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A Bi-National Carrier For the North Atlantic?
HMS Ark Royal is scheduled, once again, to be deactivated as an attack carrier (CV) upon completion of her present deployment. When the British cease to operate the CV, there will be a degradation in NATO's ability to deploy air power rapidly to the North Atlantic. And when they drop the CV, the major innovators in carrier development will no longer have reason to maintain a research and development effort on conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft operations at sea. These considerations should concern the U. S. Navy.
Naval aviation has been an integral part of the Royal Navy since World War 1. Early World War I carriers included lighters under tow by destroyers which launched Sopwith Camels with varying degrees of success, and modified channel ferries that were used as seaplane carriers. In 1917, the Royal Navy commissioned HMS Furious the world’s first CV—the USS Langley (CV-l) finished her conversion from collier to carrier in 1922. Sustained and economical operation of jet aircraft from ships has been largely permitted by the angle deck design. And every American carrier pilot on active duty probably owes an accident that didn’t happen to the steam catapult, the Fresnel lens, or the angle deck which are all of British origin. The Royal Navy’s contribution to the development and perpetuation of naval aviation has been stupendous.
It appears that the Ark Royal's departure is a matter of economics rather than one of changing U.K. military requirements, strategy, or commitment. Politically, the United Kingdom remains firmly committed to NATO and the Royal Navy. The British have accepted specified Allied missions which require maintaining naval forces that are capable of protecting sea lanes in the Atlantic as well as NATO’s flanking land masses. Insurance in peacetime that the United Kingdom’s NATO goals can be achieved would be broadly enhanced by the continuation of a CV presence in the North Atlantic; the wartime presence of such a vessel might be the decisive edge in a naval conflict that may well occur outside the range of shore-based NATO airpower, but not outside that of Soviet naval aviation.
Britain’s answer to providing air coverage for naval forces in the future is much the same as our own. Air- capable ships are being developed on both sides of the Atlantic, as is the vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft which does much of the work of CTOL aircraft without the expense of requiring a large aircraft carrier. As might be expected, the Royal Navy is once again a leader in innovation relative to new technology and unique employment of shipborne aviation. The AV-8A Harrier alone is a hallmark achievement. The performance gap between the AV-8A and the CTOL aircraft operated by the CV, however, remains far too wide to be ignored when the question at hand is confronting the Warsaw Pact at sea and in amphibious warfare roles.
My contention is that a Western carrier capability, which is dedicated to NATO, must be maintained in the North Atlantic. If the Ark Royal must go (and she cannot be replaced by the United Kingdom), then she must be replaced on a permanent basis by a U. S. carrier until V/STOL technology is sufficiently developed to counter the possible threats in the NATO theater.
We would be foolish to let the Royal Navy wholly dissolve its heretofore superb relationship with CVs if it is within our power to preclude the dissolution.
The U. S. Navy can solve the pr°b" lem of North Atlantic air power by deploying CVs there regularly; but tin5 answer would draw down on other de ployment capabilities, or further stretch already over-committed personnel and ship assets. A better answer would be to home-port an Atlan" tic Fleet CV in the North Atlantic. Home-porting would keep the selected carrier within quick reaction distance of the North Atlantic under most circumstances, and the same could be used to stretch deployment intervals of United States-based CVS by making periodic Mediterranean e* cursions and by assuming all, or W°s1, of the periodic North Atlantic deployments currently required of Atlatl tic Fleet CVs.
The U. S. Navy could also achieve some secondary desirable goals if we home-port a CV in England, and if jointly man, support, and operate thlS CV with the Royal Navy. We could accomplish all of these things, and Ve would keep the Royal Navy interest0 and involved in the carrier. We w°u also overcome some of the personn0 shortages that are projected for the 1980s. A joint operation would cut our costs to some degree without a loss in CV capability. The United Kingdom should benefit from the sl& nificant increase in its defensive P°s ture which would be achieved with[1] seriously impacting on its military budget.
• off
Multi-national naval operations as old as alliances in war, but mtik1 national operation of a particular ^ man-of-war by governments in agtee ment is without precedent in hist°r' Agreements to jointly man and °P^r ate a CV would be extensive, and £ most complicated should be the inter-government political one con cerning the employment of the vesS Relying on the historic and special
4.
t0 Eei
nt manning of a CV would have
to
earn
its support, and controlled to ;
Poi
Commanding
Squadron | Aircraft | Officer | Personnel by % |
VF-A | F-14 or F-4 | American | 100% American |
VF-B | F-14 or F-4 | British | 100% British |
VA-A | A-7 | American | 100% American |
VA-B | A-7 | British | 100% British |
VA-C | A-6 and KA-6 | American or British | 50% American/50% British |
VAQ-A | EA-6 | American | 100% American |
RVAH-A | RA-5 | American | 100% American |
VAW-A | E-2 | American or British | 50% American/50% British |
VS-A | S-3 | American | 100% American |
HS-A | SH-3 | British | 100% British |
II. SHIP STRUCTURE
A. Commanding Officer—American
B. Executive Officer—British
C. Departmental Composition
Department Head of Department Personnel by %
Ship and Air Wing Manning Structure
I. AIR WING STRUCTURE
A. Commander—American
B. Vice-Commander—British
C. Squadron Composition
American
British
British
American or British American
American and British American or British American
■K.-U.S. friendship, our mutual Understanding ar>d commitment to reedom of the seas, and our parallel Retests in NATO seapower, I believe ese two governments could reach Such a unique agreement. The politi- Ca agreement should be a treaty be- ^een the two countries and within e framework of, or in reference to, e existing NATO structures. It can- n0t severely restrict the captain from ^Perating his vessel, but it must dene under what conditions the vessel 1 enter the international arena. It Ee precise, void of contradiction, fid k°rn r^e sPec'a* trust and conduce that exists between the people n governments of the United King- 0rn ar*d the United States.
^ Economics dictate HMS Ark Royal
cease to operate, and economics uid be a large part of a joint agree- ^er>t to replace her in part by an •fierican cv. I suggest the following Vlsion of economic responsibilities:
^ EJ.S. Navy Input
1- The CV
2- All aircraft
3- Material support for ship and air wing
4 • Operating cost of ship and air wing
i 5- 50% of a fully trained crew Royal Navy Input
E All port facilities for CV support
2- All shore base facilities for air wing
3- Suitable location for American family housing 50% of a fully trained crew
Joi
tnplemented in a manner which attractive enough to the Royal Navy 1
in the accompanying table. This manning plan, developed with the objective of retaining U. S. command of the operation, opens key billets and responsibility to the Royal Navy to produce a truly integrated ship. As previously stated, a primary windfall saving for us would be the several thousand personnel we would not have
Operations
Air
Navigation
Engineering
Supply
Medical/Dental
AIMD
Communications
to recruit, much less train or pay.
A joint venture in one ship would be an unprecedented statement to the world that the North Atlantic is not to be closed to our shipping. Such a ship would be a “no lose” proposition for the free world, and a “no win” proposition for potential enemies.
100% American 100% British 100% British
50% American/50% British 100% American 50% American/50% British 50% American/50% British 100% American
[1]J't tvhich would satisfy the U. S. ^ eose Establishment and Congress. Sarnple manning plan is presented