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greatly underestimate the determine of the Vietnamese people
ati®11
The
El Salvador: America’s Next Vietnam?
Steffen W. Schmidt. Salisbury, NC: Documentary Publications, 1983. 217 pp. Illus. $19.95 ($17.95).
Reviewed by First Lieutenant William R. Meara, Jr., U. S. Army
In El Salvador: America’s Next Vietnam? Steffen Schmidt presents what may be the key to understanding the Central American caldron. Cutting through the polemical smoke screen, Schmidt shows us the three-way struggle that is the essence of contemporary Latin politics: democratic reformers under fire from both ultra right-wing extremists and communist left-wing revolutionaries.
While the threat from the communist left is familiar to most U. S. observers, the right-wing danger is frequently overlooked. Schmidt describes the right-wing strategy of “erasing the center.” Employing “death squads” that are often linked to the security forces, the Salvadoran far right has sought to eliminate those reformist groups that pose the greatest political threat to the status quo. Hoping to leave the far right as the only alternative to communist rule for the Salvadoran people, right-wing death squads have slaughtered tens of thousands of their countrymen.
Schmidt provides a rare look at the thought process of the Salvadoran right wing. Citing the Chilean elections of 1970 as a pivotal event in the genesis of the death squads, Schmidt says that conservative Latins concluded that Chilean Christian Democrats had laid the groundwork for Marxist Salvador Allende’s electoral victory. In the eyes of the right wing, reformers were now “watermelons”—green on the outside, red on the inside. The center became the target.
As a native of Latin America, Schmidt is well able to describe cultural factors that tend to exacerbate the political difficulties. In a chapter entitled “Death and Violence,” he explores certain Salvadoran cultural proclivities that result in the quasi-acceptance of the use of violence as a political instrument.
Schmidt fails to give adequate attention to the Salvadoran military. While he does describe the impact of the security forces in general terms, he fails to explore the factions within the services that have exerted such a powerful influence in recent years.
The chapter on the church in El Salvador is unfair. Schmidt exaggerates the links between the church and the guerrillas, and he rationalizes the murders of nonpolitical priests and nuns. He presents the Catholic religious community as a group of suicidal zealots seeking martyrdom in the Moslem style. Nothing is further from the truth.
Overall, however, Schmidt presents a compassionate view of the tragedy that is El Salvador. “Given different circumstances, an accident of birth, we all could be caught in the violent time warp of El Salvador. ...”
With the United States supporting a decimated and demoralized political center, Schmidt is less than sanguine about the prospects for U. S. success in El Salvador. He concludes that:
“. . . the current Administration is casting a political and military scenario for Central America which must lead to but two alternatives: the United States will gradually involve itself in a Vietnam type war or, failing to gain popular American support for such a war, the United States will pull out, abandoning that sad land to a long and bloody conflict between left and right.”
If we are to prevent the situation from deteriorating to the point where these are the only options, we must move from the simple fantasy of good guys and bad guys to a realistic analysis of Central America’s problems. Schmidt’s book could be a valuable aid to such an analysis.
Lieutenant Meara was graduated from Manhattan College with a bachelor of arts degree in International Studies. He is on active duty as a student at the Foreign Area Officer Course, U. S. Army, Institute for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia
Arnold R. Isaacs. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. 559 pp. Illus. Maps. Bib. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95)-
Peace with Honor? An American Reports on Vietnam 1973-1975
Lieutenant Colonel Stuart A. Herrington,
U. S. Army. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983. 253 pp. Illus. Maps. Ind. $15.95 ($14.35).
Reviewed by Lieutenant Michael N. Pocalyko, U. S. Navy
The concept of honor is a powerful motif in both journalist Arnold >*• Isaacs’s Without Honor: Defeat in Vi(i nam and Cambodia and Army Lieuten»n Colonel Stuart A. Herrington’s Pe°ce with Honor? An American Reports °n Vietnam 1973-1975, i.e., the U. S. Per^ ception of honor in international pohh that is often viewed as the reason for ^ eventual failure in Southeast Asia- ** Chi Minh characteristically downplaye the dimension of conflict in U. S. h°n°^ concerning the South Vietnamese Wi>e he said, in 1961, “I think the America11
Vietnamese people have always sho^ great determination when they were f®c® with a foreign invader.” That statem®^ could serve as an epigraph for the Is® and Herrington accounts of 1973-75- ^ Isaacs shows an objectivity and an cellence that represent what is best military journalism. His in-depth V details the background leading up t0 ^ Paris Agreement, a document from Wl1 “only North Vietnam and the U- S- rived anything .... Washington gotoj troops out and its prisoners back; »*a won an end to the bombing and an Am ican withdrawal from the war >n. j South. South Vietnam . . - receln0r nothing: neither a political settlement
apeace’” fthewaf
Isaacs centers on the aspects ot about which he knows the most, th® ^ temal policies and international mo / tions that brought about both the def®a
... t#4
^°Uth Vietnam and the communist suc- Ce«s in Cambodia. For example, in treat- tog the fall of the Khmer Republic, he l0rnbines President Gerald Ford’s 28 anuary 1975 call for “an early negotiated settlement” and his assertion that 0r|ce the insurgents realize that they '■te'not win by force of arms, I believe hey will look to negotiations rather than 0 War,” with a telling and taut analysis ln historical retrospective:
“The Khmer Communists, however, did not realize any such thing, for the excellent reason that a victory by force of arms was becoming increasingly likely. They now held more than four-fifths of Cambodian territory. . . . Numerically the insurgent army was probably equal to the fighting strength of the Khmer Republic forces . . . [and] the insurgents appeared to have all the ammunition toey needed.”
j, in Southeast Asia, Isaacs views the ,°uth Vietnamese dependence on the toted States and the U. S. preoccupa-
h
tion with Moscow and Peking as parallel reasons for the defeat of a tenuous “alliance” between a great power and one so weak that it was barely surviving. The application and interpretation of honor as Isaacs saw it during his four years in Vietnam lies in his statement that, “What mattered fundamentally to the U. S. leadership was not what happened to the Vietnamese ... but what happened to the world’s—and particularly the Soviet Union’s—impression of American capability and resolve.”
Herrington has a considerably different and more internalized approach to many of the same events. He views honor in the same moral context as Isaacs but adds a military dimension. Peace with Honor? is a sequel to Herrington’s earlier work, Silence Was a Weapon (Presidio Press, 1982), an account of his 1971-72 experiences as an intelligence advisor to Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) territorial forces. Herrington’s new book is a reflective commentary that is disciplined while evoking a “you are there” tone. The author served as a specialist in
Southeast Asian affairs on the U. S. delegation of the Four-Party Joint Military Team, negotiating the implementation of the Paris Accords.
Herrington’s clear prose is at its most haunting when he tells of the final month of the Americans in Vietnam and the evacuation of the U. S. embassy.
“My press assistant, Terry . . . broke into tears. ‘I hate you Americans for what you have done to my country .... Why don’t you just kill us all quickly and be done with it?”’
He intersperses history, such as President Nguyen van Thieu’s farewell promise, “I will stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the compatriots and combatants to defend the country,” with personal recollection:
“Four days later, Thieu fled to Taiwan aboard a U. S. Air Force C-l 18. The following day, one of the officers on the South Vietnamese delegation explained to me that it would have been impossible for the ex-president to take command of a combat division and fight in the defense of the capital. ‘He would have been killed almost instantly,’ my friend quipped, and not by a Communist bullet.’”
His most soulful passages record his thoughts, frequently of honor and commitment, in the midst of Saigon’s collapse and the U. S. evacuation. He wrote on 18 April 1975:
“I am still worried about one final breach of faith here. The idea of Americans first and then we will do our best to get out as many Vietnamese as possible scares me. I’m afraid that if I get all my Americans on the helicopter, someone will say, ‘That’s it. Get the landing zone controller on the next bird.’ I don’t know how I would react if that were to happen and my people were on the ground.”
It is impossible to accurately measure the residual amounts of guilt and feelings of collective national culpability the United States has today about the fall of Cambodia and South Vietnam. These two books teach lessons that cannot be ignored. They are timely, reasoned, thoughtful, and written by unimpeachable and circumspect witnesses. No serious student of Vietnam should miss reading either one.
Lieutenant Pocalyko is a LAMPS detachment officer- in-charge from Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron Light 34 in Norfolk, and most recently, he served in the USS Pharris (FF-1094).
War Games: North Atlantic ’86 and Grey Seas, Grey Skies
been producing board games of unus1 craftsmanship and creativity for seve1 years, including a number of titles 1
Marin3
modem naval warfare (Le Regia
Today, with less underway steaming time and fewer tactical exercises available, tabletop war games and simulations are gaining more favor in fleet units. But the problem with tabletop exercises is that they take lots of time; they are also limited in the detail and scope of the actions that may be portrayed.
The development of powerful yet inexpensive personal computers makes it possible for naval war game hobbyists to enjoy simulations of vast complexity and detailed graphics. Two recent examples of this kind of game that should be of interest to sea power professionals are North Atlantic ’86 (NA86), offered by Strategic Simulations, Inc. (SSI), and Grey Seas, Grey Skies (GS,GS), offered by Simulations Canada. Both games are designed for the Apple™ computer or any of its numerous copies, and both sell at retail for about $60, which may be regarded as either a lot to pay for a game or little to pay for interactive conflict simulation software.
Both games are “menu-driven.” The player is prompted by the program to select various options which then require decisions as to the employment of the platforms, weapons, and sensors represented. The range and variety of systems modeled are tremendous. In fact, the games would be valuable teaching tools even if they did nothing else beyond presenting so much unclassified information in a coherent format. NA86 provides 76 contemporary ship classes, 14 kinds of aircraft, and more than 25 kinds of missiles. GS.GS provides 79 different ship classes, 23 kinds of missiles, and several distinct aircraft types. Torpedoes are significant weapons in both games, but mines are ignored.
Both games seek—-at vastly different scales—to model the interaction of air, surface, and submarine weapon systems. As a strategic-level simulation, NA86 also models land combat and logistics. Victory is a matter of sinking either a human opponent or a surprisingly competent computer adversary while remaining afloat. Ships are rated according to an abstract victory point value that factors in their cost, symbolic importance, cargo, and various intangibles. One of the first lessons both games teach the novice is that ships, with the exception, of course, of the Iowa class, are easy to sink. NA86’s software even provides a mournful beep every time a ship goes down.
North Atlantic ’86: The world of NA86 is based on a chilling premise: “The year is 1986. The great war in Europe is over. As expected, Russia won; it now controls all of Germany and Norway. Its next plan: complete domination of the North Atlantic through the isolation of Great Britain.” The time scale is 12 hours per turn; the 40 by 40 grid of 100 kilometer squares extends from Riga to Newfoundland and from the edge of the Arctic ice pack to about 43°N latitude, “in other words. Western Europe and the North Atlantic.”
In many ways, NA86 is a replay of the Battle of the Atlantic with the weapons and tactics of the 1980s. This is not surprising; Gary Grisby, credited as the game designer, has programmed a series of brilliant World War II games (most recently Carrier Force).
Four scenarios are provided: a short convoy battle, a 20-tum battle for Iceland, and two extended campaigns (252 turns and 122 turns, respectively). A low-resolution color display indicates crudely, but effectively, the positions of task forces and landmasses. Using the keyboard, the player maneuvers task forces, launches and recovers air strikes, transports supplies, and inputs various other decisions. Combat is resolved by the computer according to its own mysterious algorithms, and results are displayed, to the player’s delight or despair. During any turn, a task force must be assigned to either an active or passive sensor mode: Passive sensors make the player harder to find, but active sensors give the player better fire control and early warning.
The flavor of the game supports the old saying that modern ships are “eggshells armed with hammers.” One hit will sink most frigate- or destroyer-sized vessels, and a few hits will cripple even the largest aircraft carrier. Submarines can be highly lethal and survivable as well, but they are not under perfect command control—they may be patrolling up to two squares away from an indicated position. This simulates well the problem of coordinating surface and subsurface combatants. Area defense surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) can inflict losses on an incoming strike but are rarely able to annihilate it.
The convoy battles tend to be dominated by a few systems, e.g.. the Phoenix missile versus the AS-6, both of which tend to be expended in quantities greatly exceeding the likely existing inventories of either missile—it is not unusual to expend more than 100 AIM-54s in a single action. The combat displays cycle through a tense, even gripping sequence, typically including incoming waves ot missiles successively engaged and at- trited by long-range combat air patrols, SAMs, jamming, and last-ditch gunfire- A typical game turn might see the players planning and executing a variety of actions, such as amphibious and airborne assaults, antishipping strikes- close-air support missions, submarine barrier patrols, airfield suppression, combat air patrols, and surface engagements- Be forewarned, though, that the NATO player will almost inevitably see the Soviet player come out with a monster force and take what he wants. This will eventually be countered by the quality of the NATO forces and the eventual resuppo from the United States. Barring a faulty plan, most games will be close, excitinS contests, whether played between two people or between a person and the Pr° gram. The program can be a challeng'0^ opponent: patient, tricky, and familiar with the rules. Unfortunately, the Pr° gram only plays the Soviet side.
Grey Seas, Grey Skies: This game repre sents a first entry into the computer gan'^ ing field by a small company that
and Seapower and the State). The ganie ^ a text-based system, with cardboa counters and a simple grid provided plotting manually. The player will I"' that a protractor and a simple range c will help. Students of navigation will light in making their own charts.
Seven “pre-built” scenarios are P vided, covering an international spectr of near-term conflicts: Japanese destr y ers versus Soviet submarines in the R ^ Islands, France versus India in the Bengal, a Soviet amphibious group v sus West German forces in the Ba J U. S. versus Soviet carrier battle g10 off the North Cape, and similar clashu* the Western Pacific and the Med*,e
Reviewed by John Gresham and Michael Markowitz
fire
control systems become saturated),
nean. A possible scenario from the Falk- lands Conflict is also included: four Argentine surface ships and an air strike against HMS Invincible and her escorts. The time scale is six minutes per turn, and the playing field is a patch of ocean ^0 nautical miles on each side.
The sequence of play is flexible and may include segments for radar or visual Search, sonar search, weapons status uPdate, fire control (the heart of the game), and conning orders. In some scenarios, a helicopter operation segment may also be included. Helicopters are valuable for searching out enemy surface ships while their mother ship maintains radar silence. No helicopter-launched antiship missiles are provided in the game, however. The texture of the game 's one of gradually unfolding contacts, beginning with approximate bearings and Progressing through more exact range at)d bearing determination, up to full target characterization. Some weapons may ^ fired as “snap shots” based on incomplete targeting, with reduced chances of a
nit.
GS.GS places the player inside the e°mbat information center of the task 0rce flagship. Individual ships must be c°nned, radars and sonars turned on or “IT, targets tracked (or dropped, when and. finally, weapons fired, and damage assessed (the player does not always ^n°w how badly the target has been hUrt). Rules of engagement, task force "llx-es, missions, and many other things left to the players, which makes ^S-GS an interesting simulation tool.
GS.GS’s most powerful lesson is that there are two kinds of ships in the modem t^ean: submarines and targets. In most Cases, the submarine can move and shoot ?uts>de the range of antisubmarine war- are (ASW) standoff weapons, unless, of .^rse, she faces opposing submarines, he ASW helicopter is fast and well atTned, but limited in its sensor range. It jPUst be in the right place at the right time *? have any chance of making a kill. Nu- ear-armed antisubmarine and subma- nc rockets, along with their Soviet °unterparts, are provided in some weap- suites, but a 100 victory point penalty r each use discourages using them in J. but the most desperate situations.
I hile this hardly simulates the political tr,cacies of the rules of engagement, it
is a nice touch. NA86, for example, assumes a global war of the most reserved nuclear posture.
Air power is handled rather abstractly by the computer, and the results are displayed to the players. Patrol aircraft, such as the P-3 Orion or the Tu-142 “BearD,” are powerful assets that enhance the search and targeting ability of the side that has one. If an air strike occurs, ship defensive systems (if active) will attempt to defeat it, using SAMs and close-in weapons. In contrast to NA86, where the player has control over air mission planning, air power in GS,GS functions as a bolt from the blue, beyond the player’s control. This reflects the difference in scale between the two games: in NA86 the player is the Chief of Naval Operations or Admiral of the Fleet; in GS,GS, the player is more of a senior captain or commodore, perhaps even a “mere” commander in a small scenario.
Ironically, for a game published in Nova Scotia, no Canadian ships are included in the game (except the British- built Oberon-class submarines). We trust that critics north of the border will treat this sin of omission mercilessly. Canadian ships and aircraft are also missing from NA86, which is surprising in a game about the North Atlantic in the not- too-distant future. There is no provision to “mix” nationalities in a single task force, and some interesting new ships like the Italian Guiseppe Garibaldi and the Spanish Principe de Asturias are missing, along with such U. S. Navy helicopter carriers as the Tarawa (LHA-1) and Iwo Jima (LPH-2) classes. Perhaps an expansion disk with more ships, planes, and missiles could be produced if the market warrants it. The lack of a position and contact display on the monitor is regrettable, but the serious gamer can live with it, and the non-serious gamer is likely to have more fun with an arcade game like the Seafox (Broderbund Software. 1982).
Conclusions: An important aspect of any game is the package, especially the documentation. NA86 comes in a standard glossy cardboard box with an 18-page manual and two copies of a player reference card to accompany the all-important disk. The documentation is clear and gets the player into the game quickly. A set of strategy notes is helpful for avoiding fatal mistakes early in the learning curve. One wishes for a set of designer’s notes, however, to explain how some of the subroutines work, and how the designer arrived at his choices and decisions. Some tantalizing generalized descriptions do appear in the manual:
“When attacking, submarines fire two torpedoes at their target. After each attack, there is a ten percent chance that the sub’s torpedo supply will be exhausted.”
GS,GS is packaged in a neat, plastic box that provides storage compartments for the cardboard counters provided. Two 17 by 22 inch mapsheets (in gray, of course) are marked off in grid coordinates. The grid squares are small, and when many ships, contact markers, and helicopters are in play, the board can become rather crowded. An eight-page manual provides minimal documentation needed to play the game, along with a few hints and some notes by the designer, W. J. Nichols, who identifies himself as a former submarine officer.
The current generation of microcomputer war games is slow. There is a considerable amount of slack time while the machine crunches numbers and the disk whirrs. A good design could speed up the course of play and simplify the player’s task. Both NA86 and GS,GS provide features that make it possible for the player to recover from keyboard errors before a potentially fatal mistake is entered into the maw of the microprocessor. The cost of these compassionate features is to slow down the course of play. GS,GS has an excellent option called timed play. At the beginning of a turn, a “clock” starts running. Any player inputs or decisions must be completed before the clock runs out.
While both games approach the subject from different perspectives, both are worthwhile and educational. Of the two, GS,GS is probably the more useful to the tabletop war gaming community. With the production of some homemade playing aids (plotting and status boards, for example), GS,GS can be a useful tool to the tactical community.
Mr. Gresham is currently employed as a professional analyst by Delex Systems, Inc., and is Assistant Editor for BAM!Micro Times, a computer software and gaming magazine based in San Diego.
Mr. Markowitz is an air defense training specialist and is Editor-in-Chief of BAM/Micro Times.
vvas
no1
of strat'
emergence of a maritime school
egy, and three school (Keith
Dunn and
ival.
vantage, rather than our own. This
Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense?
Robert W. Komer. Cambridge, MA: Abt Books, 1984. 116 pp. Ind. $19.00 ($17.10).
Reviewed by Michael MccGwire
Answering the question he poses in the title, Robert Komer comes down emphatically on the side of coalition defense. He starts from two assumptions: the advent of a nuclear stalemate means much greater reliance on nonnuclear deterrence and defense; and the conventional military balance has been turning against the United States even more rapidly than the nuclear balance. Since the United States cannot afford to do everything, choices have to be made. The primary choice lies between a maritime strategy and a coalition (continental) strategy, although Komer stresses that this is “not an either- or proposition, but a question of priority emphasis.” He explicitly recognizes the importance of the sea in U. S. strategy, and the need to be able to secure command as necessary. But he is seriously concerned that the United States is drifting toward “an unbalanced maritime strategy and posture at the expense of other equally pressing needs, and that this will not only undermine our alliances but will lead to disaster in case of a major nonnuclear war.”
Komer is a man of considerable experience, who has spent more than 30 years in the national security business and most of that in government. His ideas about coalition strategy have been hammered out over the years. He was largely responsible for the Long-Term Defense Program and other measures to reinvigorate NATO’s defense posture during the Carter Administration, and as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, his responsibilities ranged from aspects of mobilization to implementing the Carter Doctrine in the Persian Gulf and reviewing contingency planning assumptions.
What is new is Komer’s conviction that the increased resources being allocated to the Navy, together with public assertions about the Navy’s likely roles in future conflicts, denotes a shift in underlying strategy that must work against America’s broader security interests. This charge is not to be taken lightly.
An unstated point of the argument is that U. S. strategy needs “revamping,” rather than to be changed fundamentally. Revamping is necessary because of “the relative decline of U. S. power, the way in which nuclear stalemate has increased the need for costly conventional forces, the gradual shift in the superpower military balance, Western reluctance to spend on defense, and finally the perceived need to take more seriously the new Persian Gulf threat,” all of which has led to a shortfall in the capabilities needed to meet expanding requirements, while faced by an increased likelihood of conflict. Komer’s solution to this mismatch of resources is to develop the appropriate “coalition posture.”
He apparently chose the term “coalition defense” for two reasons: it avoids the misleading connotations of “continental”; and it implies something more than just an alliance relationship. The latter is most important because “our greatest remaining strategic advantage over the U.S.S.R. is that we have many rich allies whereas it has only a handful of poor ones,” and a coalition approach will lead to improved integration of these capabilities through a sense of partnership. But it must be a land-oriented posture, because it is on land that the Soviets have to be deterred and countered.
Komer’s main proposals are therefore concerned with identifying flaws in our current “coalition posture” and suggesting ways of improving the situation. He stresses the need for agreement that more emphasis must be placed on conventional deterrence and defense, and he touches on a range of strategic questions: forestalling a multi-front war, the conventional defense of Europe, the role of France, Persian Gulf oil, Pacific defense, Third World contingencies, and coping with Soviet surrogates. His analyses are realistic, and show a clear perception of where U. S. political-military interests actually lie.
His proposals for improving the “coalition posture” are indicated by his section headings: a change of mindset is required; need for U. S. leadership and inducements; increased defense outlays; more rational burden sharing; greater armaments cooperation; greater host nation support; and role of security assistance. They all make excellent sense, and one might wonder why they have not been implemented already. The answer, of course, lies in the diversity of perceptions, interests, and objectives within the alliance, a problem that Komer is well aware of, but does not fully address.
Three chapters of the book promote the coalition strategy, and three challenge the “new navalism” and criticize aspects of the emerging maritime strategy. Komer attacks on three main fronts: the emphasis on maritime strategy encourages a go-it- alone approach, while skewing the allocation of resources; the historical justification for such a strategy is unsound; and specific aspects of the strategy are mistaken. In a brief historical review, he sketches the antecedents to the contin61^ tal versus maritime argument. There little doubt that Anglo-Saxon historiogr3 phy has suffered from its domination i the maritime school of thought, wW downplayed the role of continental ' mies in deciding the outcome of war, For example, the French Navy routed at Trafalgar in 1805, but it was until 1813 that Napoleon’s armies we finally beaten at Leipzig, and then °n after losing the best part of 400,000 n’e on the march to Moscow and back.
The author is not alone in marking 1
a recent article distinguish^ separate tendencies within
Will‘d
Staudenmaier, “Strategy for Survi Foreign Policy, No. 52, Fall 1983. P?s 22^11). But common to all tendencies^ the idea of naval power aS y makeweight and a belief in the effic of “horizontal escalation.” Komer n that command of the sea and can 0i strikes against the Soviet Union “can j„ adequately protect our vital interests^ Eurasia because it cannot adequa ^ deter a great land-based power like0f U.S.S.R.” In debunking the concep1^ horizontal escalation, he points out the relative values involved are i°c J mensurate and suggests that horiz , escalation could even work to the S°vieoUid
stilities at sea, it would be foolish if the ■ S. Navy were to adopt a policy that j^de such conflict inevitable. It is hard disagree with his rejection of these naval conceits,” and others, such as holding Kola at risk” with carrier hkes, or even battleships. But, are these a% part of official naval policy? Komer’s argument can be criticized for
•akii
too
Usiy enough. He takes it too seriously in at he accepts the various assertions at Ce value and fails to distinguish be- een budgetary slogans and operational ncepts—although the one does tend to Promoted to the other—and in that the
the case if we used nuclear weapons a8ainst Soviet territory, since it would al<ow them to respond with nuclear ?trikes against the carrier and our remote lsland bases, without fear of escalation.
Komer also attacks the shibboleth that any U. S.-Soviet clash must automati- CaUy escalate to worldwide war, a variant °f Which asserts that conflict on land IT>Ust inevitably lead to war at sea. Obvi- °Usly, there is a risk that this might hap- f>en) but since America’s broader strate- !=lc interests are best served by avoiding
ng the “maritime strategy” problem seriously, and for not taking it seri-
th: fa.
hvi
%
Set
Ch
anges in budgetary allocations are not Colng to shift the balance between the C(jUr services unless they are persisted in 1^ many more years. Nor is a move from "13 carriers to 14—15 going to allow
wartime missions to be carried out simultaneously rather than seriately.
Komer does not take the problem seriously enough in that he ignores the past and does not look to the future. Throughout 1952-75, the Navy could deploy 14-16 attack carriers; in 1976, the number fell to 13, and it was planned to stabilize at 12 in 1984. During this period, the peacetime maritime environment had become significantly more hostile, and commitments increased as the British dropped out, Persian Gulf oil assumed a new importance, and we lost Iran as an ally. A new Soviet interest in the Norwegian Sea as a defense zone meant that our wartime requirements also increased. This would seem to argue for keeping the fleet at 15 carrier battle groups, but past budgetary allocations had not even been sufficient to sustain a 12-carrier navy. Even the smaller force, however, requires $12.3 billion (fiscal year 1983) in annual new construction—about 17 major units a year. But, during 1968-82, the Navy shipbuilding and conversion budgets averaged only $7.13 billion per annum.
This past underinvestment was only possible because the fleet was being slimmed down from 1,000 mainly World War II-vintage ships. Similarly, the current buildup is deceptive. Only 105 major units were scheduled for retirement in 1983-92, but this rate doubles in 1993—
Navy Secretary Lehman, left, and Vice President Bush support a maritime strategy that envisions a role for battleships such as the Iowa (BB-61), which Robert Komer sees little need for in his coalition (continental) strategy.
97, and rises to 25 a year in 1998-2002. “Six Hundred Ships” serves as a rallying cry for the Navy (and as a political point for Secretary of the Navy John Lehman), but even to operate and sustain a 12-carrier fleet would require a 25% increase in the level of funding that was provided in the fiscal year 1981 budget. This is the scale of the Navy’s problem.
Therefore, Komer is right when he points to resource allocation, but wrong when he poses it as a question of the balance between maritime and coalition strategies. The mismatch of resources and commitments is far more fundamental, and policies must be tailored to fit the budgetary cloth. This need not imply a lessened involvement in the world but would require a different style of involvement, one that exploits America’s comparative advantages and bypasses the disadvantages, while addressing the problem of divergent perceptions within the alliance.
The United States is at a disadvantage in using military power as an instrument of policy, because of geographical remoteness and the escalating costs of projecting effective force, and because the Soviet Union is Mackinderland incarnate. America’s strength lies in its economic power and its political and social values, instruments of policy that are more effective for being wielded from a distance because then they are less oppressive. The United States is strong enough to tolerate dissenting ideas, but not strong enough to enforce its own ideas on other nations. American values can, however, prevail on their own merits.
Given this situation, it is perverse for the United States to place primary emphasis on military force as an instrument of policy. If it played to its comparative advantages and reduced its reliance on the military instrument, the United States would find that its resources would be adequate to protect and promote its global interests. Not least, because this approach would mitigate the problem of divergent interests, and allow coalition— a la Komer—to become a reality.
Mr. MccGwire, a former British naval officer, is now a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U. S. Navy
,'sManagement yj78), the first tformance of
ar80 Handling
l^hn R lmmer Washington, DC: Work Saving •j, “national, 1984. 316 pp. Ulus. Ind. Append. ables. $35.00 ($31.50).
Th
tough the use of ample text, figures, photo- aPhs, and line drawings, the business and
lf*hi
a8e
America's Parallel
^ichael C. Sandusky. Alexandria, VA: Old ““minion Press, 1983. Illus. Bib. Ind. Maps. Jl9-95 ($17.95).
Derived from previously classified documents and a meticulous reconstruction of events, this ls the story of the division of Korea at the 38th Parallel in August 1945. The roles of the United States and the Soviet Union are analyzed, and the causes and events behind this mzarre decision are recounted in detail. Mr. Sandusky concludes that it is the United States that must shoulder primary responsibility for his “first overt act of containment in what '"'as to become the chillingly persistent Cold War. ’ ’
^he Antagonists: A Comparative Combat Assessment of the Soviet and American holdier
j^chard A. Gabriel. Westport, CT: Greenwood miss, 1984 208 pp. Bib. Ind. Tables. $29.95 (S26.95).
J^°st comparative studies of the combat capacities of the United States and Soviet Union c°ncentrate on macro-factors, such as the size °f the defense budget, number of troops or ^apons, and the state-of-the-art of weapons evelopmcnt. This book looks instead at the Cnemial adversaries, the troops themselves, at ‘I 'evels, from enlisted men to officers. The study reveals faults and strengths in both ar- n’'es, but of particular interest is the discussion . the all-volunteer force and its ramifications p assessing the U. S. combat effectiveness. r°fessor Gabriel is a former Army intelli- 8ence officer and is currently a major in the dby Reserve. He has written a number of ^her books, including Crisis in Command: in the Army (Hill and Wang, major critique of the combat U. S. soldiers in Vietnam.
utcal aspects of cargo handling and stow- are thoroughly covered. The stowage of ^azardous materials, containerized cargo, and D and liquid bulk cargoes are addressed, °ng many other topics. A unique aspect of cls C°ok is the treatment of the application of I atPuters to cargo handling problems. John Iller was one of the first industrial engineers 'v°rk in cargo handling; he has more than 30 rs experience as a materials handling consultant and was a founding member of the International Cargo Handling Coordination Association in 1952.
Charles Vernon Gridley: A Naval Career
Maxwell P. Schoenfield. Erie, PA: Erie County Historical Society, 1983. 124 pp. Illus. Bib. Append. $5.95.
Almost everyone has heard Admiral George Dewey’s famous quote from the Battle of Manila Bay, “You may fire when ready, Grid- ley”; but little is known about the man to whom he spoke. This book traces the life of Gridley, commanding officer of Admiral Dewey’s flagship, the cruiser Olympia, from his birth in the Midwest to his death 35 days after the Battle of Manila Bay. It provides not only a detailed account of an individual career but offers an interesting look at the 19th century U. S. Navy.
Conversations With the Enemy: The Story of PFC Robert Garwood
Winston Groom and Duncan Spencer. New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1983. 411 pp. $16.95 ($15.25).
Private First Class Robert Garwood was captured by the Vietcong in South Vietnam in 1965 at the age of 18. He returned home in 1979, 32 years old, to face charges of treason and a possible firing squad. He was accused by the Marine Corps of collaborating with his captors and leading enemy forces against his own countrymen. This is his story, as told by Garwood to the authors and researched from voluminous files of notes, tapes, transcripts, and interviews. The controversy surrounding this case and the issues it raises will probably never be resolved, but the story is one of intense human drama and very difficult moral questions.
The Empire of the Seas: A Biography of Rear Admiral Robert Wilson Shufeldt,
USN
Frederick C. Drake. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1984. 353 pp. Illus, Bib. Ind.
$24.95 ($22.45).
Rear Admiral Shufeldt was a naval officer and diplomat in an age when U. S. influence was expanding, and naval power was a primary instrument in that expansion. He played roles of varying importance in the diplomatic intercourse with Cuba, Mexico, Africa, and Asia, and he was singularly responsible for the treaty with Korea in 1882. Despite his significant contributions, he has been relegated to relative obscurity until this book was written.
The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union
Edward N. Luttwak. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983. 242 pp. Ind. Append. Tables. $14.95 ($13.45).
Described as a “brilliant analysis” by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, this book analyzes the intentions of the Soviet Union by going beyond the traditional look into U. S.- Soviet relations and considering instead the whole range of Soviet policy. A Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University and author of a previous work. The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), Dr. Luttwak discusses the Soviet Union as a military empire in the classic tradition and observes how things have changed from Lenin’s original concept of the Soviet Union. Extensive appendices treat “The Economic Basis of Soviet Power” and “The Evolution of Soviet Military Power Since 1965.”
EE The King’s Ships Were at Sea: The War in the North Sea, August 1914— February 1915
Lieutenant James Goldrick, RAN. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984. 356 pp. Illus. Bib.
Ind. $23.95 ($19.16).
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This story already exists in official histories written shortly after the actual events. But, as Lieutenant Goldrick points out, some changes have occurred which warrant a retelling of this compelling drama. The earlier historians were
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The Wars in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, 1945-1982: A Bibliographic Guide
Richard Dean Bums and Milton Lietenberg. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio Information Services, 1984. 290 pp. Gloss. Bib. Ind. Maps. Tables. $58.50 ($52.65).
subject to censorship and hindered by inaccessible classified files. They were pressured by admirals still in command at the time and were denied the German side of the story. Now, in this fresh account of the early sea battles of World War I, there is new perspective and insight. It is a story of historical significance, human drama, and relevance in the study of sea power.
Mariner’s Rules of the Road
William P. Crawford. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1983. 336 pp. lllus. Append. Tables. $24.95 ($22.45).
“Seafaring is not a contact sport. . . .” So begins this latest of treatises on the nautical Rules of the Road. The tone is light, but the coverage is comprehensive and in depth. All of the latest changes to the rules have been
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incorporated, and the appendices include a one-to-one display of the International and Inland Rules as well as a section covering interpretations of the rules as issued by the International Maritime Organization (originator of the International Rules) and the U. S. Coast Guard. Mr. Crawford, author of Mariner’s Celestial Navigation (Norton, 1979), and Mariner’s Weather (Norton, 1979) has reorganized the rules into more understandable patterns, and, with the aid of many photographs, drawings, and touches of humor, has managed to put life into a traditionally “dry” subject.
On the Brink: Defense, Deficits, and Welfare Spending
James L. Clayton. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1984. 153 pp. Append.
Tables. $8.95 ($8.05).
This carefully researched thesis explores the U. S. economy as it relates to national defense. Dr. Clayton examines the increasing fiscal problems and budgetary failures that currently plague the United States, and he suggests the causes of this dilemma. He contends that this developing economic crisis threatens our ability to adequately provide for our welfare needs as well as our nation’s defense. Although the arguments are decidedly controversial, they are carefully developed and intellectually stimulating.
Phantom Over Vietnam: Fighter Pilot,
USMC
John Trotti. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984.
250 pp. Illus. Gloss. Append. $15.95 ($14.35). John Trotti flew more than 600 missions during two tours of duty in Vietnam. This is his account of those missions, and the thoughts and feelings behind them. Trotti views flying as “more than a way of life ... it is life- From the exhilaration of combat flying to the incomparable sense of loss at seeing a friend s aircraft go down in flames, this is a story 0 descriptive action and introspective insight.
USSR in Crisis: The Failure of an Economic System
Marshall I. Goldman. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1983. 210 pp. Bib. Ind. Tables. $15.00 ($13.50) (hardcover), $4.95 (S4.45) (paper).
Virtually all sectors of the Soviet economy 8,6 plagued by “stagnation, waste, and misman agement.” Author of several other books on the Soviet Union and comparative economj systems as well as Associate Director of1 Russian Research Center at Harvard Univer sity, Marshall I. Goldman examines the Sovi Union’s current economic dilemma. He eon tends that the problem is the result of the Sovl ets’ persistent adherence to the Stalinist eco nomic model devised in the 1920s. He reve why Stalin’s plan made sense initially, eventually became inappropriate, why eha - has become increasingly difficult, and 'v prospects there are for the future.
The bibliographic collection has been e panded to more than 6,000 entries in th's r vised edition. Entries, which include both 1 tion and nonfiction, are grouped by subJ . , into nine broad chapters which are topic3 subdivided into more specific areas. Extens ^ cross-indexing and accompanying tables maps make this a valuable research tool-
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