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The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis
Asa A. Clark, IV, el al, Editors. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 370 pp. Fig. Tables. Ind. $30.00 ($27.00) (hardcover). $12.95 ($11.65) (paper).
Reviewed by William J. Teague
The great defense reform debate of the 1980s is neither unique nor is it without precedent. Since World War II, military reform movements have surfaced with cyclical regularity about every ten years. The strategists of the 1950s, the systems analysts of the 1960s, and the arms controllers of the 1970s have all criticized the extant, accepted defense philosophies of their respective eras. The issues they have addressed successively are the weaknesses in U. S. strategy, the delicate relationship between military force and political objective, and the desirability of integrating arms control with traditional defense policy. The reformists of the 1980s now lay siege to a veritable array of targets ranging from weapon selection to basic military strategy and from fundamental doctrine to the essentials of the policymaking process itself.
The Defense Reform Debate offers the best of the seminar papers presented at the 1983 West Point Senior Conference. The 22 essayists, whose professional backgrounds range from field-grade Army officers to professors from the Brookings Institution and other elite “think tanks,” share no common point of view nor do they agree on any consensual prescription. However, they all acknowledge the critical—perhaps desperate— need for a profound and far-reaching reorganization, reprioritization, and basic rethinking of current and future U. S. military policy.
William S. Lind, the legislative assistant for military affairs to Senator Gary Hart (D-CO), attacks the traditional and conventional Army doctrine of “fire- power/attrition.” In a brilliant definition of the concept of maneuver warfare as envisaged by the Army’s Field Manual 100-5 and implemented in the air-land battle doctrine, he points out with clarity and perception the crucial need for mobility, quickness, and a deep-thrusting, coordinated Army/Air Force response in the early hours of any potential clash with Warsaw Pact forces. Lind contends that reliance on an outdated and outmoded “stand tough, trade blow for blow, and wear the bastards down” school of thought, still prevalent in most conservative military circles, is little more than doctrinal imbecility. Lind offers an invaluable defense of the standard blitzkrieg doctrine, updated and adapted to the real world requirements of the 1980s.
Similarly, Steven Canby, a D. C.- based defense consultant for C&L Associates, argues that the U. S. Army’s dependence on the armor-intensive “heavy” division concept portends disaster. Its inherent characteristics by definition could well spell defeat when a major regional crisis impels the Army into a contest with a fast, maneuverable foe. Given the nature of military threats in volatile, potential areas of conflict, “jaeger” or “light” infantry offers the only viable solution in a world of protracted crisis that demands both flexibility and mobility.
John D. Mayer, a principle analyst with the National Security and International Affairs Division of the Congressional Budget Office, counters with a valid, hard-hitting thesis that U. S. military forces are already too light and that in any future actions in Europe or in Southwest or Southeast Asia, U. S. forces must be dramatically beefed up to form heavier, armor/mechanized infantry-oriented units to meet successfully a comparable Soviet challenge. Not only are such light organizations cost-ineffective, their use will not provide the sustainable, hard-hitting punch necessary for victory against a foe whose strategy is based on a maximum use of tanks and other armored vehicles.
These writers and their co-essayists are concerned with maximizing defense effectiveness at minimum human and financial cost, but their theories and prescriptions are worlds apart. In presenting this conflict of views, the editors wisely avoid making value judgments. Rather, they accept the hard but realistic notion that “the more these issues are studied the greater the problems appear, while the solution seems less evident.”
An excellent primer and survey of contemporary military and strategic problems, The Defense Reform Debate offers honest, carefully considered solutions that can be equally appreciated by laymen, academics, and military professionals. The book raises with courage and aplomb a myriad of appropriate, difficult questions about modem U. S. defense policy. Balanced, judicious, and above all equitable in its presentation, this book deserves a place on the library shelf of all informed students—critics or defenders— of current U. S. defense policy.
Dr. Teague teaches American government and politics at the University of Texas at Dallas and regularly writes on military and foreign policy topics for major regional and national publications.
Revising U. S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to Ends
Jeffrey Record. McLean, VA: Pergamon- Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1984. 113 pp. Append. Bib. Index. Tables. $16.95 ($15.25) (hardcover). $9.95 ($8.95) (paper).
Reviewed by Captain Paul R. Schratz,
U. S. Navy (Retired)
Jeffrey Record’s latest study explores the means of bridging the gap between U. S. military aspirations and resources. His focus is on a strategy to accomplish a reasonable harmony of ends and means rather than on budgetary considerations. Record, an expert on military affairs and a prominent figure within the defense reform movement, is one of the few “reformers” who exhibits knowledge of maritime strategy. In his view, two changes in the strategic environment, the disintegration of NATO and the emergence of new threats to U. S. interests in Southwest Asia, dictate a change in the U. S. force structure.
Record outlines four alternative paths toward achieving a reasonable congruence of U. S. military obligations and power, but suggests that only one leads to a viable plan. The first, the expansion of U. S. force levels to meet existing commitments worldwide, is rejected as economically unfeasible. The second, to reduce commitments to a level sustainable by existing forces, would compel the abandonment of critical treaty obligations in Europe and East Asia, and thus is neither politically nor strategically viable. The third, to squeeze more fighting power out of existing U. S. forces by changing the way the Pentagon does business—the preferred course of the military reform movement—does not offer much promise for significant achievement. The fourth solution is “. . . a new division of military labor within the West as a whole, along both functional and geographic lines and entailing allied assumption of greater responsibility for tasks heretofore borne largely or disproportionately by the United States.”
The precedent for the new “division of labor” exists in the Guam Doctrine, proclaimed by President Richard M. Nixon in 1969 in anticipation of post-Vietnam cuts in U. S. military power. The doctrine entrusts Asian allies with the primary responsibility for their defense on the ground, limiting U. S. support to air and naval power and, where needed, logistic support. That doctrine is more applicable in Europe and Northeast Asia today than it ever was in Southeast Asia. The effect would be a reduction of U. S. heavy ground combat forces in Europe by three divisions, enhanced reliance on reserve forces, and a necessary buildup in strategic mobility, sea-based air power, and logistic support. Problems of distance and access for the Rapid Deployment Force dictate “a small, agile, tactically capable force . . . based at sea, supplied from the sea, and supported by expanded sea power, especially carrier- based aviation and forcible-entry capabilities. Such a force would stress ... responsiveness, not tardy arrivals from the United States; and logistical self-sufficiency, not dependence on facilities ashore.”
The author’s stress on a maritime strategy is based not on isolationism but on the sound principle that the United States has security interests overseas in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the Third World worth defending. Like the “coalition” or continental warfare strategists, he believes, as an article of faith, that a successful defense of U. S. military commitments overseas hinges upon the ability to control the seas linking the United States to those commitments. “Robust sea power is essential to the prosecution of coalition warfare, but sea power itself is no substitute for forward-deployed ground and tactical air forces.”
The military planner and student of strategy will find much of value in this short, pithy, and well-written volume. To both the professional and the general reader interested in national security affairs, Revising U. S. Military Strategy is highly recommended.
Captain Schratz graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1939 and established a distinguished record in the submarine force. With a PhD from Ohio State University, he is widely recognized as a writer on foreign policy and national security affairs. He retired as a professor at Georgetown University in 1981 and is completing a book on national strategy.
Mountbatten: A Biography
Philip Ziegler. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. 784 pp. Notes. Ind. Maps. Charts. Ulus. $24.95 ($22.45).
Captain John Coote, Royal Navy (Retired)
The 72-year-old hero of the BBC television series “The Life and Times of Lord Mountbatten” masterminded the script, played the starring role and was the program’s most successful salesman all over the world. Those who had seen the Royal Family’s master showman reach the pinnacle of every endeavor to which he set his hand took this final achievement for granted.
The world of show business had fascinated Admiral Mountbatten since Charlie Chaplin made a short movie featuring him and his bride Edwina on their honeymoon in 1922 while staying with Douglas Fairbanks, Sr., (naturally, they always traveled first class). Noel Coward became a lifelong friend and immortalized him as the archetypical wartime destroyer skipper—a handsome, charismatic, utterly fearless, damn-the-torpedoes leader in the mold of British Admiral of the Fleet Earl David Beatty. Thus, in the movie, “In Which We Serve,” much to the distaste of many of his contemporaries and senior officers, a legend was bom.
Admiral Mountbatten had accumulated carefully documented archives for C. S. Forester, his early choice as official biographer. After Forester’s death, the task then fell to Philip Ziegler, former career diplomat and book-publisher, to put Mountbatten in perspective. Observing the bonds of affection and loyalty which tied the old admiral and his closely-knit family, including his literary executors, few expected this no-holds-barred record to emerge.
In this long but exciting masterpiece, we find an “undeceived portrait” revealing that “for all the glitter and the gold the man was nothing if not human.” It is a brilliant, painstakingly researched assessment of the life and character of one of the great military leaders of our time and of the immensely rich woman who alternately supported and tormented him. All the old gossip and innuendos are met head-on, and sadly, some are confirmed by the facts quoted from the carefully listed source material.
“His vanity, though child-like, was monstrous, his ambition unbridled . • • • He sought to re-write history with cavalier indifference to the facts so as to magnify his own achievements.” Mr. Ziegler was so enraged by some of the flawed data which he inherited that he felt it necessary to have a placard on his desk proclaiming: “Remember, in spite of everything he was a great man.”
Dickie Battenberg, as he was known as a youth, went to boarding-school at the early age of eight years, while his German father was at sea, making his way up the flag list of the world’s most elitist club, the Royal Navy. There Dickie was judged to be a “clumsy but courageous boy”—an epithet which still seemed to apply in the first year of World War II- Mountbatten’s beloved HMS Kelly spent only 57 days at sea in her first year in commission because of near-terminal structural damage, not all of which inflicted by the enemy, sustained during operations. It is believed that some of the damage may have been avoidable if the man on the bridge had shown better tactical judgment and less impetuosity- Dickie’s commander in chief pointedly declined to endorse a recommendation for the Distinguished Service Order (Britain’s second highest award for gallantry) on the grounds that most of his other destroyer captains were better deserving- Six months later, Mountbatten got his medal, after the civilian First Lord of the Admiralty had been “won round by Edwina’s blue eyes.” By then there was a new Commander in Chief Home Fleet-
Apart from his private hot line to his relatives in Buckingham Palace, Mountbatten knew exactly the right strings to pull. His means to an end were fully justifiable when they led to more vigorous prosecution of the war. But they were at best distasteful when deployed for his own advancement, as was the case on almost every step in his career. One exception was when Winston Churchill surprised even Mountbatten by plucking him out to be Chief of Combined Operations and, later, Supreme Commander in Southeast Asia. To both these appointments, Mountbatten brought drive, enthusiasm, and an infectious never-say-die spirit which he spread by continual frontline visits to everyone under his command. The Bruneval and St. Nazaire raids yielded positive results out of all proportion to the forces employed or their casualties.
The last independent operation before his command was absorbed into the orga-
lization for planning D-day was the abortive raid on Dieppe, France, in August 1942. Ziegler absolves Mountbatten from some, but not all, of the virulent accusations hurled at him by the Canadian press Publisher, Baron Beaverbrook. The humiliating retreat left behind 1,000 men killed and another 2,000 Canadians wounded or taken prisoner. In hindsight, however, the raid succeeded as the first step in the deception plan which convinced the Germans that the Allied invasion could only come through a major Port, and many lessons were learned which proved indispensable to the success of D-day. Yet, recently published evidence from Ultra sources indicates that, not only were the defenders at Dieppe alerted ahead of time, but that Mountbatten knew they were so informed.
Moving on to higher responsibilities in Southeast Asia, he first won the battle against the three “Ms” which had hitherto frustrated all military endeavor in that theater: the monsoon, malaria, and morale. Churchill described General Viscount Slim’s 14th Army taking on the Japanese in the jungle during the monsoon season as “going into the water to fight sharks.” In spite of his maintaining an over-inflated staff of 7,000 at his headquarters in Ceylon against the open animosity of some of his key commanders—notably Admiral James Som- merville and General Joseph Stilwell— and having precious resources of airplanes and landing-craft held back in the European theater, Mountbatten pressed on until he received total surrender from the Japanese at a ceremony in
Singapore. The ceremony had the authentic Mountbatten touch. His attention to detail in ceremonial matters and the outward trappings of his office which he enjoyed throughout his life were reflected in the splendid arrangements he made for his state funeral. Along the way, he cut an authentic imperial figure as the Rajagopalachari’s last Viceroy and Jawa- harlal Nehru’s first governor-general.
The book is not wholly convincing in supporting Mountbatten’s undying claim that his accelerated timetable for Indian independence and partition was the only way to achieve lasting peace. Ziegler argues that the communal bloodshed between Hindus and Moslems cost “only” 250,000 lives, against 1.5 million Bengalis who died in the famine of 1943. But it is certain that the scale of the massacres took Mountbatten by surprise, and that he was heartily relieved to clear out of the subcontinent when he did.
Mountbatten then insisted on resuming his naval career, and reverted to two-star admiral in command of the Mediterranean cruiser squadron. It was like being sent back in a game of snakes-and-lad- ders, except that henceforth his ladders were moving staircases, and the snakes lying in his path lacked venom. A low- profile spell on the Board of Admiralty led to his being appointed Commander in Chief Mediterranean and Commander in Chief Allied Forces, Mediterranean. Finally he settled into the First Sea Lord’s chair under the portrait of his father, who had been hounded out of office 40 years previously by anti-German mob hysteria. He then became Chief of the Defence
Edwina Ashley’s blue eyes won the young Lieutenant Mountbatten in 1922, but the wayward heiress— alternately supporting and tormenting him—could not bridle his monstrous ambition.
Staff (CDS) and held the job for six years.
At the top of his profession, he was first engaged in saving the Royal Navy from virtual extinction by its being relegated to coastal defense. He got a stay of execution for attack aircraft carriers and their new strike aircraft, but failed to wrest control of maritime patrol aircraft from the Royal Air Force. Through his unexpected rapport with U. S. Navy Admiral Hyman Rickover, he accelerated Britain’s nuclear submarine program by at least three years, leading to early acquisition of the Polaris missile and the nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile submarines. As CDS, Mountbatten forced through the initial stages of an integrated Defence Staff, although it took another 20 years for the plan to be completed. He also caused white cap-covers to be worn year-round and officers to have gold-braided trousers for ceremonial occasions.
Mountbatten found retirement lonely and frustrating, even though his family, especially his eldest daughter Patricia, did their best to fill the gap left by the untimely death of his wayward wife. His influence over the Royal Family dwindled to the point where it seemed to have been counterproductive as far as the Queen and her consort were concerned.
Apart from being revolted by his murder at the hands of the Irish Republican Army, one puts this book down feeling sorry for Mountbatten the man. His official biography stops far short of investing him with the place in history he had so carefully prepared for himself.
Captain Coote was a Royal Navy submariner who saw war service off Norway and in the Mediterranean and later held four sea commands, 1948-54. At age 38, he resigned to go into newspaper publishing at Fleet Street, ending his civilian career as Deputy Chairman of Beaverbrook Newspapers.
Crisis in the Philippines: A Threat to U. S. Interests
A. James Gregor. Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center. 1984. 110 pp. Append. Ind. $6.00 ($5.40) (paper).
Reviewed by William R. Hawkins
The murder of Philippine opposition leader Benigno Aquino upon his return to Manila in August 1983 precipitated a crisis that has the potential to jeopardize U. S.-Philippine economic and security
Copies of articles from this publication are now available from the UMI Article Clearinghouse.
relations and undermine the stability of East Asia. Dr. A. James Gregor, a political science professor at the University of California at Berkeley, has authored a timely new monograph which deals in a straightforward manner with the central aspects of the problem.
Dr. Gregor is sympathetic to the Marcos regime, without losing his critical judgment toward its shortcomings. More important, however, is his dissection of the “moderate” opposition, arguing that it is not as moderate as the American public has been led to believe. The democratic opposition may not be Marxist, but it is dominated by a deep-seated anti- Americanism which could endanger the U. S. presence at the Subic Bay Naval Station and Clark Air Force Base should it ever gain power. These bases are vital to the entire American military position in the region.
In September 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos, who had been elected to office in 1965, declared martial law and ruled by executive power until 1981, when martial law was lifted. This act alienated liberal opinion, but Dr. Gregor believes that Marcos had good reason to act. The late 1960s and early 1970s were years of growing violence. The U. S. Embassy was stoned, Manila was disrupted by frequent strikes, Maoist guerrillas launched an armed rebellion, and Marcos himself was assaulted. In an emergency, the Philippine Constitution allows the president to impose authoritarian measures, including the suspension of habeas corpus and the imposition of martial law.
Marcos used martial law not only to maintain order, but to undertake economic reforms to promote faster development. The two main components of his program were land reform and freer foreign trade. Under the land reform measure, about one million tenant farmers became owner-cultivators. Approximately 15% of all farmland was subject to this reform in an effort to boost production. Through freer foreign trade, a new strategy to foster exports replaced the older policy of protecting import-substituting industries. This new industrial program increased the importance of Philippine trade with the United States. This program was successful for the nation in attaining agricultural self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs and a higher rate of overall economic growth. However, the economy was hard hit by the oil shock of the 1970s and the world recession of 1982 which reduced the access of Philippine exports to prosperous overseas markets.
The anti-Americanism of the moderate opposition is based on the erroneous belief that the increased economic ties with the United States are a form of “neo-colonialism” enforced by a “military occupation force” based at Clark and Subic Bay. The opposition favors a return to domestic development protected from outside contact. However, the Philippines does not have a sufficiently extensive internal market or adequate domestic capital-formation to make such a strategy work. The opposition liberals, like their brethren elsewhere, have simply fallen for a quasi-Marxist explanation of events, confusing ideology with economics.
An important element in the leftward drift of the democratic opposition is liberation theology. It is central to such groups as the Christian Social Democracy and the Catholic Liberation Front. Both groups regularly denounce American imperialism and capitalism. Aquino was a leader of these religious radicals. His successor, Raul Manglapus, has expressed admiration for the “pragmatism” of Mao Tse-Tung and Fidel Castro, though he has rejected Marxism as a “godless” ideology. Liberation theology is a vehicle for anti-American agitation not only in the Philippines but in many other Catholic nations, especially in Latin America.
Most Philippine business interests and the majority of the Philippines Catholic churchmen do not agree with the analysis of the situation made by the opposition, though both groups favor reform. Combined with the existence of a loyal bureaucracy and military. Dr. Gregor does not believe the regime is in any imminent danger of collapse, nor does he believe that the opposition will triumph when presidential elections are held in 1987. Marcos’s party won more than 100 of the 183 seats for the national legislature in the May 1984 elections. The opposition won only about 70 seats despite the demonstrations and accusations that followed the Aquino assassination.
The only event which could change this balance would be an economic collapse. Dr. Gregor believes that the economy is basically sound, but that the turmoil depicted in the press and the anti-Marcos propaganda generated in the United States by Filipino and U. S. critics has produced a serious drop in foreign investment. This has prevented the country from recovering as it should have from the recession, and could worsen conditions for some time to come. The Philippines needs an influx of capital. Dr. Gregor advocates the following measures: increased economic aid and loans not only from the United States, but from Japan, the Philippines’ second largest trading partner; a continued moratorium covering repayment of past debts; help m establishing joint ventures between Phil' ippine and American firms; a campaign to assure investors that the Aquino murder has not really changed the economic climate; and a U. S. increase in military aid to ensure that the advances made against the guerrillas are not lost.
While U. S. officials have been candid with Marcos about the need to stay on course toward a full democracy, Dr. Gregor believes that candor is needed toward the opposition as well. “There is no reason why such individuals or organizations should receive any kind °* American moral support. . . . There is no reason why the U. S. should welcome the accession of any of these persons to positions of authority in Manila.” Dr- Gregor writes that the new coalition headed by Agapito Aquino, Benigno s brother, “can hardly be anything other than a forum for anti-American posturing.” One of Aquino’s partners in leadership, Jose Diokno, has repeatedly called for the nationalization of foreign property, while referring to the United States as “the enemy.”
There is a need to head off any repeat of the pattern which has destroyed U. Sallies in the past: the destabilization of a “right-wing” regime friendly to the United States in favor of “moderates who quickly become (or fall prey to) radicals hostile to U. S. interests. The United States cannot afford another Iran or Nicaragua. This slim volume contains essential information for those interested in the United States maintaining close ties with the Philippines for the mutual benefit of both nations and the future progress and security of East Asia.
Mr. Hawkins is an assistant professor of Economics at Radford University, Radford, Virginia. He l'as published several book reviews on national security issues in Military Review and The Journal of Ec0' nomic History, among other journals, and has ha research articles on defense matters distribute through national syndication.
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U. S. Navy
® Dutton’s Navigation & Piloting: Fourteenth Edition
Elbert S. Maloney. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985 . 640 pp. Illus. Ind. Charts. Append. Tables. $32.95 ($26.36).
First written by Navy Commander Benjamin Dutton and published in 1926, this virtual icon °f the navigational world has been kept vital Fy periodic revisions. In this 14th edition, the distinguished Elbert S. Maloney once again
brings Dutton's to the forefront in navigational instruction. In addition to meeting the obvious requirement for updating technological material in order to keep up with the rapidly changing world of electronics and computerization, this newest version is enhanced by a new format and layout, many new illustrations, and a rearrangement of the presentation of topics. In addition, greater attention is devoted to the needs of merchant ship and small craft navigators. With 41 chapters and six appendices in this latest version, it is sure to remain the most widely used and respected book of its kind.
Ghost Ships of the Great Lakes
Dwight Boyer. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1984. 294 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. $9.95 ($8.95) (paper).
The Great Lakes have a long history of maritime disaster, despite the illusion of relative safety often associated with “lakes.” In this hook, Dwight Boyer recounts 17 separate incidents of vanished vessels on these miniature seas. Through extensive research drawing from newspaper accounts, personal letters, and shipping journals and files, he details the stories of these ill-fated ships—often revealing facts previously unknown. The causes of these disasters range from tempest fury to wanton disregard of safety factors for the sake of potential profit. In many other cases, the reasons for the loss of such vessels are never uncovered, and become one more of the many mysteries of the deep.
Herbicides in War: The Long-term Ecological and Human Consequences
Arthur H. Westing, Editor. Philadelphia, PA:
Taylor & Francis, 1984. 210 pp. Ref. Ind.
Append. Tables. $33.00 ($29.70).
Focusing on the use of herbicides in Indochina, this collection of works by experts in the field explores the the demographic and ecological effects of herbicidal warfare. Results of the studies relating to humans are inconclusive, but environmental impacts are thoroughly explored. Westing, a former U. S. Marine Corps officer, is a senior research fellow at the Stockholm International Peach Research Institute and has been studying the environmental impact of military activities since the late 1960s.
History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Volume I: The Formative Years, 1947-1950
Steven L. Rearden. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984. 667 pp. Illus. Bib. Notes. Ind. Maps. Tables. $25.00 ($22.50).
First in a series of volumes that will document the history of the office of Secretary of Defense, The Formative Years covers the period beginning with the establishment of the office and ending with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. These early years were characterized by resistance to unification among the armed forces, intense competition for scarce funds, and persistant quarreling, particularly between the Navy and Air Force, over the assignment of missions. The historical backdrop includes the early Arab-lsraeli Conflict, aid to Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin Crisis, and early troubles in the Far East, including the civil war in China, the Korean problem, and the roots of the Vietnam War. This book is a useful historical reference and an aid for better understanding of the complexities of today’s Defense Department.
Inside Soviet Military Intelligence
Victor Suvorov. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1984. 193 pp. Ind. Append. $15.34 ($13.80).
The Soviet Union’s military intelligence organization, the GRU, rivals the Soviet secret police force, the KGB, in its scope, authority, and ruthlessness. It runs a spy network that operates in and out of embassies, kills military and political leaders, and steals military secrets. As a former member of this organization, Suvorov is well qualified to provide informative, sometimes shocking, insight into the inner workings of this threat to Western security. The organization’s structure, tactics, and training methods are revealed as well as its history and its bitter rivalry with the KGB.
Leaders and Battles:
The Art of Military Leadership
Lt. Col. W. J. Wood, U. S. Army (Ret.), Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984. 337 pp. Illus. Bib. Notes. Ind. Maps. Append. $16.95 ($15.25).
“Have you ever read an account of a battle and wondered why the author seemed so incisive and the leaders so bumbling?” So begins an engaging treatise on the study of leadership. Lieutenant Colonel Wood does not try to quantify or scientifically analyze leadership skills, but instead realistically looks at the factors which influence men on the battlefield. He accomplishes this by vividly recounting selected battles from history from the commander’s point of view. Ten battles are used to illustrate five factors in military leadership: courage, will, intellect, presence, and energy. The selections include Custer at Little Big Hom, Scipio Africanus in 106 B.C., and Hernando Cortez at Cempoalla in 1520. The descriptions of battle and historical recreations are fast-moving, enlightening, and relevant.
Lieutenant Lamb
Kenneth Maynard. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 191 pp. Fiction. $10.95 ($9.85).
A potential successor to Horatio Homblower, according to the publishers of this book, newly promoted Matthew Lamb begins his adventures in this first of a series of novels set in the Royal Navy’s most glorious era. Serving in HMS Sturdy, a 36-gun British frigate, the 19- year-old lieutenant witnesses the quelling of a mutiny and fights in battles with Frenchmen, pirates, and privateers. The young officer “even finds time to sow a few wild oats in exotic places. ’ ’ Humor and the routine of daily life on board a sailing warship are spliced into this heroic account of 18th century naval warfare.
North American Fighting Uniforms:
An Illustrated History Since 1756
Michael Bowers, Editor. Dorset, U.K.: Blandford Press. Distributed in U. S. by Sterling Publishing, NY. 1984. 128 pp. Illus. Ind. $14.95 ($13.45).
Spanning the years from the Seven Years War to Vietnam, this fully illustrated book presents the uniforms worn by Americans and Canadians in their respective armed forces. More than 350 uniformed figures appear with weapons and accessories in full color paintings of meticulous detail. Both dress uniforms and com- bat/functional rigs are included, and accompanying captions describe the important features of the uniforms as well as their origins. The uniforms of Generals George Washington and Alexander Haig and Colonel ''Bull” Simons of Son Tay Raid fame are featured.
A Short History of the United States Navy and the Southeast Asian Conflict 1950-1975
Edward J. Marolda and G. Wesley Price, III. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1984.
131 pp. Bib. Append. (No charge. Order directly from the Naval Historical Center, Building 57, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC 20374.)
From “Rolling Thunder” to “Sea Lords,” and the Gulf of Tonkin to Phu Quoc Island,
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this is the story of the Navy’s air-war, gunfire support, coastal and riverine warfare, counterinsurgency, amphibious operations, construction, logistics, advisory duty, and civic action during the Vietnam War. Several appendices, including “MiG Aircraft Shot Down by Naval Aviators in Southeast Asia” and “U. S. Navy Medal of Honor Recipients,” enhance the work. The Naval Historical Center has been preparing a more comprehensive, multi-volume history of this subject entitled The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict (the first volume, The Setting of the Stage to 1959, appeared in 1976). The “short history” described here is designed to fill the void until the more ambitious series can be completed.
Target Tokyo: The Story of the Sorge Spy Ring
Gordon W. Prange with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon. New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1984. 595 pp. Illus. Bib. Notes. Ind. Append. $24.95 ($22.45).
The authors of the bestselling At Dawn We Slept (Penguin Books, Inc., 1981) and Miracle at Midway (Penguin Books, Inc., 1983) tell the story of Richard Sorge’s amazing spy ring which transmitted highly secret information from Tokyo to Moscow in the years 19331941. Russian-born, German-educated, Sorge, posing as a loyal Nazi, established himself in the German embassy in Tokyo where he became a confidant of the German ambassador and was able to circulate in the highest levels of Japanese society. The intelligence smuggled out included a warning to Joseph Stalin of the impending German attack in 1939. Written with the meticulous yet utterly fascinating style that was characteristic of the late Professor Prange, Target Tokyo reads like a novel yet has the authenticity of a first-hand account.
U. S. Policy in Southwest Asia: A Failure in Perspective
Colonel Robert G. Lawrence, U. S. Air Force. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1984. 65 pp. Notes. $3.50 ($3.15).
Contending that U. S. foreign policy in Southwest Asia has placed too much emphasis on military action and not enough on the historical, religious, and regional dynamics of the area, Colonel Lawrence argues that we have failed in understanding the Arab viewpoint. Relying on interviews with many Arab leaders in and out of government, he specifically addresses the questions of arms sales policies, support of Israel, the failure of U. S. policy in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He calls for “an intelligent, courageous, and forward-looking appraisal of U. S. policy in one of the most vital regions of the world.
A Vietnam Experience: Ten Years of Reflection
Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale, U. S. Navy (Retired). Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 1984.
148 pp. $9.95 ($8.95).
“This is a piece of my life—my thoughts during the ten years after what was for me a ten- year war.” So begins A Vietnam Experience, a chronologically arranged collection of lhe admiral’s speeches and newspaper, magazine, and professional journal articles spanning the 1973-1983 period. The collected pieces trace Admiral Stockdale’s recuperation in a Navy hospital, his War College years, and his more recent years as a civilian academic. There is a range of topics covered, but the central theme throughout focuses on the character and values of this impressive man. The 34 selections record what the admiral himself calls a “meltin? experience,” the growth of a human being nurtured by a pressurized environment.
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