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The expansion of U. S. special operations forces (SOFs)—specialized military forces for guerrilla warfare, covert operations, and counterterrorism—has been one of the highest priorities of the Reagan administration. The Navy’s SOFs are increasing significantly in size, but questions have been raised about their quality and capabilities.
The Navy’s SOFs are referred to as SEALs, for sea-air-land teams, a term derived during the Vietnam War. Today there are about 300 SEAL officers and 1,000 enlisted SEALs, the officers having the 113X Special Operations designation, which was officially established in 1969.1
The current SEAL force level represents a 50% increase since 1982, when the buildup began. A further increase of 50%—to some 2,000 billets—is planned for the next five years. Additional special warfare units will also be established.
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, there are six SEAL teams, two SEAL delivery vehicle teams, and two special boat squadrons, each with three boat units, plus several detachments and “units.” Of these, four boat units are Naval Reserve Force (NRF) units, as are the Navy’s helicopter units, which in wartime would be assigned to support SEAL operations.
According to published descriptions, each SEAL team has some 175 officers and enlisted men; the special warfare units have 17 men each. The latter are located at: Subic Bay, the Philippines; Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico; and Machrihanish airfield, Scotland.
Special Warfare Group 1 at San Diego and Special Warfare Group 2 at Norfolk are the major SEAL commands, responsible for logistics, planning, training, and deployment schedules for most SEAL units in their respective fleets. The exception is SEAL Team 6, reportedly organized in November 1980 for the counterterrorist role. Team 6 is under the direct supervision of the headquarters of the unified Atlantic Command in Norfolk, and tasked by the Secretary of Defense and the White House.
Under the recent changes in the U. S.
____________ Figure 2 Naval
military structure, the Army and Force special operations units have o operationally assigned to the Special Op® ations Command (SOC), a unified co mand established in 1987 with headqu j ters at Tampa, Florida.2 The Nav^ SOFs are not a part of the new comma® Initially, the Navy will have 21 billets' the SOC headquarters staff, of 'v^llC seven will be for 113X officers, the mainder being supply, communicate^ and other special-duty officers. A Nav Special Warfare Command was esta lished on 11 July 1987 as the naval co ponent commander for the SOC. It “oversee” SEAL readiness and training
Navy special warfare units will w closely with SOC, but operationally vV1j remain under their respective fleet ah type commanders (i.e., Surface F°r Atlantic Fleet and Surface Force Pacl 1 Fleet). This deviation for the Navy ‘ reCt ognized the reality of the SEALs being3 sea, operating with the fleet,” according to a Navy SOF spokesman. ..
About one-half of the Navy’s spccl ^ warfare units are normally deployed of
icial Warfare Group 2______________ _
sunfC1SeS ^Cet un*ts- The Navy units PP°rt amphibious landings and other Arm °^erat'ons- This is distinct from the n0, y and Air Force units, which “can-
tion<!I^ne^'ate^ out ant* support operant ’ ^cording to the Navy spokes- Oro., . . Army Special Forces
teZ[1]r°n.iS a “force multiplier,” in- locai . ° g° 'nt0 a country and work with lari ,rl'J°PS’ the spokesman said. Simi- tie/; he. A,r Force has limited capabili- The mF’ lndePenc*ent special operations. Porce ^^ excePl*on is tf>e Army’s Delta r0H„ ’ the much-publicized counterter-
^hSEALTeU^ t0P'‘eVel taSki"8
cial I0"801"8 PU’^UP °P the Navy spe- •nore SPaT0 community will provide •heir c f°r sPecial operations. But
same ,abllUieS may not increase at the SEAT Fate aS their increase in size. The touohcorr,munity, evolving from the Viein.,SP^,C,la' war^arc experience of the PhvsS. ur’ 'S made UP of well-trained, Put th ™ened> and dedicated men. ize(j 6 . ALs lack a variety of special- techn;e<^Ulpment and niodem delivery ture sn UCS ,tdat couid be necessary in fu- SEai • u °Perati°ns. The loss of four landingln heavy surf during the Grenada raised §S ° 1983 Operation Urgent Fury) well qUeS,I°nS about their training as
froma‘nTg 'ssues are difficult to discern Re^PU.,llshed Nicies and statements, haininf l^e i°sses at Grenada were made n I^!ated’ hut details have not been being U 1C’. ®t*ler training-related areas SEALsqUeStl°ned include the use of and rK “ anti-swimmer, surveillance, ^EALsyCh° °Sical warfare roles. Also, and inm3? resPonsihle for coastal patrol farrem "" jf°n’ although this role seems Nation °fed *rorn l^e more clandestine op- is orientecT W^'C^ t*le’r Primary training
°Us JL^^ALs equipment is a more obvi- sPect .ortc°ming. It is limited with regem* , n °Vert surveillance and intelli- •raditio ° .ect'on- This is true even for the r°le- m 3Pre;assault reconnaissance boards ^ Cd **neS and Plastic writing cated r^H St'd 'n use’ ‘hough sophisti- readii,,and.more accurate) devices are M y .avadable for swimmers.
V||i _VlaS farther offshore, the Mark hicles IX swimmer delivery ve-
the-ar. • uS 316 also less ‘han state-of- CaPab'|WUb resPect t0 Propulsion, and the mers ' ltyit0 suPPort and protect swim- si0n ’ tk Perforrn certain military mis- ati0nai e Nayy is looking at future oper- Sjyy requirements for more-advanced Plans- S^Stems- There are no specific ment’ their development and procure- appear to be several years away.
SEALs can be carried into a forward area by aircraft, surface craft, or by locking out from submarines while the subs are submerged. But SDVs can be clandestinely carried into an objective area only in the dry deck shelters (DDSs) fitted to the deck of a submarine. The Navy has converted two former Polaris submarines, the John Marshall (SSN-611) and Sam Houston (SSN-609), to carry and support SEALs. Each submarine has accommodations for some 65 troops or swimmers. Swimmers can be locked out of the submarines’ escape trunks, or from the new DDSs.
The DDSs are three-chamber structures that can be attached to a submarine deck. There are two spherical chambers— a hyperbaric chamber for swimmer decompression and an access sphere that connects to a submarine escape hatch— and a cylindrical hangar. The hangar can accommodate an SDV or serve as a giant lock-out chamber for swimmers.
The DDS has little impact on a submarine’s performance, except that flow noises are probably increased. In the early 1980s, the Navy planned to convert the John Marshall and Sam Houston to each carry two DDSs, and six long-hull Sturgeon (SSN-637)-class attack submarines would each be modified to carry one DDS—a total of ten shelters with a capacity for carrying ten SDVs.
The attack submarine Cavalla (SSN- 684) was modified to carry a DDS and conducted trials with the first shelter, which was built by General Dynamics’ Electric Boat shipyard. However, the
Navy stopped the contract for additional shelters when General Dynamics was accused of cheating the government on other contracts. This brought the DDS program to a stop. Subsequently, a contract was awarded to the Navy’s other submarine construction yard—Newport News Shipbuilding—to fabricate the DDS. A second shelter was delivered this year.
Thus, there are only two shelters now available for three submarines, with a total of five DDS spots. Six shelters are now planned. However, the John Marshall and Sam Houston, completed in 1962, will be retired in the early 1990s,
Like these SEAL trainees worming through Hell Week mud, the Navy’s special warfare community faces training and equipment quagmires in its goal to grow 100% by 1992 from its 1982 force level.
cutting the DDS spots in the fleet from ten shelters to six on the Sturgeon-class boats. With the probable assignment of three of these submarines to each fleet, the clandestine SDV capabilities will be limited.
There are also problems with the SEALs’ surface craft. SEALs primarily use rubber raiding boats, 36-foot Seafox SEAL insertion craft, and 55-foot Mk III patrol boats. Several other small craft, including some 30 riverine patrol boats and 22 armored troop carriers, are also in service, mostly operated by the NRF special boat units.
The Navy’s 37 Seafoxes are the first U. S. craft designed specifically for SEAL operations. Constructed of glass- reinforced plastic, they can carry a SEAL platoon and a rubber landing craft (atop the deck house).
The Seafox fleet was highlighted by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger as an example of the strides made by U. S. special operations forces during the Reagan administration. There were eight Seafoxes in 1981; there are 32 today. The 36-foot Seafox, however, is a rather meager measurement of a nation’s special operations forces.
The other SEAL combat craft—the medium special warfare craft (SWCM), better known as the Sea Viking—has become a model of poor design and mismanagement. The 95-foot, 130-ton Sea Viking was conceived as a multimission craft to replace the 19 Mk III patrol boats used by SEALs. The lead Sea Viking was authorized in fiscal year 1984 and ordered from RMI of San Diego, California; $15 million was allocated for construction of the craft.
The project suffered major design and fiscal problems. The lead Sea Viking had an unacceptable weight increase. Delays in the program coupled with financial problems at RMI led to the firm’s bankruptcy. The Navy took possession of the
unfinished hull on 7 January 1987.
Congress directed the Navy to “expeditiously” complete the lead ship and voted $19 million for the second ship in the fiscal year 1987 budget. A fiscal year 1988 craft was to be built by a second shipyard, with competition between the two yards for the follow-on units. The January 1987 report to Congress by the Secretary of Defense stated that all 19 units would be completed by 1992.
However, the Navy halted all work on the program pending completion of a study that was to be submitted in July 1987. The report was expected to recommend a Sea Viking better suited for the SEAL mission and that a larger, more- capable firm build the craft.
Meanwhile, there have been charges by the inspector general of the Defense Department that the Navy photographically forged a signature on a key document for the craft and then attempted to cover up the action. The investigation into what he called an “anatomy of failure” has apparently put the Sea Viking program on full stop. A Navy official said “although not completed as an operational craft,” the prototype “will prove a valuable development, test, and evaluation asset for further exploration of special warfare technologies” (although it is reported to be only 63% complete).
Program and technology problems aside, it has never been clear whether the
make the Sea Viking all things t people—it became a “budding^ srn^ Aegis cruiser in a patrol craft hull- a cursory look at the design revealed 8 infrared and radar signatures not ^ desired characteristics for SEAL OR® tions. The craft’s complexity and cost average of $13 million each) could * prevented the numbers needed for patrol requirements. u.
The Sea Viking fiasco reflects Pr° lems with the overall Navy special w fare program. Two questions What should the Navy’s SOF m‘ss,°n(j be? And how well can the SEALs ^ their equipment perform those mission
The Sea Viking—in its new configu tion—is needed, and the SEAL n115*'^ is important. But more attention mus^ paid to the increasing complexity limitations of naval special warfare. [2] 2
The U.S. Naval Institute and the Government Systems Division, Eastman Kodak Company are proud to co-sponsor the 26th Annual Naval & Maritime Photo Contest.
Winning photos will be published in a 1988 issue of Proceedings. Cash prizes will be awarded as follows: 1st Prize $500
2nd Prize $350
3rd Prize $250
Honorable Mention (15) $100 each
Mail entries to:
NAVAL & MARITIME PHOTO CONTEST U.S. Naval Institute Annapolis, Maryland 21402 (301) 268-6110
DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 1987
Entry Rules:
- Each photograph must pertain to a naval or maritime subject. (The photo is not limited to the calendar year of the contest.)
- Limit: 5 entries per person.
26th ANNUAL
NAVAL & MARITIME
PHOTO CONTEST
- Entries must be either black and white prints, color prints, or color transparencies.
- Minimum print size is 5" x 7."
- Minimum transparency size is 35mm.
(No glass mounted transparencies, please.)
- Full captions and the photographer's name and address must be printed or typed on a separate sheet of paper and attached to the back of each print, or printed on the transparency mount. (No staples, please.)
- Entries must arrive at the U.S. Naval Institute no later than December 31, 1987.
Photographs not awarded prizes may possibly be purchased by the U.S. Naval Institute. Those photographs not purchased will be returned to the owner if accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope.
WIN $500
Sponsored by the U.S. Naval Institute and the Eastman Kodak Company. Kodclk Photo ^ Y 3 Bob Self
Sea Viking was intended primarily ^ coastal patrol and interdiction or for co ert SEAL insertion. The two missions not completely compatible. As a ^ ^
to
people—it became a “budding
spokesman said, there was an attempt^
as a
[1]See Lieutenant Commander James K. Grue ^ U. S. Navy, and Major William Caldwell, • ^ Army, “DoD Reorganization,” Proceedings,
‘The U. S. Army established the Special F°rcc^^ separate career branch of the Army in April f The U. S. Air Force does not have a separate c branch as such for its SOF. efi