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Despite less than ideal growing conditions—violent
changes in governments, disparate political philosophies, international upheavals such as the Cuban Missile Crisis,
U. S. interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Falklands War—UNITAS has survived to become a staunch perennial of joint naval operations. Let us take a closer look at its roots.
First, UNITAS stands unique among multinational military exercises by virtue of the fact that it is not sponsored by any organized international military command, such as NATO. Although undoubtedly recognized and endorsed by the InterAmerican Defense Board in Washington, the only existing joint staff organization under the Rio Treaty, UNITAS is an annual naval operation that is organized, planned, and executed by navies of the participating countries on a completely voluntary basis. There are no formal bilateral or multilateral agreements and no formal command structure.
After World War II, our bases of operation in South America were disestablished or reduced, and the U. S. Navy’s primary contact with South American navies was through the U. S. naval missions in seven of the countries and a naval advisory group in Argentina. The naval missions occupied unique positions in that each was established as the result of a contract between the U. S. Government and the host government. In theory and, to a large degree, in practice, the naval missions were servants of the host navy. U. S. mission personnel embarked on board their host country’s warships, assisted in training at technical and professional schools, and acted as advisors and instructors at naval academies and war colleges.
Over a period of some 20 years before the first UNITAS operations, hundreds of South American officer and enlisted men had attended practically every significant professional and technical school operated by the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps: U. S. Naval Academy, Naval War College, Navy Postgraduate School, Marine Corps Command and Staff School, plus dozens of technical schools for enlisted men.
The net effect of these activities was the creation within South American navies of a large group of officers and enlisted men of high professional potential, trained in the techniques and theory of modern naval operations, but with little opportunity to put into practice what they had learned. Indeed, UNITAS was a natural extension of the overall effort to assist the South American navies in becoming more professional fighting forces.
Members of the South American navies are known for their patriotism, and the common professional experiences they shared together did not change the historic national rivalries and differences that had existed since the wars of independence in the early 19th century. But their shared naval training in the United States provided a fertile ground for the growth of professionalism. UNITAS afforded an environment for such growth, and it succeeded in producing combined naval operations among neighboring states who had often found themselves on opposite sides of a conflict.
In 1959, Rear Admiral Harold M. Briggs, U. S. Navy, was the Director of Pan-American Affairs (Op-63) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. As such, he was the administrative head of the U. S. naval missions and advisory groups. In a strictly legal sense, Admiral Briggs did not exercise command of the missions, since they were by contract advisors to their respective host navies. However, from a purely administrative point of view, there was a need for coordination of effort; therefore, the custom had arisen to hold an annual Chiefs of Naval Mission Conference at the headquarters of the 14th Naval District in the Panama Canal Zone. The purpose of the conference was to permit an interchange of experience and points of view as well as to effect a coordination of effort, especially among training opportunities for personnel of the host navies.
In the fall of 1959, the annual conference of naval mission chiefs was scheduled, but on this occasion Admiral Briggs requested that the chiefs invite a senior officer of the host navy of the highest rank feasible to attend the conferences as a guest of the U. S. Navy. The stated purpose of having these senior officers attend was to give the Director of PanAmerican Affairs an opportunity to meet with them for the purpose of ascertaining how the work of the several missions could be made more effective. At the time, there were no high hopes for any far-reaching decisions or recommendations. Fortunately, each country which hosted a U. S. Navy mission or advisory group sdnt a senior representative who was authorized to speak for his navy.
Contrary to the rather modest expectations for this agendaless and informal first Inter-American Naval Conference, these senior South American naval officers met in private ple' nary session and produced a number of solid recommendations related to the work of the U. S. naval missions. They made recommendations for increased military assistance and, most importantly, recommended that the U. S. Navy send naval units to each of the countries in order to give their navies an opportunity to operate with modern antisubmarine warfare forces. Although the recommendation was rather amorphous in that no particular format was suggested, it was the seed that later became UNITAS.
The flaw in this rather tentative recommendation was that a desire existed only for bilateral naval exercises with units of the U. S. Navy rather than an organized multilateral naval operation. The chiefs of the U. S. naval missions suggested that efforts should be made to organize some type of combined operation. Given the logistic problems that the vast distances involved would produce, and also mindful of the historic rivalries and conflicts of the past, it was suggested that a group of U. S. ships and submarines, augmented by antisubmarine warfare aircraft, should conduct a cruise around the South American continent, engaging in naval exercises with each country in succession. This suggestion was taken back to Washington by Admiral Briggs and presented to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, U- $■ Navy.
Apparently Admiral Burke liked the idea, because in the spring of 1960 the Commander, South Atlantic Force—base at U. S. Naval Station, Trinidad—was assigned by Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, to organize and execute the first South American training cruise with a mission of engaS' ing in joint and/or combined antisubmarine warfare exercise* with the navies of eight South American countries. Comm011 tactics and doctrine were also to be developed.
The planning phase for the first UNITAS operation was accomplished at the headquarters of Commander, South A1' lantic Force at U. S. Naval Station, Trinidad. During 4-8 April 1960, planning conferences were held with representa
'■ves of the U. S. commands and units which were to participate in the forthcoming antisubmarine warfare training cruise. Later, from 24 April to 27 May, a series of planning conferees were conducted at Trinidad with representatives of each °f the South American navies which were to participate in L'NlTAS, along with representatives from their respective taval missions and advisory groups. The detailed operation °rders for the several multinational phases of UNITAS were Jointly developed at these conferences, and, in each case, c°pies of finished plans were taken home to each of the par- ’’cipating countries. These conferences were filled with a sPirit of cooperation, professionalism, and mutual respect. There is no doubt that—within the planning process itself— ’he seeds were planted for the commonality of tactics, doc- ‘hne, and purpose that has endured the past 25 years.
Rear Admiral E. C. Stephan, U. S. Navy, was the Commander, South Atlantic Force, who personally conducted !hese first UNITAS planning conferences. As one who partic- 'Pated in the planning for the U. S.-Venezuelan-Colombian Phase of UNITAS I, I believe that Admiral Stephan’s conduct °f these proceedings revealed a man whose understanding of multinational military planning was of the highest order. Without men of his caliber, character, and understanding,
UNITAS would have died aborning. And without a continuing succession of men like him, there would not have been many more UNITAS operations.
The first UNITAS cruise began with the departure of Task Force 86 from U. S. Naval Station, Trinidad, on 27 August 1960. Embarked and flying his flag in USS John Paul Jones (DD-932) was Commander, Task Force 86, Rear Admiral Allen L. Reed, U. S. Navy. He had relieved Admiral Stephan as Commander, South Atlantic Force, on 7 June 1960, shortly after the planning for the UNITAS operation had been completed. How appropriate it was that, on the occasion of
For the past 25 years, U. S. and South American warships have operated together in the UNITAS joint naval exercises. Below, the USS Capodanno (FF-I093) rides off the port bow of the Chilean Navy oiler Araucano. These exercises are strictly voluntary, and are neither required by treaty nor sponsored by any international military command.
the numbers of naval units involved are small when comp: with other multinational exercises in other parts of the woi
The first planning conference for UNITAS was held between U. S. and South American naval officers at U. S. Naval Station, Trinidad, in April I960. Seated on the right- hand side of the table, the only one wearing glasses, is Rear Admiral E. C. Stephan, U. S. Navy; he was Commander, South Atlantic Force at the time and helped to plan the first series of U. S.-Venezuelan-Colombian joint naval operations. About four months after this meeting, a U. S. Navy taskforce arrived off La Guaira, Venezuela, kicking off the start of UNITAS I.
the first combined U. S. naval exercises with our South American neighbors, the flagship of the U. S. contingent should be named after the man who is acclaimed as the father of the U. S. Navy.
Task Force 86 arrived at the port of La Guaira, Venezuela, on 29 August 1960. For the first time in the history of U. S.- South American relations, a U. S. Navy task force had entered port for the expressed purpose of engaging in a multinational naval exercise. That same day became even more significant when two Colombian destroyers, with the Commander of the Colombian Navy Fleet embarked, also arrived at La Guaira. Never before had Venezuelan and Colombian naval forces operated together in a planned naval exercise. From that memorable day until the end of the cruise on 26 November 1960, there were historic firsts at practically every country visited. In his “Command History, 1960,” Admiral Reed reported that “Operation UNITAS saw the first integrated operations of ships from the navies of (1) Venezuela and Colombia; (2) Ecuador; (3) Peru and Chile; (4) Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, with the United States. A total of 48 ships participated.”
UN1TAS accomplished much. Task Force 86 spent 102 days circumnavigating the South American continent. During that period, 23 days of bilateral exercises and 22 days of combined exercises took place, with three or four countries (including U. S. forces) involved in each. The USS Odax (SS-484), in company with submarines of South American navies, spent 203 hours submerged, providing support to the surface units. The antisubmarine warfare aircraft in VP-24 engaged in coordinated air-surface-subsurface exercises and gave a number of demonstrations to embarked VIPs. No South American navies had any air forces at the time.
The history of South American countries, with their wars against one another, border disputes, breaks in diplomatic r«' lations, and intense national pride reveals the true significant of the military cooperation fostered by UNITAS. Although
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there is not doubt as to the far-reaching effects that a quarter century of UNITAS operations have had on hemispheric sob darity. By now, many thousands of officers and enlisted men have participated in these joint operations, becoming better trained and more highly motivated; common memories thri'f that will help to perpetuate common goals. Can anyone dou that UNITAS has indeed been a unifying force?
Those of us who participated in the beginnings of UNL TAS, from its inception to its execution, and those of us ^ from all of the navies of the countries involved can look ba with pride on the fertile ground that produced common tactics, doctrine, communications, understanding, and lasting friendships. Our countries, although having different concO11 from time to time, are caught up in a common concern f°r naval readiness. UNITAS is only one blossom in the bouque of hemispheric cooperation, but so far it has proven to be a most hardy perennial.