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Sea King: ASW Workhorse.
Lieutenant Michael K. Murray, U. S. Navy
for
numbers in the management/
The LAMPS Mark-Ill has dominated t e spotlight for the past decade. We 0ught to reacquaint ourselves with the ASW workhorse of the fleet, the SH-3 ea King. Where has it been the last several years? What evolutionary c anges has it undergone? What does r e future hold for the SH-3 or its
follow-on?
In March 1977, as a result of a de- ^*sion at the Office of the Secretary of efense, the Chief of Naval Opera- f^'ons directed a reduction in the size ° carrier helicopter antisubmarine s' squadrons from eight to six ■ 6 1C0Pters, citing fiscal constraints as Justificatjon Many impressive tes- tlrnonials from all echelons of the fleet ^ffernpted to reverse this decision, but • ere were no factual data document's t*1C ASW effectiveness of the SH-3 Present. Words were no substitute
, u<%et decision-making process. The st eight-plane deployment ended in APril 1978.
. "I'° evaluate the SH-3’s ASW effec- airCness the Navy embarked upon the (a rea^mess effectiveness measuring ]q-7EM^ program. From September Sl^ ^ through December 1978, the '3 underwent extensive tests at the tjt antic Underwater Test and Evalua- -j,°n Center (AUTEC), Andros Island. ^ e sH-3, operating singly and in tan- ety>. day and night, was to localize r attack evasive nuclear subs. The ^ u ts of these tests far exceeded the t> avys expectations. They showed C W*tI| a reasonable time late—i.e., Wa tlfne s'nce a submarine’s position tas *ast known—two SH-3S had an ex- tioIr>ely Probability of localiza-
using the active dipping sonar no '■ It is important to note also that aircraft involved in the tests oper- ■ with the benefit of the recently froduced tactical navigation (Tac-
Nav) system, and more than half of the 123 sorties were flown at night.
AUTEC data indicated that the SH-3’s success stems mainly from the characteristics of the weapon system:
► A retrievable sensor, the activedipping sonar which alleviates depletion of expendable sensors (buoys) and/or available buoy radio frequency channels
► A high level of confidence in the validity of ADS contacts (extremely low false contact rate)
► A high degree of accuracy in active sonar contacts (bearing resolution within 3° and range determination within 50 yards)
► The ability to quickly relocate the primary sensor (not predictable by the submarine)
► The ability of a single aircraft to employ the hover-launch mode of the Mk-46 torpedo and conduct an accurate attack based on its own ADS contact (the most effective mode of operation for the Mk-46).
The SH-3’s ASW capabilities have been enhanced since the AUTEC tests. The addition of the TacNav system gives the SH-3 a state-of-the-art computer system which: performs accurate navigational computations; maintains an automatically updated data base for the mission; provides a dynamic cathode ray tube display of the tactical plot; plots sensor and sonobuoy positions; displays processed sensor information; and provides accurate fly-in or hover-launch fire control solutions.
A fiscal year 1981 improvement to the sensor package is the sonar data computer (SDC). This component will give the SH-3 an on-board sonobuoy processor which can process all present and planned sonobuoys in the Navy s inventory and greatly enhance the performance of the ADS. It will increase the effective active sonar range significantly. There is no corresponding increase in the counter-detection range because the power output remains constant.
With ever-increasing emphasis being placed on the attack phase of ASW because of Soviet submarine refinements, a closer look at the SH-3’s sonar is warranted. It has three frequencies (with a sequencing mode), six different range scales, two different pulse lengths (three with SDC), and a bathythermograph trace to 450 feet (the current maximum depth of the sonar dome). It also possesses the only airborne voice-underwater telephone system in the U. S. Navy. All modes include automatic compensation for changes in water temperature and transducer rotation. With its attendant multipurpose recorder and direct sonar-listening feature, the ADS is still effective in high ambient noise conditions. In the hands (or ears) of an experienced operator, the sonar is extremely difficult to jam. The submarine has virtually assisted in her own localization should she launch a decoy device.
The TacNav/sDC SH-3 provides the battle group commander a -self- contained ASW weapon platform capable of rapid and accurate localization and attack. The SH-3 is now capable of truly independent close-in or over- the-horizon ASW operations. Its sensor package consists of self-launched sonobuoys, sonobuoy relay (the only real-time sonobuoy relay provided by the carrier air wing), on-board sonobuoy processing/analysis, ASQ-81 magnetic anomaly detection equipment, and the active dipping sonar. The wide variety of independent and highly reliable sensors on board the SH-3 and its ability to fully exploit all modes of the Mk-46 assure compatibility with any other U. S. Navy ASW
In August 1969, the U. S. Navy took delivery of its last SH-3. Today, Sea Kings are being flown at operational rates in excess of projected wartime rates, and unless the Navy comes up with a follow-on aircraft, it will soon find itself without an active dipping sonar capability.
platform in any ASW situation. There is no other air ASW platform, present or planned, capable of performing the close-in CV battle group ASW mission as effectively and efficiently as the SH-3.
The SH-3, designed in the 1950s and built in the early 1960s, will not last forever, however. With the demonstrated need for a vehicle with an active dipping sonar, whether it be in a transducer or towed array form, a follow-on or replacement aircraft is necessary. The Marine Corps HMX, now under consideration, and weighing between 28,000 and 32,000 pounds, if built with plug-in modular avionics/ASW sensors, would be an attractive option. A joint purchase by the Marine Corps and the Navy would satisfy the needs of both services, provide for parts compatibility (think of the possibilities, an LHA with an HXS detachment on board), and bring down the unit price. A derivative of the SH-60—the LAMPS III aircraft— with ADS is also a possible candidate. The SH-3 could then be phased into Naval Reserve squadrons, deployed to various choke points, and embarked in convoys employing the Arapaho concept.
A third possibility would be to give the SH-3 new engines and dynamic components. This medium-cost modification would yield a 100-mile transit with 2.7 hours on-station time, while carrying a crew of four and two Mk-46 torpedoes at sea level on a 90°F day.
There are various other options being considered, but the fact remains that the SH-3 still has no replacement. A pen-and-ink change extending the SH-3’s airframe life from 10,000 to
12,0 flight hours or useful service from 1988 to 1992 will not solve the problem. For the past several years, the SH-3, just like the rest of the Navy, has been faced with expanding commitments and diminishing resources. Indeed, the SH-3 has bee3 flown at double its project peacetime rate and significantly mofe than its projected wartime rate. bJot only do such operating rates shorty the lifespans of the aircraft in terms years, but also the depot-level mamte nance backs up as well, which ca(1 cause unacceptable delivery delays- With today’s long-lead time >°r procurement, the need for active d>P ping sonar, and the accelerated use 0 the SH-3, a decision must be made t0 acquire a follow-on replacement alf craft for the SH-3 immediately if c. C Navy is to avoid a serious gap m |tS ASW capability.
HS-l
Lieutenant Murray is currently attached t0 n where he serves as a flight instructor -1[U' i ASW instructor.
The Federal German Navy: Linchpin of the Northern Flank
By Dora Alves
The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), like its allies, is concerned by the ever-increasing Soviet military buildup. But its concern is more immediate than its allies’ because the FRG is the Central Front: 33% of the inhabitants and 25% of the industrial capacity of the FRG are within 100
kilometers of the Warsaw Pact border.
Since its inception, the Bundeswehr has had to nurture a tradition consonant with the Constitution, the Basic Law, and the Military Service Act, while acknowledging the tragedy of recent German history. The Federal Armed Forces’ operational concept, training, and equipment are deter mined by Article 87a of the Basic which states that the armed forces to be built up for defensive purp°s^ These forces operate within ^ framework of NATO: in the event « war, no strictly German service opef* tions are envisaged.
on the same hull as the Dutch
of the _
Ad^e tFle Navy Staff, Vice
fo ^'ra^ ^ns8ar Bethge, is responsible / *be navy’s operational readiness to e federal Minister of Defense. Sub-
Table 1 German Navy Ships
Laid Down
Std.
Tons
Main armament
♦ 24 Submarines 18 Type-206 6 Type-205 | 1969-73 1964-66 | 450 370 | 8/533-mm. TT 8/533-mm. TT |
♦ Destroyers 3 Liutjens | 1966-67 | 3,370 | l/Tartar system, 2/127-mm. DP, l/Asroc |
4 Hamburg | 1959-61 | 3,500 | 4/Exocet, 3/100-mm. 8/40-mm. AA, 4/ASW TT |
2 ex-Fletcher | 1942 | 2,250 | 4/127-mm. DP, 6/76-mm. AA, 5/533-mm. TT, 2/ASW TT |
♦ 14 Frigates 6 Type-122 | 1979-81 | 2,900 | 8/Harpoon, l/Sea Sparrow, 2/RAM ASMD, l/76-mm. |
|
|
| 4/ASW TT, 2/helicopters |
6 K iiln | 1957-60 | 1,750 | 2/100-mm. DP, 6/40-mm. AA, 2/ASW RL, 4/ASW TT |
♦ 5 Corvettes 5 Thetis | 1959-61 | 604 | 2/40-mm. AA, l/ASW RL, 4/ASW TT |
♦ 40 Guided-Missile Boats 10Type-l43A 1979-82 | 300 | 4/Exocet, l/76-mm. DP, l/ASMD system, mines | |
10 Type-143 | 1972-74 | 300 | 4/Exocet, 2/76-mm. DP, 2/533-mm. TT |
20 Type-148 | 1971-74 | 234 | 4/Exocet, l/76-mm. DP, l/40-mm. AA |
♦ 10 Torpedo Boats 10 Type-142 | 1960-62 | 212 | 2/40-mm. AA, 2/533-mm. TT |
59 Minesweepers/Minehunters
Geographic conditions dictate that che army be the largest service, de- S1gned to defend or, if need be, retake territory because, in the event of con- *ct> the Warsaw Pact will have the advantage of the initiative, determines the time and place of attack, acr°ss a border of some 1,700 kilometers. However, maritime defense as great strategic importance for the FRG and Europe as a whole.
The Federal German Navy numbers a few thousand fewer officers and enlisted personnel than the Imperial avy did in 1905, an exhilarating ^rne when Britain, Germany, and the nited States vied with one another in L,e budding of battleships. Today’s errnan Navy is tasked to repulse aggression launched at sea or across the S^a against the Republic, its allies, or e sea lines of communication (SLOCs) ®n which the Alliance depends. Its °rward defense mission calls for the ernployment of naval surface and naval air forces in peripheral seas where the er>emy may deploy to attack.
Limited to approximately 18% of j. e total defense expenditure, and aced with the Warsaw Pact’s numeri-
CrI • •
superiority and its improved naval arsenal, the German Navy is deter- lned to exploit the opportunities C at combined Allied military ^hnology offers. The navy now uses utch radar systems, British sonars, aUd French minehunting equipment. ^ ls working with the Norwegian . avV °n a joint design for a new ^1ype-210” submarine. Some nations ^Ve shown interest in the German avy’s external minebelts for sub- ^ar*nes. In the Allied Command Bal- c approaches, Danish and German frned forces share training and
eSuipment.
The German Navy also aims to leve equipment standardization 1,;hin NATO, and when that is not ssible, then interoperability is ght. For example, the German buavys “Type-122”-class destroyer is
a7 s Kortenaer class, and has many same weapon systems.
ordinate to the Chief of the Navy Staff are the Commander in Chief, German Fleet (CinCGerFleet), the Chief, General Naval Office, and the Commander, Naval Support Command.
The fleet comprises all naval surface and air forces, support units afloat, and facilities ashore for controlling
50 Amphibious Warfare Craft 18 Auxiliary Ships 10 Underway Replenishment Ships 2 Repair Ships 9 Oilers
7 Seagoing Tugs
Terms- DP = dual purpose; TT = torpedo tubes; AA = antiairctaft gun; ASMD = antiship missile defense system; RL = rocket launcher; RAM = rolling-airframe missile
and directing the operations of naval forces. Subordinate to the fleet commands are the type commands—such as the Naval Air Division, the Destroyer Flotilla, and the Fast Patrol Boat Flotilla. All German naval units are organized to conform with NATO-wide task organization princi-
and mul'
miss>le'
pies, and naval messages and orders are in English.
The General Naval Office is charged with making trained personnel available to meet specific requirements: participating in the development, planning, and procurement of ships and equipment; and providing medical care and supplies in the navy. To accomplish these tasks, the General Naval Office is organized into seven divisions: Personnel (including “Military Leadership and Morale Guidance”), Intelligence, Operations and Training, Structure and Organization, Logistics, Planning, and Armament. The Commander of the Naval Support Command is responsible for the material readiness of the naval forces.
The organization which provides a smooth transition from German national to NATO command, and from peacetime to wartime missions, earmarks all combat units of the German Navy for assignment to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SacEur). Upon declaration of specific stages of the NATO alert system, SacEur will assume operational command and will delegate this authority through the Commander in Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe (CinCNorth) and the
Commander Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (ComBaltAp) to the Commander Allied Naval Forces Baltic Approaches (ComNavBaltAp). Under ComNavBaltAp, the Commander in Chief, German Fleet, also holds the position of a NATO commander as Flag Officer Germany (FOG). As FOG, he controls the naval forces and commands in wartime as well. In wartime, the Commander German Naval Forces North Sea will also hold the post of a NATO commander. As Commander German North Sea Subarea, he will exercise operational control over the units assigned to him by FOG.
The two principal operating areas of the German Navy are the Baltic Sea and its approaches, and the North Sea. The Baltic Sea and Baltic Approaches protect the vulnerable seaward flanks of the NATO land front, filling the critical gap between the Northern and Central European defense regions. The North Sea area includes the ports and debarkation areas of the main artery of European internal shipping and the terminal of reinforcement and resupply routes from Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
The navy’s western operating area, the sea area of the Skagerrak and the
North Sea, is a basin roughly 400 by 500 nautical miles, widening (r0tt>
east to west, and is characterized by
strong gales and rough sea states. depth of water increases from less than 40 meters in the south to more than 400 meters in the north. The nav4 carries out its task here with 4e stroyers and frigates (equipped 'vl antisubmarine, antiship, and antia'r craft weapons), maritime patrol alf^ craft, mine countermeasure forces, afl submarines. German military caPa bilities in this area have been enhanced with the entry into servi^ in late 1979 of the first multi*10 j Tornado combat aircraft which eventually replace the navy’s F-I°^S' Both the Tornado and the F-104Ghave Kormoran stand-off missiles.
The eastern operating area, ^r0(tl the Kattegat to west of Bornholm, lS mixed land-and-sea area, which P^ceS great emphasis on maneuverability naval warfare. The German NaVf approach to the problem of operatic under such conditions is a mobibjj flexible defense by many slTiaj units—i.e., guided missile-equipP fast patrol boats working ir tion with fast minelayers tipurpose aircraft. Exocet armed “Type-l48s,” built in coopera
a,ssance craft, and helicopters are
SjQ^rated in the navy’s overall mis-
A i c°nducting, in the words of
far^ll‘ral Rudolf Deckert, “naval war-
pil& ^r°ni the air.” German naval
p| °ts were first trained at Pensacola,
itts^ Today’ German officers flying
\v,. receive 13 months’ training V^chj- --- -- °
trio
in
'ta Falls, Kansas, and 8 nths at Luke Airfield near
th,
^‘°n with
'-kbone of the Schnellboot flotilla.
Pro °Unterrneasures are designed to est^ect the shallow waters and river def aneS a8a*nst enemy mines, while the fS1Ve minelay*ng a>ms to prevent tree passage of hostile shipping be- -n the western Baltic and the Bal- jn Pptoaches, and at hindering land- rorf ^ hostile craft. The four squad- ar l°f tde m‘ne countermeasure force 6p aSe<^ 'n r^e Baltic. q rorn the very beginning of the new arfnian Navy *n *955, naval air f) ^as been an integral part of the
■ Multi-role combat aircraft, re
form; ■
'tite
°enix, Arizona. Some pilots go to aVj Vn*ted Kingdo m for additional th atl°n training and to refamiliarize ine,TlSe^ves with North European fly- conditions.
c0 6 ^*ava* Air Division (NAD) pr‘ses the division staff and headquarters unit, four naval air wings, and an air instruction group. The NAD follows the type command organization in the attack squadrons, which in combat are directly subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Fleet. The Commanding Officer, NAD, is in full command of the 5th Wing and the instruction group. A future reorganization will incorporate the inspection and special staff for naval air equipment and training with the Naval Support Command and the General Naval Office.
The 1st Wing at Schleswig consists of two naval fighter-bomber squadrons of F-I04s; the 2nd Wing at Eggebeck has one squadron of fighter-bombers and one squadron of naval reconnaissance RF-104G aircraft. All are assigned to NATO. The 1st Wing will get the multipurpose Tornado aircraft in 1982; the 2nd Wing will receive the new aircraft in 1985. The 3rd Wing, at Nordholz, is a squadron of 20 Bre- guet Atlantic-1150s, 5 of which have been modified for electronic warfare. Tasked with antisubmarine warfare and long-range reconnaissance, these aircraft are also assigned to NATO. The 1st Squadron of the 5th Wing, at Kiel-Holtenau, is in charge of the navy’s search and rescue operations and flies 22 Mk-41 Sea King helicopters. The 2nd Squadron’s DO-28 Sky Servants carry out the navy’s transport and liaison missions. Westland/ Breguet Sea Lynx WG-13 helicopters have been ordered and will fly from the “Type-122” frigates. Westerland, Heligoland, and Borkum helicopters fly missions over the North Sea.
The German Navy also operates a coastal service (Kiistendienst) which provides forces to protect harbors, depots, and key points, such as naval airfields and workshops, from saboteurs. The service includes the naval transport battalion, naval security forces, and frogmen.
Turning from service units to serviceman, the modern German Navy is determined to make the best of the manpower resources available to it. To this end, it has tailored its educational efforts to further the concept of Innere Fiihrung—“internal order”—which is brought up to date to accommodate social changes and modern leadership principles. Civic education and a thorough analysis of the effects of advancing technology are used to enhance the performance of "citizens in uniform.” A special "man on board program” strives to counter the psychological
pressures of confined, noisy shipboard conditions and separation from family.
In a small force with low budgetary ceilings, it is important to design instructional programs to get the best performance out of every serviceman. Success in this field, in turn, protects complex, expensive modern technology from misuse. Instructors are young men who can relate well with the trainees. The efficacy of every training program is subject to scientific review on a regular basis.
Training programs—whether for officers, non-commissioned officers, or ratings—consist of classroom instruction, work with simulators, on-the- job training in the harbor, and instruction under way at sea. Learning and practice alternate with the aim of molding a crew that works together.
While the German goal is that 45% of its servicemen should be conscripts, in 1979 that figure was exceeded by 5.4%. On an average, 51,500 men are called up for duty every quarter.
Future regular and non-permanent line officers, whose terms of service are 12 years, receive about 5 years of training. The naval officer candidate spends 15 months at the Naval Academy at Flensburg-Murwik. Next, after taking the officers' examination, the candidate begins, in company with candidates from the other services, a course of approximately three years in length at one of the two Bun- deswehr universities (with civilian faculties), which are located in Hamburg and Munich. After a final examination, the naval officer candidate returns to the naval academy for further training. This system produces naval officers who hold the equivalent of master’s degrees, but who also arrive at their first fleet assignments with less practical training as sea offi-
The Buck Starts Here------------
By Commander James S. Humphrey III, U.
The Congress, by our constitution, is the primary policymaking body within our government. On one hand, it does this by constructing legislation (bills) on behalf of the public and, on the other, by overseeing the effective- cers than their U. S. Navy counterparts have received.
Extension training for regular line officers begins with a 14-week basic course, usually in their 13th year of service. On passing the course’s final examination, officers are promoted to the rank of lieutenant commander and receive advance training for staff duties.
As it strives to make the most of its scientific, technological, and pedagogical talents, the German Navy is implementing its plans for the Eighties. Demographic trends show a continuing decline in population as a result of birth control, indicating a manpower shortage in about 1988. Hence, there is no incentive to build larger ships that in a few years’ time would be difficult to man.
The German Navy is attacking the personnel problem in two ways: first, by striving to use fewer men, and second, by trying to keep the men serving for longer periods. Except for the Tornado, the navy’s new ships and aircraft need less manpower than their predecessors—e.g., the new frigate requires a 200-man crew as compared with the 300 needed for a destroyer. Similarly, the new fast patrol boats require five fewer men than their older sisters. The “Troika” minesweeping drones save manpower too. Conversion programs also aim at reduction in crew requirements.
The German Navy’s approach toward new equipment is pragmatic. Among major surface ship programs, the first "Type-122,” Bremen, will be operational in April 1982. In addition to the L'utjens-class DDG modernizations which will include Harpoon and close-in air defense systems, ten “Type-l43As” are building with anti-ship missile defense missiles and
S. Navy
ness of that legislation once it becomes law. In contrast, the Executive Department executes these laws, and the Supreme Court interprets them. The defense budget basically consists of several bills which, like other bills, mine rails.
This year will see the further development of anti-invasion mines. For the second half of the decade, the combined minelayer-minesweeper^
basically minelayers that can sweep—and a new class of minehunt- ers, with the same basic platform, will become available.
In the years ahead, the navy’s nett command, control, and communications system will continue to integrate more and more functions, while communications with submarines will be improved and modernization of radar stations will be completed in the mid-1980s. The German Naval Staff maintains that the perfecting of computers to process information frees the men of the German Navy to develop better tactics.
While a peacetime German nava presence in the Baltic is seen as fun'
damental, the German operations concept stresses the importance of the Norwegian Sea. The Northern Flan^ and Central Europe must not break 1 forward defense is to hold: the Atla° tic is the center of the Albany Strategically, North Sea control an the defense of southern Norway cannot be separated. The German Navy wl cpntinue to carry out its mission hoi ing fast to the principles of quality an effectiveness. It will seek to maintain high state of readiness; to increase op erational flexibility, both in forwat defense and in depth; and to con stantly improve the quality of ltS weapons and manpower.
Dr. Alves, a former Royal Air Force 111 teorologist, is assistant to Dr. Ray S. 0<ne’ World Power Studies, the Georgetown Cen for Strategic and International Studies. Her pr fessional note, “The German Navy Moves OoCl was published in the January 1981 Proceedtog1
by
must eventually be agreed upon > both the House and the Senate, an become law either by presidential nature or by override of a president!
vet°. .
There are two types of DoD b*
authorization bills and appropriations k*Hs. Authorization bills contain basic legislation that establishes or enables continued legal operation of selected programs. Such bills serve Primarily to identify and describe programs which may be funded in future legislation. Authorization bills can set dollar ceilings for a given program or Can authorize the appropriation of such sums as may be necessary. Most l-^oD authorization bills are under the lurisdiction of the House and Senate ^rmed Services Committees (HASC/ SASC). Unlike authorization bills, appropriations bills contain the legislator! that funds and permits ex
Penditure of funds for specified time Periods in programs once they are au- norized. Most DoD appropriations ' k are under the jurisdiction of the °use and Senate Appropriations . 0rnmittees (HAC/SAC), more specif- jeally, hac/SAC Subcommittees on De- ense and Military Construction.
There exists a sequence in which °D authorization and appropriations Uls are considered, reported out, and j^oted upon in the House and Senate.
P*s sequence is determined by law, c°ngressional rules, and established Practices. By law, revenue bills must °r'ginate in the House. The interpre- ^ation of this law by the Congress has 01 to the practice of House action on aPpropriations and authorization bills Pr'°r to Senate action on the same '^s- Though House and Senate
committees and subcommittees may consider these bills simultaneously, the House is the first both to report these bills out of a committee and to hold a floor vote on the bills. Another factor which establishes a sequence of congressional action on these bills is a congressional rule which states that certain programs and personnel levels must first be authorized (in authorization bills) before being funded (in appropriations bills).
Given these stipulations, a generalized pattern of House and Senate legislative effort concerning most DoD authorization bills and DoD appropriations bills is formed. The defense budget begins in the HASC as a DoD authorization bill after its presentation before the Congress as part of the president’s annual state of the union message, which is given in January. When it is considered, voted upon, and reported out by the HASC, then the SASC begins formal action on its version of the same authorization bill. In the meantime, the HAC also begins considering the appropriations (DoD appropriations bill) for those programs authorized in the HASC version of the bill. The SAC does the same as soon as the SASC reports out its version of the authorization bill. After having been reported out of these committees, each bill is debated, amended, voted upon, and passed by its respective House and Senate floors. Once passed by the floors, differences between the House and Senate versions of each bill are resolved by conference committees and a single authorization bill and a single appropriations bill are enrolled or forwarded to the president for signature into law.
There are a few other legislative processes which are included in the congressional deliberation on the defense budget. They are budget resolutions, reconciliations, and continuing resolutions.
Budget resolutions do not become laws. They are agreements between the House and the Senate which project revenues and outlays for a five-year period, and target or allocate spending ceilings for the upcoming fiscal year in each major budget category. These ceilings are binding on Congress. A budget resolution can be considered as a process which occurs in parallel with that previously described for authorization and appropriations bills; one which sets overall spending profiles and goals, thereby paving the way for those bills.
Budget resolutions are developed by the House and Senate Budget Committees (HBC/SBC) using the input of the president’s budget, recommendations from appropriate commit- tees/subcommittees, and with the aid of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). After budget resolutions are reported out of the budget committees, each is debated, amended, and passed by the House and Senate floors; dif-
15 April
1 April
15 March
February/March
Timeframe
15 days after Congress convenes
A Working Congressional Schedule for the. Defense Budget
Action
The president submits his budget for the upcoming fiscal year to Congress. Committees begin consideration of bills and budget resolutions. Hearings and requests for information increase in number and accelerate in frequency.
The president submits a supplemental/amended request for the current fiscal year budget. (Note 1)
HASC, SASC, SAC, and HAC submit budget estimates to the HBC and SBC for programs under their jurisdiction. The HBC and SBC use these estimates in developing the first concurrent budget resolution.
The CBO submits to Congress its recommendations concerning the first concurrent budget resolution to the HBC and SBC.
Budget committees file their respective reports on the first concurrent budget resolution. House, Senate, and conference deliberations on the same com-
April (Approx.) The Executive Branch reevaluates the assumptions
associated with the president’s budget submission for the upcoming fiscal year and submits a revised budget to Congress. (Note 2)
15 May Congress adopts the first concurrent budget resolu
tion. Authorization bills must be reported. HAC and SAC review allocations set forth in this resolution and take up/report their respective DoD appropriations bills. (Note 3)
May-September Reconciliation process negotiations are conducted.
July (Approx.) Executive Branch again reevaluates assumptions as
sociated with the president’s budget submission and submits a revised budget to Congress. (Note 2)
7 th day after The Congress completes action on the DoD authori-
Labor Day zation and DoD appropriations bills.
15 September Congress adopts the second concurrent budget reso
lution.
25 September Congress completes the reconciliation process and
ferences are resolved in conference.
The budget for each fiscal year will generally progress through three budget resolution stages. The first concurrent budget resolution is an agreement which sets initial spending targets based on projected revenues- Appropriations bills cannot be reported out until after the first concurrent budget resolution is adopted. The second concurrent budget resolution is the final resolution in the fiscal year, one which is an agreement to set absolute spending ceilings and a floor on revenues for the budget of the upcoming fiscal year. A revised second concurrent budget resolution, sometimes termed a third concurrent budget resolution, may be formulated to accommodate unanticipated changes and requirements for spending (e.g., that which would be formulated to accommodate a supplemental budget request for unforeseen increased Indian Ocean operations) which become necessary after the second concurrent budget resolution has been adopted.
Reconciliation is a process which m effect changes the agreement nature of a budget resolution into a binding law. The idea behind reconciliation is to make the spending for programs (authorization and appropriations legislation) fall in line with the targets and ceilings specified in budget resolutions. It is a concept which is just being tried with the fiscal year 1981 budget process to promote disciplined spending and a more balanced budget- The mechanics of this process are dynamic, but essentially consist of if' structions to committees following a concurrent budget resolution proposing legislation to restructure revenues and expenditures for their programs by an amount which agrees with the latest budget resolution.
Continuing resolutions are interim bills which permit funding or continuation of funding in the absence o appropriations legislation. A continuing resolution bill was passed in September 1980 to permit expenditures in fiscal year 1981 because neither the second concurrent budget resolution nor the DoD appropriations bill ha been agreed upon by Congress. Continuing resolutions are effective for a certain time period and stipulate fund'
submits revised authorization bill and appropriations bills for signature into law. Congress submits a continuing resolution to the president if this action is not complete.
Ing levels. In the continuing resolution previously mentioned, expenditures in the HAC report of the fiscal year DoD appropriations bills VVefe permitted until 15 December
1980.
There are some firm dates which influence the above process. These dates Were established by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control ^ct of 1974. (Additionally, this act Cfeated the Senate and House Budget Committees and their staff facility, tl‘e Congressional Budget Office.) I wo dates were set forth in this act: 15 May, the deadline for Congress to adopt the first concurrent budget resolution; and 15 September, the date which Congress should have completed all actions on the DoD authorization bill, the DoD appropriations bill, and the second concurrent budget resolution. By using these two dates and combining them with congressional rules, established practices, and the considerations above, one can develop a target schedule of the evolution of the defense budget in Congress. It should be considered a plan of action, as many events have and will occur which will delay or sometimes accelerate milestones.
Note 1 A supplemental/amended budget request for the current or upcoming fiscal year may be submitted at any time as conditions warrant.
Note 2 Amendments to the president's proposed budget for the upcoming fiscal year are also provided as a result of changing spending requirements. Revisions and amendments can
be provided at any time but should take place sufficiently prior to each scheduled concurrent budget resolution to permit due congressional consideration.
Note 3 Revised second concurrent budget resolution (third concurrent budget resolution) for the current fiscal year may also be adopted at this time if developments dictate a change of the spending ceilings and revenue floors stipulated in the second concurrent budget resolution.
Commander Humphrey, who served operational tours with VP-17 and VP-9, and as a flight instructor and training officer in VP-31, was assigned to the Office of the CNO as an assistant in the Congressional and Policy Coordination Branch. He screened for operational aviation command and is currently the executive officer
of VP-19.
*The FFG-7 Program: A Shipbuilding Status Report
By Lieutenant Janet Ann Clement, U. S. Naval Reserve
Since the commissioning of the ^Ver Hazard Perry (FFG-7), lead ship the Navy’s current frigate ship- aiding program, on 17 December *9^7, Bath Iron Works (BIW) has tUfned over five more ships of the class to the U. S. Navy, and Todd Ship- 7ard, Incorporated, in San Pedro and eattle has delivered three of the frigates through May 1981. Six more |:,:<~"7s are slated for 1981 delivery and e'fiht in 1982. Eventually, the total dumber of ships in the class will probably kg 54 Qr more
Delivery dates for the first six ships u'lt by BIW averaged 12 weeks early, and biw predicts the remaining ones ^■11 be 17 weeks ahead of schedule, xtensive pre-outfitting has been the ey to Biw’s rapid production. The hyer Hazard Perry was launched 38% c°rnplete, and the Gallery was 70% c°rnplete when she went down the "ays. These early deliveries have saved Navy $4 to $5 million per ship, ariA Biw has enjoyed an acceleration lncentive of 30% of the construction c°st savings.
As Todd, San Pedro, does not have ^cial ized pre-outfitting facilities or Beavy Jifr
capabilities, its first ship 'Vas launched 55% complete and the s*xth 39% complete. Todd, Seattle, has averaged about 25% complete at launching. Both Todd yards have been running behind schedule on delivering FFGs to the Navy—Todd, Seattle, approximately 4 to 8 weeks late, and Todd, San Pedro, about 16 weeks late.
While comparing costs in different year dollars is difficult, the FFG-7S have stayed fairly close to the original budget goal of $50 million in constant 1973 dollars. The FFG-7 cost $92 million in January 1973 dollars, including many non-recurring program expenditures. The FFG-8 required $55 million in January 1975 dollars, and FFG-36, in the third flight contract awarded for fiscal years 1979-80, is priced at $70 million in June 1978 dollars.
Design changes to correct errors and enhance operational effectiveness and shipboard habitability, excluding new systems, increased the FFG-8’s original contract cost by 9%. The cost of changes for FFGs-ll, -13, -15, and -16 dropped to approximately 6%, and for FFG-21 to 4.5%.
Trials, Shakedowns, and PostShakedown Availabilities: Before delivery, the FFG-7S undergo builder’s trials. About four weeks later, the ships go through acceptance trials pre-
sided over by the president of the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey. The Navy is considering BIW’s suggestion to combine both trials into one for later ships. Final contract trials are scheduled after five months of fleet operations. As the program has progressed, Navy acceptance trial deficiencies have decreased from 1,216 on the FFG-8 to 871 on the FFG-15. Approximately eight months after delivery, the FFG-7S return to the shipyard for a three-month post-shakedown availability (PSA).
During the Mclnerney’s extensive seven-month PSA, she received the recovery assist, secure, and traverse system (RAST) for handling LAMPS III helicopters and LAMPS-related data links and electronics. Testing of the LAMPS III program will continue through September 1981, at which time the Navy will decide whether to approve this advanced ASW weapon system. The system is performing well, and all FFGs contracted for in fiscal year 1979 and since, starting with the FFG-36, are being LAMPS III configured. Earlier FFGs are scheduled for LAMPS III retrofits.
The Clark was the first FFG-7 to undergo a standard PSA. She reported back to BIW in January 1981 to have her keel-mounted SQS-56 sonar, with rubber dome, installed. Deficiencies in the system, identified during “fly- before-buy” testing, prevented its installation prior to commissioning. This system has neither so long a range nor so low a frequency as the sonars in the Spruance, Knox, and Garda classes. The Clark also received the AN/SLQ-32 (V2) electronic support measures system and super rapid blooming offboard chaff launchers.
Other systems to be incorporated in later ships are: the close-in weapon system (CIWS), beginning with FFG-29; fin stabilizers and Link 11 on FFG-35;
and satellite navigation for FFG-45. FFGs-7 through -34 will be fitted with the SQR-17 tactical towed array passive sonar system when they receive their LAMPS III retrofits. Budget limitations, the accelerated shipbuilding schedules and testing systems for reliability and maintainability will continue to require scheduled backfitting to be done during selected restricted availability. A high level of depot maintenance and component replacement will take place at the ship intermediate maintenance facilities.
Operating Reports: FFG-7 commanding officers report that the ships are economical to operate, most reliable, and very responsive. The CO of the FFG-13 says, "Morison handles like a sports car.” The FFG-7S accelerate from 0 to 30 knots in seconds, can turn inside their own wake, and cruise most economically at 18 knots.
The FFG-7’s two auxiliary propulsion units (APUs), which individually rotate 360°, combined with the variable pitch propeller and the rudder, can practically move the ship sideways. Although the APUs were not designed as bow thrusters, in concert, they can effectively control bow and angular movement.
The skipper of the Clark says that even though the FFG-7S are considered to be at the low end of the high-low value of the Navy’s shipbuilding mix, “there is nothing low mix about combat systems or the propulsion plant. Presently, the FFG-7S are equipped with the quick-response Standard Missile (SM-1MR) for surface-to-air combat, the Harpoon missile for surface- to-surface combat, and surface- launched torpedoes. They can also accommodate two LAMPS helicopters.
The FFG-7 COs also report experiencing virtually no problems with the gas turbines or with the reduction gear- The junior officers say the lack of engineering problems takes a lot of pressure off everyone. Equipment maintenance is relatively easy, and the emphasis on crew habitability has had a positive effect on morale.
Navy Equipment Procurement: Instead of having the shipbuilders provide most of the equipment, the Navy IS ordering all of the combat system
Hanie | No. | Builders | Laid down | Launched | Commissioned |
0liv*r Hazard Perry | FFG-7 (ex-PF 109) | Bath Iron Works | 12 Jun. 1975 | 25 Sep. 1976 | 17 Dec. 1977 |
41clnerney | FFG-8 | Bath Iron Works | 7 Nov. 1977 | 4 Nov. 1978 | 19 Nov. 1979 |
Wadsworth | FFG-9 | Todd, San Pedro | 13 Jul. 1977 | 29 Jul. 1978 | 28 Feb. 1980 |
Duncan | FFG-10 | Todd, Seattle | 29 Apr. 1977 | 1 Mar. 1978 | 15 May 1980 |
Clark | FFG-11 | Bath Iron Works | 17 Jul. 1978 | 24 Mar. 1979 | 9 May 1980 |
George Philip | FFG-12 | Todd, San Pedro | 14 Dec. 1977 | 16 Dec. 1978 | 10 Oct. 1980 |
Samuel Eliot Morison | FFG-13 | Bath Iron Works | 4 Dec. 1978 | 14 Jul. 1979 | 11 Oct. 1980 |
Sides | FFG-14 | Todd, San Pedro | 7 Aug. 1978 | 19 May 1979 | 1980 |
Estocin | FFG-15 | Bath Iron Works | 2 Apr. 1979 | 3 Nov. 1979 | 10 Jan. 1981 |
Clifton Sprague | FFG-16 | Bath Iron Works | 30 Sep. 1979 | 16 Feb. 1980 | 2 Mar. 1981 |
J°hn A. Moore | FFG-19 | Todd, San Pedro | 19 Dec. 1978 | 20 Oct. 1979 | 1981 |
Antrim | FFG-20 | Todd, Seattle | 21 Jun. 1978 | 27 Mar. 1979 | 1981 |
Flatley | FFG-21 | Bath Iron Works | 13 Nov. 1979 | 15 May 1980 | 1981 |
^ a hr ion | FFG-22 | Todd, Seattle | 1 Dec. 1978 | 24 Aug. 1979 | 1981 |
Lewis B. Puller | FFG-23 | Todd, San Pedro | 23 May 1979 | 29 Mar. 1980 | 1982 |
Jack Williams | FFG-24 | Bath Iron Works | 25 Feb. 1980 | 30 Aug. 1980 | 1981 |
Copeland | FFG-2 5 | Todd, San Pedro | 24 Oct. 1979 | 26 Jul. 1980 | 1982 |
Gallery | FFG-26 | Bath Iron Works | 17 May 1980 | 20 Dec. 1980 | 1981 |
^ahlon S. Tisdale | FFG-27 | Todd, San Pedro | 19 Mar. 1980 | 7 Feb. 1981 | 1982 |
Boone | FFG-28 | Todd, Seattle | 27 Mar. 1979 | 16 Jan. 1980 | 1982 |
Stephen W. Groves | FFG-29 | Bath Iron Works | 16 Sep. 1980 | 1981 | 1982 |
Reid | FFG-30 | Todd, San Pedro | 8 Oct. 1980 | 1981 | 1982 |
Stark | FFG-31 | Todd, Seattle | 24 Aug. 1979 | 30 May 1980 | 1982 |
John L. Hall | FFG-32 | Bath Iron Works | 1981 | 1981 | 1982 |
Jarrett | FFG-33 | Todd, San Pedro | 1981 | 1981 | 1983 |
Aubrey Fitch | FFG-34 | Bath Iron Works | 1981 | 1981 | 1982 |
Underwood | FFG-36 | Bath Iron Works | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 |
Crommelin | FFG-37 | Todd, Seattle | 30 May 1980 | 1981 | 1983 |
Curts | FFG-38 | Todd, San Pedro | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 |
— | FFG-39 | Bath Iron Works | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 |
Daly bur ton | FFG-40 | Todd, Seattle | 26 Sep. 1980 | 1981 | 1982 |
' | FFG-41 | Todd, San Pedro | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 |
| FFG-42 | Bath Iron Works | 1982 | 1982 | 1983 |
| FFG-43 | Todd, San Pedro | 1982 | 1982 | 1984 |
— | FFG-4 5 | Bath Iron Works | 1982 | 1983 | 1983 |
-- | FFG-46 | Todd, San Pedro | 1982 | 1983 | . 1984 |
-- | FFG-47 | Bath Iron Works | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 |
--- | FFG-48 | Todd, Seattle | 1981 | 1982 | 1984 |
| FFG-49 | Bath Iron Works | 1983 | 1983 | 1984 |
^°te: FFGs -17, -18, -35, and -44 were ordered by the Australian Government for the Royal Australian Navy.
ardware for the FFG-7S. To equip ~*ese ships on accelerated schedules, e Navy has had to do extensive ad- Var*ce planning. Orders for the ships’ Setvice diesel generators are now being Placed six months earlier than at the start of the program, increasing the ead time from 12 to 18 months. An aclditional month or two is required to °btain the ship’s guided missile
launcher (36 months), the Mk-92 fire control system (30-36 months), Mk-75 gun (28 months), and the long-range SPS-49 air search radar (24 months). The Navy has applied acceleration incentives to obtain the reduction gears in 24 months instead of 32.
The early ship deliveries surprised some shore establishments and caused the Navy some spare part outfitting problems for the FFG-8, which had to leave BIW with just under 91% of the necessary parts support on board. With the FFG-15, however, the level has increased to 95%, but it still may be another 12 to 18 months before ships join the Navy 100% equipped.
Crew Training: Crew training programs have had to be planned further in advance to compensate for the up-
to-four-month early ship deliveries. A few crews reported late, but now critical ratings—gas turbine and fire control technicians in particular— complete their 19-month training schedules on time.
Navy personnel received their initial FFG-7-class propulsion system training at the Naval Sea Systems Engineering Center in Philadelphia. But, by the spring of 1983, a propulsion and auxiliary system training facility (a hot plant), to be built by BIW, should be ready at the Great
Lakes Training Center. Also, simulators for frigate gas turbine training will soon be available in Newport, Rhode Island, and Mayport, Florida.
The minimum manning goal of 163 personnel was achieved, but it was found to be impractical. Thirty more bunks will be added to the ships.
The Clark’s combat systems officer, who will have a three-year tour of duty, said, “A lot of people play this class of ship down, but it is very versatile and can do a lot of things well and quickly. All the weapons systems respond beautifully. If there were a pop-up threat, FFG-7S would have the best chance of any to defeat it.”
Lieutenant Clement joined the Naval Reserve in March 1975 as a direct commissioned public affairs officer and is an active member of Navlnfo 101 in Boston, Massachusetts. Presently, she is writing for United Press International and doing public relations work for the United Way in Bath, Maine.
Toward Smaller, Simpler Submarines
By Lieutenant Commander Milton H. Jones, U. S. Navy
The U. S. armed forces seem to have become hypnotized by overzealous vendors of high-technology weapon delivery systems and must therefore share the blame for creating a race of fighting ships, aircraft, and land vehicles that are so huge, so technologically advanced, and so frightfully expensive to operate that we can afford only a few of each. Even those few, however, cannot be kept combat ready because the armed forces
MATTHEW KALMENOFF
The last “small, simple” submarine was our first—Bushnell’s Turtle which attacked a British ship in New York harbor in 1776.
are short of repair funds, spare parts, and competent technicians.
Increased platform size has, in general, stemmed from the otherwise commendable desire to cram more durable tank armor, more aircraft electronics packages, or more and larger ballistic missiles into new vehicles. Since each technologically advanced feature often adds more weight and space requirements, succeeding generations of weapon delivery platforms must expand (and therefore require larger engines to push the added weight). The nuclear-powered attack submarine is one such example.
The Los Angeles-class SSN has grown too large—and too costly—to be deployed in large numbers. The following growth data depict how we got to where we are today:
Year | Type | Tonnage |
1959 | Barbel SS | 2,895 |
1959 | Skipjack SSN | 3,513 |
1967 | Sturgeon SSN | 4,640 |
1976 | Los Angeles SSN | 6,900 |
Source: Combat Fleets of the World 1980-81 (Naval Institute Press, 1980)
Mission capabilities have already suffered from poor design practices employed in those SSNs which now form our first line of defense. The Permit (SSN-594) and Sturgeon (SSN- 637)-class attack submarines were never capable of matching speeds with the CV task force they might be assigned to protect. The Los Angeles class is a faster ship; however, her control problems and huge size make her an untenable platform in two of the submariner’s traditional hunting grounds- shallow inshore waters where surface ships have traditionally sought protection; and, close tactical combat situations where visual identification °* targets is still imperative. Although difficult to quantify, the growth >n the size of the submarine seems t0 have adversely affected the submarine community’s sense of camaraderie. In fact, poor retention of submarine- qualified personnel threatens rhe Navy’s capability to continue operating these advanced vessels. The Department of the Navy’s hard sell ana the quick congressional acquiesence to pay-scale adjustments for submariners and increased nuclear incentives bear witness to the universally perceive gravity of the unsatisfactory morale and retention situations confronting the U. S. Navy’s submarine community.
Rather than refight the old battle o “diesels versus nukes,” it is assume for this discussion that the Navy w» continue its all-nuclear policy f°r submarines. This discussion will show how “systems thinking” might contribute to the further improvement o our nuclear-powered thoroughbreds.
Let us attempt to identify a° categorize the variables which migbc
tin l 15 u 11 tii_c ship ^erchant/warship), electronic surveil- Ce- training of ASW ships/aircraft,
lan. Photodean
While many of the variables have been greatly simplified for graphic display , the “mission" subset might include requirements such as optical, sonar, electronics and communications sensors, weapons, role-expansion and navigation equipment, etc.
a ect the size requirements of a new J’uclear-powered attack submarine.
on-engineering factors which might ln uence final design will also be addressed.
single variable should be a®plified to overpower the effects of a others, and thus drive the overall rn°del system" out of control. As an ejrarnple, there are those who believe at a submarine’s depth capability is e most important facet of survivabil- ty- And it might be possible, at enormous financial cost and by sac- ri ‘c'ng other capabilities, to design an construct a “submersible boat” capable of sustaining its full opera- j'.onal capability even after absorbing a *rect rorpedo hit. But from a practi- Ca Vlewpoint, the range of choices j. Ust within a reasonable set of m*ts- In short, the boundaries of ac variable tested should be based n solid experience and represent readable expectations.
k aior Variables—What follows is a rief discussion of a few of the major ar*ables associated with developing f a^ternative submarine design and ^ eir relationship to and/or depen- „ency upon other variables within the
system."
^"sions: The missions which the W|I1 be assigned to perform cer- y have a major impact upon the s,gn. A few of these missions are: ntisubmarine, antisurface reconnaissance, minelaying, escort, rescue, and special opera- sh°nS ^SUC^ as Punching of SEALS for e reconnaissance or other covert operations).
Given a 30-year lifetime, future oc‘ssions-—e.g., SSN escort for either fasl< n~Cr°SS'n'® merchant convoy or CV s force—must be considered as im-
°rtant as those of the present. There must k r ■
fol °e room ‘or expansion for future
so bonification designed into the SSN etfiat existing mission-support c<iU|Prnent need not be removed be- Tk Sh>ace hrnitations. an 6 effect °f one parameter upon fe(_0tfier may be illustrated by the ef- On1 e^ectron‘cs (a subset of mission) hull size/displacement. A great
deal of interior space might be saved by mounting non-mission-critical electronics in pressure-hardened (gas- filled) or pressure-compensated (water-filled) spaces between the pressure hull and the exterior fairing. Actually, if any resulting loss in equipment reliability can be accepted within mission constraints, there are three apparent reductions: (1) interior space; (2) cooling requirements (chilled water/air conditioning) for electronics mounted externally; and (3) crew size, since equipment mounted externally could not be reached or maintained by shipboard technicians.
Another example which occurs inside the mission subset might be hull projections where size of sonar/radar/
radio/electronics/navigation/ship
safety-related projections could be based on knowledge of current NavSea/NavElex/etc. criteria, added to an estimate of future requirements with results extrapolated from tow- tank models. Simplified resulting relationships are represented by Figure 2.
As illustrated by the two examples cited, it should be possible to quantify, based on state-of-the-art technology, all of the mission inputs and outputs.
Power: The Division of Naval Reactors, popularly known as NR and headed by the legendary Admiral H. G. Rickover, burned its fingers in the design of the Seawolf power plant which used liquid sodium as a primary coolant. After years of attempts to solve leakage problems, the Seawolf was reengined with a pressurized water reactor (PWR) of a design similar to that of the original Nautilus. All subsequent attempts to get NR to sponsor plants other than PWR have proved fruitless. The PWR plant, however, is inherently heavy and bulky. More important, those PWRs "blessed" by NR have had a rigidly limited power output. Combat Fleets of the World 1980-81 (Naval Institute Press, 1980) estimates power available to first- and second-generation singleshaft U. S. Navy SSNs as 15,000
20,0 s.h.p., while the power available to Soviet vessels of similar size has been estimated to be several times that amount. Power does not translate directly to speed, but an approximation of its effect might be gained from design specifications for an 11,500 d.w.t. nuclear-powered merchantman as depicted in Figure 3-
The fact is that NR provides the
ship designer a packaged power plant on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis. The diameter of the containment vessel uncompromisingly determines the minimum hull diameter and hence directly affects hull shape, displacement, and drag. Maximum speed, therefore, is essentially dictated by the reactor design. And the relatively low output power of U. S. Navy PWRs has limited operational speeds of SSNs to well below that of many Soviet designs.
More modern, efficient, and powerful reactor designs are already available which could create as much as five times the currently available quantity of power using the same amount of space and weighing the same as the current design by either: accepting the calculated risk in reducing the safety coefficients designed in present PWR; or shifting to gas-cooled or liquid- metal reactors, relying on advances in technology to solve problems that arose in the Seawolf (Science Magazine [“Nuclear Navy”], 18 January 1976). It should be noted, however, that the Chief of Naval Operations (then Admiral Zumwalt) failed in a 1974 bid to convince NR of the desirability to develop a lightweight reactor capable of powering a surface effect ship.
Crush DepthlSurvivahility: While the terms “crush depth” and “survivability” are not precisely the same, much of the effort directed toward improving the first serves the purposes of the second. The reverse is not necessarily true, since shock-hardening of interior-mounted electronics, as an example, does not appreciably improve crush resistance of the hull.
There are some proponents of deep-diving combatant submersibles who claim that in the next war, battles involving SSNs will resemble World War II fighter dogfights. They hypothesize that an SSN capable of operating at depths of 20,000 feet could withstand all but the most severe of direct hits and that such craft would ideally go “low and slow,” dodging into and out of submarine canyons for protective camouflage as fighter pilots dodged in and out of clouds. The hulls of such submarines would be mostly free-flooding, consisting of small spheres connected by short cylinders, all constructed of immensely thick and exotic materials. Such a submarine would require a very small crew controlling largely automated machinery.
On the other hand, those who view the world’s oceans as relatively shallow believe that deep-submergence capability comes at too high a price for the modest gain in operating parameters. At any rate, the designer of a sophisticated SSN is interested in what capabilities must be sacrificed in order to build a deep-diving ship. Another author has postulated that it is possible to trade off increased operating depth for reduced speed. Using as a basis the fact that modern SSN hulls approach the ideal body of revolution, where:
Weight 7t D2
Unit Length a 4
and
(a = specific weight
of displaced water)
and assuming the unlikely availability of 140 KSI steel, he extrapolates the following trade-off for a sample hull:
14.0 feet = 16.3 knots
10.0 feet = 20.5 knots
4,0 feet = 24.3 knots
Source: Naval Engineering Journal ("What Price Depth?"), December 1975.
But is such a deep-diving craft practical, even with the required sacrifice in speed? For an idea of the technical difficulties involved, 2.5' inch thick, vacuum-melted steel and 3.8-inch thick, titanium alloy are examples of materials that might be required to form 10-foot diameter spheres, since the present HY-80/10°' 130 (T) steels would be adequate only for spheres of a maximum diameter of 9 feet (Naval Engineering Journal [“Material for Pressure Hulls, Present and Future”], December 1968.) The difficulty does not end with the choice or construction materials. As one example of the remaining difficulties involved, the special problem of buckling stresses generated by the joining of spheres and cylinders is almost a complete field in itself.
Drag: The force necessary to move a hull through the water at a given speed, or drag, is directly proportional to the square of the velocity and is illustrated by the following formula:
F(Force) = l/2CfPV27rDavg L Cf = Coefficient of Friction P = 1.93 Slugs/Ft.3
(Freshwater)
V = Velocity in Ft./Sec.
Davg = Average Diameter L - Length
Can drag be reduced? In one novel approach, investigators claim that it al ready has been proven that the coeffi cient of friction can be si gnificantly reduced by electrolysis in that hydro gen bubbles tended to break up the energy-wasting shear stresses at the edge of the laminar flow area. The space and energy requirements for m hydrogen bubble generators appear t0 be low when compared to the arnou111 of propulsion power saved. Moreover- the external apparatus (electrodes) *s small, thus contributing little to add1 tional drag. This effect seems, h0"’ ever, to have been of most benefit in models where velocities were scaled to
in
and Con-
this
Stess
°ne-way transmission,
with Seerns almost always to go along Whatever NR rtrpsrrihnc
Wh,
aPproximate the mid -range of normal SN speeds. Only freshwater tests are n°wn to have been conducted. (No ^Pen-sea/full-speed trial data have een examined for this discussion.) It WeU be, however, that the cited of hC *S even more benefit in water 'gher saline content, such as seaWater> where the electricity finds an easier path between electrodes and greater quantities of hydrogen are generated per amount of current used.
, . t any rate, a dependent relation- *P does exist between drag and ee and may be used to form one ore loop of our model system.
far !?!SUJn °f Naval Reactors—Thus v ' u ^*aVe descr'bed situations where e^ria afe eaS,1y related by use of e ^Ineefing techniques and formulae; nter now the human element.
S$N "e °f the strongest inputs to the jj , es'gn process is the transmission ^ tom NR to the public and Con- Co-- Although the Navy’s chain of sho1?140^ d‘ctates that this path ^ °U d not exist, it has nevertheless
year" Vtr^ e^ect've for the past 30 rs' path quite simply repre-
Rick t^*e P°Wer NR ancl Admiral and °Ver' ^ts significance is enormous >VR US aPPl'cati°n simple. Anytime proSUSpects that the “system” is ap- a departure from the ultra- Nr ^ s*tuation previously described,
gtes^ U^S *n *tS d'rect l*ne t0 tlle Con-
th>SS cad always gets through i
:yer NR prescribes.
tail h 31 many w'sh f°r is a conference five °°kUP that might include the ac- {qav Participation of the Director of Th 3 P'esearch and his capable staff, all S| t^S des*8n process should actu- stp j°0^ sornething like Figure 4 in- ead of Figure 1.
fr^ eVeral conclusions can be drawn X 01" th‘s discussion.
V A
Soiv- tt'nlti-disciplined approach to exces^ t^le Problem of oversized and °therS1Vely expensive submarines (and any WeaP0n platforms) is essential. If (t0Q «rouP gains unchallenged control in ^och amplification of any one w*thout proper feedback), the system will tend to generate a product that will be undesirable i.e., the system goes “ultrastable or “unstable.” Nevertheless, the habitability people will build an almost irresistible case for inclusion of larger mess areas and a complete gym to go with modularized berthing; the weaponeers will stress the critical importance of carrying enough bullets to allow the SSN to expend three missiles and five torpedoes each day on station; etc. While these examples may seem overdrawn, they represent mutually exclusive parameters for the harried ship designer.
^ A complete listing of all possible variables and their effects on other variables and upon the whole is an overriding requirement if we are to construct a complete and faithful model of the actual design process. Even the public has an input to this open system when one considers that elected legislators appropriate the dollars which determine the number and size of the Navy’s SSNs. This effect of mutual dependency of variables appears throughout the model system and cannot be over-emphasized.
^ It should be possible to use a more sophisticated systems thinking approach to improve the final design of future SSNs, although use of other analytical tools should not be neglected. It should also be stressed that it was possible for a casual student to quantify fairly rigidly several important relationships. A serious study could probably extract others and, perhaps, all.
And where does all this leave us? Smaller directly translates to cheaper. Cheaper SSNs means we can build and keep more of those technological marvels on the line, just in case Armageddon really does sneak up on us. In the meantime, the Soviets respect only a force in being. An SSN force expanded in numbers at a rate of even 20% over present plans (extracted from a conservatively estimated 20% savings per smaller copy) would finally demonstrate a measure of belttightening on the part of U. S. naval planners. Such firm resolve on our part is not calculated to help Admiral Gorshkov drop off to a peaceful state of slumber.
Commander Jones has served in submarines and surface combatants. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, a Master of Science in Business Administration, and a Master of Science in Administration (Information Systems Technology), in addition to his Naval Academy degree.
113
ee<ilngB / June 1981
Naval Warfare in the Gulf: Iraq versus Iran
by Commander William L. Dowdy III, U. S. Naval Reserve
*A training frigate/transport.
Source: Combat Flats of tht Vt'ortd 1980/81 and Jam s Fighting Ships 1980-81.
Table 1 Comparative Naval Assets 1980
The war at sea has been a little- noticed aspect of the Iraq-Iran War. The Gulf war provides one of the rare examples in recent years of naval vessels engaging naval vessels, of Third World states using naval resources to strike at one another, of states with relatively modest naval capabilities putting those capabilities to the test. The war matches adversaries with different sources of equipment and doctrine, and adversaries with more thunder in their cannons than most small navies before them.
A comprehensive review of journalistic coverage of the war between 22 September 1980 and 22 April 1981 has produced a mass of information on which preliminary and speculative analysis of naval actions has been based.1 The quality of the information is suspect, frequently based as it is on newspaper reports of claims and counterclaims from Tehran and Baghdad rather than on actual eyewitness accounts. But an effort has been made to sift out an approximation of the truth of what has occurred by comparing several accounts of the same incident, by comparing claimed sinkings against known assets, and by taking into consideration views of other analysts.
Major Naval Engagements: There appear to have been three relatively major engagements involving naval elements of both sides and resulting in
Type_______________________
Destroyers
Frigates
Fast Attack Craft Large Patrol Craft Coastal Patrol Craft Hovercraft Minesweepers Landing Ships
Auxiliaries, Miscellaneous Craft Coast Guard (patrol craft)
substantial losses for one side or both. On the initial day of general hostilities, 21 September 1980, the Iraqi News Agency said that Iraqi ships attacked and destroyed five Iranian gunboats after Iranian naval forces harassed merchant ships flying the Iraqi flag on the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Another three Iranian gunboats were reportedly destroyed by Iraqi artillery fire. Tehran radio broadcast a military communique which said that Iraqi forces also shelled the Iranian naval facility as Khosrowabad, south of Abadan. The attack was an apparent reprisal for an Iranian air attack on the Iraqi base at Khor Abdulla two days earlier. Iranian and Iraqi reports were in agreement that Iraq lost one patrol boat in the action of 2 1 September.
A second major naval battle erupted on 24 September as Iranian warships bombarded Basra and two oil terminals: Khor al-Amaya and Mina al- Bakr, off the Iraqi port of Fao. Iraq claimed it sank two Iranian frigates and seven gunboats; Iran reported the destruction of four Iraqi vessels. Fighting ignited again on 25 September when Iraqi gunboats and helicopter gunships reportedly fought off an Iranian Navy attack on the oil port of Khor Abdulla. According to Baghdad radio, three Iranian frigates and two gunboats were sunk. A day later, Tehran radio said that "during the last 24 hours” Iranian forces had destroyed
Iran Iraq
3 | 0 |
8 | 1* |
9 | 24 |
7 | 5 |
40 | 26 |
14 | 0 |
5 | 5 |
3 | 3 |
20 | 0 |
46+ | 0 |
six missile-launching Iraqi boats and two “other craft” while admitting the loss of two gunboats and a minesweeper. It was not clear where the naval clashes occurred, so it is possible that Tehran was giving its version of the Khor Abdulla engagement.
What both nations described as the biggest naval battle of the war occurred over a 48-hour period on 29-30 November. Iran said the engagement took place near Fao and Iraq’s offshore oil terminal of Mina al-Bakr. Baghdad radio reported destruction of three Iranian warships during the initial assault, and Iraqi military officials later claimed an Iranian frigate had also been destroyed. The Iranians, on the other hand, said they sank four Iraq1 missile boats and seven gunboats- Tehran further claimed that Iranian commandos had overrun Mina al-Bakr and had raised the flag of the Islamic Republic over the oil export facility- The Iraqis denied that the oil terminal had fallen and said that their navy and air force had teamed successfully ,n repulsing the assault. Four days later, in what appeared to be reprisal attacks, Iraqi naval forces reportedly struck two Iranian naval facilities at the entrance of the Khor Musa Canal, claiming they had set on fire four Ira' nian warships.
Unfortunately, none of the press reports gave any information about the weapons employed in naval actions- Whether the surface-to-surface missile (SSM) capabilities of the Iraqi "Osas and the Iranian destroyers, frigates, and fast attack boats were used, and to what effect, could not be judged. Nor could anything be concluded with confidence about tactics. Reading be' tween the lines, the advantage seeme to lie with the forces on the attack, surprise and concentration of forceS appeared to be key factors in the successful operation.
It should be noted that the Iranians seemed to improve somewhat afref clearly being outfought in the early days of the war. From the Iraqi p°int of view, it may have been a mistake not to press its offensives farther in rhe
fofnn‘n8. With help from the air rce> the Iraqi Navy might have deci- f-VeIy defeated the Iranian Navy in the rjst two weeks. Whether this seeming ,tlCence >s more attributable to doc- ‘fal factors or to political consid-
tiotl0nS *n ®a£hdad *s an °Pen ques- n- The Soviet-trained Iraqis may e^e been constrained by rigid adher- wh' it0 .a Pre"designed tactical plan tj lc not provide for further ini- a^'Ves Respite early successes.2 in ^0sses Claimed: Careful account- and an<^ 'nterP0lation of the claims Counterclaims of ship losses sug- st that both navies have been serial y Cfippled. If the reports are given 76 Cre<^ence’ Iran has lost more than 0fnaval craft of various descriptions, Ita ni°re ty*an 56% of its inventory.
C' *las lost fewer vessels, 42, but to^ rei)resents 66% of its naval inven- Edition to assets lost during p naval engagements discussed, the beeUfeS *n<dude vessels claimed to have and"1 <JeStr0yed by aircraft and artillery p ln at least one case, by troops. c|uj°ss*ble anomalies in the data in- fri 6 f^e ^racl* claims of six Iranian nia'3teS destroyed. Although the Ira- clasTd'aVe e'^bt sbips which could be by v ^ ^r*Sates’ they were reported hav;arious s°urces at various times to lin ad uf t0 three frigates patrol- .tbe mouth of the Gulf near the gaC Hormuz. The naval en- cUrei?entS’ °n tbe other hand, oc- 5qq6 at the head of the Gulf, 450- re^ ^des away. But once again there the i*nS an element of plausibility in atesacl' claim to have sunk six frig- the ^1 WOuld have been possible for cjj -'"Icnot Saam-class frigates to qUIP fc stations from one end of the t0 the other in 12-24 hours.
Uresn°ther way in which the Iraqi fig- interTlay he inflated, or open to mis- tptetation, stems from the lack of
specificity in the reports. According to Combat Fleets, Iran owned 40 Bertram Enforcer-type “harbor patrol craft” of only 31 feet and 20 feet in length. Those 40 boats are not listed in Table 1, but some may well have been reported by the Iraqis as Iranian “gunboats” destroyed. Particularly suspect, for example, is the report of 12 Iranian gunboats sunk in the Karkheh River by "Iraqi troops.”
The Iranian reports are also open to second-guessing. Tehran claims to have destroyed a total of 20 Iraqi “missile boats,” yet Iraq was known to have only 14 missile-firing craft, six “Osa Is” and eight “Osa IIs. It is possible, however, that at least some of the Iranian claims were the result of misidentification. In addition to the "Osas,” the Iraqis carried in their inventory 17 other fast attack and large patrol craft which, in certain circumstances, might have been misidenti- fied as “Osas.”
Undoubtedly, some (if not most) of the claims of both sides have been inflated by mistake and/or by design. The history of war is replete with examples of how unreliable the claims of belligerents can be. But even if the reported losses were reduced by half in both cases, each navy would still have lost well over a quarter of its total hulls.
Naval Diplomacy: While naval engagements were fought at the northern end of the Gulf, naval diplomacy was the order of the day elsewhere in the region. Because of its size and credibility under the Shah, the Iranian Navy was the chief practitioner and beneficiary of that non-violent variant of naval strategy.
Ceding, / June 1081
On 22 September, Tehran radio announced that “all waterways near the Iranian shores are declared war zones and that “Iran will not allow any merchant ship to carry cargo to Iraqi ports.” A day later, a report attributed to “intelligence sources in Washington” indicated that two Iranian frigates were patrolling the Strait of Hormuz but had not interfered with shipping. An oil company said that one of the company’s ships had passed through the Strait without incident, but that the Iranian vessels were warning all shipping not to go to Iraq. A diplomatic source indicated that the
Although Iran never attempted to restrict traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, its threats to do so helped keep other Gulf nations out of the u ar and forced Western navies to beef up their forward deployed forces. The Royal Navy’s frigate HMS Ardent escorts a loaded oil tanker during the Gulf war.
Iranians were cutting in on communications frequencies to ask transiting ships where they were bound.
Meanwhile, Tehran began issuing warnings that if any other nation intervened in the war, Iran would block passage through the Strait rather than just monitor the traffic. A few days later, an Iranian admiral warned the Arab states of the Persian Gulf that his country’s navy would carry the war into their territorial waters if they did not stop giving shelter to Iraqi warships. The admiral said that Iraqi ships had sought refuge in ports of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), just west of the Strait of Hormuz, but he made it clear that the warning was directed also at Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, the other Arab countries of the Gulf. “We have pinpointed the ports,” he said in the broadcast which was monitored in Beirut. The admiral said Iran hoped the departure of the Iraqi vessels could be brought about by negotiation. “If not,” he said, “we will be compelled to destroy them wherever they are.”
In the midst of talk and activity concerning the possible formation of an international naval force to keep Hormuz open, Tehran announced that "the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in full view of its international obligations, wishes to assure the international community that Iran shall not hesitate in any effort to keep this waterway in full operation.” Two weeks later, however, on 14 October, Tehran renewed its warning that it would take drastic action if other Gulf states aided Iraq. A Tehran radio broadcast quoted the commander of the Iranian Navy to the effect that he would mine the Strait of Hormuz if other Persian Gulf states gave military aid to Baghdad.3 Seemingly reversing positions again on 22 October, Iran sent a message to United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim affirming that it was committed to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open to international shipping. Denying “certain rumors” that it intended to blockade the vital oil lanes, the message said Iran "will not spare any effort" to ensure freedom of navigation.
The Iranian tactic of warning and reassuring had the apparent effect of forestalling military assistance to Iraq by other Gulf states and intervention at Hormuz by a joint task force of outside powers. The former course of action was made to appear risky, the latter unnecessary. Whether Iranian naval diplomacy was actually responsible for preventing actions the Tehran Government wanted to deter is an open question, but it seems plausible that fear of retribution may have caused the Arab states of the Gulf to act with a greater degree of “neutrality” than they might otherwise have preferred.
While the Iranians were successful, for whatever reason, in preventing the resupply of Iraq and oil export by Iraq via the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, both objectives have been achieved by Iraq using other means. The Jordanian port of Aqaba and, reportedly, Red Sea ports of Saudi Arabia have been used to receive supplies for transshipment to Iraq. Baghdad has also succeeded in sending some oil to market via pipelines through Syria and Turkey to Mediterranean ports. Meanwhile, Iran has itself accomplished some resupply and oil exportation from ports on the lower reaches of the Gulf, apparently beyond the Iraqi Navy's capability to take any type of
preventive actions.4
After the Fray: However the Gulf war finally turns out, both navies appear to be losers. Clearly, Iran’s navy, once dominant in the Gulf, is now in a precipitous decline. Losses in manpower since the revolution, departure of technicians and advisors, lack ot spare parts inventories, destruction of assets in the present war, and prosper five long-term political instability all bode ill for Iran’s navy in the future.
If the Iraqi regime emerges frorrl the present campaign intact and >n charge, the chances are good that it will bounce back rapidly from its 'var losses. There may even be positive spinoffs from the war for Iraq’s navy- The country’s naval cadre, particularly its professional officers, will have got" ten valuable combat experience- Morale should be relatively high hy virtue of having done well against what was once a clearly superior navy- And, ironically, by losing some of <ts outdated and largely Soviet-built hardware, Iraq’s navy may modernize faster than it otherwise would have-
When Iraq’s oil production gets back to normal levels, there will he shopping money available. Already lfl the pipeline from Italy are four Lup0' class frigates, six 673-ton corvettes, and two Stromboli-c\ass replenishment
tankers.5 And French officials have been bending over backwards to please Saddam Hussain with arms deals t0 thereby obtain a reliable oil supply- Iraq continues its turn toward the West, it may end up with 3 Western-built (and vastly improve navy.
Possible Lessons: While any lessons
lo
Sh;
'gistical
course, that more elements of air force would have been
fawn from analysis of naval aspects of 1 e Iraq-Iran War must remain speculative pending confirmation of actual course of events, it is possi- 6 at this point to advance three ten- tatlve conclusions.
First, relatively low levels of naval capability have demonstrated utility l°r tFe belligerents in a limited war ctween two Third World states. If e Iraqis had had no navy, the Ira- ".'an Navy could have operated with rtual impunity against Iraqi ports oil facilities at or near the coast, u d have offered uncountered oppo- Ul°n to Iraqi crossing, assault, and
operations on or near the art al-Arab, and could have inflicted freater damage on a totally unpro-
^rac3‘ merchant fleet. It is posable, of Iraq’s
Passed into action against the Iranian (/Vy Baghdad had little or no navy v ,'ts 0wn- But if such speculation is th ' ’ t^6n *t m'gbt also be surmised ui C^e existence of a reasonably cae Iraqi Navy may have freed ele- Sio- °F its air force for other mis- ns (and thereby have saved some si ^osses to Iranian ship-launched Jce-to-air missiles), or h t**e ^ran*an Navy had not existed, jta<^ deteriorated to the extent that theWaS comPletely non-operational, strn i S navai units could have ent*C Forts and facilities along the th *en^t^1 °F Iran’s coastline, re^le y denying Tehran much of the acL • Pv and oil exportation that it off *eVe<^ ’n the lower Gulf and also jrSetting some of the leverage the p^nians enjoyed against Arab states. Susarne speculative line of reasoning jr^^sted above also applies here. If resou t0 divert scarce air force
j. . rces to defend itself against the T Navy in the absence of Iranian
naval capabilities, Tehran would have lacked air assets for other missions. In short, navies can be particularly useful to states that are near other states which have navies.
A second conclusion is that small, relatively undeveloped navies possess some of the flexibility characteristic of larger navies. Even in sketchy press reports, a number of differentiated naval roles were apparent: coercive diplomacy (Iran’s Strait patrol and deterrent warning to Arab states of the Gulf); logistical resupply (Iran’s sustaining of Abadan); shore bombardment (both navies, operating in the Shatt and along the coasts); amphibious operations (Iran’s assault on Mina al-Bakr and evidence of landings by Iraq in conjunction with the Khorramshahr-Abadan campaign); joint operations with air and artillery components (both navies); and surface engagements (both navies).
The third conclusion is the most obvious: small navies have limited capabilities. The Iraq-Iran War presents an interesting context for the questions: How small is too small? How big is big enough? Iraq’s navy was too small to challenge even a badly crippled Iranian Navy in the lower Gulf; it was too small to keep shipping lanes open. It was big enough to give a good account of itself in the northern Gulf. The Iranian navy, on the other hand, was too small to blockade Aqaba and Red Sea ports through which poured sustenance for the Iraqi war-making machine; it was too small to close the Strait of Hormuz. Until 21 September 1980, it was big enough (along with the Iranian army and air force) to deter an attack by Iraq.
Guardian, The Halifax Chronicle-Herald, The Gulf Mirror (published in Bahrain), Time magazine, The Economist, The Middle East magazine, and Facts on File. The author would like to express his appreciation to Baljinder Singh Dhil- lon and Malcolm Grieve for their research assistance.
“The author has been told by the one-time skipper of an Egyptian missile boat of Soviet origin (which he operated in accordance with Soviet doctrine) that he had been taught to prosecute tactical plans without question or deviation and that great importance was always attached to following the course lines, etc. prescribed on planning charts. No initiative was left to the individual commander according to the Egyptian officer.
“According to a 27 October 1980 Time magazine report, “American officials remained confident that an Iranian threat to mine the Strait of Hormuz if other countries intervened in the conflict was a bluff. U. S. intelligence found no evidence that Iran was manufacturing mines or acquiring them from abroad.”
4There are some indications that the Iraqis had a plan to launch air and helicopter attacks from Oman against three Iranian-held islands in the mouth of the Gulf and against the Iranian naval base at Bandar Abbas near the Strait of Hormuz. According to reports, the United States and Britain exerted considerable diplomatic pressure to prevent the widening of the conflict in that fashion after British intelligence got wind of the possible plan.
5In a move to emphasize its neutrality, the United States, on 25 September 1980, suspended the export of six turbine engines to Italy for installation in the Lupo frigates. Two other engines had already been delivered. Before the war, Iraq was reportedly planning to double the size of its navy.
Ni
This
avy Re,
Is the year of the RZ—the
cruiting Command’s code for giv Serv*ce personnel. Recruiters are °n h 111016 Points for RZs, depending eir Pay grade and rating, than
Prior
any other category with the exception of nuclear prospects. Why? Because it is economically sound for the Navy to bring trained people back in the fold.
Economics is also the number one
reason why Navy veterans are returning. Inflation and unemployment are factors pushing veterans back in the service. Other reasons include the new 11.7% pay raise, the variable housing
In civilian life, Commander Dowdy is a Research Associate at Dalhousie University s Center for Foreign Policy Studies. A political science graduate of Duke and Tulane universities, Commander Dowdy specializes in study of the international politics of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas. He is coauthoring a forthcoming book on Regional Navies of the Indian Ocean. While on active duty, Commander Dowdy served a tour as Aide and Flag Lieutenant to Commander Middle East Force.
allowance, and the selective reenlistment bonus. And, believe it or not, there is a word creeping back into the veterans’ vocabulary: patriotism. The Vietnam War caused a change in traditional attitudes which are only now returning to normal.
Another key factor in the RZ increase is that the political pendulum is swinging back to the right and many returning veterans realize that the party in power is very supportive of the military and that they will not have to suffer major budget cutbacks at least for the next four years.
Who are the returning veterans?
Many veterans miss the camaraderie they had in the military. Civilian life can be much more cutthroat.
Basically they are those who got out after one term. Usually, they are second- and third-class petty officers, pay grades E-4 and E-5. There is also a fair percentage of E-3s and E-6s, a scattering of chief petty officers, and once in a while, a senior chief is returning. They are coming from all ratings. Some are finding that they have to change their rating because of an overload in their particular speciality.
With the emphasis being placed on
RZs, the goal is steadily increasing. It has gone from 600 to 700 to 800 in the first three months of the first quarter of the current fiscal year. And recruiters have responded by exceeding their goals on a regular basis. Of 99,351 persons joining the Navy during fiscal year 1980, more than 9,700 had prior service.
But what about the quality? It, too, has been improving, although more and more less desirable people are trying to get back in. But that is because many cannot make it on the outside.
Many people leave the Navy thinking they are going to make it big on the outside. But after four or five different jobs, they discover they can do as well in the Navy.
Some leave because they are tired of taking orders, especially from individuals they believe are mentally inferior. But in the civilian job market, the same situation exists. The veteran soon finds that he is competing against a guy who has four or five years longevity. And he realizes that he is starting all over again, as if he were an E-l again.
Even those RZs who have made it on the outside find they cannot do as well overall. Though Navy base pay is not sensational, it is better than in some professions such as school teachers, bank employees, and journalists. And when other factors such as the variable housing allowance, submarine pay, and sea pay are added, the Navy picture becomes brighter.
Many sailors go to civilian life and do not realize the advantages of free medical and dental care. Even if they go to work for a firm that has health insurance, dental care is not usually included, and employees thus must pay a percentage of the insurance premiums. They also discover that the retirement benefits are either nonexistent or long in coming. It dawns on them that they can retire after 20—or even 30—years in the Navy and still be relatively young with an opportunity to go to work with civilian firms and gain a second retirement income.
Some others are discovering a different type of salary squeeze. Take, for example, the veteran who finds a job and starts at, say, $14,000. Three years later, he is working for 5 15,500, and the company decides to hire a° additional person. The new man starts at 515,500. The guy who has been there for three years knows that pet' sonnel in the Navy are paid according to longevity and that time in grade as well as time in service counts f°r something in the paycheck.
Too, many former Navymen are discovering that civilian occupations can be boring—i.e., the same task day after day after day.
And the rate of advancement
doesn’t seem to be as good. If a sailof keeps his nose clean, gets recommended for promotion by his commanding officer, and passes the examination, he stands a good chance or being promoted. That is not necessarily the case on the outside.
In addition, veterans are not fmd' ing the camaraderie in civilian l^e that they enjoyed while on active duty. And they miss it. Life on the outside seems more cutthroat.
Still, despite all the many reasons for coming back in the Navy, Navy recruiter has to provide motivation and support. The Recruiting Command sends out lists of prior service personnel, but it is the persona contact of a recruiter contacting a Navy veteran to explain new benefit of serving in the Navy that will mak^ or break this program. About 20% 0 those contacted are ready to return-
But former sailors move around a lot. Although the Recruiting Command’s computers have become sophisticated in tracking down people and advertising in classified section5 has paid off, we need more help- you know an individual with Prl°r Navy service, encourage that person t0 contact the Navy Recruiting Com mand (4015 Wilson Blvd., ArlingW0’ VA. 22203) or a local recruiter.
A graduate of the University of Florida with degree in journalism, Senior Chief Gordon h*5 served aboard aircraft carriers as well as 5 marines. He is currently youth programs off‘ce and public affairs petty officer for Navy RccrUlt ing District Raleigh, North Carolina.