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^ulf Mines Pose Tactical Questions
Co ’ '
Several c|Uet*. *ran'an operations in the Persian Gulf have demonstrated aPParentlySSjC ^eatures °* mine warfare. First, remarkably few mines, all lane, i[,(, ? an obsolete design, very nearly shut down a busy shipping and, the if o°nly two sb'Ps suffered damage and none was sunk. Sec- SUres can K r Navy ^0Un(J 'tself without a deployed mine countermea- ’hat it r."lty> V« reports suggest the area several mines in
Sented tr j-■ ’ boating mines pre-
It ann ‘tl0nal Pr«b'ems.
^°rean tbat tbe m‘nes are North vintage CoP'es °f World War •’
Hines_ a °V'et m°ored contact
c°ntact h SPbere with protruding the mine°rnS ^ Passing ship throws tvave; th l° °ne s’de w'th its bow the ship tben sw'ngs back into s°phistic. t fSe m'nes are much less torn) a cd tban the ground (bot- !%4, T.es lai(J in the Red Sea in ‘s lo cut ft,Standard countermeasure stroy (L e mooring cable and define SUn'1^'116 itS£lf by r'Ae °r ma'
’he Gulf lre' ,n tbc dear water of ’he air r'amines can be spotted from '°'v'ng shjtaCt'C Used 'n ^orea)' al-
chain out'fS t0 evade them. The paravane, a float that holds a length of Ao\veverr°m tbe bow of a ship, is another classic countermeasure. safficjenti 'S not clear whether a large tanker can be fitted with a
It is |j|A on8 cable; if so, it would have to be modified in drydock. Srnall nuiff tbat tbe Iranians used small, fast boats to lay a relatively "trough the p °* mooretI mines in the path of the first U. S. convoy bl|t reportC11^' ^ran lades sufficient stocks to mine much of the Gulf, *°nes that ,. .gained a considerable advantage by declaring keep-out which j 'mited neutral shipping to a channel about two miles wide,
Th, '
victi
16 mine"^ SU'table for mining.
she
damage itself was also instructive. The first U. S.-escorted
■■itt, the i “---------- ---------------------- — — 7' ------ ----------
c0,a,, , ar8e tanker Bridgeton, did not sink. Indeed, it seemed that
. haVP ......................................... -t-u . n ■, . .. J ...___________
Mi
:adin
avy
'g the
e taken several more hits. The Bridgeton looked strange
»>y ^ convoy through the area of potential mine danger. Surely the rrtade Seftbere to protect the tankers, not the other way around. But it (sUch as y2 Pbc surface warships were there to counter other threats I” the p;f f or missile attack), which they could do from ahead or astern. ^r°ugh n •’ tbe S. Navy converted several Liberty ships for steaming s'rr>ilar nr-lneC* areas’ exploding ground mines. The Germans followed a L°uld bef01'06 'n ^orld War 11. Currently, the surplus of large tankers fillinBenuP'°yed ’n lb's manner. Their survivability might be ensured ^rtajniy * 6m wbb buoyant foam; if hit, flooding would be limited.
The Un-S°me surPlns tankers are laid up in or near the Persian Gulf. "r°vi(jesnifed States is part of a larger alliance, in which the U. S. Navy 6s’ WhjJh'1113*^ ab ,be blue-water, high-threat component. The al- ■ must protect their end of the sea lines of communication,
pr°vide sh...
>,ext (^d °w-water defense, including minesweeping. In the alliance "V to hL L' bl' S. mine countermeasures resources are designed primar- ^ende(i h ^Ports clear and to support amphibious assaults against !'pecialiXa(Cacbes' ^ben the United States finds itself fighting alone, its o' a"ian '°n Can be cmbarrassing. British specialization—also based Vverth1™6^-™5 a near-fatal embarrassment in the Falklands. ari" under £ States continues to finance mine countermeasures
’ence, ThR ater exPlosives disposal research, development, and compe-
' likely the origin of official announcements that the Navy
cleared mines in the Gulf well before specialized sweepers arrived. Reportedly, the Navy fitted out a chartered oilfield support vessel as an emergency minesweeper/hunter.
The United States must be able to deploy naval forces on a global scale, to deal with surprise contingencies. By their nature, minesweepers are slow: they must be relatively small and much of their power is drained by the sweep gear. Seagoing sweepers cannot reach overseas areas quickly, and it is not economically feasible to maintain sweepers abroad. The U. S. solution has been to maintain some mine countermeasures assets that can be transported on board larger, faster ships or sweeping helicopters—in this case, helos operated from the amphibious carrier Guadalcanal (LPH-7) and 57-foot minesweeping boats carried to the Gulf in amphibious ships’ well decks. Britain and France decided to contribute their own sweepers. The estimated five weeks it will take British sweepers to travel from Britain to the Gulf illustrates the United States’s problem.
Iranian tactics likely will limit the sweepers’ value. Sweeping tends to be laborious, and it is unlikely that one or more sweepers can lead a convoy through a mined area. Sweepers usually clear and mark a channel. To the extent that fast Iranian small craft can operate at night without being sunk, they may be able to remine the cleared channels. Thus, the U. S. Navy may have to maintain continuous control of the cleared channel. However, the Iranian stockpile is so small that the threat of mine clearance may end the problem.
Deliberately floated mines are banned by international law because their paths cannot be predicted and thus they may attack neutral shipping outside a war zone. It is not clear that the floaters in the Gulf of Oman were planted knowingly by enthusiastic (and perhaps irrational) Iranians, or whether they are the natural consequences of using old equipment. Ironically, the first victim was carrying Iranian oil.
There may be a larger lesson here. U. S. military forces are designed primarily to deal with the Soviets, on the tacit assumption that other enemies present a lesser threat. However, at least at sea, that may not be the case. It is not so much that the threat of a few elderly moored mines and a few pathetic suicide motor boats negates U. S. sea power, but that these threats, which the Soviet Union does not pose in blue water, require specialized countermeasures. For example, the massed light antiaircraft guns of World War II would easily have disposed of the Iranian suicide boats, just as they destroyed their Japanese equivalents. They would not have had much success against jet aircraft or cruise missiles, which is why they no longer exist.
Of the Gulf states, only Saudi Arabia operates minesweepers, which were supplied by the United States in 1978. Reportedly, Kuwait is negotiating with the Netherlands to buy Tripartite (Alkmaar-class) minehunters. Two operational Dutch vessels might be supplied.
Polish Navy Gets Two Kilos
The Polish Navy has received two Soviet-built Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines to replace its aging Whiskeys. Two more are on order. The Kilo class is the first entirely new Soviet diesel submarine design since the late 1940s; its predecessor, the Tango, was a modernized version of the Foxtrot, itself an improved Zulu. It is not clear whether the Kilo is intended primarily for export. The Soviet Union is credited with six units, produced at the rate of two per year. India has three on order. Other exports seem likely because the Soviet Union no longer produces Foxtrot-class submarines to replace existing craft, and as it has no coastal submarine comparable to the elderly Romeos and Whiskeys. Current Soviet client-state operators of Romeos are Algeria, Bulgaria, and Syria. Cuba and Libya operate Foxtrots. Romania is known to be interested in resuming submarine operations, and East Germany and Vietnam are other possible potential operators.
Toe,
'8s / October 19S7
219
tion was incorporated in the Update-IV proposal.
ihuttle
befofe
mainder of the s.
The program began i- jn.
crash of the shuttle, wl n
tense Air Force lobbying-v£
expendable-rocket a te to the reusable shuttle- n -
.................................. i,„nch r°c .
small numbers of new heavy-launch rO,^0- A rv,. tj — Titnn Ac trnrl 20 ,
ordet
:kets-
then,
the future space defense system. The Challenger crash was, — ^ugu’' ous military blow, sandwiched between two Titan 34D crashes ^ye 1985 and April 1986). The Air Force hopes that the Titan’s de e^ j-lfSt been cured, and that 34D launches can resume later this year- p0rc£ Titan 2 launch is scheduled for early 1988, from Vandenberg Base, California. fo(
The U. S. Navy is a heavy direct and indirect user of sate c0ti- navigation (the Global Positioning System), communications, ar,natjor>a* naissance. The shuttle and Titan crashes exposed a disturbing j vulnerability. Published reports suggest that U. S. satellites are ^eC
Taiwan to Get FFG-7 Plans
Congress was notified in July of the Reagan administration’s plans to supply Taiwan with plans and specifications for the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate. Six would be built by the China Shipbuilding Corporation of Kaohsiung under the supervision of a U. S. general contractor. Taiwan is seeking options for six more. They would be equipped with locally-produced weapons and sensors, reportedly including the Hsiung Feng antiship missile (copied from the Israeli Gabriel II) and a new three-dimensional radar.
This is the latest in a series of Taiwanese attempts to modernize its aging surface fleet. Taiwan operates 26 destroyers and 10 frigates, all of U. S. World War II construction. Although they are reportedly in excellent condition, it is not clear how long the 40 -50 year-old destroyer hulls can remain operational. A previous replacement project, in which West- inghouse designed a 3,348-ton diesel/gas-powered frigate, failed because of its high cost.
China can be expected to protest this sale. In addition, there may be U. S. congressional pressure to have one or more of the ships built in the United States, owing to the economic depression in U. S. shipbuilding, particularly on the West Coast (Lockheed has closed and Todd is reorganizing). This would probably produce vociferous Chinese complaints. It is possible, then, that Taiwan will turn to an alternative supplier, most likely South Korea: its Ulsan yard competed for the new Greek frigate program. Most alternative suppliers would probably be deterred by Chinese disapproval. For example, the Netherlands cancelled Taiwanese options for submarines beyond the two now under construction.
Boeing Breaks into Aviation ASW
Boeing was awarded a $244 million contract in July for full-scale engineering development of the P-3 Orion Update-IV avionics suit. This culminated five years of efforts to break into the U. S. air antisubmarine warfare (ASW) market. The contract award followed parallel demonstration and validation contracts let to Boeing and Lockheed (which manufactures the P-3) in November 1985. Boeing began its demonstration phase in October 1986. The prototype Update-IV airplane is to be delivered in 1990. Of 205 suits in the program, 125 will be installed in new aircraft and 80 in Update-II P-3s. The current production version is Up- date-III; the Update-IV program was approved by the Navy Systems Acquisition Review Council in November 1984. Like other current Navy programs, provision is made for competitive production. The initial award will cover 140 of the 205 systems; the second competition is scheduled for the remaining 65. The estimated flyaway cost is $8 million per system in fiscal year 1987 dollars.
Update-IV is part of a wider air ASW improvement program. The Navy announced that P-3 production will be suspended pending competition for a new ASW aircraft, tentatively designated the P-3G but possibly using a new adapted commercial airframe. This is not a new idea. A decade ago, the Navy was considering a new airframe; Boeing submitted modified versions of some of its airliners. Given its Update-IV success, Boeing might be able to capture the U. S. replacement ASW aircraft market. Navy plans call for 125 new ASW aircraft to be ordered from 1991 on; and a Request for Proposals is due this month.
The new avionics suit reportedly includes a new surface-search radar, a new electronic surveillance system, a new distributed data processor, high resolution multipurpose color monitors linked by a data bus, and satellite communications capability. The latter presumably would permit real-time updates of acoustic information while the P-3 was en route to a target search area. Distributed processing, the result of advances in computer speed and capacity, improves overall reliability and survivability because a mission can be completed even if one processor is lost. Similarly, because the displays are identical (each is programmed for its particular function), the overall system can survive the loss of one or more crew stations by reconfiguring others, and the overall system can reconfigure itself to change the way in which the work load is shared. Common components should reduce maintenance costs. The subcontractor team consists of Magnavox, Resdel Engineering, General Instruments, and M/A Com Government Systems.
Boeing is marketing a more austere ASW package for small countries, based on the DHC-8 airliner, and modernized the avionics in six Royal New Zealand Air Force P-3s. Technology developed for that moderniza-
220
It is likely that the Boeing Update-IV experience will be apphe projected ASW version of the Boeing-Vertol MV-22 Osprey ti aircraft, which may replace the current Lockheed S-3 Viking-
Titan 2 Boosters Rolled Out
Martin Marietta rolled 03 Titan 2 satellite-launch rocket in August, the {irs ordered by the U. S. Air ** These heavy boosters wi to fill the gap in U. S. v ^ ity left by the January crash of the shuttle Chalk and the grounding of^
the
the Air Force ordered __ ___ __ „
About six earlier Titan 34-Ds remain; 23 larger Titan 4s and 20 launch Delta 2s are on order. Reportedly the Air Force hopes ^ more expendable heavy launchers. The United States has lighter but the Titans and the shuttles are the only heavy-payload °
The Titan itself is a direct descendant of the last of the generation (liquid-fueled) intercontinental ballistic missiles (1 j0„ed indeed, existing Titan launch vehicles reportedly are reconranfe ICBMs. Similarly, the Delta is based on the old Thor intermedia^ ^eii ballistic missile. It appears that all Atlas heavy-lift boosters ha^st by expended; reportedly, no further production is contemplated, at ^-
the Air Force. The Atlas-Agena reportedly could put 3.8 tons in^ yef.. mile orbit or 1.2 tons in a synchronous orbit. In its most ac'v3t' n34-D sion, the Delta could put 1.2 tons in a synchronous orbit. The 11eafth could put 1.9 tons in a synchronous orbit or 12.5 tons in a orbit. The shuttle reportedly can launch about 14 tons in orbit, ing the need for the expensive Titan. fpfl)
Thus, although the range of existing boosters (other than t ^jng would suffice for relatively light communications and weather r ^ejed satellites, it appears that something like the Titan or the shuttle lS ,s 0f to lift very heavy payloads, such as reconnaissance satellites^or^F^ serj-
designed for long operational life, so that frequent replacement ^ essary and the number of launchers can be minimized. T“econoit>icS shuttle is thus an attractive launch vehicle. However, the .n>‘e: would be radically different in wartime or near-war, whe ^ 0f a might be shot down. It has been fashionable to claim that the major satellite would be a clear warning of impending is incre3f thus timely replacement would be pointless. However, if, aS ^ a)1 ingly being claimed, nuclear attack is unlikely, one imagines^jg ^ tisatellite warfare could and would be conducted, just as air ^ allWorld War I began—with attacks on reconnaissance aircraft- ntisatelU‘! both the United States and the Soviet Union have developed ^ ^ weapons. In antisatellite warfare, quick satellite replacement immense military significance. rell'teS ^
The Soviets have orbited multiple naval reconnaissance ss Con^ close succession to cover crises, such as the 1982 Falkland replaCa This peacetime capability seems to indicate an ability to rapi J destroyed satellites. Moreover, shuttles, which the United Sta aCtive have to reuse and cannot easily replace, would be extremely w0113 targets, both in wartime or in a crisis. The loss of a single 1 have much less impact.
r
Proceedings / 0***