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violators of strategic principle on b° sides of the Atlantic who do much to dermine this floor of alliance naval cap^ bility by their pursuit of technolog1®*^ fixes or more aggressive strategi®s' more wholehearted espousal of the ® ^ voy strategy might well provide a set
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Britain’s Naval Future
Sir James Cable. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 220 pp. Notes. Bib. Ind. $24.95 ($19.96).
Reviewed by Eric J. Grove
At the time this important book was written, the near-term future of the Royal Navy seemed much bleaker than it does today. The Falklands Conflict and the continued requirement to defend the islands have mitigated the worst asperities of the “1981 Defence Review.” Yet the conflict has not altered the basic problems of matching resources to the commitments that lay behind that review; it may well have made those problems worse. The quality of Sir James’s analysis shows through when he mentions the Falklands Conflict as an example of a possible national scenario for the use of naval force. Fie was somewhat pessimistic about the attitudes of both allies and the public in such a contingency. However, as is pointed out in an added preface, subtitled “First Thoughts on the Falklands,” he was only too correct about the relative cost-effectiveness of deterring such events rather than “dealing with a situation that should never have been allowed to arise.”
In this relatively short but densely argued book, Sir James puts his finger on one of the main weaknesses of the contemporary naval debate, the lack of a strategic dimension in the old-fashioned, narrow sense. This deficiency is particularly evident in Britain where, partly through failures in education and partly through failings in professional culture, the Royal Navy has been surprisingly unsuccessful in specifically defining what it can achieve in war. The strategic certainties of the age of the battleship have not been replaced by any coherent up-to- date doctrine. The strategic thought that does go on today—and, like Sir James, one is open to doubts about both its quality and quantity—is carried out behind closed doors, free from the annoying attention of outside critics. This atmosphere is not the optimum one for the evolution of a convincing strategy for the Royal Navy. Indeed, the Royal Navy’s persistent failure to sell the navy’s case cannot be divorced from possible weaknesses in the case itself.
Sir James’s main achievement in this book is his attempt to provide a firmer- than-usual intellectual foundation for the Royal Navy. After an all-too-brief setting of the historical and politico-economic context, he looks at the relevance of sea power in the modern world, the types of conflicts that might ensue in which navies might be important, and the case for and against a seaborne British nuclear deterrent. The book becomes even more interesting and thought-provoking when its author goes on to analyze the various scenarios for a NATO naval war. He creates two divisions for these scenarios: first, the classic “Third Battle of the Atlantic” fought around reinforcement and supply shipping; and second, operations that might ensue around the flanks of the alliance. The various “Roles for the Navy in Alliance War” are neatly tabulated, and Sir James stresses the Royal Navy’s importance as the provider of a response to “limited threats in specific contingencies." His extended discussion of the Norwegian scenario makes it clear which "specific contingency” Sir James thinks is most important. It also provides an unusually cogent rationale for the antisurface ship armaments of the British escort fleet.
The author comes out strongly against NATO’s Central Front, that bete noir of many British navalists. Sir James even goes so far as to say that “for the structure of navies and for their strategy its needs are subsidiary, not central.” This attitude is probably a mistake, especially at a time when the trend seems to be toward extending the conventional phase of a future war for as long as is practically possible. The defense of ships sustaining operations—and populations—in Europe offers the most solid rationale for an oceangoing navy that is consistent with the Eurocentric priorities of Britain’s defense policy. Given the right strategy (defining strategy even more narrowly than Sir James does), the defense of reinforcement and supply shipping may well be within the capabilities of the naval forces deployed under Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. The phrase “given the right strategy” is the key, for a quantifiable number of ships means a quantifiable number of convoys and escort groups of a certain size. Despite his obvious and well-founded doubts, Sir James is modest enough to spare from criticism those
force goals on which bureaucratic might be fought and even, perhaps But heresies like “defended lanes perhaps not the main enemy of soon NATO naval strategy. One of the rrnn gaps in the book is its neglect of an tended discussion of the NATO stn^ fleet concept. This neglect is the m surprising as Sir James quotes figur , which show the concept’s obvious cen place in alliance naval planning- . . book quotes half the operational Britt antisubmarine warfare carrier capab' J and a third of the available escorts a being allocated to strike fleet protection
destroyers screened Admiral David Be^ ty’s battle squadrons. For some time, whole strike fleet strategy has nee1 critical security. Is its land-attack role vital as is thought? Can it not be earn® out in ways that do not use up scarce a lied naval resources so profligately? ^ there no better uses for the naval assets allocated? With the U. S. Navy stressing once more the primacy of aggressive b tie fleet operations, a foreign observ whose survival might depend on the sa and timely arrival of unspectacular m® chantmen is entitled to some concern- b James is more worried about whetn there will be any carriers available for u in the Atlantic given other potential ca ■ on their attention. .
Sir James is rightly skeptical abo some of the siren calls for the Royal Nav to return to distant oceans. He accepts1 case for the potential usefulness of l**1®
when cost-effective and unblurred ^ romantic illusions. He is somewhat con cemed by the extent of British nation^ commitments around the globe. R®ce events have clearly shown how thes^ might require a total commitment ^ available resources, drawing streng away from the more vital theaters clos to home. .
Unlike many authors, Sir James brave enough to think about the unthin'
otajor items of public expenditure. If Se responsible for the bureaucratic ense of the Royal Navy absorb the leaning of this book, they will be in a ?Ueh better position to fight the coming ^hle, of Whitehall if not the Atlantic. he book is highly recommended to any- 'Jne who may wish to offer support. Bet- ,.r conceived and articulated alliance O.e the
naval future.
PREFACE
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jj. e; the failure of NATO by defeat or ^integration. He makes a good case ^ t> in such circumstances, a navy might one of the most important assets Brit- n could deploy. He goes on to argue at Britain ought to combine self-interest llh alliance commitment and alter the Phasis of its strategic posture to stress “>e navy.
This point brings us back to the ques- °n of possible British withdrawal from e Central Front. Sir James skims over a Problems of alliance credibility and hesion that such a withdrawal would P®Se- In defense of Britain’s nuclear- J'-'^'ered fleet ballistic missile submarine . rc®, the author is a little more convinc- 8 than most (albeit, still not entirely ( h he argues that there is no certainty at money saved on strategic forces °uld go to the conventional navy. With- ^ ra\vals from the Central Front might not . Ve that much anyway, unless the Min- ljy of Defence was willing to bite the 'fficult political bullet of disbanding units.
.Sir James rightly points out that this lr>d of choice, Central Front versus the astern Atlantic, may well have to be ced. “Doing without a Navy,” the title his penultimate chapter, is a real possi- , ,ly given the sounds emanating from . e Treasury at the moment. They auger for the defense budget as they do for
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U. S.) naval strategy may well be context for a more assured British . graduate of Aberdeen and London universities, £ r‘ Grove is Deputy Head of Strategic Studies at the ntannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth. He was *980Chang6 Pro^essor at the U. S. Naval Academy in
China as a Maritime Power
TCdr. David G. Muller, Jr., USN. Boulder, 0: Westview Press, 1983. 268 pp. lllus. WaPhs. $27.50 ($24.75).
Reviewed by Jan S. Breemer
Commander Muller has filled a void in 0lJr factual understanding of the naval ar,d maritime evolution of the People’s “epublic of China. The timeliness of L'lina as a Maritime Power is underscored by recent press reports of future u- S.-Chinese naval port visits, bilateral n4val exercises, possible Chinese partici-
pation in Western-oriented joint naval exercises like RimPac 1984, and closer naval collaboration.
The book’s basic thrust is that, after years—perhaps even centuries—of internal debate over the proper role of naval power in Chinese defense, sea power has become acknowledged as a key element in China’s foreign policy objectives in the 1980s. China’s naval strategy has turned the comer, the author claims. The coastal defense-oriented “Young School” that had dominated naval thinking since the founding of the People’s Republic has reputedly been discarded in favor of an outward-looking, professional elite whose concerns are the practicalities of naval technology and strategy rather than ideological fervor. The principal reason for this change of outlook, according to the author, is the vast expansion of Soviet naval power in the Pacific.
The book’s chronological narrative is conveniently divided into three main periods: 1945 to 1960 and the Sino-Soviet split; 1960 to 1971 and the fall of Defense Minister Lin Biao; and the 1970s and early 1980s. Each phase is reviewed in terms of five themes: naval history, naval strategy, maritime economics, naval politics, and foreign maritime relations. Valuable information, much of it not published previously, is contained in the historical account—the result of Commander Muller’s painstaking research of declassified files in the Office of Naval Intelligence. The author offers conclusive evidence that, while a Chinese invasion of Taiwan might well have succeeded prior to the Korean War, such a threat no
longer existed in the mid-1950s. China built not one of the 100 or so amphibious landing ships that Commander Muller estimates would have been needed.
One event that has intrigued students of Chinese and Soviet naval affairs for years is the rumored Sino-Soviet naval command of 1958-1959. This book acknowledges at least two separate Soviet proposals for the Chinese to relinquish a “significant” degree of control over a joint Sino-Soviet Pacific Fleet. The Chinese, in return, would presumably have received access to advanced Soviet naval technology, including nuclear missiles for the “Golf”-class submarine. The Chinese refused, and the “Golf’s” missile tubes remain empty to this day. Curiously, the author does not make reference to Bruce Swanson’s report in Voyage of the Eighth Dragon (Naval Institute Press, 1982) that a key reason for the Chinese rejection was the Soviets’ insistence on extra-territorial rights to build and man naval communication facilities on Chinese soil.
The book concludes with an assessment of China’s future as a major maritime power, including the navy’s likely roles and missions in the event of a Sino- Soviet war. Interdiction and harassment of Soviet seaborne supplies are suggested as one possibility; defense against Soviet amphibious landings as another. Looming in the background is China’s emerging submarine ballistic missile force. The Chinese Navy would undoubtedly seek to make the movement of Soviet war supplies as difficult as possible, but this scenario overlooks the probability of the
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The People’s Republic, which may have begun an open-door policy of its own in Shanghai last year, seems bent on becoming a maritime power in the 1980s, willing to work with the other Western countries, especially the United Slates.
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navy having its hands full trying to protect China’s own substantial merchant fleet. In addition, no Chinese military leader can rule out a Soviet mining campaign against China’s coastline. Here, too, the desire for offensive action against Soviet shipping may well be preempted by China’s necessity to first secure its own shipping routes. The answer to this speculation has no bearing on this book’s valuable contribution to our knowledge of the world’s third largest navy whose flag may soon be seen in a U. S. port, after a quarter of a century of hostility.
Jan Breemer is a senior associate with Doty Associates, Inc. of Rockville, Maryland, where he is involved in the study of naval warfare problems. His article “U. S. Chinese Cooperation: The Naval Dimension,” was published in the Proceedings in February 1983. He is the author of the book U. S. Naval Developments (The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co., 1983).
The True Glory: The Story of the Royal Navy Over a Thousand Years
Warren Tute. New York: Harper and Rowe, 1983. 288 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. $22.95 ($20.05).
Reviewed by Captain John O. Coote,
Royal Navy (Retired)
This glossy book has to stretch a few points to justify its claim to be an unbroken history of a navy-in-being all the way back to Allred the Great’s mauling of a handful of Danish longboats in 882 B.C. But it serves well as a jumping-off point in the narrative, since the penultimate act in the saga (V-J Day) was largely won by the Wavy Navy officers of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve—florists,
stockbrokers, race-car drivers, farmers, jockeys, yachtsmen, and masseurs who were turned out as seagoing, front-line officers after a few weeks at a run-down leisure center on the front at Hove, commissioned as HMS King Alfred.
The book’s format is unusual. Each of the 12 chronological chapters leads off with a potted history of the era, the main events and people concerned neatly summed up in profiles. Interspersed seemingly at random are boxed-in special features from early navigation to the coming of missiles, backed by well-chosen pictures throughout, from the Bayeux tapestry to the hangar-deck of HMS Hermes off the Falkland Islands.
Perhaps the most significant impression this book leaves is not the recollection of ships or weapons, but the unflinching daring of the men and their genius for improvisation at times of national crises which have endowed the
Royal Navy with its imperishable g'°R Some argue that of all the navies invo v in World War II, the Royal Navy was least prepared in ships or training f°r long campaign. Prewar promotion to higher ranks was won at flotilla rega[1] ^ formal harbor inspections, for which ^ executive officer often paid for the amel paint to shine up the quarterde^ area; and stage-managed main armaffl firings, with the battle practice targ towed on a steady course at six knots- Warren Tute, obviously deeply fected by being a member of the 1°^ elite, was lucky enough to serve on staffs of a succession of wartime adm who turned the tide. There was Max H0 ton, ultimate victor of the Battle of Atlantic; Bertram Ramsey, the forgot ^ master planner and leader of all the m3J amphibious landings including D •” and, finally, Lord Louis Mountbatta whose charisma wiped out any linge° doubts surrounding his qualities aS practical seaman. The author says in m unequivocal terms: “The Navy ente the War in its most parlous condij1 since the War of Independence. The ships and materiel were plainly there. ...” . •
On such a wide canvas there are me table gaps. The decisive role played ^ our submarines in World War II £ scarcely a nod, nor do the escort gr° commanders who secured the Atlan ^ lifeline, except for a passing reference
the convoys through to Mufflin' against unimaginable odds from weather and an enemy fighting a 1® ditch battle, only to be greeted on arrtv by surly abuse from the uncooperah Soviets, fare little better.
The final pages on the Falklands Co flict underline the fact that most of 1 lessons the Royal Navy learned the ha way against the Axis had been forgone • But, it was leadership, improvisati0 • and the resolute men on the spot who re deemed short-term political expediency However, the reader will search in vain the index for the names of Sir Teren Lewin, Sir John Fieldhouse, Major Gen^ eral Jeremy Moore, or Rear Adrnir Sandy Woodward.
Although this is likely to be categ0 ^ ized as a coffee-table book, it is rn|?c more than that. It is an invaluable ret® ence source for naval historians interests in the Royal Navy.
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The Struggle for the Falkland Islands
Julius Goebel. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982. 482 pp. Ind. $10.95 ($9.85).
The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics: A Documentary Sourcebook
Raphael Perl, Editor. New York: Oceana, 1983. 722 pp. Ind. Bib. $45.00.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Hays Parks, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
While the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas Islands Conflict accomplished little toward resolving the long-time dispute between Britain and Argentina, it has made a few publishers wealthier in their pursuit of the interest fired by the controversy. These two books add fuel to the fire while shedding no new light.
Julius Goebel’s book, first published in 1927, remains a controversial but fundamental study of the history of the Falkland Islands from their discovery until reoccupation by the British in 1833. This reprint includes a new preface and a 1968 article by J. C. J. Metford from International Affairs which brings the historical narrative almost up to date, except for a
discussion of the negotiations and eWn immediately preceding the 1982 contlC^ Dr. Goebel was an international la*? L at Yale Law School. His account.
though old and colored by the
al
isolation
ism prevalent in the United States time it was written, nonetheless re:
at the :main8
the only substantial work in English1 with the Falklands’ early histofl that went un*J
swered in 1927 remain unanswered this second printing; the book is ihuStr tive of the difficulty of placing 'nten!|e tional relations problems in the neat " categories many international lawy often desire. ,
Whereas Dr. Goebel’s book is a sen® arly essay, Raphael Perl’s is a detai ^ compilation of 52 documents, cases, a statements relating to the Falklands/M3 vinas controversy. A 55-page essay sU^ marizing the myriad legal and pol'd issues involved illustrates its compleX' •*' A bibliography lists 274 articles and a uments relating to the history of the ra lands prior to the most recent cont" • The book will stand as a time-saving re erence tool for any research on this c°n tinuing dispute.
tng
However, in
-eedM*'
Chief of International Law for the U. S- An11!’
Colonel Parks, a frequent contributor to Proc
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Books of Interest
Compiled by Lieutenant Commander Thomas Cutler, U. S. Navy
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11^flCa’ and Latin America. Replete with more ,his ^00 maps and 2,000 charts and graphs,
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. 'dance from Washington. Besides serving as lst°rical account of this little-known aspect g "• S. military and political affairs, The rniana Wars provides insight into the current ^uate surrounding U. S. responsibilities in entral America and the Caribbean.
°f the Third World
[x-p’6 Kurian. New York: Facts on File Ss ‘CaIi°ns, 1983. 381 pp. Ind. Maps. Tables. P°0 ($76.50).
0^'nS as a companion to the author’s previ-
,l "'ork, the three-volume Encyclopedia of
S(f World (Facts on File, 1981), or
£r “mg alone as a valuable, independent ref-
div C£ Wor^’ t>o°k is a compendium of
erse data on most of the nations of Asia, Afn-
Cali Sln§*e volume provides an instant, graphi- „ ^ depicted overview of the political, eco- ofth'C’ military’ anc* soeial conditions in each ip e 80 major countries of the so-called Third w°rld.
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.< * ®anana Wars: An Inner History Of (rtler>can Empire 1900-1934
PrpICr Langley. Lexington, KY: The University
0 Ss of Kentucky, 1983. 255 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. ^>s- $26.00 ($23.40).
|*L
■ e author of three previous books about U. S.
olvement in the Caribbean describes the ^ 'deal ramifications of U. S. intervention in lhe*iC° and several Caribbean nations during 35 years spanned by the two Roosevelts. r°fessor Langley’s treatise recounts the four ^ajor invasions by U. S. troops into Cuba, Nicaragua, and Hispaniola (Haiti and e Dominican Republic) as well as numerous ljl,l0r incursions. He describes the role of the
1 ' military as not only fighting the wars, s- frequently ruling as occupiers or exerting ..Snificant influence in the domestic affairs of
tropical nations, often with little or no
Th
c Bomb and European Security
Vigeveno. Bloomington, IN: Indiana jcrs'tv Press, 1983. 131 pp. Illus. Append. bIes- $12.95 ($11.65) $6.95 ($6.25) paper.
y ^>s foreword, Eugene Rostow, head of the S. Arms Control and Disarmament Sency, writes: “I am happy to commend Mr. Uido Vigeveno’s book ... to serious readers J) both sides of the ideological divide.” : hl,e the argument is decidedly in favor of an Creased U. S. military presence in Europe, e facts and figures presented are relevant to ls topical controversy regardless of any preconceived bias. Presented from a European- NATO viewpoint and with an appendix of charts and graphs depicting the weapon capabilities, relative strengths, and total dollar expenditures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, this concise work is an unusual contribution to the ongoing debate.
ES Caviar and Commissars: The Experiences of a U. S. Naval Officer in Stalin’s Russia
RAdm. Kemp Tolley, U. S. Navy (Retired). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 289 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. Maps. Append. $21.95 ($17.56).
With a cast of characters including W. Averell Harriman, Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, Admirals Harry E. Yamell, William Leahy, and William H. Standley, as well as the colorful and somewhat unorthodox author (a kind of
real-life “Pug Henry”), this work is both historically informative and fascinatingly entertaining. The author of two previous works. Admiral (then-Commander) Tolley served as assistant naval attache to Moscow from 1942 to 1944. Speaking fluent Russian, he was able to develop relationships with many Soviet people from various walks of life. The account is laced with photographs from the author’s private collection and contains several interesting appendices which lend historical perspective. John Toland wrote the foreword.
Conventional Deterrence
John J. Mearsheimer. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983. 296 pp. Bib. Ind. Maps. $29.50 ($26.55).
Focusing on the rarely treated concept of conventional (as opposed to nuclear) deterrence, Professor Mearsheimer first reviews a number of world crises that subsequently led to major conventional wars, and he attempts to evaluate the factors that contributed to deterrent failure. He then examines the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to assess the prospects for conventional deterrence in future crises.
Companion to Russian History
John Paxton. New York: Facts on File, 1983. 503 pp. Bib. Maps. Tables. $17.95 ($16.15).
Anyone who has ever read a novel or historical account of Russian history will appreciate this book’s immense value. A one-volume compendium of alphabetically arranged facts, figures, dates, places, and biographies, this work is at once a dictionary, atlas, gazetteer, and “Who’s Who.” Spanning 14 centuries with more than 2,500 entries, this book is invaluable for quick reference and includes entries on such diverse subjects as art, law, politics, philosophy, and religion.
The Enemy Fought Splendidly: Being the 1914-1915 Diary of the Battle of the Falklands and Its Aftermath
T. B. Dixon. Poole, Dorset, UK: Blandford Press, 1983. Distributed in the U. S. by Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., New York. 96 pp. Illus.
Bib. Ind. $8.95 ($8.05).
The diary of a 28-year-old newly commissioned junior surgeon of the British cruiser HMS Kent during the first year of World War I, this book provides a day-by-day account of life at sea ranging from the drudgery of coaling operations to the intense excitement of battle. The accounts of the battle of the Falkland Islands in which the Kent sank the German cruiser Nurnberg and the months-long search along the coast of South America for the light cruiser Dresden provide the historical insight that can only be gained through the eyes of the beholder.
Fighting Ships of the Royal Australian
Navy
Compiled by Ross Gillette. Wellington, New Zealand: Burgess Media Services Ltd. 1983. 128 pp. Illus. Ind. Approx. $7.95.
The second volume in a series entitled The
World's Not-So-Large Navies, this concise book contains 133 photographs of Royal Australian Navy warships from the Royal Australian Navy’s inception in 1911 to the present. Although primarily a pictorial, vital statistics are provided on each vessel, including displacement, draft, dimensions, armament, speed, and complement as well as some brief historical notes. Ships are presented by class, but an index makes locating the vessel by name feasible.
The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun:
The Drama of The Imperial Japanese Navy 1895-1945
Stephen Howarth. New York: Scribner. 1983. 448 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. Maps. $16.95 ($15.25).
The Imperial Japanese Navy surprised the world in 1905 by decimating the Russian fleet at Tsushima, thus emerging as a world naval power. In less than a half century, this naval protege of Great Britain rose from virtual nonexistence to become the world’s third greatest navy, controlling seas stretching across one- quarter of the earth’s circumference. Then, in less than four years, it was driven out of existence. This account of that rise and fall is fascinating and exhaustively researched. Well-written and including a detailed chronology and extensive bibliography, this work is satisfying for the history buff and the general reader alike.
Jane’s 1982-83 Military Review
lan V. Hogg, Editor. Boston, MA: Jane's Publishing Co., 1982. 160 pp. Illus. Maps. $14.95 ($13.45).
In its second year of issue, this annual periodical reviews the military and technical develop
ments during the year ending in June of 1982. It is a compilation of articles written by different authors and illustrated with the latest photographs covering such current topics as the Soviet Union’s continuing struggle in Afghanistan and lessons learned from the Falklands Conflict. It is both a historical update and a forum for the discussion of issues.
Military Power and the Advance of Technology: General Purpose Military Forces for the 1980’s and Beyond
Seymour J. Deitchman. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983. 278 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. Maps.
Tables. $27.50 ($24.75).
Changes that have occurred in the last four years in the world situation, in perceptions of U. S. national security needs, and in the evolution of high-technology weapons are reflected in this fully revised, new edition of Dr. Deitchman’s previous book, New Technology and Military Power (Westview Press, 1979). The quote from Robert Frost at the beginning of the book, “Before I built a wall, I’d ask to know what I was walling in or walling out ■ . .,” reveals the essence of this work: the discussion of technology and its appropriate application to military power.
Navy and Empire
James L. Stokesbury. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1983. 430 pp. Bib. Ind.
Maps. $16.45 ($14.80).
Professor Stokesbury has created “readable history" in his third published work. He concisely traces the rise and decline of British imperialism through four centuries of sea power from the famed battle with the Spanish Armada in 1587 to the Falklands Conflict.
World Index of Strategic Minerals: Production, Exploitation and Risk
, OjCtS
D. Hargreaves and S. Fromson. New York, on File, Inc., 1983 . 300 pp. Append. Tables- $95.00 ($85.00).
This unusual work profiles 37 key m'nera*San£| their processing, transport, trade'fl°w?’belj. price histories. There are chapters a**\ao„i. cally arranged by mineral, country, and pany, but the most significant feature 0 ^
handbook is the “total strategic factor is calculated for each mineral by comp the actual supplies of a given mineral 10 j_ potential risk factors such as geographic nerability and disputes in the local lab°r ,.r's ket. Definitely not for the average cea bookshelf but invaluable to those in nee such specialized information, this book 15 ^ tensively researched and carefully comp1
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Captain Coote was a Royal Navy submariner saw war service off Norway and in the Mediterran and later held four sea commands, 1948-54. At ^ 38, he resigned to go into newspaper publishing ^ Fleet Street, ending as Deputy Chairman Beaverbrook Newspapers.