | Miscellaneous |
Well Deck | 440 x 50 feet; raisable water barrier 137 feet from forward end |
|
LCAC Capacity | 4 in tactical mode; 5 in ferry mode |
|
Flight Deck | 212 x 83 feet; two spots; CH- 53-capable; forward spot designed as vehicle stowage |
|
tionhein’ ^ Ut'lity landing Craft (LCUs)' This restric- avenue 5 f 6 enemy commander identify the most likely Plan hk°H a/'Proac^1 over the coastline in his sector and moving ,C ^nses accordingly. Second, today’s slow- the beachS|SaU t Cndt must launched relatively close to time to th °h'lrnPl'fy their navigation and minimize transit to four h 6 °at *anes' This requirement ensures that two arnPhibio°UrSuW'd e*aPse from the initial appearance of first unitsUS S|j S on horizon until the landing of the P°nentCa a[ . our- Jhis delay is unacceptable: The op- the landin'1. °ng s'8n*ficant combat power to bear against tat'°n is trf cac^es *n this amount of time. The third limi- e predictability of any large-scale assault. At the
Marine Corps Command and Staff College, every exercise involving amphibious assault includes a port and an airfield as the key assault objectives. The rationale is sound: The Marines are a relatively small fighting force designed to spearhead an invasion, clearing the way for larger follow-on forces. Fixed air and port facilities must be seized early in the operation to rapidly establish the follow-on forces within the beachhead. Progress has been made in reducing the dependence on these fixed facilities, especially with regard to in-stream cargo handling. But the CATF and CLF must still designate, as objectives, facilities to accommodate follow-on forces when they arrive in the amphibious objective area.
actually direct the LCACs in and out of the proper spots in the well.
Because the LCAC can make a rapid turnaround after a run to the beach, a sizeable deck force is needed to direct vehicles and handle cargo, to exploit the LCAC’s speed. The LSD-41 class is particularly well-suited for this highspeed evolution. The ship’s large flight deck and boat deck are easily accessible to the well via an internal vehicle tunnel and turntable. Rolling stock can be
^ableVh^K 18 tar more man‘
c°nventi the one for receiving
Uunch '0"3 land’ng Craft:
fent-hnii^ recovering displace- •han*td ^.require more officer,, lne handlers and petty harm, ^everal LCACs can be officer 3 Wel1 deck control
a 'Veil d Stl'P S firSt lieutenant)> in charo r sa^ety observer/officer °ne or t sk'P's boatswain), and ramP marshalls who
state thr
m Ce’ adow’n8 the ship freewill fnr Imaneuver- The 1-A watch 2!?? LCACs is hr
quickly moved down to the well and driven directly into an LCAC in one of four predesignated spots in the ship’s 440-foot well.
LCACs are equipped with bow and stem ramps, allowing several craft to be loaded simultaneously. The LSD-41 has 60- and 20-ton cranes, mounted port and starboard just forward of the flight deck. These can load cargo directly into the well via a large cargo access. Moving cargo loads within the well itself is done with a twin-hook gantry crane running the length of the well.
Living with LCACs has required the usually crusty LSD deck force to make some adjustments. The turbine-powered LCAC is noisy, generates 200- knot winds on the ship’s catwalks, and gobbles fuel during high-tempo operations. The LSD crew supporting LCACs mans a fueling detail and fire party, much like flight operations. Personnel working in the well during LCAC operations wear flight deck head, ear, and eye protection and the same inflatable life preservers flight deck crews wear, the color of the outfit indicating each man’s job. The crew communicates with a very-high-frequency (VHF) walkie-talkie system. The need to keep unauthorized personnel clear of the well while LCACs are running led to the establishment of a yellow well for LCAC start-up and maintenance, much as is done on a flight deck. As in conventional landing craft operations, red and green well conditions are des-
45
Direct-fire Weapons: Lightly armored, the LC ^ ents a large radar, visual, and infrared target, an ^ particularly vulnerable as it slows to approach the ^ and when it stops to discharge its cargo. AlthohS ^
In contrast, the OTH amphibious assault lends itself to tactical surprise, owing primarily to the unique capabilities of the LCAC. This craft can operate over a wide variety of landing beaches, unimpeded by either the hydrography of the surf zone or the trafficability of the beach. In addition, by eliminating the requirement for amphibious shipping to close the beach for the launch of conventional assault craft, the LCAC permits the ATF to remain clear of shore defenses or minefields.
Though the LCAC offers significant—almost revolutionary—tactical advantages over its predecessors, technical constraints on OTH amphibious operations need to be considered by Navy and Marine Corps planners.
LCAC is no more vulnerable to direct-fire weapons ^ an AAV and can sustain significant damage before^ ^ put out of commission, its value to the ATF requi ^ the LCAC cushion landing zones (CLZs) be secure fore the LCACs cross the beach. to
Command and Control: Having the technical a > ^ assault a coastline from over the horizon is a hoi ^
cept if command and control of those units can _
maintained. Although a landing may begin in to'
Table 3 Time vs. Loads Delivered for Various Landing Craft
| LCAC (2-craft detachment) |
| --------- rem---------- (2-boat "nest") |
| LCU |
| |
T |
| T |
| T |
|
| |
i m e 9 | Launch; proceed to beach | m e | Launch; proceed to beach | m e | Launch; proceed to beach |
| |
Offload on beach |
|
|
| ||||
| 120 (Tons Delivered) | 19 |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| ||
| Return to |
|
|
|
|
| |
| ship |
|
|
| Offload |
| |
|
|
| Offload on |
| on beach |
| |
| Load in well |
| beach |
| 150 (Tons Delivered) |
| |
|
| 130 (Tons Delivered) |
|
|
| ||
| |||||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
48 |
|
|
|
| Return to |
| |
Return to beach |
| Return to ship |
| ship |
| ||
| Offload on beach |
|
|
| Debaliast to “ground,” craft |
| |
|
| Deballast to “ground” |
|
| |||
| 240 (Tons Delivered) Return to |
| l3 | in well |
| ||
76 | ship |
|
|
|
|
| |
Load in well |
| Load in well |
| Load in well |
| ||
| |||||||
| |||||||
|
| Ballast for relaunch |
|
| o w | ||
|
|
|
|
|
| a? | |
96 |
|
|
|
|
| o | |
105 | Return to beach |
| Return to beach |
| Ballast for relaunch | o 03 <D | |
Offload on beach |
|
| Return to | IT i | |||
| 360 (Tons Delivered) |
| Offload on beach |
| beach |
| |
| Return to ship |
|
|
| I | ||
| 360 |
| 130 |
| 150 |
|
Notes: A two-hour time period after H-hour is assumed, i.e., a general offloading situation. Craft are embarked in an LPD or LSD.
LCU assumed to be a 1646 class; capacity 150 tons of cargo. LCM-8s are usually operated in a “nest” of two and the combined capacity of both assumed is 130 tons. A two-LCAC detachment is assumed. Together they carry 120 tons. LCACs and LCM-8s arc launched and proceed together, but it is assumed that it will take slightly longer for beachmasters to bring both LCM-8s ashore at the same beach, hence the longer time for them to touch down and unload.
LCU/LCMs average eight knots for their round trips. LCACs are assumed to make 35 knots. The LCU/LCM ships arc assumed to be anchored 5,000 yards off the beach; the LCAC support ship is considered to be underway in its sea echelon area five nautical miles (average) off the beach.
Times for ballasting, onload, and offload will vary with loads, crew proficiency, material condition, etc.
ignated for launch, recovery. a loading. .q
The similarity between L and helicopter operations is an added bonus. Conducting js
neous flight and well operat<°n remarkably easy on board an LSD-41, and the flexibility ano speed of offload using helic°P and LCACs is a great benefit- Now the CATF can make realtime decisions about how he____________
wants to offload on call-seria s via LCAC or helo. This poten will be expanded as more wd■ well ships are modified to °PC the LCAC, and will reach its ^ peak with the advent of the L 49 cargo variant. the
Tactics being developed to LCAC are revolutionary, com pared to those employed in c°a ventional boat assaults. Curre tactics call for the first LCAC wave to be launched more than 20 miles from the beach, Pr°C^,s ing toward the beach via a ser of control points. Able to navi gate on its own, the LCAC can make this transit under electron emissions control (EmCon) c°n ditions without the support of a control ship. The craft’s LN-o radar and video processor giveS the craftmaster and navigator a well-defined presentation and a lows the LCAC to maintain a high transit rate right up to the beach. Navy SEALs or Marine Corps reconnaissance (Recon) units may be used to mark the LCACs’ entry points on the bea in advance should the beach prove particularly tricky. Once
bat serv enCe’ tFe coordination of supporting arms, com- warfare ICCS| [2]u^0rt’-S'^na*s 'ntefligence and electronic waves ap0 u *and‘n8 °* on-call surface and helibome c°nimuni er,- dlour demand rapid, reliable, and secure echelon n^i *'r,nS amon8 t*ie *ead elements of the assault To condut thC Support agencies on board the ATF ships. cal miles ° rr u™ assault today from even 20 nauti- between i° r ore.wouid severely restrict communications and cnntr-3!^ ',n^ ^orce dements ashore and the command Real elements afloat.
are limited °pt'ons *or improved OTH communications unavailahl r ate"‘.te c°mmunications will generally be e or tactical use. In wartime, higher level headquarters can be expected to dominate the limited number of available channels.4 Airborne relay of ultra-high- frequency (UHF) or very-high-frequency (VHF) communications is feasible, but this is limited by the number of aircraft that will be available for dedicated communications relay early in an assault. Expanding the high- frequency capabilities of amphibious ships would help, but that would require additional expenditures in an increasingly austere fiscal environment. Until a solution is found, amphibious ships involved in the command and control of the assault will be required to close rapidly to within VHF and/or UHF range of the beach (typically no more than 10-15 miles offshore) at H-hour.
condit’j 6 tact'ca* situation, surf the [p0,np dlc inshore area where avoid • ^ wi*i offload, and must tion.fi lntcrference with
conven-
l|ng craft.
Th,
Win e^’t hr LCAC detachment UnloS^b 3 Z°ne f°r rapid
duceiu^ opcrat'°ns have intro-
PhibiousT^'n'00'1 for the Am- LCAc0 !? Force (ATF); during Con (Df vC°n (silent) and Pos-
craft nai In' C°ntrol) missions’
(CDP) "rough departure points
hit the hnd u°ntr01 P°ints (CCP); Point (rpm at a craft Penetration ion” ’ and “come off cush- ?°ne (c,U50aJat a craft ianding is the J1 Ahh°ugh the LCAC craft ni°St Pexikie of our assault must be annin8 its employment Opern;6 3S thorough as any gator fortheTra"d ™re. Planning beach eACs transit to the *°gica|IT1USt cons'der the meteoro- iaunch COnditi°ns at the offshore beach n,°lnt’ tFe seas enroute the
‘>1 land
sugg:rersatility of the LCAC ► Co S U W'^e range of missions: lQACemion“l ^sault: The aniZe | ,Can deliver the first mech- H-hof °ads t0 the beach at motorr ^an^s’ beachmaster gear, lande t transPort equipment can be beach 3t 3 wider range of Oiai eS- rooved inland to an opti- Sdi°n’ and rolled off the its |(). c°mbat-ready. It can put stapj U, cl°ser to inland roads and that ^ areas> and avoid the areas sauitCa" bog down the beach as- tiVe ‘ ‘be craft has proven effec- vthi f transporting almost every lcle embarked "in the ATF.
- General Unloading: The speed with which the LCAC can offload cargo from wet well ships can cut offload time to a fraction of what it takes with conventional-hull boats. The payoff: the LCAC- equipped ATF can move the landing force ashore and depart the AOA quickly, minimizing ship exposure to attack.
- Advance Force Support Craft: The LCAC can launch in open seas at night, proceed independently to a secluded beach, disembark SEAL or Recon units in their raiding craft and return to its support ship—with a much reduced risk of detection.
- Amphibious Raid Capability: The LCAC’s speed, range, independence, and mobility permit forward-deployed amphibious forces to land a small mechanized force across a wide range of beaches with a reasonable chance of surprise. Missions are limited only by imagination and the unpredictable nature of today’s “violent peace” operations. Reconnaissance in force, hostage rescue, and seizing key checkpoints
are only the most obvious use of LCACs and complementary land systems such as LAVs or LVTPs.
The craft and the entire concept, however, have their critics—particularly among those who wear Marine green. The most frequent criticism is that the LCAC is too vulnerable, its sensitive components too easily damaged in combat. This argument is tempting but unconvincing. The LCAC has a significant degree of redundancy, and was designed to operate on cushion, even with a significant amount of damage to its rubber skirt and the loss of much of its propulsion plant. However, the LCAC’s survivability lies in its ability to hit a wide range of beaches at high speed with little warning. It is hard to believe that a conventional landing craft or amphibious personnel carrier waddling into a limited beachfront at five to ten knots is less vulnerable than a 40-knot LCAC. In World War II, conventional landing craft did not fare well against heavily defended beaches. Besides the helicopter, the LCAC has the best chance for survival in assaults.
Other criticisms of the LCAC focus on its small payload and the fact that it is limited to carrying vehicles and cargo. The LCAC is a poor troop carrier. However, amphibious tactics call for rifle companies to land on board helicopters or AAVs.
Shipboard operators are maintaining and employing LCACs in a wider number of scenarios. In short, the LCAC is earning its place in the fleet. It is up to the amphibious assault team, particularly the Navy, to make full use of its potential.
2 Phalanx Gatling guns; S‘ air search radar; SPS-67 sur search radar; LN-66 navigatl° radar; SLQ-32 electronic w fare system
Medical spaces: operating r°"' ’ ward, two dental opera 1 rooms . .
Crew: troops live in central*2®^ air-conditioned spaces >n superstructure; crew and r berthing identical .
Facilities: gym, rec&»° [
closed-circuit TV; SNAP-'1 tral administration/supply/"1’1 tenance computer system
2 B&A cranes on boat deck (60- and 20-ton capagr well deck gantry crane (1- ^ capacity); two rough te forklifts; direct access flight/boat deck to well 8,900 cubic feet 9,465 square feet .g
Commander McKeamey became the plans officer on the staff of Commander Amphibious Forces 7th Fleet last month, after serving as executive officer of the Germantown (LSD-42). A 1973 Naval Academy graduate, he has a master’s degree from the Naval Postgraduate School.