The major NATO training exercise Teamwork 84, conducted in northern Norway during February-March of this year, was the largest amphibious exercise ever conducted above the Arctic Circle in wintertime. To many observers. Teamwork 84 reflected a growing NATO capability to deploy large numbers of combat troops under severe climatic conditions to reinforce a key member nation. It also illustrated some of the difficulties the alliance may expect in actually executing that reinforcement in the face of unique political restrictions, harsh geographic realities, limited strategic mobility assets, and an expanding Soviet interdiction capability.
For two of the major players in the exercise—the United States and Norway—Teamwork 84 also represented a considerable investment of fiscal and political capital. For the Norwegians, the exercise afforded an early appraisal of U. S. readiness to provide credible reinforcements in the far north. It was also an opportunity for the Norwegians to assess the progress of the major unilateral and bilateral measures taken in the past eight years to offset an awesome Soviet buildup in the region. For the United States, Teamwork 84 provided a hard look at the ability of large amphibious forces to operate in arctic winter conditions. In addition, both nations were able to get an initial look at the operational feasibility of the new prepositioning program in Norway. It is safe to say, also, that the exercise was watched with unblinking interest by all of Norway’s neighbors—both Nordic and Slavic—as well as by a restive NATO.
Such a significant investment warrants a closer analysis. As Teamwork 84 recently caused us to focus on the arctic flank, perhaps now would be an appropriate time to ask ourselves a few probing questions:
► What is the strategic significance of Norway to NATO and the United States?
► What is the nature of the Soviet threat in the north?
► What is Norway’s capability to defend itself?
► What should be the role of the U.S. Marines as part of the strategic equation in Norway; specifically:
—Can they get there in time?
—Will the prepositioning program be effective?
—Can they fight in the arctic?
—Can they contribute to the prosecution of a naval campaign?
Norway’s Strategic Significance
Norway’s proximity to the access routes and home waters of the Soviet Navy’s Northern Fleet accounts for the nation’s greatest strategic significance. This prominence has increased dramatically with the Soviet buildup of naval forces in the Kola Peninsula and the evolutionary growth in the Northern Fleet’s importance to Soviet strategic planning. Norway’s critical position is a function of geography, politics, history—and the bipolar competition of the two superpowers since World War II.
Norway’s military geography offers many contrasts. While the rugged terrain generally favors the defense, the same convoluted mountains and narrow defiles also limit the rapid flow of reinforcements and supplies to forward defenders. There is but one main north-south road, Route E-6, and a parallel rail line, which ends at Bodp. The military highlights in central and north Norway include the airfields at Banak, Tromsp, Bardufoss, And0ya, Evenes, Bod0, Orland, and Vaemes, the port cities of Trondheim and Narvik, and, perhaps the far northern island of Svalbard. Bardufoss, the main reception airfield in the north, is considered the linchpin.
Norway shares a 122-mile border with the Soviet Union. The other two contiguous neighbors are avowed neutrals. NATO reinforcements must all come by air or surface lift; North American allies are 4,000 miles away. Norway is acutely aware of these realities.
Increasingly, the airfields in north Norway are assuming a considerable significance in any major East-West confrontation. A strongly defended Norway would enable the NATO alliance to monitor, surveil, and interdict the sorties of the Northern Fleet to great advantage; deny or limit Soviet access to the Atlantic; and indeed serve as a springboard for offensive strikes against the Kola complex in a protracted, conventional war. By contrast, with north Norway in Soviet hands, the alliance could be outflanked in many respects, and the critical sea-lanes between America and central Europe could be placed at grave risk. Considering the fact that 90% of the allied reinforcements and sustainability for a Central Front war must proceed along those sea lines of communications (SLOCs), the loss of Norway could be catastrophic.
There is now an added dimension to Norway’s strategic significance. It is increasingly evident that the Soviet Navy is favoring a forward deployed strategy for protecting the Northern Fleet’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in a general war. Early positioning of these defensive assets in the deep waters of the Norwegian Sea, literally a series of rings of surface and subsurface forces, well within range of Soviet Naval Aviation units flying out of newly captured Norwegian airfields, would provide additional defense in depth for both the SSBNs and the Soviet homeland. It would enhance the preservation of a credible second strike capability for the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact in a global nuclear war. It would also enhance protection of the Kola, threaten the Atlantic SLOC, beat the Allies to the Greenland/Iceland/Norway Gap, outflank the key islands, and bring the Central Front within range of Soviet “Yankee”-class submarines, among other weapon systems. Indeed, Norway is no longer considered the “forgotten flank” by serious defense analysts. As Robert Weinland first observed six years ago: “World War III may not be won on the Northern Flank, but it could definitely be lost there.”
Possession—or neutralization—of the northern airfields is thus a critical strategic objective for both sides. Time would be of the essence. In fact, the element of time is fundamental to any analysis of invading or reinforcing Norway.
The Regional Balance
Soviet Forces: The dominant force in the north is the Soviet Northern Fleet, with headquarters in Severomorsk on the Kola Peninsula. It is especially significant to note that the Northern Fleet includes about one-half the Soviet Union’s submarines, including some 70% of its sea-based nuclear forces.
Other Soviet forces arrayed against the Northern Flank include eight motorized rifle divisions, an airborne division, a naval infantry brigade, and several hundred tactical aircraft. The one weapon system which has probably had the greatest impact on military calculus in the north has been the TU-22M “Backfire” bomber. Should the Soviets be able to launch “Backfires” from captured Norwegian airfields, the allied convoys to Europe would be placed at even greater risk than they would be with the Soviets using their own facilities. NATO planners also watch the development program for the Soviet’s newest bomber, the “Blackjack.”
Soviet developments in unconventional warfare also bear watching by NATO. In the Manchurian campaign of 1945 the Russian commander used well coordinated attacks by small units of paratroopers and swimmers against strategic targets. Forty years later, the special forces— “Spetsnaz”—of the GRU, Soviet Military Intelligence, have evolved into a significant force. The reported Spetsnaz mission of sabotage, assassination, disruption, and diversion would seemingly lend itself to any postulated Soviet designs on Norway. A Spetsnaz Naval Brigade is assigned to the Northern Fleet. It is reportedly organized into an “anti-VIP” company, a midget submarine group, several combat swimmer battalions, and a parachute battalion.
The trend in terms of Soviet forces in the vicinity of the “Murmansk Oblast” is therefore up. The Soviets have made the Kola Peninsula one of the most militarized regions in the world, and have added considerable organic interdiction and power projection capabilities.
When we consider the Red Army’s ability to fight in the arctic we too often remember their poor showing against the Finns in the Winter War of 1939-1940. This is misleading. The Soviets are certainly students of their own military history. Their recapture of Finland in 1944-1945 against both Finns and Germans was masterful. So was their counteroffensive to drive elements of the German Army Group North out of Finnmark, the easternmost county of Norway. It is safe to state that Soviet troops stationed near the Murmansk Oblast are organized, trained, and equipped to fight capably under arctic wintertime conditions.
Norwegian Forces: The Norwegians have had a mobilization army since the age of the Vikings. The concept has always been based on the premise that the country’s rugged terrain would permit the small standing army to delay an invader until reserves could be mobilized and redeployed to the fight. Thus, the brunt of any Soviet attack would be absorbed by Norway’s regular forces until mobilization could bring the reserves and the Home Guard into action, and—further in time—external reinforcements could arrive. The worrisome thing to the West, however, is that the system failed in 1940. There were barely 15,000 Norwegians under arms on 9 April 1940 when the Wehr- macht attacked. The Germans, in a classic blitzkrieg, used a combined amphibious/airbome operation to seize Oslo, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik almost simultaneously. They also used extensive unconventional warfare activities to confuse and disrupt the Norwegian mobilization. The British Fleet delivered a coalition counter-invasion force within three days, but the campaign was ill-conceived and poorly executed. The reinforcing British, French, and expatriate Polish units lacked cohesion, heavy weapons, tactical mobility, and air cover. In seven weeks they were driven out of Norway. The Norwegian forces held on for a total of 62 days on sheer bravery alone, but eventually surrendered and the nation suffered five dark years of Nazi occupation.
Following the war, Norway became a charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, seeking a more substantial deliverance from a possible Soviet invasion. There are some significant caveats to Norway’s participation in NATO, however, which must be understood in any analysis of Norwegian security policy. These caveats are a series of unilateral policy declarations which reflect Norway’s acute sense of political reality: a mixture of reassurance to the Soviet Union, Finland, and Sweden, balanced against the requirements for insurance against another foreign invasion. They are, in effect, a series of voluntary confidence-building measures. First, since 1949, Norway has declared a policy of no basing of foreign troops on its soil as long as it was not under attack or “exposed to threat of attack.” The policy is not overly restrictive. Allied troops have always been allowed to train in-country with Norwegian forces; prestocking of allied supplies and equipment is increasingly authorized; reception ports and airfields have been modified to facilitate reception of allied reinforcements. But Norway is not West Germany, where hundreds of thousands of allied troops are forward deployed on an almost permanent basis and a massive prepositioning program has long been established. The rules are different on the Northern Flank.
These restrictions notwithstanding, it is important to recognize that Norway is a resourceful and worthy ally. The country has quietly but consistently stood up to Soviet threats and intimidation attempts in the north. In the face of the alarming Soviet buildup in the Kola, Oslo has initiated a meaningful “buildup” of its own, including selective modernization of its armed forces by acquisition of F-16 fighters, P-3B Orion maritime patrol aircraft, diesel submarines, and I-Hawk antiaircraft missiles.
In many significant ways, Norway carries its share of the load. Norwegian defense expenditures have doubled, and per capita defense spending has quadrupled since 1971. In fact, during the period 1975-1980, Norway had the highest percentage growth rate in defense expenditures in all of NATO. Given the European political milieu in those years, this sustained growth has been remarkable. And, as a corollary, these defense expenditures have been accompanied by national polls that reflect a healthy support for Norway’s continued participation in NATO.
Today there are a total of 43,000 people on active duty in Norway’s armed forces, of which 30,000 are conscripts undergoing their mandatory one year of initial military training. On paper this may seem an insubstantial force, but it is, in my experience, a professional one with high motivation and a clear perception of its primary function: to delay Soviet invasion forces long enough for mobilization to take place and reinforcements to arrive.
Many countries boast of the readiness of their reserves and their mobilization plans. Usually it takes a crisis such as the German invasion of Norway in 1940—or perhaps an uncompromising exercise like our Nifty Nugget ’78—to validate or discredit the claim. Norway appears to have learned its 1940 lesson well. There are 122,000 troops in the army reserves, consisting of 12 brigades of about 5,000 men each, plus support units and territorial forces. Norway also has a Home Guard comprised of 90,000 men of all services who receive 90 days initial training. A good number of Home Guardsmen, incidentally, are already well versed in essential military skills, because so many are experienced outdoorsmen—hunters, trappers, skiers— to begin with.
The aggregate number of reserves and guardsmen is significant. This means that Norway relies on these part-time forces to provide over 85% of its wartime strength. The NATO average is 50%, but let’s not mislead ourselves. Norway has roughly 1% of its total population on active duty. So does America. It is difficult for any democracy to maintain a higher percentage in peacetime. The key is quality, and Norwegian reservists are arguably among the best in the world.
The effective mobilization and deployment of Norway’s reserve forces are central to the nation’s ability to delay invading Soviet forces long enough to permit orderly reception of external NATO reinforcements. Norway appears determined not to let a preemptive attack or subversive activities disrupt mobilization again. Norwegian troops are under standing orders of the Crown since 1949 to fight automatically if attacked, without waiting for central authority. Mobilization is assumed upon the first sign of an invasion, whether notification works or not. Mobilization drills are frequent and taken seriously.
All this is good. But Norway’s population distribution—with most reserves living in the south, needed in the north-works counter to the plan. The vulnerability of Norwegian mobilization may well be the requirement to deploy the bulk of these troops from south to north along a narrow line of communication that can be readily interdicted. The Norwegians know this and know the soft spots. The Home H Guard and territorial units are trained to protect them. In addition, Norway plans to use its considerable civil air fleet and commercial ferryboats and other craft to trans- port troops to the north. These are not inconsequential assets. Norway’s merchant marine is the fourth largest in the world. There should be plenty of surface transport available. Can it be assembled, organized, and protected?
Winston Churchill once declared that “wars are not won by heroic militia.” However, the mission of the Norwegian force is not to “win the war” but simply to delay an enemy invasion. Unlike the West Germans, the Norwegians can afford to trade space for time—to a point. They are organized, trained, and equipped to fight for time. The issue then centers on the speed with which Norwegian and NATO reinforcements can arrive, and with what quality of combat power.
Allied Forces: For NATO, support to Norway is a function of the “art of the possible”: the ban against foreign H basing means that allied combat power must be built from ground zero at a time when limited strategic mobility assets are probably needed to reinforce/resupply the Central Front. Thus, those reinforcements designated for Norway must be small, light, self-supporting, and ready to deploy on short notice. The fate of the Central Front may be measured in terms of “armored division equivalents,” but the unit of choice in the defense of Norway is the combined-arms brigade. Four of these brigades, a true international force, comprise the principal reinforcements to Norway.
The first to arrive in response to a request from the H Norwegian government would probably be elements of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF), deploying by air from their base in Seckenheim, Germany. The unit is task-organized and well trained for operations on the Northern Flank. Essentially a light brigade, the AMF is a show-of-force unit designed to deter Soviet escalation of a crisis by early insertion of mixed NATO forces, who then serve as “trip-wire hostages” should deterrence fail. The AMF is also committed to other contingencies throughout NATO Europe.
The composition and timing of subsequent reinforcements to Norway will be determined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), based on his estimate of the situation on the Central Front. Canada currently has the only external national force clearly earmarked for Norway, a 4,000-man “Combat Air/Sea Transportable” (CAST) brigade which would deploy by merchant shipping to north Norway. Other reinforcements are likely to be the United Kingdom’s Royal Marine Commando Brigade, augmented by units of Dutch Marines.
U. S. commitments to Norway would likewise be at SACEUR’s call. The first and most immediate requirement is likely to be for Air Force fighter squadrons to deploy to co-located operating bases in Norway from either the United States or elsewhere in Europe. This deployment is so dependent on the strategic situation on the Central Front and the tactical situation in Norway that it is almost impossible to quantify. Suffice to say that the few Norwegian and AMF fighter squadrons in Norway will need augmentation as early as possible.
One U.S. Marine Corps amphibious force (MAF) is generally considered to be part of the regional reserve as- signed to the Commander in Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe (CinCNorth). Leaving aside the prepositioning issue for a moment, it is likely that a portion of these forces would be committed to reinforce Norway. Sufficient amphibious and merchant shipping is generally available along the east coast of the United States to embark a heavy Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) of about 15,000 troops in fairly short order. If (admittedly a very large “if”) the amphibious task force could be adequately protected by multiple carrier battle groups and could arrive in Norwegian waters prior to the Soviets developing fixed defensive positions ashore, the MAB could lend a credible, combined arms force to the defense of Norway. There are plentiful landing points (not beaches) in northern Norway where the MAB could fight its way ashore against intermittent or disorganized opposition. This is the preferred method of war-fighting for the Marines, of course, but unless the MAB is forward deployed, afloat, as a “pre-conflict measure,” it is unlikely to get there in time to help save the airfields. The Soviets know this. They have many incentives to execute an attack with utmost surprise and speed.
The deployment of most of the NATO reinforcements to north Norway by shipping is less than satisfactory. Force closure is piecemeal and belated, and the movement itself becomes increasingly vulnerable to interdiction as the crisis worsens. If time of arrival in Norway of combat- ready, integral forces is our measure of effectiveness, then we seem to have a serious “reinforcement gap.”
Weighing the Balance: What could the Soviet Union do with its power in the north? The operational objectives are the north Norway airfields, specifically Bardufoss. The key factor, again, is time. The Soviets must seize and hold those facilities before the Norwegians can mobilize and external reinforcements arrive. It is a classic force generation problem. For this, the Soviets would need a combined arms approach, a maximum amount of surprise, exceptional operations security, the advantage of strategic distraction, and much luck with the weather and other elements of “Clausewitzian friction.”
As students of military history, the Soviets have most assuredly analyzed the German invasion of Norway in 1940. They would note the Wehrmacht’s use of light, combined-arms forces, well supported by tactical aviation. They would also note their adroit use of operational security—the concealment of an entire mountain warfare brigade aboard a German whaling ship which anchored in Narvik; the use of other merchant ships with prepositioned supplies and equipment which loitered near the target ports prior to hostilities. They would appreciate the effective Nazi unconventional warfare program which, under the treasonous Vidkun Quisling, spread disinformation and sabotage to disrupt mobilization. Finally, they would note with interest the inability of the Allies to provide effective reinforcement to Norway from the sea.
But Norway is not likely to be caught flat-footed in the north. The warnings and indicators involved in Soviet preparations for such an invasion would provide plenty of time for Norwegian mobilization. Soviet tanks would encounter increasingly difficult terrain that would slow and channelize their approach. Key bridges would likely be blown or mined by the Home Guard. Soviet airborne troops may find that high winds and well-prepared defenses would disrupt their preemptive drop on the airfields. Likewise, Soviet amphibious forces may reach the Norwegian coast only to find the key fjords toughly defended by controlled minefields, coastal artillery emplacements carved out of rock, diesel submarines, Penguin-firing fast patrol craft, F-16Bs, and enterprising ski-troops on the mountaintops lobbing mortar shells down on the thin-skinned amphibious warfare ships and merchant vessels. Nor does the Soviet Union have the capability of providing adequate sustainability to long-range, power projection forces. Their airborne and amphibious units could be subject to defeat in detail if spread too thinly.
Nevertheless, as the Norwegians review their national security situation in the 1980s, they cannot help but be sobered by developments beyond their control. The relentless buildup of Soviet naval, interdiction, and projection forces in the Kola has been alarming to them. They are aware that the expected warning time has dwindled to a couple of days at best. They are aware of the force asymmetries involved in their general war plans and the existence of a “reinforcement gap” caused by inadequate strategic mobility assets available to NATO in the first days of a crisis. They are faced with the task of defending not only their northeastern borders, but also their 150,000 islands and a coastline 1,643 miles long. At the same time, they probably feel that they have gone about as far as they can go in terms of the balance between defense spending and public support. Clearly, something more is needed.
The Airlifted MAB and Prepositioning
In July 1978, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown directed the Navy Department to plan for “the rapid reinforcement of Norway with an airlifted, brigade-sized force” based on prepositioning of selected equipment in country. This guidance launched a bilateral planning and programming process with the objective of enabling an airlifted MAB to deploy to its prestocked equipment in Norway and be ready to fight early in a developing crisis. The undertaking is seen as a partial solution to the reinforcement gap, an opportunity to reduce significantly the deployment time of one of Norway’s four reinforcing brigades.
The concept of prepositioning is simple. The host nation agrees to provide storage, security, and substantial maintenance services for certain stocks of combat supplies and equipment for the reinforcing nation. Typically, these stocks would include high density, low maintenance, and oversized items suitable for long-term storage, such as ammo, fuel, engineer equipment, wheeled and tracked vehicles, artillery pieces, rations, aviation support equipment, and general supplies. (Some items are not suitable for prepositioning: aircraft, electronic gear, “smart” ordnance, for example.) Relieved of this strategic lift burden, the reinforcing nation is thus able to fly troops and perishable equipment directly to the prestocking sites for redeployment to combat.
Prepositioning has recently come to be perceived as an integral part of the “triad” of strategic mobility, along with sealift and airlift. With time of such critical essence in the reinforcement of Norway, sealift is too slow and airlift too light (our largest aircraft, the C-5, can carry only one tank). Prepositioning completes the triangle. It is a strategic mobility enhancement—categorically not a forcible entry capability—which can nevertheless be used as a preemptive, economy-of-force measure under certain conditions early in a developing crisis. Quick reinforcement by credible combat forces from offshore ships and adequate airlift remains the ideal military and political solution. Prepositioning reflects current and future fiscal realities. It is much less costly than funding for additional ships, planes, or the rotational base needed to support forward deployment.
To truly understand prepositioning, one must first accept certain rather unsettling premises:
► That storage sites will not be blown away by enemy preemptive or saboteur strikes
►That the tactical situation in the host nation is sufficiently benign to permit an uncontested airlift, marry-up, and redeployment of reinforcements
►That the pre-stocked equipment will in fact be operational upon demand
That the prepositioned site has been selected with such foresight that the eventual crisis which triggers the reinforcement develops within reasonable range, and not a thousand miles away
The U. S. Army has practiced prepositioning in Europe for many years under POMCUS (“Prepositioning of Material Configured in Unit Sets”), an enormous program. Currently, the combat supplies and equipment for four full divisions have been acquired and prestocked in German warehouses and depots. By comparison, the MAB prepositioning program for Norway may seem small. The Marines can learn from POMCUS, but there are also some meaningful differences in the programs.
A second major U. S. “strategic mobility enhancement initiative” is the Maritime Prepositioning Program. Currently, all four services have combat supplies and equipment embarked on a flotilla of chartered merchant ships stationed in the Indian Ocean. Coming soon is a quantum improvement of this concept, the first of three sets of specially built or modified T-AK ships, with each set designed to embark a heavy MAB’s worth of gear. All will be employed under a similar concept: an administrative landing in a benign port or beach, coupled with a marriage of airlifted troops and the organic air group. The prepositioned ships will be used in conjunction with their designated MAB as either a preemptive, administrative move to defuse a pending crisis or as a backup to complement assault forces.
A question often asked is why the U. S. Marines should forgo maritime‘prepositioning in favor of an uncharacteristic, for them, prepositioning ashore in Norway. Marines are “soldiers of the sea,” the argument goes, and should benefit from the flexibility inherent with maritime prepositioning. The Norwegians, however, need a positive signal of U. S. commitment to their defense. Cargo ships loitering in the North Sea or anchored at Spithead are not nearly as reassuring as the warehousing of that combat cargo ashore. Again, the painful memory of 1940 persists. Besides, prepositioning in Norway doesn’t need the flexibility of the maritime format. The Marines are committed to defend Norway. Prepositioning ashore is the logical next step.
Norway has accepted allied prepositioning for many years. The Canadians, British, and the ACE Mobile Force all have prestocking agreements. In spite of the precedents and the innocuous nature of the program, the idea of prepositioning Marine Corps combat equipment had a rough time gaining political acceptance in Norway. Domestic political pressure in 1980 caused the compromise decision by the Norwegian Parliament to accept prepositioning in central Norway instead of the north. Prestocking in the vicinity of Tromsp was considered too provocative towards the Soviet Union and perhaps too drastic a reversal of traditional Norwegian nonalignment. Some thought prestocking in the north might prompt Moscow to counter with prestocking, or even forward basing, in Finland. The compromise site, Trondheim, is more readily protected than Tromsd and may offer more options in a crisis, but the decision nonetheless will require the Marines to undertake a substantial 400-mile redeployment after marriage with the prepositioned equipment. As a considerable offset, the Norwegian government agreed to prestock heavy equipment for another of their brigades in the north.
With the Trondheim compromise accepted, the way was clear for the two nations to sign a memorandum of understanding in January 1981. In this document, both nations agreed to the following:
►That the U. S. “may provide, consistent with SACEUR requirements and implementing arrangements, a U. S. MAB for alliance reinforcement of Norway within the NATO chain of command”
►That prepositioned MAB equipment will consist of “155mm howitzers and their prime movers; bridging equipment, motor transport, ammunition, fuel and food’
►That Norway will provide host nation support to include “over-snow vehicles, two motor transport companies, one ambulance company, one refueler section and necessary engineering and airbase support equipment”
►That Norway will provide adequate means “to tactically load and transport personnel and equipment of the MAB from central Norway to other threatened areas in Norway”
►That Norwegian policies with respect to the stationing of foreign troops or the stockpiling or deployment of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory will not be altered
The first part of the document is more notable for what it does not say than for what it actually states. Contrary to popular belief, the document does not automatically lock a Marine amphibious brigade to Norway. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe still calls the shots. In fact, all three parties must agree to make it work: Norway has to ask, SACEUR has to approve, and the United States must agree. Some flexibility is therefore retained.
Further scrutiny of the agreement reveals the absence of heavy combat vehicles—tanks, assault amphibian vehicles, or self-propelled artillery—so the MAB expects to be light. Also evident is the quantity of host nation offsets: over 370 tactical vehicles and a good number of other support equipment. The statement of Norwegian responsibilities to redeploy the MAB from its reception airfields in Central Norway to “other threatened areas” is a further reflection of the “Trondheim compromise.” Not specified in the memorandum of understanding, but an integral part of the proceedings, was the U. S. agreement to delete the usual A-6E squadron from the aviation combat element of the MAB. While the U. S. Marine Corps prizes the A-6E as its only all-weather, close support attack aircraft, some Norwegians view it as a long-range, high-payload strike aircraft which could be perceived as an offensive threat by the Soviets.
A comparison between Norway prepositioning and the traditional POMCUS program is in order. Three observations are relevant. First, the MAB equipment is by no means a complete unit set. This is selected prestocking. Some items are not mission-essential, others are not suitable for extended storage in a cold climate. Second, the Norwegians are providing substantial offsets in both equipment and personnel to lighten the overall load. Third, the Norwegians themselves are providing the security and maintenance for the stored equipment. In the spirit of the agreement, not a single Marine will be stationed in Norway to look after the gear.
Although years away from completion, the Norway prepositioning program is very much under way. The first load of ammunition arrived in country in November 1982. Thus far, all of the POL and about 25% of the ammo is in place, along with much of the artillery, rolling stock, and airfield support equipment.
Deployment and Employment
The Norway prepositioning program is bound to have an effect on the U. S. Marine Corps. The Marines actively sought this assignment at a time of transition in roles and missions—a time of decreasing amphibious lift and increasing commitment to “rapid deployment” tasks. The airlift commitment to Norway will require specialized training and equipment to meet environmental requirements in the arctic, which may logically lead to the “earmarking” of a specific Marine amphibious brigade for the task. Some Marines were not altogether pleased with the new tasking. For them, prestocking in Norway for an earmarked MAB represented a significant step away from the global maritime flexibility which has characterized the Marine Corps contribution to national security throughout much of the past 208 years. Others accepted the reality and looked for ways to become more useful—another institutional trademark—in the new assignment.
What kind of combat capability may NATO and the two nations expect to get for their investment in prepositioning on the Northern Flank? At first glance, a mere brigade seems hardly a force to be reckoned with amid NATO’s fixation with armored division equivalents. And the Norway MAB, it must be realized, will deploy and fight without its heavy combat vehicles. But that’s the beauty of being able to task organize in support of a specific mission. The operational objective of the airlifted MAB will be to beat the Soviets to the northern airfields; then—in coordination with the Norwegians, ACE Mobile Force, Canadians, Dutch, and British—to fight a defensive campaign to keep those facilities operational.
Even without its tanks, LVTs, and A-6Es, the Norway MAB will be a substantial force of well over 10,000 troops, integrated into an air-ground task force and provisioned with an initial 30 days of all classes of supply. The combination of its three squadrons of fighter and close air support aircraft and abundance of antitank systems should offset the tank deficiency in north Norway.
It has been estimated that the prestocking in Norway of the equipment listed in the memorandum of understanding will reduce airlift requirements for the MAB by nearly 80%, saving hundreds of sorties. More significantly, prestocking saves time, the critical ingredient in reinforcing Norway. Details will vary, but it is probably safe to estimate that the MAB could be in place in north Norway within about ten days of an execution order by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as opposed to several weeks’ deployment by surface means.
Arriving in Trondheim is one objective; getting up to the northern airfields is an altogether different one. The movement north from Trondheim will obviously require a team solution. Simply stated, everything will be moving north at once: Norwegian reservists, allied reinforcements, resupply columns. A premium will be placed on savvy traffic management in order to “deconflict” the inevitable bottlenecks. Should the MAB somehow arrive in Trondheim before general mobilization has been declared, the Norwegian government would have to order selective mobilization within the civilian transportation industry in order to make the ferryboats, for example, available to redeploy U. S. forces northward. And we should recognize allied vulnerabilities during that period of redeployment. Special security efforts will be essential to prevent Soviet Spetsnatz strikes against reception airfields, bridges, tunnels, assembly areas, and ferry slips. It will be a target-rich environment to Soviet military intelligence forces.
Fighting in the Arctic
Let’s first define a theoretical mission for the airlifted MAB. Based on security objectives deduced from our preceding analysis, the MAB’s mission could be stated in these terms:
► Deploy to Norway as rapidly as possible with optimum combat power and unit integrity.
►Defend designated airfields in North Norway—in coordination with other allied forces—against assaults by combined airborne, amphibious, overland, and special forces.
►Provide forces in support of the naval campaign in the Norwegian Sea.
The Allied reinforcement operation in 1940 was poorly equipped and under-supplied for the mission. The U. S. MAB in the late 1980s should fare better. The combination of its prepositioned gear, Norwegian offsets, and airlifted equipment should provide a light but lethal force with excellent sustainability. The aviation combat element of the MAB, in particular, should play a significant role in accomplishing all aspects of the unit’s mission. Even without the A-6E squadron, the aviation element is sizeable: two F-18 squadrons, a large AV-8B Harrier squadron, detachments of EA-6Bs, RF-4Bs, and OV-10s, over 75 helicopters, a Stinger platoon, a full I-Hawk battalion, and complete air control and support units.
With all this combat equipment, what will be the MAB’s level of mobility under arctic conditions? Perhaps no other capability is as important in arctic combat, even in defensive operations. Soviet invasion forces are expected to be heavily mechanized. In the winter months they may make good progress through Finnmark’s tundra, but they’ll play hell in the high ground. “Mechanized legions in north Norway don’t impress me,” said a former CinCNorth to visiting U. S. Marines, “but give me helicopters and strong young men.” Hence, the primary mode of MAB mobility will be its 54 transport helicopters, including a detachment of the new CH-53E “Super Stallions.” Cross-country tactical mobility will be provided by the Norwegian BV 202 and 206 over-snow vehicles, considered by many observers to have the best snow agility of any military vehicle in the world, including the Soviet GT-T. The one problem with the “Bandvagns” is their thin skin: they are best at movement to contact and logistic support. The Marines may wish they had retained their assault amphibian vehicles. The LVT-7A1 is not particularly agile in Norwegian snow (although it has done well in North American snow of a different consistency), but its outstanding river/fjord-crossing capabilities will be missed, and the vehicle would perform well in marginal terrain during the eight months of the year when the ground is not snow-covered. Cleats added to the tracks improved mobility of all tracked vehicles used in Norway during exercise Teamwork 84.
In terms of individual mobility, the Americans will be at an initial disadvantage. Everyone else in the theater— Norwegians, Russians, British, Dutch, Canadians—will be able to ski with ease. Look for the Marines to be mainly on snowshoes. It’s a question of exposure and experience. Canadians and northern Europeans literally grow up on skis. The British and Dutch Marines train in north Norway for three months every winter. Some Americans will have the background; most will not. Snowshoes can be learned more quickly, produce fewer accidents, are more easily transported and—under certain conditions—produce comparable mobility. This is the best we can expect under the terms of a sudden 4,000-mile deployment from the Carolinas to north Norway.
But what about training? How can Marines train in the temperate piney woods of Camp Lejeune for the harsh conditions of Norway without breaking the bank? Frankly, this has been a real problem. The initial Marine Corps training exercises in the Norwegian arctic during the mid- 1970s were not promising. Inexperience and unsuitable equipment produced frostbite, disorientation, and poor mobility. Since then, both training and equipment have been reassessed and modified, and arctic proficiency—on the aggregate—has been improved significantly. The Marines now take cold weather training seriously. In the United States last year, for example, some 10,000 Marines were cycled through the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center in Bridgeport, California, and an additional 4,000 were trained at the Army National Guard Facility in Camp Ripley, Minnesota. Marine Corps Reserves prepared for their role in Teamwork 84 by conducting a series of cold weather field exercises at Camp Ethan Allen in Vermont in early January. Amphibious cold weather training in North America has been less productive, however, primarily due to the problem of finding suitable sites that are ice-free and unhampered by environmental restrictions.
The best training for both units and individuals, of course, is in Norway itself. It’s an expensive undertaking, but U. S. Marines—in one configuration or another—have trained there every winter since 1976. Anorak Express 80 was a landmark: the first U. S. amphibious exercise north of the Arctic Circle in the wintertime, and the first joint training experience between the Marines and the ACE Mobile Force. Anorak Express was a mini-Teamwork 84—a walk-before-you-can-run learning experience.
Unit performance in progressively larger winter training exercises in Norway has thus been encouraging for U. S. forces. And yet, U. S. Marines will never be as proficient in arctic warfare as their Norwegian, Canadian, and Royal Marines counterparts—nor should they be expected to be. Even an “earmarked” MAB would never be able to afford the expense of prolonged training exercises in Norway, and—significantly—the normal turnover in its ranks would vitiate the experience even if it could. Any MAB assigned the Norway mission could do more for its combat effectiveness by balancing available cold weather training with equal emphasis on discipline, small unit leadership, physical fitness, employment of combined arms, and readiness for rapid deployment. In particular, Marines need to become as familiar and proficient with airlift planning as they have been with shipboard embarkation planning since the 18th century. (The contingency airlift of replacement troops and equipment to Beirut immediately after last October’s bombing was both a vivid example of the requirement for greater airlift expertise and an example of how far we have come in learning this new skill). The Marines may well be at a certain disadvantage when they arrive in the arctic, but this will hardly reduce the organic combat effectiveness the MAB should be able to bring to the fight.
The northern airfields are key to the MAB’s mission. Defending them, and keeping Marine air flying from them, should be the prime focus. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman has identified the Norwegian Sea as the “principal naval battleground” of a NATO war. Early deployment of the MAB to Norway will not only deny use of the northern airfields to the Soviets, it will also provide relatively secure sanctuaries for U. S. land-based aviation to operate as a forward element of the naval force.
This is not a boast that Marine aviation will single- handedly win the Norwegian Sea campaign—far from it! Most serious defense analysts envision the integrated employment of all available joint and combined assets— Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, allied—to defeat the Soviets in that region. The MAB’s aviation combat element can assist in several ways. The Harriers and rotary-wing aircraft can help the Marines and other allied forces defend the airfields against Soviet combined arms attacks. The F/A-18s could readily be employed against Soviet surface targets in the open sea, but they would best be employed in the air defense role against the inevitable waves of Soviet long range, naval and tactical air forces swarming out of the Kola airfields. Admittedly, 24 Marine F-18s, by themselves, would soon be overwhelmed, but the concept involves combined antiair warfare roles with U. S. Air Force and Norwegian F-16s, plus the Canadian and AMF fighters. It would be a credible umbrella.
In terms of antiship contributions, let’s think realistically about the A-6Es. While we should scrupulously honor the peacetime ban, we should also be prepared to deploy the A-6E squadron, along with KC-130 tankers, to Norway if hostilities begin and the Norwegian Government is prepared to request them. The A-6E should be equipped with Harpoon antiship missiles by the late 1980s and can be eminently useful in support of the naval campaign.
The MAB’s aviation combat element can assist in other ways, as well. As described in Lieutenant Colonel T. L. Wilkerson’s excellent article “Two if by Sea,” in the November 1983 Proceedings, the MAB will provide C3 interoperability through the Marine air command and control system/Navy tactical data system (MACCS/NTDS) linkage, thus permitting a landward extension of the naval task force commander’s offensive and defensive operations. In fact, the Marines’ TAOC may well be the single most valuable system in the theater during the Norwegian Sea campaign, providing linkage between Navy ships and NADGE systems ashore, and between NATO or U. S. Air Force AWACS and the ships. The TPS-59 long-range acquisition radar and TPS-63 gap-filler radar systems will help provide early warning and stand-off interception for all allied forces. The MAB can further assist by providing divert airfields, tactical fuel dispensing systems, and other logistic support services to carrier-based naval aviation, and Air Force units or maritime patrol aircraft if required.
All of this amounts to a significant level of Marine support for the naval campaign offshore. In this light, the assignment of an airlifted MAB to the prepositioning mission in Norway is not such a radical departure from tradition after all. It makes optimum use of the special capabilities of a combined-arms, naval expeditionary force. It provides an arguably more realistic role for elements of SACEUR’s strategic reserves. It is a role distinctly maritime in flavor and, in its own way, has a surprising degree of flexibility. One of the formal roles assigned to the Marine Corps by Congress in 1916 was “to provide a force of Marines for seizing and defending advanced naval bases in time of war.” Times change; some roles do not.
Prospects
We should realize that the prepositioning program in Norway is not yet a capability-in-being. The program— 'veil under way and initially exercised in Teamwork 84— "oil be subject to periodic funding reviews by the U. S. Congress, the Norwegian Storting, and NATO, and thus at the mercy of whatever political winds that may prevail from year to year. We should also realize that, while the Norway-oriented MAB will be capable of giving a good account of itself, it will not by itself save the war on the Northern Flank. Its deployment represents a novel if only partial solution to the problems of time and firepower shortfalls in that region. Successful completion of the prepositioning program is important. So, also, is completion of the Norwegian modernization program, further development of U. S. Air Force capabilities in support of maritime operations, solution to the interoperability problems in air command and control, improved traffic management and route security for the redeployment of allied reinforcements within Norway, and further cross-training in the arctic between the Americans, British, Dutch, Canadians, ACE Mobile Force, and the Norwegians. It is a systems problem, not amenable to “salami slice” quick-fixes. Given the geography and climate, and the likely arsenal of the opponent, we are much better advised to defend north Norway, rather than have to recapture it!
In recent years Norway has seen the carefully nurtured “Nordic balance” disturbed by the Soviet buildup in the Kola, repeated Soviet submarine excursions within Scandinavian fjords, brutal intimidation of neighboring Poland and the Arne Treholt espionage case in its own Foreign Ministry. Remembering 1940, Norway casts appraising eyes westward for reassurance.
Perception is all-important in the NATO alliance. The credibility of U. S. reinforcement capabilities is crucial. If the perception of rapid reinforcement of NATO by U. S. forces is enhanced by the deliberate measure of prepositioning expensive combat equipment for Marine forces in Norway, then a valuable message has been sent. In this regard, the U. S. prepositioning initiative may well have as much political significance as military value. While preserving the delicate Nordic balance, it still emits a positive signal of deterrence. Early commitment of the Norway MAB may possibly defuse a larger crisis, or at least provide an additional crisis management tool.
The significance of the U. S. commitment of the prepositioning program in Norway is therefore this:
►To the Norwegians, it signals support and reassurance.
►To the Northern Flank and NATO, it conveys increased commitment without regional destabilization.
►To the Soviet Union, it raises the stakes in the north without unduly threatening the Kola complex.
►For the United States, it enhances basic security interests at proportionate risk and affordable cost.
I conclude that the concept has merit and should be brought to fruition.
Note: While the author bears full responsibility for all views expressed herein, he is grateful to acknowledge Colonel Theodore L. Gatchel, USMC; Colonel David E. Marks, USMC; Colonel James M. Myatt, USMC; Mrs. Gael Donelan Tarleton; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Wilkerson, USMC, and Major Larry W. Wright, USMC, for their suggestions. The views of the author do not purport to represent the position of the U. S. Marine Corps nor the Department of Defense on this subject.