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Perhaps never again throughout his career WiU the naval officer have to burn the mid- tight oil as he did when he was a midshipman or an officer candidate. For the action- oriented Navy is the least literate of the Services, a handicap it must overcome if it is t0 project an image of relevance, and command the respect of both its civilian superiors and the young, in uniform and out, on Whom its future depends.
Franklin Roosevelt, an ardent advocate of U. S. sea- power and an avid collector of naval memorabilia, Nonetheless once complained that dealing with the Na- a-avy” was like pummeling a pillow. You could whale away with both fists at the thing, but you could not change its basic shape.
F.D.R.’s periodic frustration with the conservatism he found while helping to lead the Navy in World War I, and commanding it in World War II, seems to be tie typical reaction of all civilians toward all navies °f all nations throughout all time. This being so, the challenge confronting the U. S. Navy in the last quarter of the 20th century would seem to be neither greater Nor smaller than it has always been. Yet, this is not Suite true; for never in our history has American youth been asking more questions—and been less satisfied With the answers—of both the Navy and the nation.
The modern era of American history, roughly the Past one hundred years, has been marked by three major historical watersheds. Each has been the result of shift- lng relations between nations; revolutionary developments in science, technology, and industry; and the associated explosive temperament of the American people at these times. In the first two cases (the third has yet to run its course), the impact on the U. S. Navy
resulted in great intellectual ferment and sweeping doctrinal changes.
The first watershed came in the first decade of the present century, a decade of relative peace, but with such enormous international tensions that the ideas of that era led to worldwide upheaval. The race for empire resulted in a further race for naval arms and, eventually, war between Great Britain and Germany. Lesser naval expansion programs occurred in the United States, which defeated Spain at sea in 1898, and in Japan, which defeated Russia at sea in 1905.
The mood of the American people by 1900 was one of innocent bellicosity. The Western frontier had closed only ten years before, and the amphibious assault at Daiquiri, Cuba, had included cowboys of the "Rough Riders” regiment. Soon after the explosive lieutenant colonel of that unit, Theodore Roosevelt, became President in 1901, he expressed the intense nationalistic spirit of America by seizing Panama for a canal, by carrying the "Big Stick” of gunboat diplomacy into the Caribbean, and by building a new battleship fleet which he sent around the world in 1908. A proponent of the vigorous life, Teddy Roosevelt was the embodiment of rugged American individualism and democracy. The Great White Fleet symbolized that spirit.
The Navy of this "progressive era” was faced with making a major change in its doctrine. From the essentially defensive orientation of its "coastline battleships,” the Navy now began to look outward, guided by the offensive principles of its greatest intellectual, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. Applying the evidence of past history to advanced technology, Mahan saw the "Battle Line” as the weapon to achieve command of the sea. The spirit behind this intellectual search for a new naval policy, begun a generation before with the founding of the U. S. Naval Institute and the U. S. Naval War College, quickly spread to the generation of officers then graduating from the modernized U. S. Naval Academy.
Among the zealous junior officers who challenged
the conservatism of many tradition-bound seniors in the pages of the Proceedings during this time were Commander (later Admiral) William S. Sims, who wrote on gunnery, and Lieutenant (later Fleet Admiral) Ernest J. King, who wrote on administration.
By the time Teddy Roosevelt left office in 1909, the tenor of the Navy had been established for the next generation of naval officers. The principal American instrument of naval warfare reached its essentially final form with the commissioning of the 27,000-ton, 14-inch-gun dreadnought Texas (BB-35) in 1914. Later battlewagons and guns would be larger, but they would
not alter the tactics of these original big-gun, center- line turreted capital ships. The principal administrate organization was set by the creation of the office d the Chief of Naval Operations in 1915. The major tactical arrangement—following the lead of the British Grand Fleet in World War I—was the establishment of the U. S. Fleet and its Battle Force in 1922. Lack of battleship action during the war, followed by $ years of peace, kept the leading commanders of this new Fleet—e.g., Henry T. Mayo, William B. Caperton, Hugh Rodman, William V. Pratt, and Thomas C Hart—in relative obscurity. But, under their tutelage
and
then1
lane
emerged a young group of dynamic strategists tacticians of the Battle Line, among Raymond A. Spruance, Charles M. Cooke, Will'5; Lee, Jesse B. Oldendorf, and W. H. P. Blandy.
, fleet
naval adventures. Disarmament cutbacks to the ^ discouraged deviation from the form of the Nav) j. ated during the progressive era. Furthermore, ad®1^ and captains weaned on the ideas of that era servatively stuck to their silent guns. As with the
Despite such technical innovations as the airp1 ^ and submarine, a complacent, isolationist Amen1-1 ^ the 1920s and 1930s had little interest in military
Youth and the U. S. Navy 29
of American society during these years, the Navy was not reform-minded. The only national reforms were the emergency measures designed to cope with the great Depression.
The second watershed in modern American history and in the modern American Navy came in the 1940s. World War II destroyed American innocence. The harsh realities of the modern world became obvious to the American people, whose nationalistic spirit was united in an unprecedented demonstration of individual creativity and group teamwork to fashion victory. The Pacific Fleet that was resurrected from the graveyard of Pearl Harbor and fought its way to the final glory of the victory ceremony on board the Missouri tn Tokyo Bay, embodied the triumph of American genius and willpower.
The Navy of that war and the immediate postwar years was again faced with a major challenge to its doctrine. From the moment the concentrated battle line met destruction in the 7 December air attack, its adherents were challenged by the Navy’s air officers and those °f the enemy. Despite the demands for reform within ^e wartime Navy, however, conservatism again provided a Wrier to fresh ideas. But, within the wartime plan- n'ng councils, the ideas of progressive proponents of W aircraft carrier, the attack submarine, and amphibi- °Us forces emerged to reshape the Navy. The names [he leading admirals are familiar enough, but many Wir important ideas were implemented by their W>rm-minded subordinates: Richmond Kelly Turner, ^phibious commander for both Halsey and Spruance; Wles A. Lockwood, submarine commander for Wtz; John H. Towers and Forrest P. Sherman, air Planners for Nimitz.
And fresh minds would carry forward their ideas: g°Wt B. Carney, chief of staff to Halsey; Arleigh A. UrW chief of staff to Mitscher; George W. Anderson, Pecial assistant to Towers; David L. McDonald, assist- ^ °perations officer to Montgomery; and Thomas H.
°orer, tactical officer to Bellinger. Such is the list
CNOs from 1953 to the end of the 1960s. In sub- fines, the lessons of the battles of the Atlantic and W Pacific were applied by the inquiries of such think- ^ts as Hyman G. Rickover, Elton W. Grenfell, and ernard A. Clarey. In amphibious operations, a whole Iteration of Marine Corps leaders was educated on
( e coral atolls and islands of the South and Central
Pacific.
^ % the end of the 1940s, a new basic doctrine had een established for the next generation of naval offi- ,trs- One principal instrument of naval warfare reached /S final form with the commissioning of the 27,100-ton ast carrier Essex (CV-9) late in 1942. The other main
°f CT - 6
'hari;
instrument, owing to a later technological breakthrough, reached its essential configuration with the commissioning of the 5,600-ton, 16-ICBM nuclear submarine George Washington (SSBM-598) late in 1959. Later attack carriers and submarines would be larger and carry more missiles and nuclear weapons, but they would not alter the tactics of these two weapon systems. The major tactical arrangements of the surface forces were finalized in the Fast Carrier Task Force and hunter- killer anti-sub group of 1943. The principal administrative form was set by the reorganization of the Navy Department in 1945 and the establishment of the Department of Defense in 1947-49.
The American people of the 1950s and 1960s, though committed to global defense of the Free World, had little interest in military and naval adventures beyond the basic strategic necessities which were met by nuclear war forces. The limited wars in Korea and Vietnam were first greeted with lack of enthusiastic support (even in the military) and then with hysterical opposition, the Joe McCarthy Communist witch-hunt in the one case, the youth protest movement in the other. And spiralling defense costs of existing weapons systems discouraged changes in the form of the armed forces that had won World War II. Furthermore, generals and admirals weaned on the ideas and weapons, especially air and nuclear weapons, of that era tended to reject deviations from them unless absolutely forced. In addition, bitter interservice rivalries and tight civilian control hindered any sort of serious reform- mindedness within the Navy. The only reforms tried on the national scale were again in the domestic area, civil and human rights, not in foreign and defense policy.
The third watershed in modern American history is upon us. As the innocent chauvinism of the T.R. "Big Stick” era had matured to the determined wartime resolve to overcome the forces of Fascism, so now the United States has evolved to the point of assuming responsibility for worldwide political stability and for deterring major aggression. Concurrent with this challenge, sweeping tensions are remolding domestic American life and attitudes as in the 1900s and 1940s. In the midst of continuous fighting in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Tropical Africa, and the Sino-Russian borders; during constant tension in Central Europe, Korea, and Latin America; and beneath the eternal threat of nuclear holocaust, a new generation of Americans dared to question the past assumptions of what it calls "The Establishment,” which includes the military. Initially, in the 1960s, unwilling to await the full maturity of their generation—30 years—these youth even dreaded the day when they would reach that
awful age. But, alas, in the present decade, they are attaining such venerability.
The young reformers of the 1970s are becoming the most sophisticated and best educated generation in the history of the world. Their idealism matches that of their proud forebears of the Teddy Roosevelt era and their pragmatism that of their embattled parents who extinguished the enormous flames of World War II. In addition, they enjoy more knowledge, material wealth, and sober sense of ultimate destiny than any of their predecessors. After all, one could expect little else from a generation reared not only in the shadow of possible nuclear annihilation, but also in the universal hope engendered by the brilliant achievements of the Apollo moonships. All that remains is for this generation to exploit its inheritance on its own terms and in its own way.
Perhaps the most pressing dilemma is the search for an American foreign and defense policy to accommo
date the changes this generation will bring to the American way of life and to the world. The time has come for an intellectual probing of the deepest type, in the armed services as in the American community at large. In the Navy, the seeds of such an awakening are being sown. The authors of the U. S. Naval Institute’s annual prize essays and of the Naval War College’s theses are increasingly vigorous in their analyses- The Institute’s much-discussed book Soviet Naval Strategy, by Commander Robert W. Herrick, in 1968 opened the type of frank discussion that is essential for intellectual ferment in the naval service. And the Institute publisher’s solicitations of individual evaluations of the naval profession helped to open the doors of debate and constructive criticism.
The Navy that will be finally fashioned during the 1970s for the next generation cannot yet be fully P^' dieted. But its reshaping can only be made with a tell awareness and consideration of historical factors tin1 always affect the shaping of naval policy.
Politically, navies have always been weak, even ,n such essentially maritime nations as 17th century Holland, 18th and 19th century Britain, and early 20t century Japan. Admirals learn their professional skill5 at sea among a small ship’s company, where admin15 tration and political considerations are minimal. The) are technical experts, skilled in the technology of d* sea. For seamanship, as Pericles told his Athen'111 brothers on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, "is something that can be picked up and studied in one- spare time; indeed, it allows one no spare time 0 anything else.” The counterparts of naval officers m
Youth and the U. S. Navy 31
land-based forces on the other hand deal with vast administrative organizations on the scale of the infantry division and the bombardment wing and are in constant physical association with the political organs of government.
Naval officers therefore lack the political polish of the generals and tend to remain aloof from politics or to adopt a safe, conservative approach. The experiences of the modern American navy bear this out, from the abortive Presidential aspirations of Admiral George Dewey in 1900 to the clash of Admiral George Anderson with the Secretary of Defense over the TFX (F-111) aircraft in 1963.
Seapower works slowly and subtly, whereas generals, politicians, and the people at large are impatient for immediately-apparent results. These elements of our society therefore view expensive navies with suspicion when they are confronted with often superficially more pressing domestic and international concerns. Resisting liberals out to cut the Fleet, admirals therefore oppose changes to their Service from which recovery will be difficult when the national mood again suddenly changes to a frantic awareness of actual naval requirements.
Thus, sensitive to criticism by politicians and their constituents, flag officers usually fare rather badly when embroiled in broad political disputes. Uneducated in the art of political infighting, admirals are rarely called upon to serve as advisers to civilian leaders. In the U. S. Navy, evidence of this lies in the fact that during the first 20 years of its existence, only once was the post of permanent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held by an admiral (Arthur W. Radford, 1953-57). A rare exception to this tendency was Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President from 1942 to 1949, but who had actually retired from the naval service before World War II.
Socially, life in navies has always been rigidly hierarchical, aristocratic for the officer corps and often very hard for enlisted personnel. Only in the 20th century, with the expansion of the large democratic navies and the demand for skilled ratings to handle advanced technological equipment, has the lot of the ordinary seaman markedly improved. Bound by the unwritten law of custom, navies have been slow to acknowledge the need for changes in their common social structure. Such is another factor in the traditional conservatism of navies and their leaders.
In seemingly direct contradiction of the above, navies are a bedrock of individualism. At one with the sea, which he eternally must battle to control, the mdividual sailor develops a self-confidence and pride °f service seldom equaled in armies. Unaffected by shifting political winds ashore, the sailor fashions a
hardened sense of duty to his ship and his profession, making navies perhaps the most stable of institutions in many governments. In a democracy such as America’s, this trait makes the Navy a pillar of the government.
The naval profession nurtures this individualism by demanding the very qualities that shape great peoples— discipline, creativity, and a high level of practical intelligence. Discipline at sea is more than following orders; it is also self-discipline in the face of constant danger- on board a crowded flight deck, in the engine room of a submarine in uncharted ocean depths, handling fuel lines in heavy seas, or manning a river gunboat under fire from the jungle shore. Creativity or "Yankee know-how,” the ability to improvise when short on doctrine or material, is essential for survival at sea. So, practical common sense becomes a necessity for officer and enlisted man alike. Hence the naval profession is a school for individualism.
It is no coincidence, then, that life at sea is a high adventure, creating a spirit embodied in numerous examples of both daring fighters and fearless explorers. The breed of men who penetrated Japanese home waters with their subs in the early months of World War II were direct descendants not only of Lord Nelson and David Farragut but also of Sir James Cook, Charles Wilkes, and Richard E. Byrd. In this tradition, the U. S. Navy has fostered such pioneers as early-day test pilot A1 Williams, astronaut Alan Shepard, and aquanaut Scott Carpenter.
Rugged and outspoken when in their own dement, sailors have always enjoyed a high degree of tolerance, but also a keen sense of justice. They respect authority, but when it is downright unreasonable they can rebel, despite the obvious official consequences of their "mutiny.” Usually, sailors’ grievances have grown out of shipboard problems rather than shore-based political movements. The plight of Captain Bligh of HMS Bounty is classic, also the general British naval mutinies of Spithead and the Nore in 1797. In more recent times, the revolts of the Russian Baltic Fleet in 1917 and of the German High Seas Fleet in 1918 against their officers were instrumental in toppling their respective governments. The mutiny of the Soviet Kronstadt fleet in 1921 was a major challenge to the Bolshevik regime; one or the other had to be annihilated. The U. S. Navy has even had its taste of sailor unrest, some of it related to social change ashore, in the Arnheiter affair and the racial incidents on board such large warships as the carrier Constellation.
Individualism will always remain an essential ingredient of effective navies, so that the democracies enjoy a built-in advantage over authoritarian governments in this respect. The dictatorial governments of wartime
Germany and Japan created such rigid naval doctrine that defeat at sea became inevitable. In contrast, the American and British navies adapted to the changing nature of naval warfare and won. The rigid Marxist doctrine that permeates life on board every Russian warship today is certain to be of little help in shaping a navy of rugged individualists.
Small wonder, then, that maritime nations have always placed a high premium on their seamen, merchant as well as naval. This spirit of individualism, however, is not the normal habit of old men. It is the expression of youth. If such a spirit is to survive and grow, youth must never be stifled, within a navy or outside. In the words of Admiral Burke, "The Navy has considerable tolerance for young officers who err on the side of initiative and industry . . . [but] there is no room for deadwood.”
How, then, will the U. S. Navy accommodate the youth of the 1970s, in recruiting them and then retaining them for careers? How will it present an image of relevance and need to a generation disillusioned with the intellectual straightjackets of "The Establishment” of the 1960s? How will the Navy overcome natural political conservatism and its rigid social structure to become a meaningful participant in this new age? These questions are not merely rhetorical. They involve nothing less than the survival of a dynamic, superior U. S. Navy in the era now being shaped by youth the world over.
The first problem to be solved is the formulation of a new naval policy. For, as Arthur C. Herrington, Director of Naval Forces in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), said at the Naval War College in March 1969, ". . . since World War II this country has not had a clear and consistent naval policy nor does it have one today.”
No tradition, no assumption, no other loyalty can be permitted to stand in the way of correcting such a lack of direction.
A major step to solving this problem is for the Navy to abandon the cliches of the immediate past and of the generation of the 1940s and to open the floor for frank discussion. One assumption of the past 30 years is that superiority in technical weapons offers a strategic
The Nary that will finally be fashioned during the 1970s cannot yet he predicted with confidence. Hut its reshaping must include an awareness of the historical factors that shaped previous naval policy. And it must be as forward-looking as the young submariners in this picture—of whom the youngest in spirit is the father of the nuclear Saty, Vice Admiral Hyman G. Kickover.
panacea for American defense policy. In fact, evep superweapon sooner or later is countered by anothef weapon. Principles of political and military action <1° not change, however, and such constants have taken a back seat to the god of technological determinis”1 in recent years. Non-Western peoples have no sud> preoccupations. A nation armed with pitchforks 0" stop the mightiest of military forces: witness the Conti' nental Army of old or the Viet Cong guerrillas.
Related to this problem is the force of subservitf loyalty. In the fight to continue their traditional rofc the various parts of the naval service have endanger^ the mission of the whole. Such groups include the aviators, the submariners, the Marine Corps, the surfi^ forces and the nuclear power specialists. Ultimately’ these traditionally significant elements of the Navys strength may have to sacrifice some of their forfltf' importance to the actual needs for, perhaps, rivet/ inshore craft, fire support battleships, new logistic an“ amphibious craft, or minelaying vessels. The Navyan its missions must be re-examined boldly, from d* larger overview, not from the component parts of1[S current organization. The same problem occurs in d* Army and Air Force.
Youth and the U. S. Navy 33
Another major step in shaping a new policy is one that has been consistently minimized over the past 30 years. This is the critical examination of historical evidence. No amount of electronic war-gaming, systems analysis or computer-programing—however useful in solving particular problems—can be substituted for the study of history, a force that remains unquantifiable. And yet, the Navy has no professionally-trained historians examining and transmitting the lessons (and dispelling the myths) of the naval experience of all history. Unlike the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps, which send uniformed officers to civilian universities for the Ph.D. and M.A. degrees in history in order to teach in their academy and ROTC courses, the Navy does not allow any of its officers such pursuits. Neither does the Navy substantially use qualified civilians to broaden its base in this valuable field of inquiry. (History course offerings at the Naval Academy, Postgraduate School, and War College are but a bare beginning). As a result, the Navy is the least literate of the three services. And without a real sense of historical continuity in naval policy, strategy, tactics, and administration—and their relationship to the present—the Navy can hardly hope to communicate effectively with the youth who are trow recasting contemporary history. Nor can the Navy ®nvey any sense of relevance to its own midshipmen ar>d junior officers.
At this level, the colleges and the academies, the Navy will either win or lose the support of its potential reservoir of good, young officers. Pay and length of duty are matters of secondary importance against the relevance and reputation of the naval service among youth. Naval policy must therefore be critically exam- lncd, and fresh ideas solicited, within the Fleet and the Universities, by officer and civilian scholars alike if the Navy is to earn the respect of its best junior officers and the youthful public. Without a large number of tan, inquiring, intellectually-trained minds in the Reet-Mahan of course, was self-taught as a historian— 'he Navy cannot hope to overcome its natural reluc
tance to enter the political arena. And, unless it improves its overall literacy, the Navy will suffer increasingly from an unsympathetic public and government in the 1970s.
What is the reward if the Navy openly accepts the challenge of this new age? It is nothing less than the emergence of the Navy as the senior Service in America’s defense structure. A politically-adept, intellectually- honest, and youthfully-vigorous naval Service will be able to shape a viable policy in this new era of American civilization—and to defend this policy with confidence before the decision-makers of the government and before the people. The naval Service teaches the individualism, self-discipline and creativity that remain fundamental to the survival of the American democratic faith. And the Navy’s real mission, discoverable in the pages of history and in the ideas of its best analysts, needs only to be released from the dead hand of recent precedent.
A watershed in the history of the United States and its Navy has been reached. The future of the Navy—its professionalism, its mission, even many of its vital ships—is at stake. Frankness, self-criticism, and searching analysis are the first step toward shaping this future. Then, the Navy must make the sacrifices and changes demanded by the conclusions drawn from this examination, whatever they happen to be. But the instrument of change, whatever changes do occur, is youth. For in America’s youth, in uniform and out, lies the future of the U. S. Navy.
A graduate of the University of California at Santa Barbara, Professor Reynolds took his doctorate in history from Duke University in 1964, then taught naval history for four years at the U. S. Naval Academy. Author of The Fast Carriers (1968) and co-author of Carrier Admiral (1967), he is associate professor of history and director of graduate Studies in Military and Maritime History at the University of Maine. Many of the ideas in this article, his third for the Proceedings, arc taken from his new book, Command of the Sea: A Strategic History of Navies and Empires (Morrow), to be published later this year.
A Heated Exchange
During the usual Monday morning race from the submarine tender to the San Diego sea buoy, our aging, fleet-rype submarine, the USS Rock, passed the modern USS Salmon, which wears the coveted gold "E” for outstanding performance.
"Gold is cold but Rock is hot,” we flashed triumphantly.
Their reply was barely discernible through the exhaust of our badly overloaded #4 main engine:
”We can tell that from your smoke.”
—Contributed by Cdr. W. B. Hickman, USNR (Ret.)
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)