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effort by a retired TAR captain, now a staff member with the House Committee on Appropriations to micromanage the Navy via appropriate wording in the committee’s report on the defense appropriations bill. An analogous illustration is the annual position statement on Navy issues published by the Naval Reserve Association (NRA) which is principally authored by a retired TAR captain. These NRA positions are sometimes opposed to previously published Navy decisions and the majority views of the organization’s own members.
In providing these illustrations, I impute no Machiavellian intent to them. It is a relatively common practice for members of a small group in a large hierarchy to make themselves appear indispensable by stressing the esoteric nature of their activities, controlling paper flow, and positioning themselves in key billets. In my view, the TAR officer community merely demonstrates these common human organization practices, and it does so quite effectively.
Recognizing that the TAR officer program has a few outspoken advocates in the Congress and elsewhere, it may be unrealistic to disestablish it overnight. Moreover, it would be imprudent to do so. Pragmatically, it should be gradually phased out, so regular Navy officers can be placed into the open Naval Reserve billets with minimum administrative disruption.
Historically, one of the primary problems in addressing disestablishment of the TAR officer program is the existence of vociferous participants on both sides of the issue. Unfortunately, many of the debates on this subject have generated more heat than light. Viewing the matter objectively, there appears to be a way to confront the issue in a more constructive manner.
During the tenure of Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) Joseph T. McCullen, b a board was convened under the auspices of the Bureau of Naval PersonB to address this question. It prepared * comprehensive plan for the gradual phaseout of the TAR officer program which seemed to resolve most salient issues, including opportunity for care6 completion by all TAR officers then ^ active duty. This plan was later held > abeyance by the then-incoming Carter administration. If the disestablishmen of the TAR officer program is to be , reconsidered, it seems logical to upda and revise this study as a foundation for further action.
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The Total Force goal is one which should be pursued by all advocates o strong and effective Navy. Let’s get with it by a gradual and thoughtful phaseout of the TAR officer progra^ accompanied by a concurrent input 0 regular Navy 0-3 through 0-6 off1' cers into the resulting open Naval serve billets.
Nobody asked me either, but .
By Captain Edward L. Barker, U. S. Naval Reserve
The Missing Link in the Naval Reserve
What should we do with the Naval Reserve? We are told the regular military forces face a growing squeeze on funds and manpower. This comes as public and congressional pressures mount in this election year to keep defense spending down and as fewer people consider professional opportunities offered by the armed services with an
improving economy. Accordingly, the role of the reserves is expected to expand in the years ahead.
This expansion reflects a move by Congress to augment the reserve forces, filling the gap caused by expanding defense requirements. A recent study addressing this dilemma notes that recruiting goals for the 1980s cannot be met without increased reliance on guard and reserve forces and proposes a plan designed to beef up re-
serve forces, provide more modern ^ equipment, and improve job satisfy and morale. ^
Under current Total Force policy’ reservist is placed on a par with his « full-time counterpart. The Secretary j
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the Navy has stated that,
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of giving lip service, which has alw J been given to the Reserves, make u1 a part of the total force for mobile3 tion and able to carry part of the bn den in wartime.” Consequently, a zontal reorganization was laid out t° put new equipment into the reserve*’ including new frigates and new fiS ^ aircraft. In the wake of the mid-l9 post-Vietnam War political backlas^ the Department of Defense tried to in half the strength of the Navy’s b > lected Reserve. The threat of large resulted in repeated reserve progral1^ reorganizations, a debilitating exerc which created vast turbulence in tbe Naval Reserve. J j
The current proposal to enlarge 3 improve the Naval Reserve should ^ prove useful if for no other reason ^ it does represent a boost to the res^ program as well as congressional c cem. But the problem of what to with the Reserve goes much deepef'
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The recall of Naval Reserve units since World War II has been less than satisfactory on the whole. Tactical air squadrons activated during the Korean and Vietnam recalls were deficient in readiness and logistic support. This proved to be a major obstacle in their immediate operational deployment, as well as a drain on the regular operating forces. These deficiencies resulted in more changes in the reserve organization and training, resulting in substantial readiness improvements.
On the brighter side, however, Naval Reserve support units—e.g., intelligence, medical, and technical units— have augmented regular forces on a continuing basis. These units have an excellent record of responding to numerous recalls and providing immediate critical services.
We have reservists serving on special duty for exercises in the Indian Ocean, Pacific, and the North Atlantic areas. They also deploy to Iceland, Adak, and to numerous other locations to support the fleet.
The individual reservists are not lacking in motivation. In fact, they are a most willing, energetic, dedicated, and tenacious group who continue to hang together with unflagging patriotism in spite of the program’s continuous ups and downs.
With current emphasis on more opportunities for and a wider use of the reserves, consideration is being given to determine whether the mix of forces can be altered to expand still further their role. But there is a limitation: no substitution for regular active-duty personnel. The Secretary of the Navy has stated, “The Navy and Marine Corps, the sea services, are the deploying services. The other services are fundamentally garrison services; they go to a place ... and that is where their force structure stays. . . . [Y]ou can’t have a ‘weekend warriors’ manning a fleet that is forward deployed.”
How, then, can the Naval Reserve best support the Navy? Promises of
more and better equipment and hardware are greatly welcomed, as are increased personnel allowances. But will these measures actually have an appreciable change over the way the Naval Reserve responds on short notice to national emergencies? There is a good possibility they will not unless the limitations of the Ready Reserve are better understood.
The Ready Reserve consists of two groups: the Selected Reserve, consisting of organized units that drill together, and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), containing non-drilling individuals with prior active or reserve service and residual contract obligations. There are also two other categories: the Standby Reserve and the Retired Reserve. Of these four categories, only the selected and individual elements of the Ready Reserve provide significant mobilization assets.
To provide immediate mobilization support for naval operational requirements, there should be special category units within the Naval Reserve. The Ready Reserve should have a new “Active Reserve” category composed of a limited number of elite units fully manned and combat ready. They would form the direct link between the active forces and the Selected Reserve. With respect to naval aviation, reserve air wings would be integrated into the active force. Integration would involve simultaneous hardware modernization along with active squadrons. Similar integration patterns could be applied to surface forces and other designated elite units.
The reservist’s monthly drill participation would be expanded to provide for increased readiness. Additional periods of active duty for training would facilitate the necessary integration with active forces. This direct link between the active and reserve forces could provide a conduit for the movement of personnel as they change status.
The opportunity for multi-level types of reserve participation and the method
ology for rotating personnel in and o of the new units warrant serious c°n sideration and study. This proposa c be viewed as a triad system: Active. Active Reserve, and Selected ReserV,
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is characterized by personnel layot > an adequate manpower pool of rese ists could be maintained to man this “Active Reserve” category. Airline pilots and mechanics are a case in point. This new category would a provide an opportunity for personne leaving active service to spend an >n terim period as drilling reservists wt increased participation and pay he 0 moving into the Selected Reserve.
The personnel involved are key 1 the success of multi-level partieip3^.* ,
retirement eligibility. Promotion tunities decline markedly after atta'^is the rank of lieutenant commander, is also accompanied by a gradual cline in available billet assignments-^ There is a need to provide an out those officers who, in effect, bec0^ redundant. A variation of a plan us by the Royal Navy could provide one-time annuity for those officers siring early separation from the Na Reserve. u,.
The other side of the personnel lem concerns demographic shifts- ^ an increase in the average age and span of the population, there will fewer male youths available to fm
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recruiting efforts not just on the school group but increasingly on : cling older segments of the reserve We can no longer rely on the P ^ pine Principle of rolling into a ba ^ brandishing our quills. We must ha ^ the capability to identify selective 'j ^ reserve quills and rapidly position in the forward areas of our operat* forces.
Nobody asked me either, but
By Lieutenant Commander Peter B. Mersky, U. S. Naval Reserve
Why a Reservist?
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Many times in the past 16 years I have asked myself, “Why am I a naval reservist?” Initially, I was motivated
by the opportunity to select my billet, rather than wait to be drafted and have no choice. But now, a decade and a half later, I have no one breathing down my neck and no threat of war to hold me in military service. Why am I still a naval reservist and a j, lected air reservist, working in a P tion that demands lots of time an work?
/ OcWber
Proceedings