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The significance of Chinese troops maneuvering in a nuclear blast area, below, as filmed by Chinese cameramen, was not lost on Japanese television viewers in 1967—just as China’s first successful hydrogen bomb test, facing page, was noted by the rest of the world in 1966. While, in the opinion of the U. S. Department of Defense, China’s nuclear weapons program poses no immediate threat to the U. S. mainland, the Chinese have deployed, or can deploy, missiles capable of incinerating many important Asian targets and, not surprisingly, a major part of metropolitan Russia.
In their annual appearances before committees of the Congress, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff offer prepared, unclassified statements describing our military posture, programs, and budget proposals. The documents are of course "sanitized” for open publication, but it must nevertheless be assumed that they present a fair description of what the Defense Department leaders see as the "state of the world” insofar as their responsibilities are involved. Accepting that some classified material is excluded (often because of the way it was obtained, rather than because of actual content) it should still be possible to develop, by analysis of what is offered, some useful conclusions about U. S. perceptions of other nations and the military strategic concepts designed to support American policies.
It is clear throughout the statements that there is massive difference in the assessments of Soviet and Chinese forces. It is plain that the forces and programs of the Soviet Union are the primary concern—and, both in volume and in detail, much more space goes to these elements. There is the conventional caution,
In testimony before Congress this year, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Aloorer, seen here with Secretary of Defense James Sch/esinger, stated: "It seems dear that the continued growth in China’s nuclear capabilities will eventually have a profound impact on the current bilateral strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.”
repeated several times, about the reliability and completeness of our intelligence information. It is evident, however, that the Soviet Union either yields information more easily or a great deal more effort goes into its collection. Statements about Chinese forces and programs tend to be much more general in nature. Steady improvement in Chinese forces and potential for continuing growth are recognized but, as will be demonstrated later, there is a general tendency to postpone major capabilities and threats to U. S. interests to some later time. There is frequent reference to the workings of the Nixon Doctrine and to the easing of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, but there is a counterpoint of caution over too much or too early relaxation of vigilance or reduction of strength on our part. A sample from the Chairman’s 1973 statement gives the general tone: ". . . the U. S. strategic forces provide the indispensable foundation for the collective defense of the entire Free World.”
of
At several points the statements draw attention to the Sino-Soviet situation. This is seen as a general operating constraint on both sides, although its permanence is not predicted. The Secretary of Defense also called attention to the limiting effect of the rivalry on the influence that each has been able to gain in the world, but he added that we see no evidence that the Communist nations had changed their objectives and, particularly in the case of the Soviet Union, he saw continuation of attempts to extend influence through military presence as well as political and economic assistance to third countries.
Nuclear Programs. In 1972, the general assessment of Chinese nuclear programs was that slow, steady, and rational progress was being made. The focus was on the development and testing of liquid-fueled IRBM and MRBM, a few of which might even then have been deployed, with a modest force in operation in Fiscal Year 1973. There was evidence that work was being
done on solid fuel, but little was given in the way of detail. The production of weapons material continued to expand. Two Chinese space satellite launches gave evidence of some future ability to produce longer- range weapons vehicles. At best, the People’s Republic of China was seen as capable of deploying 10 to 20 ICBM (3-megaton, 6,000-mile range) capable of reaching targets in the United States no earlier than 1975 and more likely in 1976. A 3,000-mile weapon, capable of reaching deep into the Soviet Union, was also seen as possible by 1975.
It was noted that the small force of TU-16 bombers (nuclear capable, 1,650-mile range) was being substantially increased by series production. There was apparently no interest in heavy strategic bombers. Progress in sea-launched weapons seemed modest. The People’5 Republic of China has only one "G” class diesel- powered submarine, but has shown some interest in nuclear-powered boats which could, in turn, produce missile-launchers by the end of the decade.
The overall assessment of P.R.C. nuclear forces an^ programs was that they are occupied with the problem5 of developing a regional capability oriented on deter' rence within the theater. China could threaten mo5t of the cities and area targets in South and Southed1 Asia and a substantial part of the Soviet Union.
In their 1973 appearances, the Secretary and tb£ Chairman seemed much more expansive about tb£ Chinese nuclear condition. Significant progress in bal' listic missile programs was cited. The production fissile materials was expanding as new facilities camc on line, thus permitting a more rapid increase in blC P.R.C. weapons stockpile. It was now believed th5' both MRBM and IRBM had been deployed, with a long£t range IRBM (3,000-mile) nearing readiness. T*11’ weapon, it was observed, could reach deep into metr° politan Russia, but only to western Alaska on the othc' flank. Missiles in hardened silos were expected in next few years. An ICBM of 6,000-mile range al> 3-megaton warhead, to reach major targets in the cofl11 nental United States would reach an Initial Operation1
21
The Department of Defense and the Chinese Threat
Capability (IOC) by 1975 or 1976. A full operational capability was in prospect for the end of the decade.
Earlier statements about work on solid fuel and the growing force of TU-16 bombers were repeated. A sea- launched missile was still possible, but we do not have a good basis for estimating IOC and the mid-70s seems possible.
A general summary of the views of the Secretary and Chairman would include these major conclusions:
The P.R.C. is now able to attack some Soviet and U. S. targets as well as allied forces from Japan through Korea and Taiwan to the Philippines, and in South and Southeast Asia.
The P.R.C. theater nuclear forces include MRBM, IRBM, and medium and light bombers. It is not believed that there are nuclear weapons in naval forces at this time.
The P.R.C. is still far behind the Soviet Union and the United States, but is nevertheless a significant nuclear power in the region. Peking’s total weapons inventory, both strategic and theater weapons, numbers at most in "the few hundreds.” As noted earlier, expanding fissile material production facilities will permit rapid stockpile increases.
Conventional Forces—Ground. In 1972, the ground forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were described as a well-balanced force of about 2.6 million men in 150 divisions. It was, however, essentially an infantry force, lacking organic transport and limited in the number of fighting vehicles. It was observed that the production of armored vehicles, artillery, and all types of light infantry weapons had increased significantly since 1965 and was expected to continue. The tank inventory was considerably less than that of the United States. On the other hand, the Chinese possess a greater number of artillery pieces, although this advantage is offset by American self-propelled weapon and helicopter assets. The P.R.C. was also close to the United States in numbers of antitank weapons, but the Chinese holdings were largely of World War II vintage. American forces had far more helicopters devoted to the ground combat role. The Secretary described the Chinese as capable of "launching full-scale conventional attacks against nearby countries.” "They also,” he said, "foment guerrilla warfare, sabotage, espionage, and subversion through the area.”
In his 1973 statement, the Secretary said that the Chinese Army consisted of 2.5 to 3 million men. It continued to be upgraded and additional production of armored vehicles indicates plans to increase armored forces and possibly to mechanize some infantry divisions in the next few years. The Chairman displayed a chart that indicated some nine million men, active
duty and reserve, in the ground forces. He differentiated the components later when he said that the strength of the active army was about three million, backed by a large armed militia and other armed auxiliary units totalling some six million. He emphasized that these men were more than simply a reserve manpower pool. They have their own assigned missions in peace and war, such as the provision of internal security and local defense. Some were engaged in agriculture and construction.
Attention was also directed to the increasing production of armored personnel carriers as well as tanks. APC are appearing in increasing numbers in operating units. The previous year’s statement about comparative artillery and mortar strengths was repeated, including reference to U. S. qualitative superiority, even though, gun for gun, the Chinese weapons outrange ours. The earlier general assessment of anti-tank weaponry was again made. Finally, it was stated that the United States has more helicopters for ground combat than the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. combined.
Conventional Forces—Sea. While acknowledging
growth and improvement in the P.R.C. Navy, U. S. officials in 1972 saw it as a potential, rather than as an immediate, threat. It was said that it never leaves home waters; in fact, it seldom gets out of sight of land. Even though the navy might increase dramatically over the next several years, it would still be "Asia- oriented” rather than global. (This, however, would be significant if the United States were to be heavily engaged with Soviet forces in a major conflict.)
Even while thus assessing Peking’s naval strength, the fleet was described as expanding, as well as modernizing. In 1966, major surface units numbered eight: four destroyers and four destroyer escorts, all Soviet- built. Beginning in that year, a new class of Chinese- built destroyer escorts appeared and there are now "a number” of them in service. In 1971, the first guided missile destroyer appeared and it is believed that more will be built. Twenty-eight Soviet "W” class submarines (diesel-powered, 1,355 tons displacement submerged) were in hand in 1965. A Chinese-built version of the Russian "R” class (1,800 tons submerged) appeared in that year and construction is expected to continue. Older types are expected to be phased out in time, but P.R.C. attack submarines are distinctly inferior to current U. S. or Soviet models. The Chinese were said to be interested in nuclear-powered submarine technology and probably to be capable of producing a prototype in the next several years. It was thought that neither nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines nor associated missiles would be available before the last half of the decade. In another presentation
22 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1974
it was said that the P.R.C. had "over 40 diesel-powered attack submarines—of which a major portion are medium-range "R” class.” The Navy was seen as concentrating on the development of sophisticated systems such as guided-missile destroyers and missile-equipped coastal patrol craft. Charts showed approximate major Chinese assets as of mid-1972 as follows: major combat surface ships, 16; attack submarines, 50. (These numbers are approximations from measurement of charts, but should be accurate within 10%.)
Testimony in 1973 saw the diesel-powered, medium- range attack submarine as continuing to be the base for Chinese offensive naval strength. A new class— apparently a Chinese version of the Soviet "R” class—is now in production. The underwater force, now numbering between 65 and 70 (all types) is expected to continue to increase, with older types being phased out. The end result will still be a force distinctly inferior to the nuclear-powered vessels of the United States and the Soviet Union.
The P.R.C.’s surface forces are small, but growing. The largest ship in a force of approximately 18 to 20 vessels is the Chinese-designed guided missile destroyer, several of which are expected to become operational in 1973. Others are under construction or now fitting out. The P.R.C. is also expanding its missile-firing patrol boat force.
It is concluded by American officials that Peking’s naval forces will continue to grow but will remain much smaller than American or Soviet fleets during the current decade. The Chinese Navy will have greater capacity to project power beyond the limits of the China Seas, but it will nevertheless remain primarily a defensive force during the period being considered. It is particularly noted that ability to project ground forces by naval means is sharply limited.
Conventional Forces—Air. The general strength of PLA air forces (including the naval air arm) was given to the Congress in 1972 as more than 3,000 jet fighters and 350 light and medium jet bombers. Both figures represent increases over the previous year. It was also specified that there were (mid-1972) "over 3,000 home defense interceptors.” These holdings were largely MiG-i7s and -19s, with a few MiG-2is. It was noted, however, that the P.R.C. is now producing interceptor aircraft at a fairly sizeable rate. "Several hundred” SAM launchers in hand and gradual increase over the next few years were also cited as air defense resources. It was stated that the U. S. F-14 and F-15 aircraft were expected to be distinctly superior to any aircraft the Soviet Union or the P.R.C. would be likely to deploy in the 1970s.
The TU-16 (Badger) bomber is being manufactured
in China. It was expected that series production would produce a "substantial number” by mid-1972. This aircraft, with a radius of 1,650 miles, was described as the principal element in a Chinese theater nuclear strike capability. Exclusive of more than 3,000 aircraft assigned to home defense, the P.R.C. is shown to have about 500 fighter, attack, light bomber, and reconnaissance planes.
By mid-1973, the Chinese were expected to have about 3,400 home-defense interceptors. Except for a few MiG-2 is, older types (MiG-i5s, 17S, 19s) predominate. Tactical aircraft—fighter, attack, reconnaissance, bomber—number about 920 in active service. We have no information on reserve aircraft. The tactical inventory is expected to grow at a relatively rapid rate during the next five years. There will be an increase in the number of native-designed and produced F-9, which is a larger, faster version of the MiG-19. Older aircraft are slowly being phased out. The jet bomber force is based on 11-28 and TU-16, with the latter now being produced in China.
P.R.C. air defense rests on what is described as outmoded aircraft, a very modest SAM force, and limited air surveillance capabilities. SAM protection, now provided in a few key cities, is expected to grow more rapidly. Even with continuing increase in numbers and modernization, the air forces of the P.R.C. will continue to be far behind the United States and the Soviet Union, both in quantity and quality. The 1972 statement that the F-14 and F-15 will be distinctly better than anything that Peking or Moscow will be likely to deploy in this decade was reaffirmed in 1973.
U. S. View of Chinese Posture. The first and most obvious conclusion that we can draw from the testimony of the Secretary and the Chairman is that a clear and specific set of priorities exists. Attention is focused on the Soviet Union, its power, and its capabilities. Whatever mischief the P.R.C. might be able and inclined to do, it can not inflict any significant damage on major American assets. It could, if it disregarded the massive damage of U. S. retaliation or disbelieved in the likelihood of its use, attack U. S. forces in Asia and the territory of U. S. allies. The combination of lack of any ability to strike the continental United States and the damage mainland China could suffer ir> retribution for other action apparently assure U. S. defense officials that China is now, and for some time will be, a lesser threat. American ability to contain and deter the Soviet Union includes, at little extra cost, the ability to contain and deter the P.R.C. To look at the argument from the other side, Peking has 3 modest ability to deter; Moscow has a massive capacity to destroy.
Although there are a number of references to the changing political relationships among the powers, Defense Department spokesmen properly focus on the current and prospective military situation and its implications. A definite spirit pervades the style of viewing things. It was perhaps made most explicit for all the defense authorities by the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army in 1972 when, in commenting on the then new initiatives, he said:
"While we all have great hopes that these initiatives will produce greater stability among nations, it is not a time to initiate force adjustments that may be perceived as a weakening of the U. S. will and commitment to world peace.”
The Nixon Doctrine, one might say, is seen as a device which, while having great potential for reduction of tensions and thus of costs, must be viewed with caution and used with discretion.
The Si no-Soviet relationship is recognized as exercising major influence on both parties. The Secretary at one point said that the threat from the P.R.C. required the U.S.S.R. to deploy a large portion of their forces in the Chinese border areas. This did not, he went on, reduce Soviet capabilities in the actual forces opposing NATO, but it could cause the withholding of reinforcing units normally intended for use in a conflict with NATO. The Chairman said "it seems clear that the continued growth in China’s nuclear capabilities will eventually have a profound impact on the current bilateral strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.” For the Chinese part, it has been said in 1972 that logistic constraints and the necessity of providing forces to meet the Soviet threat make it unlikely that the Chinese would undertake operations on more than one front. U. S. authorities believed that multi-front conflict could be carried out only if China’s basic war-making capacity and her
lines of communication remained intact. As a general conclusion, it would appear that the heavy involvement of forces in the Sino-Soviet confrontation is seen as a positive element in the American security calculus, but it does not figure as a long-term influence inducing major reduction in the U. S. posture. In several places we are cautioned that we must contemplate the need to face the Soviet and Chinese threats simultaneously.
Careful comparison does reveal some relaxation in U. S. views toward China. The recent moves toward greater world stability are noted—the new U. S.-RR.C. relation, SALT and MBFR progress, and the agreement on Vietnam—but we are cautioned that we dare not ignore the reality of the military power that confronts the U. S. today and is likely to face us in the future. Even so, some tangible results of new conditions can be noted; the protection of the American people from Chinese nuclear attacks by the use of Safeguard was
24 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1974
not mentioned in 1973, although it was noted several times a year earlier. In 1973, much was said about ABM, but all was in the context of U. S.-Soviet conditions and the SALT Agreements. New relaxations seemed largely to enter as factors permitting more time in which to improve allied forces.
There are several alternative logics that may be applied in trying to understand the Chinese nuclear weapons program. The Chinese themselves are not forthcoming, but it is possible to make some tentative— and rather obvious—conclusions from the statements made to the Congress. Whether because of economic and technological constraints, or in keeping with an ordered set of capability objectives, we see that the P.R.C. began with short-range vehicles and warheads of modest yield. They have moved steadily toward longer ranges and higher yields, but they have yet to conduct a full test of an intercontinental missile that can strike targets in the United States. It appears that we believe that they now have deployed, or are capable* of deploying, missiles that can strike many important targets in the Asian region. Whether by the coincidence of orderly progress or as a result of focused effort, they now seem to have an intermediate range weapon that brings the major part of metropolitan Russia within reach.
Ground forces are being modernized on a broad front. There is steady improvement in armor and other battlefield firepower and mobility. (We know, from other sources, that significant improvements in communications and electronics have been made in all the services.) We do not seem to see extensive efforts to reach those levels of mobility (including ground- associated aviation) and firepower that characterize the thrust of improvement in Soviet and American forces.
Naval force improvement is guided by a program aimed most particularly at improving close-in defense. Guided missile destroyers and diesel-powered submarines firing conventional torpedoes enhance the quality of coastal defense, but do not express great ability to project significant naval power over great distances in any major time frame. Neither does there seem to be any significant program for building amphibious vessels. It is of some interest that the production of missile-firing submarines seems to have a relatively low priority. This could of course derive from problems of priority, technology, and cost. Equally, however, it could demonstrate low interest in attaining the ability to reach continental U. S. targets, or lack of attention to the fact that multiplicity of delivery means complicates defense problems for one’s opponents. In any case, U. S. officials show little concern over RR.C. capabilities.
By far the major effort in air forces improvement
effort is directed to improving homeland defense. A substantial portion of the total aircraft inventory consists of those items described as "home defense” fighters. A good part of the total is obsolescent by either American or Soviet standards; reasonable progress is apparent in a program of replacement. Fighter-bomber aircraft are mentioned, and this may indicate increased interest in shorter-range bombing tasks or in more air support for ground operations. Ranges and the total absence of any air-to-air refueling fleet suggests that operational concepts turn around action within or not far beyond the borders. The growing TU-16 force seems surely related to a regional nuclear weapons capability- The older 11-28 force is steadily decreasing in numbers and significance. As noted before, there are no signs of interest in heavy bombers. The surface-to-air missile capability shows modest growth, but it is interesting that U. S. experts do not mention any prospect of mobile defenses that would be expected to accompany expeditionary forces operating beyond the fixed positions now seen in metropolitan China.
Chinese Views and Goals. Is it possible, from what we know and think, to place ourselves in the position of the leaders in the RR.C. and relate military posture to strategic concepts and major problems of national defense? What general conclusions can the independent analyst draw from the facts presented by U. S. Defense Department officials?
First, it is possible to say that overall defense expend itures are no doubt high and burdensome, but no[ unbearably so. We do not know specifically whethet the shape and content of any particular program lS ultimately controlled by technological consideration*- resource availability and priorities, or actual perceive^ need for a weapon or system. There are other Con' gressional publications, beyond those used here, ths1 give economic evidence to support the general concep1 of rationality and purpose in RR.C. military program* Particularly useful is People’s Republic of China: An Ed nomic Assessment, published by the Joint Econofl111 Committee of the Congress on 18 May 1972.
Turning first to the nuclear weapons programs, see remarkable progress in weapons development When this activity first came to notice it was wide^ speculated that pride and prestige were large factors1,1 the Chinese search for nuclear weapons. This is doubt true, but now—nine years after the fir?l test—U. S. observers see a small but growing force 1,1 regionally useful weapons, the likelihood of a m°tf powerful vehicle that threatens metropolitan Russ'1: and a full-scale intercontinental weapon that co threaten the United States still some several years a"'*’ Peking has achieved the ability to make hostages l’
The Department of Defense and the Chinese Threat 25
American allies in the region, to threaten any Asian country not protected by the retaliatory power of one of the superpowers, and to assure the Soviet Union that some damage will be inflicted on important targets in the Soviet Union should Moscow elect to attack. The ability to attack the United States directly does not yet exist, but it is evident that American officials anticipate its eventual appearance. From what we know in general about .the cost of nuclear programs, it is clear that the P.R.C. has made a major investment. They now see, in return for their effort, some ability to raise the threshold of attack on themselves. There are of course great weaknesses in such a deterrence strategy, but, given the time and resource problems involved, China has indeed made a "great leap” in this endeavor. At the moment we can see that in Chinese eyes a significant "first phase” program will be complete when an ICBM becomes operational. What China will seek beyond this capability is not asked publicly by U. S. planners now, but Peking’s options are wide enough to suggest that they will have a voice in future great power affairs and a strong position as the principal military power in the area.
Ground force improvements are unspectacular, but significant. Firepower and mobility increases make the infantry divisions more able to cope with the qualitatively superior forces of the United States or the Soviet Union, particularly when the PLA enjoys the significant local numerical superiority that is implied in a defensive strategy. Neither the Secretary nor the Chairman suggested that China was preparing the transport that would be necessary in any sizeable airborne or seaborne attacks. The ground army is best prepared to conduct "defense of the homeland” operations, with interior lines of communication and assured logistic support.
Naval force construction, no doubt limited to some degree by industrial constraints, suggests policy that looks to close-in defense and comports rather neatly with the historical absence of major maritime considerations in Chinese strategic thinking. The increase in the number of submarines may be seen as implying desire for offensive power at greater distances, but it must be kept in mind that the boats have comparatively modest endurance at sea and, being diesel-powered and thus relatively slow and noisy, particularly vulnerable to the modern antisubmarine capabilities of the major powers. It seems more likely that Peking sees its submarine fleet as an interruptor of the sea line in and out of Vladivostock or the ports of Japan, reducing the total effort that could be made against her coast.
Aircraft construction follows the same defensive pattern: interceptors and SAMs for home protection and
some capability to operate fighter-bombers in the tactical role, but without any significant long-range or expeditionary characteristics. The TU-16 force must be seen as part of the regional nuclear delivery system, not large enough to be thought of as a major conventional offensive threat over any sustained period.
The Chinese concern over having to operate on more than one front is also a major point in Peking’s considerations. This implies fragility in the system that would also be significant should Peking try to operate over too great a distance from base or with a tenuous supply line over air or sea routes.
What then is the People’s Liberation Army in the eyes of its controllers? It is a massive infantry force geared primarily to defense of the homeland. Air and sea elements, relatively modest in size, are improving substantially, but within the same general context of home defense. The nuclear program has no doubt satisfied the desire for status and prestige and has produced some actual damage-inflicting capability—but not yet beyond the levels of modest deterrence and threats to the unprotected. The Chinese high command is transfixed by the Soviet presence along their long border and in the operational sense is moving to avert the disaster that major war with the Soviet Union would be. In the process of improving defensive capabilities, the P.R.C. is acquiring forces that steadily grow in their ability to operate effectively anywhere around her periphery. The temptation to use this growing muscle in the service of political and strategic goals in Asia will be great at times. Whether or not temptation will prevail will depend to a great degree on the Chinese perception of American willingness and ability to react effectively. Meantime, as was noted earlier, the P.R.C. will continue to assist and encourage legitimate governments whose aims support their own (such as Pakistan) and to support selected insurgent or out-ofpower activists by way of money, arms, and political encouragement. This is obviously seen from Peking as a relatively safe form for asserting its position.
Colonel Fraser retired from the Marine Corps in 1964 after a career which included command of appropriate troop elements from platoon to regiment. He had duty in North China at the end of World War II and served as Senior Marine Advisor, MAAG, Republic of China (Taiwan) from I960 to 1962. He is a graduate of the Joint Services Staff College (British) and the National War College. Since retirement Colonel Fraser has worked as a research analyst and consultant for the Institute for Defense Analyses and the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization. Recent publications include "Some Thoughts on the Resurgence of Militarism in Japan,” in Pacific Community, April, 1972, and a monograph "The People’s Liberation Army: Communist China’s Armed Forces” published for the National Strategy Information Center.