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^*6l) reflects that he is working >n excess of 60 hours per week receiving less than the $13,980 lng salary paid a baggage handler
.035 is for step 1 the maximum salary at ^vel is $22,147 (step 10).
Attack Submarines
^Ur One True Strength”
p" * J Glaeser, p. 86, June 1980 tendings)
I he Reasons They Give. . .
And the REAL Reason”
M. T. Brown, pp. 86-87, June 1980 ^feedings)
^'"'Hander J. L. MacMhhael, U. S. avy Both authors cite poor pay as a nia)or reason for the exodus of person- ne* horn the service. I could not agree "'hf1 them more.
hjual pay for equal work” is cur- rtncly a widely heard slogan. How es the Navy measure up? Examples, !Ulllt drawn from personal experience, °w- A Washington directorate is eaded by a rear admiral ($47,729 Jarly)# anj j1js civiiian deputy (SES- ^Cis-i7)/$56,099, capped to ’ 112). The admiral is assisted by ,"”u secretaries, one military (E-6/ ^.702) and one civilian (GS-9/
. '’U35). Meanwhile, the command- officer of an aircraft carrier v3y,l97) in the Indian Ocean talks the master of the MSC oiler ,32,15Q; capped to $50,112) ^0ngside, while on the flight deck of jy6 ‘-atrier a junior petty officer (E-4/
Ml aad Statt
^0Washington National Airport for a 'hour week. By the equal pay 9stick we do not measure up well at all.
,. "hhe declining number of ships llWl1 roughly 50% in the last decade)
n,'ual military salaries include basic allow- ,r"'es for subsistance and quarters (with depen- tnts) and appropriate longevity. Medical/ '),n'«issary/exchange benefits have not been in- ded; to compensate for this, all general ^ (GS) civil service salaries cited are
4s<:d on step 1 of a 10-step salary ladder. For
(*a'nple, although the GS-9 salary cited *l7.(>s, . - - - • .
tha without a corresponding decrease in commitments (i.e., deployments) had exacerbated the problem, even before the current Iranian crisis. Prolonged family separations inevitably take a toll. 1 recently completed my XO tour; the ship did well in retention and was the squadron nominee for the Golden Anchor (retention excellence) Award. Nonetheless, we “lost” many able petty officers who elected to return to civilian life. Almost invariably, one of the reasons mentioned was, "I want to be with my family as my children grow up.” During the 18 months I was on board, the ship was out of home port 78% of the time; with one- in-four duty, the average crewmember was away from his family nearly 85 days out of 100. Those sailors who did reenlist were often swayed by a rate change to a specialty perceived to be in a non-seagoing area (photographer’s mate, training device repairman, etc.). In my opinion there are at least two subsets to the pay problem: one which applies to the military at large, and a second, more severe problem applicable to those on sea duty (or its equivalent). For this latter group, the 17% pay raise recently proposed would be as much an insult as an incentive. A harbinger of the future may have been the recent, widely publicized inability of the oiler USS Canis- teo (AO-99) to get under way because of personnel shortages. 1 would estimate that to provide a credible incentive to compensate those on extended sea duty, a sea pay approaching 100% of base pay will be required. The problem will not be solved by a return to the draft; the strength of the career force is relatively independent of the number of “first termers” in the service. To those who would argue that this is totally unrealistic (or perhaps unattainable?), I suggest that they look at the U. S. Merchant Marine which has found it necessary to pay higher salaries in order to attract personnel who are willing to spend simi-
Contents:
Our One True Strength The Reasons They Give . . . Retention: The Pressure Is On
Raiding from the Sea
The Freshwater Navy:
An Alternative to MX
The Twelve Days of the England
LAMPS: The Ship System with Wings
A Fantasy?
The Naval Reserve Should Work
A Fleet for the Year 2000
Do American Shipping and Shipbuilding Have a Future?
A Sea-Based Interdiction System for Power Projection
Lord Louis
ELF Update
Human Rights and Base Rights A Good New Idea
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. I'he Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
challenge. If we are going to the majority of mid-grade petty
offi'
rsue
ide-
Congress can solve the pay Pfl
■ob'
■d,
sail°r*
and their
land, U. S. Naval Reserve—On April 1980, dramatically underset
24 ring Rust)1
on'
larily extended periods at sea. For example, a watchstanding able-bodied seaman on a U. S. cargo ship currently makes $11,764 annually for a 40-hour week without overtime. The fact that such comparisons throw Pentagon analysts and OMB budgeteers into disarray does not make them less valid.
Regrettably, the Herculean efforts of the service leaders, both uniformed and civilian, to secure significant relief from this situation have been largely unsuccessful. This could be because the nation’s leaders and most of the American public have not yet come to grips with the fact that we are fiscally overcommitted and that a reexamination (and possibly reordering) of our national priorities is long overdue. Until we reach the point of extremis where this reexamination can no longer be avoided, there will be a continuation of attempts to mitigate the current career retention problem with what an analyst acquaintance charitably calls “lesser cost alternatives.” Barring another depression, 1 believe these alternatives can only delay and not defer the inevitable reckoning. The type ot sailor (and officer) we need to retain is in demand in the civilian labor market. For many personnel in the Navy today, particularly in the enlisted ranks, pay IS the issue—one which sorely needs to be addressed effectively and soon.
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“Retention: The Pressure Is On”
(See J. F. Kelly, pp. 40-45, April 1980; D. P. Van Ort, p. 20, June 1980 Proceedings)
Radioman First Class David R. Putnam, U. S. Navy—With nine years of naval service, 1 am not getting out of the Navy! Hard to believe?
Obviously, a person has to enjoy his work to stay with it. And the officers and chiefs have to keep the job interesting to retain the first class. This can be done by delegating more responsible jobs (not overloading the individual), recognizing a job well done, treating the first class like an adult rather than a high school dropout, and not taking people for granted. I don’t mind working 50-80 hours a week to accomplish a job when I know the CO or chief is going to appreciate it and it aids the ship or station in its mission. However, when the CO, chief, or members of the crew say something like, “That’s your job; get back to work,” that is when one questions whether the extra effort is worth it.
We are taken for granted when we work overtime without compensation. When I worked at Allied Chemical, I received triple time on holidays and time and a half for any work over 40 hours. So, why did 1 come back in the Navy when a civilian company was paying such good wages? “Command at sea.” Not all first class sailors want command, but the opportunity is there for the ambitious. Which leads to the second reason why I came back and why 1 will stay: advancement opportunities. 1 think it is great the way the military pushes education. I strongly recommend to the budgetary types that they reconsider cutting any education programs and, instead, institute more. My education has been funded by the Navy, and I hope it will keep funding it until I obtain a PhD. Without rich parents or scholarships, college is not within every petty officer’s grasp. The Enlisted Commissioning Program and Enlisted Education Advancement Program are excellent opportunities for mid-grade petty officers.
Captain Kelly brought out two good points in his article: captain’s call and communications. When the CO, or any other officer, has communications with the first class, y°u feel more like a member of the team rather than a pawn of the wardroom- Some problems can be solved in ^ wardroom, and some problems can t>c solved in the first class mess. When an officer shows you that he is interested your productivity and self-esteem are brought to a new high.
The challenge of trying to beef1 quality sailors in the Navy is a m ficult job. I find it difficult to retain people who are working 50-80 hours‘j week and applying for food stamps- find it difficult to retain quality sail°rj who are losing their G.I. benefits an^ having their pay and benefits lining or cut by various other congression* actions. The senators and congressmen are really making my task of retain10? quality sailors an almost impossm
retam three areas: job satisfaction, comra< ship, and competitive pay.
lem. All sailors, officers and enliste< can provide job satisfaction and con1^ radeship. When the wardroom an chiefs’ quarters start treating ^ sailors like men instead of “comm011 enlisted,” a majority of the first, seC ond, and third termers will stay- ^ To combat the Soviet threat and r challenge of tomorrow, today’s have to have the will, the desire the reasons to fight and follow leaders.
Raiding from the Sea
Lieutenant Commander Roger L- Cf<sS,
points made in my article. _
Hand of Steel: The Naval Raid ( ^ cember 1979 Proceedings, pp. 60-my the United States initiated a ral^ mounted from the sea, in an effuft free the Iranian hostages. Unf°rtl1 nately, the raid could not be tt,|T1 pleted.
Why are so many otherwise resp sible persons so intent on public*2 every detail of a false start? In the 1° ‘ run, this precedent of confusing, flitting, speculative publicity c°u
the
di
h
Preclude, for future raiders, the option withdrawing, revising, and giving 1( another try. Other experienced raid- lng countries, Israel for example, Jon t report false starts—why should "'U Notwithstanding comments to t"e contrary, the War Powers Act did n°r require immediate disclosure of rhe Tehran raid.
The Rusty Hand article noted that ra‘ds have the power to arouse and Maintain popular support. We should take care not to dilute that impact by giving to such efforts, be they success- U or not, the full-blown publicity of a coup de grace. Our tactics-related ^closures, if made at all, should be I'tied to avoid hampering further ac- j'vity on unfulfilled missions. If the ranian raid had every possibility of Recess, perhaps we could have fazened it out for a day or two, with n° disclosures, then tried it again with variations.
In general, raids are go-for-broke Pfopositions and must be executed v'’lth total, unreserved commitment to t'eir completion. Once the pieces are Set >n motion, they can only be recalled at great peril. Raids are games firmly based in surprise and elan, atl anathema to the cautious, ratchet- effect school of warfare. We cannot at- ternpt to play both sides of the street when raiding.
For a country of our technological attainment to have been turned back y weather conditions and equipment failure was regrettable. We were aPparently quite capable of sending
participants by helicopters the full stance. We may be new at sophistiCated raiding, but we are well ahead of °Ur contemporaries in maintenance technology and the ability to judge mtes of equipment failure. There is Cavy irony jn the fact that we ^countered problems in the area the m°dern military places the most Strfcss, material maintenance.
. Tet the raid has several very posi- |IVe aspects which should not be overlooked. They indicate an evolving— °Wever plodding and painful — Progression in our knowledge of ir- re8ular operations.
Undetected raids from the sea are easible. The widely held belief that modern electronics equipment (in
Iran’s case, equipment we provided) makes surprise attacks of scale impossible has been convincingly dispelled. Furthermore, the Tehran raid adds to the evidence that the sea is often a country’s blind side. Clearly, the principle of raiding from the sea is correct; we only have to perfect the details.
Perhaps, now, we have worked the fear of failure out of our system. Undoubtedly, the ill-fated German rescue attempt at the Munich Olympics paved the way for Grenzschutzgruppe 9’s brilliant rescue raid at Mogadishu. Until now, no one wanted to be the first to try, and possibly the first to fail. Terrorists and hostages are a continuing reality in the current world political climate. With this new change in circumstances, we can prepare for the next rescue operation.
We have made progress. Until recently, there were no elite military units trained for and tasked with anti-terrorist rescue operations specifically. At long last someone, the Army, has acknowledged the continuing military necessity of maintaining a commando unit prepared for sophisticated assignments. We have only just begun to fight.
In conclusion, the events in Iran show that the concept of raiding, particularly raiding from the sea, merits serious consideration as a developed and ever-ready standing capability of the U. S. Navy. As Churchill stated begrudgingly after learning of the Otto Skorzeny-led rescue of Mussolini from Gran Sasso, “The stroke was one of great daring . . . [i]t certainly shows there are many possibilities of this kind open in modern warfare.” It requires no great clairvoyance to envision a scenario, similar to the Pueblo incident for example, requiring a raid in a purely maritime environment. We have our choices; we can be prepared ... or worse than embarrassed.
The Freshwater Navy:
An Alternative to MX
Commander J. J. Pursel, U. S. Navy (Retired)—In an October 1979 Proceedings comment (pp. 12-17), I proposed placing diesel-powered Trident submarines in the Great Lakes as an alternative to MX. The comment received national interest. It soon became apparent that there was little understanding of the term “deterrent” and no consensus on the policies that should govern a deterrent system.
The central issue is the meaning of a “deterrent” and the application of that meaning to a weapon system. Secondary is the issue of the “triad” or the need for balanced land, sea, and air deterrents. Lastly, the MX and Trident systems (salt and freshwater) will be measured against the deterrent criteria, and questions about the Freshwater Trident will be answered.
Primarily, a “deterrent” is a weapon that will prevent the Soviets from making a nuclear attack against the United States because they are certain the Soviet Union would be destroyed no matter what they accomplish on their first strike. But a deterrent may be flexible so that any response can be controlled, consistent with the attack and situation at the time.
A good deterrent should not invite or compel a preemptive attack by the Soviets, and should not increase the chance of miscalculation or overreaction. There should be no advantage for the Soviets to hurl total destruction at the United States. If our deterrent fails to stop an attack, it should remain unimpaired so that a limited strike or total coup de grace can be made against the Soviets.
As national policy, the United States will not strike first. Therefore, a system that must react rapidly to be effective, such as MX, requires the president to respond in minutes to the pre-programmed “logic” in the computer. The authority to start World War III has then been delegated to nameless programmers. A true deterrent should avoid a time-sensitive decision. The president should not be “trigger happy” when reviewing his options.
Finally, the deterrent should be economical to build and to operate. It should not suck funds away from other options, such as correcting conditions that cause war, building the B-l bomber, or the expansion of research on antiballistic missile systems.
have
largely ignored the spirit of the treaty- Nuclear Strategic Air Comman armed bombers cross the borders, a(1 defensive systems against aircraft spa(1
not
and
the
in-
Tim5’
ten1
to
The “triad” concept is a myth. It evolved during a period when the edge went to any new offensive weapon, and the technology that evolved resulted in effective countermeasures. There still persists the erroneous assumption that land, sea, and air each has its own unique defensive characteristics, and the chance for technological nullification of all three is minimized by each having its own strategic system.
The key issue is that of dispersal and the enemy’s ability to act against a deterrent even if the site is detected. Fixed sites dispersed in the desert should be weighed against moving submarines in the Great Lakes or oceans and airborne systems. The medium for dispersal is secondary to dispersal. Soviet development has resulted in 70% of its ICBM force being on land. The United States is not compelled to follow the Soviet lead. We should use the medium best suited to our needs and technology.
MX, designed to survive a first attack and accurate enough to hit Soviet SS-18 silos, is a first-strike "deterrent.” This confusing statement is the essence of the MX conflict. The MX is most effective when used as a first- strike weapon against unlaunched Soviet missiles. The nature of MX is
not to deter; its nature is to invite a massive first strike by the Soviets. This fact could make the president anxious to use MX without a complete evaluation of the reported threat. The existence of MX will escalate risks in any conflict, for the objectives of MX presuppose that if a war appeared inevitable, it would be to our advantage to launch the first strike.
As a second-strike “deterrent,” MX loses the advantage of its accuracy because Soviet silos will be empty and MX may not survive the Soviet strike. The MX sites in Nevada and Utah will be only 500 to 700 miles from the ocean. They are highly vulnerable to early and continuous strikes by Soviet submarines that could seriously cut or eliminate MX reaction time to the main Soviet attack. This would nullify MX effectiveness.
MX is an extravagance. It will cost at least four times that of a Freshwater Trident and will be twice as costly as an equivalent Trident system, including development of the Trident II missile which can have MX accuracy. Some estimates for MX run double the predicted cost of $33 billion. The recent change from the race track concept to the linear track approach is an indication of the potential for design defects that could result in massive cost overruns. MX construction difficulties, moving thousands of people to a hostile desert, and environmental concerns are overwhelming problems. This effort is wasted if MX has an effective life of only 15 to 20 years as has been suggested. It is better placed near cities where the roads can be used for transportation, where workers are plentiful, and the tunnels can be used for bomb shelters.
The Freshwater Trident remains competitive with MX at a fraction of the cost. It will require a tenth of the people, will not disrupt the environment, will bring employment to depressed areas, and construction could start now. Questions raised against the program are summarized here:
► Won’t winter ice impede Trident? Meteorological surveys indicate that Lake Superior and Lake Michigan only partially freeze over, and one icebreaker can keep a port open if needed. Ice is an advantage. The ship could stay under the ice and make Soviet surveillance more difficult because of the combined shielding of ice’ water, and pressure hull. The ship5 can easily surface through the ice ana fire from the surface, and be no more vulnerable than MX.
► Won’t a few large nuclear warhead5 wipe out all submarines in the Great Lakes? The impact would be less than the effect on the rigid MX sites whir'1 are easily targeted. There is a “V‘in Dorn Effect” which relates to the effect of shock waves in the water following shallow water bursts. Much o this effect is still theory. The Alf Force has said that the ranges of shallow water nuclear effects are poorly known as are the effects of reflection5 that may lead to pressure enhancements and phasing. With patrol area5 in trenched or sheltered locations, rhe effect of water bursts is minimized-
► Is there a treaty with Canada rha| prohibits the use of the Great Lake5^ Yes. The Rush-Bagot Treaty of was directed against military forces >n the Great Lakes that could be use against the other nation. The treaty in effect, but both countries
the Great Lakes. Since we have
followed the treaty in the air, there a precedent for discussions on u5'n^ the Great Lakes. Canadians Americans could jointly man submarines to make them ternational! .
► Would the Freshwater Trident *n vite more nuclear strikes to cities
the area? In all-out war, they are ready target areas. But the cento issue is one of providing the best terrent at the lowest cost to preven^ any strike. If the Soviets launch ' strike against the United State5, Canada is a co-participant Canadians should support any sys1 that provides a better deterrent war. As our strongest ally and close5 friend, validated by actions in we should not find Canada lacking support.
► Have the Great Lakes already be^ rejected as an ICBM site? Possibly’
b;
•ne. Trident is in production. Car-
Sub;
^ould
S only two or three missiles, SUM
'stantial duplication in defensive,
otenance, and other support sys- s- SUM could require as many as times more people to support
er,t with 24 missiles per submarine *°uld be more cost-effective. fU Why is there so little support for freshwater Trident? The layman
Judies that have not been released. Consideration was given to underwater ias'ng concepts by the Defense Science Board wherein missile capsules ''Verc to be deployed at random points y ships and periodically moved. No c°nsideration was given to submarines. Rand Corporation investigated silo basing in the Great Lakes, and while feasible and cheaper than ^■riuteman shore silos, the Air Force ejected the proposal. The Air Force 35 acknowledged that a submarine Pr°gram in the Great Lakes is feasible ut could not be ready until the -''Os, and it violates the triad conCePt. Delays would be caused by bu- ^aucracy and not technology.
Could the submarines be smaller? y operating in friendly waters they c°uld be smaller if redesign costs and elays would not exceed any savings associated with a reduced Trident.
eeping the present size would permit lrnmediate production, and the added space could be used to enhance ahitability and permit longer patrols, os larger tubes are needed for the r'dent II missile which will have more accuracy and range than Trident ' Otherwise, some reduction in ength is possible.
Would a Freshwater Trident be as SUrvivable as MX? The first ship would jmjoy the protection of the total Great i es patrol area the first day of de- oyrnent, which could be many years ef°re mx. MX will not have its ^aximum dispersal advantage until e 4,600 shelters are completed 15 ye®rs after construction starts.
the shallow water underwater mobile (sum) system of small submarines patrolling the continental a better alternative to the Great a^es proposal? Possibly, but SUM re- ^res the development of a new sub- mari v
ryin require many more ships with a ntai tern; e'ght
,ac^ missile, thus the Freshwater Trine
the
can only guess. The Air Force naturally wants its own system, and a Freshwater Trident would be a Navy system. Naval support may be weak because Navy may not want to invite attention to the present Trident system, or just change established policy.
^ Would it not be easier to build more of the existing Trident submarines? While the Freshwater Trident would be cheaper, the standard Trident would be less vulnerable and would not have the Canadian complication.
Trident meets the test of a true deterrent. No matter what the Soviets accomplish on the first strike, a large Trident fleet will be able to destroy the Soviet Union. Ranging in the far reaches of the oceans, Trident has two thirds of the earth in which to hide. The technology has been developed. Even if the oceans become transparent because of some future technology, the Soviets would be faced with an impossible task of attacking over the total surface of the world’s oceans. For Trident does not have to be within target range on the day war commences. Trident subs can launch the first hour, first day, or first month with equal effect. There is considerable psychological and practical merit in a staggered launch. The Soviets have a good shelter system, and a staggered attack would make them less able to recover rapidly and continue a land war. Better the Soviets direct their resources to locating submarines in the ocean than increasing the size and number of their warheads to blast American land targets.
After launching their missiles, Trident submarines are still effective attack submarines against Soviet shipping. Any recovery after a partial or total nuclear war will depend on the sea-lanes for help from areas that were not hit. Protecting these sea-lanes will be an important function for the Trident submarines. MX has no function after launch.
With large Trident fleets in the oceans, the president can make war decisions after due consideration of the facts and consequences. He will not be compelled by computers and senior advisors to make a quick strike to maximize MX. Nor will the Soviets deem it necessary to make a massive first strike in fear of MX.
Without MX, a larger Trident fleet will improve future SALT negotiations. MX and other land-based ICBMs can make the paranoid Soviets doubt our intentions. Trident is a true deterrent, and wider deployment throughout the oceans makes this fact obvious. Therefore, future SALT negotiations “might” be conducted in an atmosphere of greater trust and achieve progress toward strategic arms limitation.
“The Twelve Days of the England”
(See J. A. Williamson and W. D. Lanier, pp. 76-83, March 1980; W. J. Ruhe, p. 81, June 1980 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, Royal Nary—1 never made a better decision than to choose life membership in the U. S. Naval Institute as a payment for a Proceedings article which I wrote in the fifties! I still read each copy of the magazine with care and pass it on to my son who is a commander in the Royal Navy.
As an old Battle of the Atlantic hand, I read with great interest about the cruise of the England (DE-635). As an enthusiastic and not unsuccessful user of the Hedgehog in 1943-44, I had long wanted to know the details of the England’s remarkable exploits. Her achievements must have required all the qualities which we tried to produce then and which are just as necessary today: correctly tuned sonar and radar sets; well-maintained antisubmarine weapons (there were a number of misfires associated with Hedgehogs); perfect calibration of both weapon and sonar set; first-class training of the radar operators, the sonar crews, the Hedgehog crew, and the CIC team. And finally, the captain and the antisubmarine officer must have studied the habits of Japanese submarines until they could guess instinctively what the Japanese would do in different circumstances.
Clearly, the England had achieved all these qualities in full measure, and I salute her.
(Continued on page 83)
Comment and Discussion
PI.
LAMPS: The Ship System with Wings”
R- N. Winkel and D. Manningham, pp. Il4-117, March 1980; R. P. Hulson, pp. ^'22, April 1980 Proceedings)
lieutenant Curtis A. Weaver, Jr., U. S.
avy-—The key to the success of the lAMps m weapon system would appear t0 be the data link. It is through this ata link—and because of it—that Cuntrol of the weapon system remains |v‘th the ship. Thus, by intentionally Siting the stand-alone capabilities of Seahawk aircraft and requiring ata link contact to achieve full use of ^e weapon system, we have created a ship’s weapon system.” I wish to analyze the possible consequences of Wog this weapon system to a ship by ar> electronic umbilical cord.
a multi-threat scenario, we can exPect electronic warfare to play a ,Tla)ur role. Thus, the data link must
“Vers on the ASW team.
function under conditions of intense electronic countermeasures (ECM), electronic counter countermeasures (ECCM), and defensive electronic countermeasures (DECM) activity. Even directional data links can be jammed or otherwise rendered unuseable. A related consideration must be the capability of the data link to function in a high electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) environment resulting from an exchange of tactical/strategic nuclear weapons.
The electronic warfare and EMP considerations presuppose the ability to use the data link. What if force EMCON policy prohibits its use? Should we not expect that the air vehicle subsystem of the LAMPS Hi weapon system be capable of accomplishing its primary missions without dependence on the host platform?
The authors state that final localization and attack may be conducted “. . . at low altitudes which may be below the communications horizon.” 1 submit that while the aircraft is conducting magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) sweeps or is delivering a weapon, it will be below the communications horizon for fully two- thirds of its mission radius. The loss of data link contact during this most critical phase of the ASW mission must impact negatively on the probability of completing a successful attack.
Still another consideration is the impact of this data link-dependent weapon system on the conduct of coordinated ASW. The LAMPS 111 weapon system and the air vehicle, in particular, lack the capability to interface with H-2, H-3, P-3, or S-3 aircraft, or with any ships not equipped with the LAMPS III weapon system. Furthermore, a ship that is equipped with LAMPS III can only link with one Sea- hawk aircraft at a time, preventing multi-LAMPS operations. It would seem that LAMPS III does not positively contribute to either the conduct of a coordinated ASW mission or to the solution of the problems of command, control, and communication within the battle group.
Another weakness of the data link is its susceptibility to the soft kill. Any mast-mounted system must be assumed to be highly vulnerable in any shooting war.
Finally, the operation of the data link is heavily dependent on atmospheric conditions. The data link can be rendered tactically useless by atmospheric anomalies which the operators would be unable to overcome.
The most effective course to take would be to maximize the stand-alone capabilities of the air vehicle. While the aircraft does have some capacity to perform its primary missions without reliance on the data link, 1 believe that it should be able to perform all of the acoustic-processing and ESM- processing functions which only the ship can now perform.
The key to the LAMPS III weapon system is not the data link; it is the air vehicle which extends the ship's sensor and weapons delivery capabilities. It is the air vehicle that will be expected to accomplish the assigned mission, whether or not it is in data link contact.
“A Fantasy?”
(See W. Outersun, pp. 72-77, April 1980
Proceedings)
Lieutenant (junior grade) Robert Holyoak, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Captain Outerson calls attention to the possible “appalling” results of a Soviet submarine lobbing conventional missiles at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station. While 1 am not conversant with the penetrating power of submarine-launched missiles, I am very familiar with the massive construccion of nuclear power stations because I manage one. My station and others, including Millstone, are built to absorb hits by F-llls, Boeing 707s, tornadoes, and many other imaginative events that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has conjured up. Vital areas of the plant are protected in depth by many feet of reinforced concrete. The plant I manage has over
400.0 yards of concrete with over
30.0 tons of reinforcing steel. I cannot imagine any significant penetration to a plant’s vital areas by conventional missiles.
Rather than nuclear plants being held up as a dangerous target, perhaps we should examine them as an asset in a major confrontation. A nuclear station is built to seismic qualifications second only to the defense command center in the Colorado mountains. It has its own security, food supplies, highly trained health groups, and other technicians. It will have, as a result of the Three Mile Island incident, a technical command center which will have computer and other communications links to Washington for transmission of area meteorological and radiological information. Along with the ability to supply electrical power for more than 18 months without any delivery of fuel, a nuclear power station could serve as an area civil defense center.
“The Naval Reserve Should Work”
(See ). G. Aberc, pp. 49-53, February 1980
Proceedings')
Lieutenant Commander John If7. Heinrich, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve—I agree with Captain Abert that it is not particularly worthwhile for the Naval Reserve to train simply for "wartime mobilization.”
I am the commanding officer of a Naval Reserve Security Group unit, one of the “intelligence units” probably alluded to by Captain Abert as doing meaningful work. We believe our real-time intelligence reporting is of value to our consumers—reporting is also handled by reserve units—and we feel that we do maintain a reasonable state of readiness by performing
this collection and reporting.
However, it is my belief, reinforced by comments made at higher levels of command, that this mission is not considered “mobilization” training and, therefore, not “worthwhile,” at least to the Naval Reserve. However, the Chief of the Naval Reserve is not in a position to fairly evaluate our production, and hence our mobilization; only our present command, the Naval Security Group, can do this.
Yet, the unit and I, as a commanding officer, are frequently evaluated by the Naval Reserve standards. Furthermore, our equipment allocation is developed through Chief of Naval Reserve, and as a result, we occasionally receive equipment that is either (1) not state of the art or (2) not the most cost-effective because the people procuring it do not always know its intended use.
Proceedings readers may find it useful to know how our reserve program is developed. I believe there are lessons that can be gleaned from our experience and applied to other reserve components.
First, overall intelligence tasking is developed from the top DoD agencies and presented to our parent command. Originally, our reserve tasking developed because insufficient active forces existed to prosecute all cases on the DoD priority lists. Whatever we were thus able to develop in the way of an intelligence product was more than could be gained by active forces because of force constraints. This is a particularly important point to reinforce in these days of volunteer force shortages. Reserves can take up slack.
Second, our focal point for developing opportunities to use the Naval Reserve is our parent command. Technical management of our reserve activities is carried out by reserve and active duty members of the parent command's staff, with our highest- ranking officer equal in stature to other departments’ officers. Thus, we have the commitment to use reserve forces at the highest levels.
Third, as a commanding officer, I am given reasonable latitude in scheduling drills, so that personnel are present at the best production times for our particular assignments. We are
constrained to four drills Pef month—which can be unfortunate m times of peak load activity—but do have much control over when individuals schedule drills. (I should po‘nt out that this degree of latitude varies considerably from reserve center to reserve center.)
Fourth, a vigorous program ^ training and requalification f°r operators, in order to assure their pr0' ficiency in intelligence production, lS part of our training. Units ®re “graduated” from the training Pf0' gram into real-time intelligence pr°" duction only after our regional commander has seen continued evidence 0 each operator’s ability to meet the quality standards for the intelligence product. In this way, quality is ma|n' tained; a unit’s graduation can even be revoked if quality dips below standat for a sustained period of time.
It often seems that most of the administrative problems we have are produced by Chief of Nava Reserve—the recurrent funding Pr°^ lems for active duty for training aIt but one example. As a result, 1 ofren think that technical and administra tive control should be assumed by Naval Security Group Command, d can defend and justify the use of Nava Reserve forces. More broadly, it migbc be worthwhile for all active duty NaVl commands to consider programming for Naval Reserve forces—and conse quently justifying their use—with rhe Chief of Naval Reserve providing “host” facilities for the “tenant re serve forces in a locality.
“A Fleet for the Year 2000: Future Force Structure”
(See F. J. West, Jr., pp. 66-81, May 198° Proceedings)
Captain Peter F. Block, U. S■ (Retired)—Mr. West’s lucid timely article is one of the best articU lated essays to appear in the Proceeding in quite some time. I agree with mu of what he says. But there are s°nllj rather important things he hasn t sal that need saying, and when all faec°rS are considered, I find m yself disagfe^j ing with some of Mr. West’s prindP conclusions.
abl, no
p | •
tlght of hand. Now, it is seemingly Pessary to count almost anything th« floats.
Then there is the matter of names. n rhe early 1960s, we found it neces- to build some very big destroyers 111 order to accommodate the modern rrnaments and electronics that were re9uired. These ships seemed to deServe a different designation from the ^tJinary DDs then in the fleet, so the j, 8 destroyers were designated DLs. ,iUr some time they were called destroyer leaders,” but that title
f*rst, it is high time we stopped linking and talking in terms of a residual U. S. advantage over the Soviet Union in overall naval power. This is s,niply noc true We did have a clear advantage, but it has been lost. The alance shifted some years ago—no attr than the mid-1970s. Whether "e talk in terms of overall force levels 0r> more properly, in terms ot relative Capability to perform necessary naval ‘n|ssions, it seems clear that it is the ov‘et Union, not the United States, ^hich today holds the trump cards. ['stead of warning of the need to avoid a loss of superiority which has in *act already occurred, the U. S. Navy uuld be concentrating on the task of Etching up.
insist on fooling ourselves. One "'ay we do this is to juggle names and ^umbers in such a way as to camou- age our lack of adequate numbers. tveral years ago the active fleet, for fc hrst time in recent memory, was flowed to drop well below 500 ships.
“ere were a number of unfavorable Public media comments on this situa- tlUn> and some politicians expressed £fave concern. Then one day the fleet "'as back to a more respectable 550 or s° ships, and criticism became some- "fat muted. Had there been an tr|C'rgetic construction or acquisition pr°gram, or recommissioning ot inac- tlVt units, or some other program to Restore the fleet’s numerical strength? _ °> we simply started counting Naval tserve Force ships (most of them ^Uper-antiquated) and civilian-manned ij ditary Sealift Command (MSC) aux- 'aries in the overall fleet totals. *'en the fleet was at a more respect- numerical level, there had been Perceived need to resort to such was replaced by the name frigate. This wasn’t a very good choice of names—other navies operated “frigates” a tenth the displacement of ours—and so it was decided to call the big destroyers "cruisers,” which is what we call them today. This is fine, up to a point. The danger is that we may think we have 27 or so cruisers in our Navy. In fact, we don’t have any—not in the functional sense ot the term, and not in the sense that the “Kynda,” "Kresta,” and “Kara” are cruisers, capable of sustained independent operations and possessing significant firepower against surface targets.
Our "cruisers” are really big destroyers whose primary mission and capability are the protection of the aircraft carrier. We have become overly dependent upon the carrier for offensive capability. Except for the carrier, our surface combatant ships possess little capability against surface or shore targets. Should our carriers be sunk, disabled, or simply not available, we have nothing in the way of surface naval forces to take their place. Only our submarines could then carry on offensively. And while our SSNs possess impressive capabilities, it will be well to remember that the Soviet submarine force outnumbers our own by better than two to one.
In concentrating our limited funds on shipboard aviation and submarines, together with the forces and facilities needed to protect and support these two arms, we have allowed glaring deficiencies to develop throughout the remainder of the spectrum of naval capabilities. We have permitted our gunfire support capability to atrophy
E. BONSIGNORE
One way to acquire large numbers of small, capable ships is to buy foreign naval ships. Of the many good ships available, the acquisition of the Dutch-German “Standard” I'rigate offers the added advantage of improving NATO force commonality.
to a state of near impotence. Our mine countermeasures capability is, at the very best, marginal and probably inadequate to meet even a modest challenge, let alone a future Wonsan. The U. S. Navy, despite the painful experience in Southeast Asia, has today, tor all practical purposes, no inshore warfare capability whatsoever. There are other deficiencies as well, but none quite so alarming as the lack of numbers—and this includes the lack ot an adequate number of experienced sailors, as well as the lack of sufficient ships.
Mr. West correctly points out that ASW protection of sea lines of communication is not our main weakness. He would, therefore, stop building frigates and put whatever money is thus saved into better (and more expensive) ships and systems. The fallacy here is twofold. First, there is a point at which escort forces reach so low a level as to constitute an unacceptable vulnerability, and we have probably reached that point. The fact that other deficiencies may be even more serious doesn't change that situation. Second, Mr. West pays scant attention to the most serious problem of all: the lack of adequate numbers. His proposal would further reduce the number of ships in the fleet. It would therefore
be a step in the wrong direction.
The Navy’s strength must be significantly increased. It is not realistically possible to live within a 56 billion annual shipbuilding and conversion, Navy (SCN) budget (the equivalent of half that much a decade ago), and still maintain the naval power this country needs. We should stop pretending that it is possible. While the final decisions must be taken at the political level, the leadership of the Navy must leave no doubt where it stands. The time for a cheery “Aye, aye” is long past.
The Navy must learn to better compete for needed resources. That so much is about to be poured into the foolish MX system, instead of into a sea-based alternative, is no tribute to the powers of persuasion of our existing naval leadership. The potential good that strong seapower can do this country is so overwhelming that it is difficult to understand why our Washington representatives have not done a better job of selling their product. Perhaps we have something to learn from Admiral Gorshkov.
We need to obtain additional ships as quickly as they can adequately be manned. The latter qualification is a serious one, for we will not begin to retain the people we need until we are willing to pay them something approximating what they are worth and can earn on the outside. Fortunately, our most pressing need is for relatively small ships, with small crews. We do need some heavy gunfire support capability (big ships, big crews), but we also need long-endurance escorts, minesweepers, patrol craft, missile boats, and diesel submarines—all small ships, with small crews. Although some will say that we have a blue water navy and don't need small ships, there are plenty of places where small ships can be very useful. We don’t have to look very far from our own shores to find an area where such a need may arise. How humiliating it will be if we find ourselves unable to perform a naval mission because the only ships we have are too big and costly to be committed in a high-risk coastal or inshore environment. Yet that is exactly the kind of situation that is most likely to arise: a confrontation against a minor power, possessing limited naval forces but with a significant capability in small, fast, expendable units. We are not well prepared to deal with such a threat.
The Navy should press hard for the assets it needs. If this means spirited competition against the other services for a larger proportion of a limited defense budget, then we should do the impolitic thing and compete. The need for more ships should be recognized, and the ships should be procured, quickly. This may well mean procurement of some suitable small ships from overseas sources. Many countries have designed and built classes of smaller ships which would be eminently suitable for use by our own Navy. In almost every case, overseas procurement would be considerably less expensive than building ships in our own shipyards, and it would certainly be faster. It would not be a politically popular thing to do, but we should ask ourselves if we haven’t worked our way into our present straits largely by having bowed too often to the demands of political convenience. If we really believe in the importance of seapower for the United States, we should bring our Navy back to its former status of providing our first line of defense.
“Do American Shipping and Shipbuilding Have a Future?”
(See C. W. Whitehurst, pp. 66-71, April 1980 Proceedings)
Marvin 0. Millar, Department Manager, Underway Replenishment Department, Naval Ship Weapon Systems, Engineering Station, Port Hueneme—Mr. Whitehurst’s comments on the sad state of U. S. shipbuilding and our merchant marine suggest two elements for a new U. S. Maritime policy:
► "... A case can be made for the Navy to close or, preferably, lease its yards to private shipbuilders.”
► ”... A still unresolved question is to what extent commercial shipping can perform Navy underway replenishment missions.”
The operation of Navy yards and underway replenishment ships by the
low bidder will surely degrade naval readiness. Those who sincerely suggest such changes are just not aware of rN facts.
Four years after the San Francisco Naval Shipyard was closed, a naval m- vestigation was conducted to determine why private shipyards in the San Francisco Bay area were not adequate!) performing Navy work. One significant piece of evidence presented 'vaS the complete lack of training Pr°" grams in any ot the marine trades as compared to the well-known Navy yard apprentice program for ever) shipyard trade. Complex naval ship systems cannot be properly overhaul* by untrained personnel. .
Admiral Zumwalt, as CNO, note that Soviet merchant ships were Pr° viding mobile logistic support to sur face warfare groups. He had tests con ducted to determine the potential t°r U. S. flag merchant ships. ProieCt Charger Log I results showed that fueling combatant ships from mer chant tankers was an extremely sl°'' operation as compared to using U- ’ Navy fleet oilers. The Soviets obvi ously concurred with our assessment because they are replacing their mef chant ships with high-performante ships copied from U. S. Navy unJef way replenishment ships. j
Turning our Navy yards afl underway replenishment ships over private industry appears to be grasping-at-straws attempt to help c maritime industry. In my opm|t,n’ this action will only further weaken our Navy and have little or no effeCt on the health of our merchant marme-
“A Sea-Based Interdiction
. »>
System for Power Projection
(See C. E. Myers, pp. 103-106, November 1979; M. C. Franklin, pp. 23-24, January 1980; J. F. Downs and T. W. Jackson, PP' 74-75, February 1980; H. W. J. R- () Bergbauer and F. J. Koch, p. 85, June U Proceedings')
Harold Patrick Pulver—In these time of cost restraints and budget contr > the idea set forth by Mr. Myers aP pears to be one of the best solution^ This entails putting to sea not only major caliber gun system, but also 1(1 corporating some of today’s modeffl
98°
w°uld replace the old 5-in./38 cal. §un mounts. There would also be an Edition of three Vulcan-Phalanx ^O-mm.) defense weapon systems: w° midships (one port side, one star-
°atd side), one on the 05 level aft ak
aoove the flight deck control bridge, ms third system could be trained to starboard or aft, giving maximum protection and coverage against incoming threats.
'kfensive and offensive weapons.
The concept I suggest would not °nly put the much proven 16-inch 8un back in service, using the lowa- class battleship, but would also pro- Vlde a very stable platform for VTOL arid helicopter assault staging. By removing the third turret and redesign- mg the superstructure, a flight deck ar>d staging area of more than 32,000 StfUare feet could be built (approx, x 100') with a hangar deck area about 20,000 square feet. The ar>gar would have an overhead clearance to facilitate the stowage and maintenance of the CH-53E Sea Stallion ar>d AV-8A Harrier, in addition to levators which would move equip- mttit and supplies to the flight deck atld staging areas.
As for the weapon system, the ship W°uld not only be equipped with the tmesent l6-in./50 cal. Mod 0—two tUfrets forward, but four 5-in./54 cal. ^k-45 automatic weapon systems (tWo to port and two to starboard)
The ship would also be equipped with Harpoon (RGM-84) antiship missiles and Standard ER (RIM-67) antiair missiles. These would be launched from the Mk-26 Mod-1 guided missile launching system located well forward of turret No. 1 on the forecastle or from either of two dual-purpose cell launchers located aft of the flight deck. There would be ample room just aft of turret No. 2 on the 01 level for placement of cruise missile launching canisters.
The electronic suite would be that which is associated with the newer weapon systems, electronic warfare, and communications. The suite would be comprised of TACAN air, navigation and control, the AN/SPS 40B and AN/SPS 48 (3D) air search radars, and the AN/SPS 55 and AN/SPG-9 surface search and navigation radars. The AN/SPG-9, AN/SPG-60, and AN/SPG 5 ID would be the standard fire control radar systems. The electronic surveillence and warfare system would be the AN/ SLQ32(V) and associated equipment, including the new Mk-36 RBOC chaff launchers. These launchers would be located on the 01 level: two port side and two starboard side. For the main battery gun control system, the Mk-13 director and associated computer system could be modified to facilitate future developments in ordnance guidance. Another alternative would be to use the Mk-86 digital fire control system which would be modified to handle the ballistics of the 16-inch gun by using a system similar to the Mk-116 computer used in conjunction with the three-inch gun mount.
The superstructure of the proposed interdiction platform would be so designed as to provide maximum visibility from both the forward navigation and flag bridges and after flight deck control bridge of ongoing flight operations and necessary weapons observation and control. It would also provide maximum fire training arcs for guns and missile launchers. As found on the John F. Kennedy (CV-67), the exhaust stacks would be so designed as to be canted to starboard. This would prevent boiler gases from drifting over the stern and interfering with flight deck operations.
This ship, not only being a stable platform for gunfire support, could also be a primary helo assault support ship, thus acting as two primary ships in the assault group.
“Lord Louis”
(See Duke of Edinburgh, pp.26-35, February 1980; J. D. Ferguson and F. Poole, p. 22, April 1980 Proceedings)
Gnstaf Newcomb—Like many other Americans, I watched the Earl Mountbatten’s televised memoirs, which were based on Mr. Terraine’s work, and was awed by the breadth of Mountbatten’s experience and character. The scope of his life and the grace of his personality truly conform to the ideal of the renaissance man at his best, as immortalized by Kipling in “If.”
When I first heard of Admiral of the Fleet the Earl Mountbatten's death, I was deeply shocked by this senseless tragedy. Since Mountbatten's death, a memorial trust has been established to perpetuate the memory of this unique man. The trust is under the direction of the Earl Mountbatten’s secretary, Mr. John Barratt. Remembering the generosity of the British people in establishing suitable memorials for the many great Americans who were leaders in the fight for freedom, such as John F. Kennedy, 1 am sure that many other members of the United States Naval Institute will wish to contribute to the memorial for this great Anglo-American captain. Contributions or inquiries may be sent to: The Mountbatten Memorial Trust, Mr. John Barratt, Director, Broad- lands, Romsey, Hampshire, England, S05 9ZD (Telephone: Romsey 3333).
very well cause embarrassment to the officer in charge of the honor guard which might not yet be assembled and ready to perform its duties, and that it was always far better to arrive two or three minutes past rather than ahead of the appointed time. I have always remembered his counsel, and it served me well during my career.
“The U. S. Navy:
Attack Submarines”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 112-113, January 1980;
E. S. Ruete, pp. 11-17, March 1980
Proceedings)
Arthur Hanley—In 1964, the Navy was testing an 18-foot model of a new type of submarine propulsion system at the David Taylor Model Basin. It was developed by Commander F. R. Haselton of the Undersea Warfare Branch of the Office of Naval Research, and involved tandem propellers that encircled the entire submarine and ran in opposite directions. The concept involved two rings around the hull, each ring having 18 to 20 2.5-foot variable-pitch blades powered by electricity from a nuclear reactor. The tests appeared to be successful. This new method of propulsion promised greater speed, quieter operation, far more maneuverability at all speeds and depths, and deeper diving capability because no moving parts penetrated the pressure hull, allowing a better seal. What happened?
Can’t someone assure us that it isn’t true that the only advantage a Los Angeles-class SSN has over an updated Sturgeon class is 5 knots of speed?
What happened to the “mid- 1970s” class of SSN? The Los Angel* class was supposed to be only interim design until the “mid- 1970s class became available.
nism for the blades, and other factors-
Second, looking at the unclassifie characteristics of the Los Angeles 688) and previous SSNs, the princip8 difference appears to be a speed >n' crease of about 5 knots. The SSN-^ also incorporated advanced silencing features, the BQQ-5 sonar, an Mk-117 tire control system (ECS). The silencing may only be a factor at the higher speed of the SSN-688 and, thus, may not be a valid item of comparis°n with the older, slower SSNs. The Pre vious Sturgeon (SSN-637) and Pernid (SSN-594) classes are being upgraded [0 the BQQ-5 sonar (from BQQ-7) a11 Mk-117 FCS (from Mk-113).
Thus, the increased cost of the ss
688 over the SSN-637—approximate y 40%—is the result of essentially dm[1][2] bling the submarine’s horsepower c°
gain some 5 knots.
Third, 1 am not certain that
Norman Polmar, Editor, The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet—With reference to Mr. Hanley’s questions, • offer the following comments:
First, Commander Haselton5 tandem-propeller submarine offered a number of interesting features f°r underwater movement, including a very high degree of maneuverability and the ability to hover at virtually any angle. However, the concept "a5 determined not to be practical l°r full-size submarines because of the sizc of propeller blades required, the con' plexities of the variable-pitch mecha
the
D. LOCK"*"’
hi
Hiitl-1970s design SSN was intended to Ptoduce a specific attack submarine, father, I believe that it was intended tn keep up with all practical features rkat could be considered for incorpora- tlQn into the next SSN design, such as W|de-aperture-array sonar, weapons Eternal to the pressure hull, etc. The SsN-688 appears to have been devel- °Ped as a platform to use the S6G reac- t0r plant and HY-130 steel. The latter "as not used, however, and the SSN- r,«8 pressure hull is fabricated of HY-80 *teek as have been all SSNs since the hresher (SSN-593).
discussions with several Navymen and civilians involved with submarine
dptiAi — * i
=>mcnt, both active and retired, ave led me to conclude that a large nilrnber of advanced features could be lr,corporated into the “next" SSN de- s'8n. More important, in my opinion, ere are several areas of submarine- related technology that should be ex- P'ored for later submarine designs,
, oth nuclear and non-nuclear. These ^clude modular construction and conjuration, advanced materials and ahricarion techniques, higher-density n terms of full power hours) propul- S|°n plants, communications, sensors, and weapons.
Unfortunately, current U. S. approaches to future submarine devel- Prnents appear to be highly conserva- tlVe> and one sees that the “next gen- ^tation” SSN being proposed by the k avy >s similar to the previous classes, ut larger (and hence more expensive) arRl slightly faster.
£LF Update”
R. K. Jurgen, pp. 135-1.36, March 1980; Beam, pp.81-82, June 1980 Pr°ceedings)
^Wniander Henry H. Beam. U. S. a,’al Reserve, Assistant Professor of 'ar>agement, Western Michigan diversity — In my opinion, much of tbe difficulty in presenting Seafarer/ to Michigan residents could have been avoided if the following technical asPects had been made clear at the
start.
No new knowledge is involved. Sea- arer differs from existing broadcast Sterns, including familiar AM and FM
radio srarions, only in that it requires extremely low frequencies be radiated. Since the length of an antenna required to radiate is inversely proportional to the frequency, unusually long antennas are required. In the case of Seafarer, resonance (the condition for efficient radiation, attained at approximately half the wavelength of the base frequency to be radiated) can be reached only when the antenna length approaches a thousand miles.
Through two quirks of nature, extremely low frequency radio waves can provide virtually continuous global coverage, including signals that can be received by submarines at operational depths; something that cannot be achieved with the commonly used higher radio frequencies. The first quirk is the ability of properly polarized extremely low frequency radio waves to penetrate seawater to great depths. The second quirk is that when extremely low frequency radio waves are coupled into the air-earth- ionosphere cavity, they travel around the globe with very little attenuation, a phenomenon known as the Schumann resonance. Further, the drag exerted by the earth s surface provides just enough forward tilt to the normally vertically polarized E-field so there is a small but sufficient horizontal component directed downward into the ocean to permit us to take advantage of the first quirk.
A third quirk of nature solves the final problem, that of generating the extremely low frequency radio waves in .the first place. As Mr. Jurgen noted, the very deep layer of low conductivity rock in the Laurentian shield region of VCisconsin and Michigan s Upper Peninsula make it possible to lengthen the antenna enough through the effect of the low conductivity rock on the current return loop to make radiation feasible at extremely low frequencies.
The anrenna is arranged in a grid simply to provide omni-directional coverage with the radiation pattern.
Some further aspects of the Seafarer system are of note.
The system can only be one way from the ELF transmitter to the submarine. This because the submarine is unable to trail an antenna long enough
to radiate at ELF frequencies.
The EI.F signal can be received on land as well as on or in the ocean. Hence, the system could be used for purposes other than communicating with submerged submarines.
The cost of Seafarer is not large as military systems go. A rough esrimate for the current scaled-down Seafarer is $300,000,000, or about the cost of a new frigate. In addition, most of the cost is in the transmitting facility. Only a tenth of the cost would go for equipping each submarine with an ELF reception capability.
The Seafarer system would not be hardened against enemy attack. Some thought was once given to a hard, deep F.LF system to be called SHELF. To date, no serious consideration has been given to building SHELF, which would be much more costly than a Seafarer-size system.
Other technologies may be developed which will provide as good or better methods of communicating with submerged submarines. One possibility is to use satellites or airplanes to beam high-frequency transmissions directly at the surface of the ocean. If workable, such a system would greatly increase the data transmission rate and provide the potential for two-way communication with the submerged submarine, perhaps in tactical as well as strategic modes.
Unlike security sensitive areas such as nuclear weaponry, virtually all the pertinent technical data on Seafarer are readily available in the public domain. The entire IEEE Transactions on Communications (Volume Com-22, April 1974) is devoted to technical papers on various aspects of ELF communication systems. Two other relevant publications are: Seafarer Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) Submarine Command and Control Communication System, by the Special Communications Project Office of the Navy Electronic System Command, and the 1977 National Academy of Sciences report entitled “Biologic Effects of Electric and Magnetic Fields Associated with Proposed Project Seafarer.” Thus anyone interested in the details of the proposed Seafarer system can learn about ir without having access to classified material. (Continued on page II7)
Comment and Discussion
(Continued from page 89)
| Human Rights and Base Rights | have caused spiraling inflation, serious back answers to such questions as: Is balance of payments deficits, and most America a dependable ally? Does it |
: ®rigadier General Edwin F. Black, S' Army (Retired)—In the past, the c°tnplaint has been that Americans do no,: understand Asia. Now Asians themselves are wondering if they really understand America. When President Ferdinand E. Marcos acCepted an invitation from the Ameri- ean Newspaper Publishers Association t0 speak at their annual convention in Honolulu this spring, he did so to try to explain the Third World or, more Particularly, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) point of view to the power elite of the U. S. neWs media. At the same time he hoped to carry back with him some 'dea of what is really going on in the ’firnds of the Americans—what will Hiey do next? Asian leaders find it difficult enough to understand U. S. policy "'hen they analyze it in terms of what they assume to be national self-interest and basic strategic considerations. But ^hen the Carter Administration mixes m intangible, and often inconsistent, human rights policies, they are completely lost. As these leaders look ahead, seeking the wisest course of action for their respective nations, their primary conCern is the possibility of a disastrous Slobal war between the United States ar,d the U.S.S.R.—a catastrophe they are powerless to prevent or even influ- er,ce in any significant way. Regard- Hss of its outcome, such a conflict 'v°uld surely bring large-scale death and destruction to their helpless People. These fears are stimulated by repeated predictions of a World War Hi from Peking’s most influential sPokesman, senior Vice Premier Deng Xioo Ping. In Marcos’ words, “Asians hear the roll of the drums of war!” Their next concern is the maintenance of internal stability. This has become exceedingly difficult as they c°nfront growing economic problems caused again by external forces beyond their control. Since 1973, the repeated 0pEC increases in the price of crude oil | painful of all, a steep rise in the cost have the military capability and will of living for the common people. The to meet its mutual security commit- resulting economic environment is ments? Can America “pass the test of made to order for Communist ex- integrity?" ploitation, through clandestine sub- In their efforts to maintain internal version of governmental authority stability, Asian leaders often find and/or armed insurgencies in remote themselves in conflict with President rural areas. Carter’s emphasis on human rights. As for the people themselves, the The difference of opinion arises not on overwhelming majority long only for the matter of principle, but on the peace, political stability, law and or- question of timing. They look on der and some form of prompt assist- human rights as an evolutionary proc- ance from the central government ess, while President Carter seems to when natural disasters strike. Over the want instant results. While they are centuries they have been able to cope prepared to admit they are far from with what the West would call “low perfect, they believe they are the ob- standards of living.” What they can- ject of intense and unfair pressures not handle is anarchy: armed bands from the United States, particularly spreading terror and destruction when human rights violations are far throughout the countryside. more serious and blatant in neighbor- The non-Communist Asian leaders ing Communist countries. As they see have concluded that a strong Ameri- it, national survival as a free country can military presence in the Pacific re- and the day-to-day struggle to help gion offers the best hope of at least de- their people pull themselves out of the ferring a global war. But having made quicksand of poverty are the real prob- this decision, they are now wondering lems. Human rights, on the other if they shouldn’t hedge their bets. hand, are a commendable, but What disturbs them most are reports longer-range goal, from authoritative American sources Circumstances have forced the that the United States does not have Third World to seek a practical the capability to conduct sustained “Third Alternative” to Communism military campaigns in such widely and to Western-style constitutional separated theaters as Europe, the Mid- republics. “We in the Third World,” die East, and the Far East. They re- Marcos explained, “have temporarily member only too well that, in the last chosen strong, nationalist govern- war Asia had second priority. If hos- ments that are neither completely to- tilities break out between the super- talitarian nor completely liberal, con- powers, might not America again sensus democracies.” The choice leave the Asians to defend themselves throughout Free Asia has been “au- as best they can while it fights thoritarian governments” dedicated to elsewhere5 showing their people “the disciplined 6 'Theirdoubts are compounded by way to democracy.” the disturbing comparisons of U. S. Th.s deliberate choice has been and Soviet strategic nuclear power much misunderstood, and perhaps made public during the congressional even resented by the West. The prob- hearings on SALT II—evidence rein- lem seems to be that the liberal media forced by repeated instances of hesi- has been unable to distinguish be- tancy inconsistency, and vacillation tween tyranny and authoritarianism, on the part of the Carter Administra- To them, any restrictions on the press tion in its handling of international is the equivalent of tryanny The differences between the two are CflItS is not surprising that Marcos’ obvious to Asians. Tyrannical regimes ASEAN peers have asked him to bring (Continued on page 122) |
pfoceeHlnc»«, / .Tulv 1080 | 117 |
117
The U. S. Navy: Frigates
By Norman Polmar, Editor, The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet
Table 1 LJ. S. Surface Combatants
Fiscal Year | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1990(estimated) |
Cruisers-Destroyers Frigates | 240 (30%) 41 (5%) | 186 (24%) 47 (6%) | 100 (22%) 65 (14%) | 110 (24%)* 120 (27%) |
Active Fleet___________ 812 769 462 450 maximum
•Includes 15 CG/DDG-47 Aegis ships
As the U. S. Navy begins the 1980s, it faces shortfalls in most categories of ships, based on estimates of requirements for peacetime and wartime operations during the remainder of this century. Instead of the 600 active ships that the Navy had earlier called the minimum necessary to carry out national commitments in this period, the Navy will have some 450 active ships, at most. This situation has been somewhat mitigated by the increasing use of the Military Sealift Command and Naval Reserve Force to operate fleet support ships.
Still, in the face of increasing U. S. operations in the Indian Ocean, Soviet construction programs and expanding areas of activity, and growing Third World military forces, there are demands for more U. S. naval forces. But by the 1990s the U. S. Navy will have more ships in only one category of ships: frigates.
Counting of ships is but one criterion for measuring navies and has limitations. It is useful, however, to indicate trends in size and in relative capabilities. Frigates are “low-mix” antisubmarine ships that trace their modern genesis to the several hundred destroyer escorts (DEs) built during World War II. Those ships were intended primarily for ASW escort of merchant, amphibious, and underway replenishment ships. The modern frigate must be able to counter hostile submarines, and aircraft and antiship missiles.
Thus, the latest class of U. S. frigates, the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7), has a limited surface-to-air missile and antiship missile defense (ASMD) capability, as well as ASW weapons and sensors. However, these ships are limited with respect to: electronics, fire control, missile capacity, high-speed endurance, and growth potential. Further, the SH-60B Seahawk helicopter, which will provide the principal ASW weapon for the FFG-7S, will not become operational until the mid- 1980s.
By the late 1980s, the U. S. Navy will have approximately 120 frigates in commission:
2 Bronstein (FF-1038) class
10 Garcia (FF-1040) class
46 Knox (FF-1052) class
1 Glover (FF-1098) class
6 Brooke (FFG-l) class
43 Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class (authorized through FY 1981)
11 Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class (planned FY 1982-84)
This number compares to the Navy's minimum frigate force objective of 92 ships. This is not to say there is a “surplus” of frigates, only that the Navy will be almost 30 ships over its minimum force goal. The 92 number is based on 5 ships to help screen amphibious forces, 63 ships to escort merchant convoys carrying military equipment, and 24 ships with 4 underway replenishment groups. In contrast, there are serious shortfalls projected for the 1980s and beyond in cruisers, destroyers, amphibious warfare ships, and several types of auxiliary ships unless major new construction programs are undertaken.
Further, the frigate force is re^a’ tively new, with most ships complete^ in the late 1960s and early 19705- While the frigate force will excee goals, Vice Admiral James H. Doyle’ Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Surface Warfare), has said: “we can always use more ships [frigates] and will undoubtedly need more in a gef1' eral war.”
Beyond the FFG-7s, the Navy is e3£" amining the requirements and alternatives for a new ship class, the so-calle FFX “corvette.” Admiral Doyle has said, “This corvette would fill the gap in protecting mercantile convoys> whose protection we have not specif ically provided for in force planning- The ship, however, would be IeSS costly and, hence, less capable than the FFG-7S.
The latter factor concerns some naval observers. Admiral Doyle has observed, “In the tight fisca
environment of [ship construction! planning ... we have gotten seriously out of balance in inventory between frigates on the one hand and cruisers/destroyers on the other.” Th‘s can be seen, for example, by comparing the Navy’s cruiser-destroyer an
frigate forces in I960 and 1990 (Table 1). The percentages indicate the fraction of the active, Navy-manned fleet-
It becomes obvious that not only has the size of the active fleet declined by almost half over the period, bur that the composition of the fleet has shifted toward the low-mix. Although today’s frigates are more capable than those in service in I960, with the potential threats increasing in effective' ness over the past two decades, the frigate remains the Navy’s low-m>x warship on a relative basis. The U- S-
'avy is thus shifting, in part, toward a low-mix fleet at a time when overSeas naval commitments appear to be lr,creasing along with Soviet naval ^abilities.
The proposed FFX program will exacerbate this situation, as would the J-Ontinued construction of FFG-7s.
here are political reasons for continues frigate programs: shipyards in Politically important Maine, Wash- lngton, and California are producing the FFG-7 class. And, if the FFG-7 and F,?x programs dry up, the shipyards n°w building frigates would seek w°rk currently going to other yards.
The state of the U. S. Navy, the Pfobable political-military problems of the 1980s and beyond, and Soviet naval developments demand that al- tetnatives to building more frigates aricl corvettes be considered. For example, the current Aegis cruiser (CG-47 nee DDG-47) program could be accelerated. These Ticonderoga-class otuisers are the most capable surface Warships now being built in the West. The Navy apparently has Department Defense approval to seek 21 ships—18 to operate with carrier bat- 'T' groups and 3 for surface action groups. Still, 21 high-capability sur- hace combatants appear an absolute m‘nimum, perhaps acceptable only if tlle six modern nuclear cruisers (CGN- 36 through CGN-41) are later upgraded Wlth the Aegis weapon system. (Interestingly, the CG-47, as the DDG-47, Was the lower cost alternative to the aborted nuclear-powered strike cruiser icsGN] as a means of putting the ^egis air defense system to sea.)
What is the tradeoff of shifting funds for some or all of the 11 frigates planned in the fiscal year 1982-84 programs to building additional ships of the Ticonderoga class?
Or, could an alternative to additional FFG-7s and the new FFX program be the construction of additional Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers? These large, ASW-oriented ships have long been criticized (including by this writer) for their lack of missile firepower. The development of vertical launch missile systems, which can permit a single Spruance to carry up to 122 missiles (plus additional weapons in canisters while retaining both 5-inch guns and helicopter facilities), makes the construction of additional Spruances attractive as an alternative to more frigates.
Another consideration is that the large number of Spruance-type ships in the fleet—the CG-47/DDG-993/DD-963 classes—and the FFG-7 program provide a personnel assignment, training, maintenance, and logistics base that can be exploited for additional variations of those classes. The development of new frigate or corvette classes could only marginally make use of those infrastructures.
The planned DDGX program, for an antiair-oriented ship of perhaps 7,000 tons to replace the 49 missile cruisers and destroyers being retired by the year 2000, is not sufficiently developed to be considered as an alternative to additional frigates. However, to fill the need for high-mix surface combatants, the CG-47 and possibly missilearmed DD-963S become viable alternatives to the construction of additional frigates and corvettes for the U. S. Navy.
Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 117)
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are unbridled, whereas authoritarian government are in the Confucian tradition and have definite limits to their powers. To begin with, they have their constitutional restrictions, and they respect international law. Unlike tyrannical states, they maintain civilian control over the military. Most important, they are regarded as temporary political structures.
As America examines its policy options in the Pacific, it should pause and listen to these Asian leaders. On the subject of human rights General Kriangsak, now in retirement from his former post of Prime Minister of Thailand, advises that if the United States is to work in harmony and understanding with its Asian allies, it should separate its human rights policies from its national security policies. Otherwise it may irreparably damage them both. The latter involves questions of survival; the former express hopes for a better world. Has not the mixture of these policies brought about unrest and confusion throughout the Middle East? Or to be more specific, has the United States really advanced the cause of human rights in Iran?
From the standpoint of national security, there is no piece of strategic geography west of Hawaii more important to the United States than the Philippines. America’s naval and air forces, already stretched to the limit to counterbalance the fast-growing Soviet naval might in the Western Pacific, are doing their best to maintain a credible military presence in the Persian Gulf area. The United States would find it virtually impossible to carry out any of these tasks without the use of the vital naval and air facilities at Subic Bay and Clark Field, our two remaining bases in the Philippines.
Nevertheless, strong forces in the Congress are seeking to express their displeasure with the human rights situation in the Philippines by imposing a "symbolic” $5 million cut in that country’s military assistance program. What disturbs these wellmeaning legislators are the following charges against the Marcos regime: (1) running the country under martial law since 1972; (2) restrictions on the absolute freedom of the press; (3) instances of brutality by government forces in the localized Moslem rebellion which is seeking to establish an independent Islamic state in Mindanao and nearby southern islands; (4) inequitable distribution of wealth; and (5) an elected, but “rubber stamp” parliament, the Batasang Pambansa.
Without seeking to excuse any of these infringements on human rights, charges of a similar nature could be laid at the door of every Free Asian nation from Pakistan, on around through Singapore, Indonesia, and on northward to include Taiwan and South Korea.
The point the Asian leaders are trying to make is this: America can be proud of its efforts to advance the cause of human rights. But it must remember that in developing countries these rights do not materialize overnight with a wave of the wand from Washington. Even more important, our policymakers must understand that these rights can best be achieved in an environment of political stability, not in the trauma of revolution and violence.
In Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and more recently in Cambodia and Afghanistan, there are many grim reminders that human rights cannot be defended by words alone.
“A Good New Idea”
(See G. O’Rourke, pp. 42-47, March 1980;
H. D. Cannon, p. 80, June 1980 Proceedings)
Lien tenant Commander Daniel H. Wicks, U. S. Naval Reserve—As a former
member of a reserve unit whose mission was to control and protect merchant shipping in wartime, I was interested in Captain O’Rourke’s artide on Arapaho. The prospect of a cheap and effective defensive system aboard merchant ships has long appealed ro those of us who worry about threats to our country’s sea lines of communication. As Captain O’Rourke points out. the attractiveness of Arapaho is that h might offer a solution to the dilemma of how to get merchantmen across the seas in a hostile environment when few units are available to protect them. Unfortunately, Arapaho, iS envisioned by Captain O’Rourke, "'ll not solve the central problem. What is needed is a system complete in itsel >
Spruance- and Oliver Hazard Perry-daSS escorts will be present. The function5 that the author assigns to the Arapah0 helos would appear to be only marg1' nally useful. Would Congress fund a project whose main objective is t0 create radio relays, or weapons cat riers, or even sonobuoy-droppers f°r LAMPS aircraft? It would seem that such problems, if they are problem5’ could be solved in other ways.
We must recognize and ackno"'! edge that present projections of con struction for surface escorts do n0t provide a minimum of protection convoy operations, except in North Atlantic, where operations be of a much different nature than implied in this article. Something l'^e Arapaho could be a godsend in the Pacific where air cover is often impraC ticable and where we can expect to lose assets to the Atlantic Fleet in anY large-scale conflict. Our Navy spread too thin, and it certainly nee1 good new ideas. But Arapaho will not fit into that category if it remains a5 limited as Captain O’Rourke proposes- In all probability, Arapaho will neve^ “fly” until it can go it alone, and sti deal an effective punch.
Vice Admiral Luis E. Vargas Caballero, Peruvian Navy (Retired) — During Admiral Mountbatten’s official visit to Peru in March 1962, I had the honor and pleasure of being his aide-decamp. He impressed me immediately as a man of great charm with a profound love for his chosen profession, the navy.
[2] clearly remember one instance which 1 believe depicts his genuine concern for others. We were driving from the British Embassy in Lima to the Military Academy in the suburb of Chorrillos. The admiral was expected at the Military Academy at 1100. As we neared the academy he asked me how much longer it would take us to arrive there. I answered that we were almost there and would arrive two minutes ahead of time. He immediately asked me to order the driver to slow down the car and said something to the effect that on such occasions one must never arrive before the appointed time, because this could