As Commander, Naval Air Force, Atlantic Fleet—and designated to become Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Air Warfare, in January—Admiral Dunn (here, on board the USS John F. Kennedy [CV-67] with the carrier’s CO, Captain John A. Moriarty) is well placed to answer questions about naval aviation today and in the future. Admiral Dunn’s interview was conducted on 12 August for the Proceedings by Peter Mersky.
Proceedings: Naval aviation has had some recent tests—Grenada, Lebanon, and Libya. What are some of the lessons learned from these operations—sustainability, support, and logistics, as well as the more obvious combat aspects of the operation?
Dunn: The most important thing we’ve learned is that when we deploy aviation forces, they must be ready for any mission within their required operational capability, because we never know when we’re going to be called on to do something. So we not only train our forces to be ready before they go on extended deployments, but we must keep them ready while they’re on deployments. We don’t know whether, at a moment’s notice, we’ll be called on to intercept an airliner, to conduct reconnaissance, or to conduct strikes ashore or at sea.
Readiness involves individual aircrew training and maintenance training, and logistic support—keeping all of the aviation spares up to snuff in the ships, keeping all the people up to the required manning levels, and ensuring that our aircraft are as fully mission-capable as we can make them at any given time.
Proceedings: “Taking the offensive” is frequently discussed in regard to future U.S. naval operations. What is the impact of such thinking on tactics? What are the risks?
Dunn: There’s a risk any time you engage in combat or near-combat operations, but I think it’s been proven over the centuries that the best kind of defense is to be offensive in your thinking, strategy, and tactics. In my opinion, the right way to go is to be ready for the offense, whether it be offensive strike warfare, offensive antiair warfare, or offensive antisubmarine warfare. The best thing we can do is be on the offense. So I applaud that orientation.
Proceedings: What is the best application of using carrier battle groups in peacetime—hold back, forward deployed, in pairs, etc?
Dunn: That depends so much on the peacetime scenario—and there is such a thing. It’s best for us, in the usual peacetime environment, to keep a certain number of aircraft carriers forward deployed so that they can be on station, ready to act whenever the President and the National Command Authorities want to act. But, at the same time, the carriers have a mission for presence: to show the potential enemy that we are on-scene; to reinforce our allies; and to conduct training in areas where we might be called on to perform in combat. The best way we can do that is with a compromise of deployments, with a minimum of one carrier in a given theater, but with another one available on very short notice. From time to time, we ought to operate with two or three carriers together, because in wartime we'll want to operate that way, and we have to practice. There’s no short answer to your question; it’s dependent on what we want to achieve.
For example, we keep at least one carrier in the Mediterranean because of the situation there, and sometimes two. But even when we have only one, we ought to have another one earmarked, ready to move in the event of a contingency. That carrier could be operating in the North Atlantic or off the East Coast of the United States. But we ought to have one ready to go. The same thing applies to the other theaters—the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.
Proceedings: There have been very specific goals established to reduce carrier optempos. With new carriers coming on line, it appears these goals are achievable for the ships. What about the air wings, especially given their out-of-homeport training requirements?
Dunn: The air wings and the individual squadrons in the air wing fall under those perstempo and optempo rules, and we pay very close attention to them. You’re right—individual squadrons deploy to Roosevelt Roads, Key West, Fallon, and other places for training. But my staff keeps track of their perstempo. If we begin to exceed the goals, we rethink that training and, perhaps, try to do it in the vicinity of their home field.
In that connection, we’ve been successful in conducting some exercises right off the East Coast rather than in Guantanamo or Roosevelt Roads as we used to do. I am optimistic that we can continue to comply with the perstempo rules, providing we don’t have too many people blowing up embassies or committing other acts of terrorism.
Proceedings: It’s also helpful, then, if we are able to use air space near the home field to the extent that we need.
Dunn: That’s right. One of my biggest problems as ComNavAirLant is ensuring that we have adequate targets and air space in the continental United States. The reason we go to places like Roosevelt Roads, Guantanamo, and Fallon is that we don’t have adequate air space in the eastern part of the United States, and there’s constant encroachment on what used to be Navy air space.
Shopping centers and hotels are being built on the approaches to runways. We have waterfront developments where we used to have bombing ranges. As our population grows and our attitudes toward the environment change, we’re finding our airspace more restricted.
We’re looking for alternatives. One way is the offshore range. It’s going to take some money to install all the offshore ranges we want. There’s one now in existence off the Virginia Capes. Next year, we’ll begin one off the coast of Charleston, South Carolina, and then the following year, one in the Gulf of Mexico, which will service Navy aircraft flying out of Key West and Air Force aircraft out of McDill.
But all of this costs money. In the current fiscal climate, that money is going to be harder and harder to obtain. Plus, those offshore ranges don’t give us all the training we need. The aircrews need opportunities to attack land targets; they need opportunities to navigate at low levels over land; they need opportunities to do air combat maneuvering over land.
Proceedings: The Super CAG concept has generated a great deal of discussion. Opponents claim it undermines the carrier commanding officer’s authority. Does it? What are the advantages of the concept?
Dunn: First, let’s discuss the concept. This major commander, the new style air wing commander, brings to the job a breadth of experience the more traditional CAGs did not have. His training is more extensive; he is a proven performer at a higher level than previous air wing commanders. He brings with him a talent which will be of major importance, I think, to the battle group commander, because the battle group commander will now have an expert immediately available to him on the employment of the most important part of that battle group—the air wing embarked in the aircraft carrier. It will also give us another path to flag rank for our naval aviators—by holding the CAG slot in addition to the traditional carrier slot—and provide more carrier CO slots to non-fighter/attack aviators. All of that will have beneficial future effects.
The biggest hurdle is just what you mentioned: the potential friction between the major commander who is a CAG, and the major commander who is the CO of an aircraft carrier. To preclude that we are making the air wing commander report as additional duty to the CO of the aircraft carrier, and the CO of the carrier will, therefore, always be in charge when there is a difficulty. But most important, we have attempted to inculcate in every carrier CO and every air wing CO the importance of cooperation. The hallmark of any good aircraft carrier/carrier air wing has been cooperation. Whether the captain of the ship is a four-striper and the CAG is a three-striper, or whether they’re both four-stripers, we have to continue with that cooperation. So far, early in the program, there has not been a problem: in the Nimitz, on this coast, and the Vinson on the West Coast.
There’s another plus. In that as more and more of our aircraft carriers are nuclear-powered, the nuclear power training pipeline becomes so long that it’s most difficult for an individual to be both a CAG and a nuclear XO and then CO. So this allows us to have the best qualified person as CO of the CVN, and also the best qualified person as commander of the air wing.
Proceedings: How have the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget cuts affected AirLant thus far, and what other effects do you foresee?
Dunn: Of course, this is the first year of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings effects, and the biggest problem we've had is that we did not get the rules regarding those cuts until well after the fiscal year began. So we’re playing catch-up trying to accommodate.
More directly, it reduced our hour dollars from 85 percent of primary mission readiness [PMR] to about 80 percent. That would mean that instead of about 25 hours flying per-month per-pilot in the tactical air communities, we would be talking about maybe 21 hours flying a month. Because I believe that infringes on safety, as well as readiness, I have ensured that all of the aircrews do get enough money to fly their 85 percent PMR. That means we have to take money from other things. While we can absorb those losses this year, we're going to feel the effects in later years. The initial indications are that we're going to suffer much more in fiscal years 87 and 88.
Proceedings: What is the current status of the Naval Air Reserve support for active-duty missions? Do you foresee any changes in this area?
Dunn: We work very closely with the Naval Reserve in Atlantic Fleet naval aviation and indeed throughout most naval aviation. The most visible contributions of the reservists are in the VP (patrol) world, where our Naval Reserve patrol squadrons make regular deployments with our active-duty forces. And, in fact, on an almost continuous basis, the reserve forces augment the patrol aviation we have stationed in Lajes, Azores. But they do other things as well.
On the TacAir side, we now have reserve squadron augment units assigned to some of our fleet replacement squadrons, and they're working very well in the A-6 and the F-14 communities. We have reserve crews that come in and fly with the fleet replacement squadrons (FRSs); they get carrier-qualified, and they are doing extremely well. We're very pleased to have them because they augment our own FRS assets.
We are in the process of standing up a VRC (Air Transport Squadron)-40 FRS; these are the people who fly the C-2 CODs. We've already carrier qualified our first two Naval Reserve C-2 pilots for that unit. Very shortly, we're going to stand up a Naval Reserve minesweeping squadron augment unit.
Of course, our Naval Reserve Force squadrons in Reserve Carrier Air Wing 20 regularly train with our active-duty carriers; they are carrier qualified; they make deployments to Roosevelt Roads; and they’re available.
Another important reserve contribution is with the training command augment units. We have a significant number of pilots who spend time each month as fully qualified instructors in the training command, which helps us immeasurably in keeping the pilot training rate up to where it should be.
On the nonflying side, the Naval Reserve makes some very important contributions, too. Reserve air intelligence is extremely important to us; reserve staff and air station help is extremely important. In fact, we couldn't do the job nearly so well as we we didn’t have the reservists.
As far as the future—yes we'd like to do more with the reservists, but I'm afraid we’re running up against stops. While we seem to be able to find enough pilots to man the squadron augment units, we're having more difficulty finding NFOs [naval flight officers]. In general, they're not as mobile as the pilots. In addition, the enlisted manning is woefully short.
For some reason, the Naval Reserve recruiters are not as successful as I would like to see them be in manning up the NFOs and the enlisted side of the reserve program. It may be the people aren’t out there. But we've got to be careful not to extend too far without ensuring that we have those people we need to support such plans.
Another point that should be made here is that when we use reservists, we do need some full-time active-duty people to administer and to carry out the routine day-to-day business, and we do that with the TAR [Training and Administration of the Naval Reserve] personnel. Congress, in its wisdom, has seen fit not to authorize us the full growth in TARs that we need, and so that's hurting the Naval Reserve program, too.
Proceedings: The Naval Air Reserve safety record is consistently better than that of the fleet, even though the reservists are flying less frequently and usually operate older aircraft. As a former Chief of Naval Reserve and Commander of the Naval Safety Center, can you say what safety lessons the active-duty aviators can learn from the reserve aviators?
Dunn: Despite the fact that they both wear Navy wings and Navy uniforms, there are significant differences between the active duty and reserve aviators. To begin with, the reservist is at least a senior lieutenant, usually with significant cruise experience in the active Navy. More likely, he is a lieutenant commander with extensive fleet experience and now flying an aircraft not too different from what he flew in the fleet. That experience keeps him from making the nugget-style mistakes.
Remember also that the fleet squadrons deploy for six months, flying off aircraft carriers or from foreign bases day and night, whereas the reservists do that for two weeks a year. The rest of the time they are operating from their home bases. Another reason is continuity of experience. When I was Chief of Naval Reserve, I visited a VP squadron in Jacksonville, and went on a flight with them. The plane commander had been in that same squadron doing the same thing, flying the same airplane for 14 years. He ought to be safe! He’s not like the active-duty pilot who has gone from sea duty to shore duty and maybe to a desk job for a while.
Experience is the key. If we could keep our active-duty people in squadrons that long, they would have a commensurate safety record. The problem is that we need aviators on staffs, in Washington, in flight training, and so forth.
Proceedings: You are headed to OP-05 for your next assignment. What do you see as the priority action items facing you in your new job?
Dunn: The biggest problem will be to do what I can to enable the fleet to maintain its current level of combat readiness in the face of constrained budgets. The handwriting is on the wall: We’re not going to have as much money in 87, 88, and 89 as we have had recently. Yet, we must maintain our level of readiness with people, spares, and other things. And while we do all this, we can’t forget the future, because there’s a certain amount of money that has to be spent on development and procurement of newer systems in order to keep up with the state of the art and keep up with the changing level of the threat.
Allocation of scarce resources is always the game in Washington. In the next ten years, it will be even more so.
Proceedings: You have written for Proceedings before. How do we encourage more young naval aviators to enter the Proceedings forum?
Dunn: I think that the encouragement has to come from the more senior officers in the Navy. Certainly Proceedings itself has got to urge people to write, but unless the senior people—the captains and the flag officers—encourage the junior folks to write, it’s not going to happen. Then when they do write, we’ve got to understand that they’re voicing their opinions, and whether we agree with their opinions or not, we have to respect them and not jump on them or put them down. We cannot be patronizing toward their views, but instead must encourage them to express themselves.
One of the most valuable things Proceedings can do is to serve as a medium for the exchange of views in the Navy. Too often, I’m afraid, we have stifled that exchange by coming down hard on people with well-meaning thoughts offered for discussion.
Proceedings: In all the celebration of the 75th anniversary of naval aviation, do you believe the enlisted air crewman has received his full share of praise?
Dunn: He has not. The enlisted air crewman has not been adequately recognized, nor has the maintenance person, or the other support people who have made naval aviation what it is. I regret that very much. We became aware of the slight sometime after the celebration in Pensacola in May and tried to do something about it, but it was too late. Perhaps one of the things we can do soon is to focus on what our enlisted people contribute. It’s great for the aircrews to get the glory, but unless the sailor, the supply guy, the maintenance guy, the refueler, and everybody else do their jobs, it’s obvious that the system isn’t going to work.
I’m embarrassed by this oversight; we should have done better.
Proceedings: There’s one other group in naval aviation which we would like to have your views on—what about women in naval aviation?
Dunn: We have women pilots and women naval flight officers in the force support area, and they are doing a superb job. They are good aviators; they do everything that’s expected of them and more.
Of course, we’re limited in numbers of women aviators because of the law, which says that we can’t deploy women on board combatant ships, as we all know. However, enlisted women are now in all of our force support squadrons; they’re in our shore-based squadrons of all kinds; and they’ve now entered into the VP squadrons—not the aircrew, but with the non-flying elements. Once again, they do an incredibly good job. Every CO I’ve talked with has spoken highly of the performance of the women.
We do have one major problem with the management of enlisted women, though. We haven’t really developed good career paths for a number of ratings. In fact, most of our women are nonrated, and many of the ratings for which they’d like to strike are closed because of sea-shore rotation and other problems that go back to inadequate design of the women in the Navy program. We have to solve those things, or we’re going to lose a very important resource.
Proceedings: Why has such a high percentage of the weapons used in Libya been simple iron bombs and not the high-tech guided weapons?
Dunn: The targets that were presented lent themselves better to the less sophisticated weapon. The method of attack using the A-6 at night is such that—for that particular raid—we didn’t need the sophisticated weapon. We had complete surprise, and we could get in and do an acceptable level of damage without sophisticated weapons. The third reason is that we don’t have all that many sophisticated weapons in our inventory. If you read the brochures and the publications, you’d think we were well-equipped. But if you look at the actual inventory levels in the magazines, we have a limited number of such weapons. They’re still being procured.
Proceedings: Did we know in advance that Libyan surface-to-air missiles would perform as poorly as they did?
Dunn: I’m not so sure they did perform poorly. It may have been our tactics or our warning or some of the other systems we have that made the SAMs ineffective. To be more direct, we had not seen an SA-5 prior to this operation; all we had were the intelligence estimates. We never want to underestimate an enemy.
Proceedings: Isn’t the SA-5 really a strategic SAM.
Dunn: That’s what our thinking was. We always thought it would be something used against a B-52 or something like that, and we were surprised when it was used against the tactical aircraft.
Proceedings: Is there anything else you would like to add before we wrap up the interview? .
Dunn: We’ve been talking so much about aircraft carriers, that the VP, LAMPS, and force support people, who are all very important to this whole business of naval aviation, haven’t received their proper recognition. The VP squadrons regularly deploy to places around the world, and they track Soviet submarines on a day-to-day basis; they are the best there is in antisubmarine warfare, bar none.
We have the LAMPS helicopters, two kinds now—the Mark I, which is the SH-2, and the Mark III, which is the SH-60—flying from frigates and destroyers. They, too, are doing a great job. The SH-60 is a superbly well-designed weapon system which is exceeding expectations as far as availability and sustainability. We’ve also found that it’s an aircraft which is well-suited to surface surveillance and over-the-horizon targeting, as well as antisubmarine warfare. In fact, the percentage of time it spends in antisubmarine warfare has been reduced somewhat because it has such great utility in those other missions.
We also have helicopters that haul potatoes and mail, and sweep mines. Then the force support, the COD, the C-1s, now the C-2s, T-39s, the Naval Reserve C-9s are all important to this whole great system that we call naval aviation, and they're all doing real well.
Finally, having recently return from the Med where I visited our shore stations and our two deployed aircraft carriers—the Forrestal and America, I'd just like to say that I've never seen naval aviation in better shape is right now. The ships have the lowest number of CasReps I’ve ever seen the people are good and bright and cheerful; and that's from the newest seaman right up through the captains of the carriers. I think we have good leadership in our aviation units, and it's all the result of the attention paid over the last four or five years. We've been able to get and keep good people; we’ve had an adequate number of spare parts; and we've had adequate flying hours. We've got to continue these good things if we're going to keep naval aviation roll it’s on right now.