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This Professional Note discusses one successful solution to a Service-wide | problem involving military helicopter fleets. Whether the helicopter fleet be |hc Army’s CH-47 Chinook, the Air force's H-53, or the Navy and the Marine Corps’ H-46 Sea Knight, the same costly problem must be dealt with.
The word "costly” is not used lightly •n relation to this particular problem the uiilitary services face. For example, the Army’s more than 600 CH-47S, the Air Force’s more than 200 H-53S, and the Navy and Marine Corps’ more than 600 H-46s cost more than a million dollars per helicopter. This initial cost is only the beginning. There are many more dollars involved in operating a fleet of helicopters than just the purchase price ; of the individual helicopter.
There must be spare rotor blades, transmissions, rotor heads, engines, and the like. Further, it is an inescapable fact that spare parts for any mechanism arc more costly, picce-by-piece, than the tncchanism itself, particularly with helicopter spares. Those pertinent to this discussion arc referred to as "dynamic components.” (See Figure 1)
First, let us consider only one helicopter fleet—the H-46S that belong to the Navy and the Marine Corps.
livery H-46 helicopter is equipped with dynamic components that either have a definite life limit, such as rotor blades, which arc life-limited at 3,200 flying hours, or dynamic components that have definite flight-hour limitations between overhauls, such as aft transmissions, which can fly 600 hours and then must be removed and sent to an overhaul facility.
In order to keep the helicopter in a flyablc status, removed components must be replaced with components that have useful flying hours remaining. How do Navy and the Marine Corps helicopter maintenance personnel know how much flying time remains on a spare dynamic component such as an aft transmission, when it is received from supply? By Navy requirement, these dynamic components must be accompanied by an Accessory and Component Service Record (ACSR). This is a singlesheet form, which provides space for recording aircraft data such as history of operating times, maintenance, repair, overhaul, and configuration changes. The ACSR serves to record the individual component history, so that the component may be overhauled and that life- limited parts can be replaced according to a pre-determined schedule.
Suppose then, there are some Navy or Marine maintenance personnel in a unit having H-46s and they have removed one aft transmission because it has completed 600 flying hours, and they have received a replacement from supply. What then is the problem?
The problem is, what does the responsible maintenance officer do when the spare transmission is received without an Accessory and Component Service Record? What is done with this $50,000 dynamic component that could be used for 600 flying hours if it were known to be new, or that it had just been overhauled. This transmission might even have some flying time available to use if it had just been repaired and was ready to be reinstalled in a helicopter. But if there is no ACSR form with the transmission, then a decision must be reached as to what can be done with this expensive dynamic component. The following is some command guidance from the Naval Air Systems Command:
(a) If it can be determined that the component is in fact new, an ACSR card will be initiated upon receipt and prior to installation.
(b) If the above determination cannot be made, the SRC Repository at NASCRepLant in Norfolk, Virginia,
106 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. December 1972
should be contacted requesting any pertinent historical data available. If repository response is negative, adequate testing and engineering analysis must then be conducted by the nearest A1MD to determine the data to be recorded on the new ACSR card. This may necessitate assistance by the nearest Naval Aviation Rework Facility (NARF), via customer service, if capability is not available.
(c) Caution must be stressed with components having an established finite life, i.c., helicopter rotor blades, arresting hooks, etc., since failures of finite life items may have catastrophic consequences. It is mandatory that documented proof of its remaining service life be determined prior to installation. Visual appearance and/or apparently satisfactory operation of items arc not considered sufficient evidence of remaining serviceability. hack of the necessary historical data will require that the item be returned to supply as unserviceable. CNO concurs. Addressees arc requested to pass to ALCON for action.
These instructions are clear and logical and provide sufficient guidance to proceed. A message must be sent to the repository in Norfolk, Virginia. If the proper information is received, the unit can be installed. If a negative answer is received, however, the transmission must be returned to supply, and ultimately returned to a NARF for an overhaul.
In the meantime, another transmission will be issued, and soon the helicopter will be back in commission. The only harm done is a minor delay while waiting for an answer from Norfolk, and probably a little money spent at the NARF to overhaul the transmission. It sounds as though it was not really a problem, but let us examine the situation in depth. Consider some other facets of this problem so that a perspective can be achieved that can be equated to other helicopter fleets as well as the H-46. Regardless of the type helicopter, the problem is basically the same.
Helicopters have been in use by the military services for many years. Innumerable dynamic components have been removed and replaced. Many of these components were returned to overhaul and repair depots and, in the process, the component record cards were misplaced or lost. Also, many replacement components were delivered to operational units without records, and these,
too, had to be returned to depots for premature overhauls because no major data source for operating hour verification existed.
As an example of the magnitude of the problem that developed—referring only to the H-46, and not the total Navy helicopter population—the overhaul facility in Japan made a great many waves when it was made known to Commander, Fleet Air, Western Pacific (ComFAirwestPac), in September 1969, that in less than two years, 549 H-46 dynamic components without record cards had accumulated, and would have to be overhauled or possibly scrapped
unless assistance could be provided. The outlay of monies for the unscheduled overhauling of these components was estimated at $2,750,000.
Remember, this overhaul facility was one of five similar facilities doing H-46 component rework. So, if all five facilities were required to do similar overhauls, even of one-half the magnitude as the one in Japan, the outlay of Navy monies amounted to a considerable amount, and this was on just one weapons system—the H-46. What about the SH-3AS, the H-34s, the CH-53S, the UH-lES, and the other helicopter fleets?
The total dollars being wasted un-
necessarily in the Navy, because of the loss of a little piece of paper, was very substantial. As a result of this backlog of components without records that required overhaul, and a Navy-wide awareness of the problem, a survey was conducted at each NARl; to determine the percentage of dynamic components that were received with either missing or incomplete component records.
H-46 Sea Knight
E W KING
It was learned that, on an annual basis, approximately 30% of all dynamic components received, required record research action by the NARK This action required communication with the using organization, if that could be determined. Generally, however, Hying units, such as Marine squadrons, do away with old maintenance records after a reasonable period of time. Then, too, the inherent delay in the supply system pipelines, in getting an unusable transmission or any other dynamic component from a squadron to a NARK, results in the squadron responding to the NARK’s query with: "Information no longer available.” In any event, the Nark would have to delay induction of a component until the historical data Was resolved. If the data was not available from the squadron, and more recently, if a negative answer was also received in response to a query sent to the repository in Norfolk, the component would then be completely overhauled. This increased the spares usage at the NARK level, and wasted an unknown amount of usable part hours by scrapping finite parts as a result of complete overhaul.
In the case of rotor blades, should the historical records not be available, an average use of 75 hours pier month since the date of manufacture was added to each blade’s life. In the event that the manufacturing data could not be determined, one-half of the 3,200-hour blade life was deducted as a penalty. The blade would then be able to fly only 1,600 more hours before being scrapped. Later, in the H-46 life cycle—1970 and 1971 — when rotor blades were known to have accumulated more than 2,500 flight hours, the decision was made that on older blades with no historical records, scrapping of the blade was the only solution.
The problem has now become pretty dear. A lot of dynamic component
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Professional Notes
records are lost at squadron level, in supply pipelines, en route to or from NARKs, or almost anywhere. When these cards arc lost the component must be reworked. Spares usage increases, and total component spares purchases from the contractor increases. Everything adds up to more dollars being spent than is necessary.
What action could be taken to correct this problem? In early 1969, the Navy requested that the Vertol Division of The Boeing Company, manufacturer of the H-46 helicopter, initiate a pilot program on H-46 dynamic components by establishing a data bank with sufficient inputs to supply pertinent information, in a usable format, to the using activities (squadrons) and overhaul depots receiving dynamic components without historical records.
A comprehensive and elaborate type of data retrieval system was proposed to the Navy as the "CH-46 Traceability Program” in May 1969. In July 1969, the Navy rejected the proposal because of cost. In the meantime, the Navy contracted with the Vertol Division to overhaul rotor blades, transmissions, and rotor heads. This placed Boeing-Vertol in the position of also receiving components from the field with no component records. A data bank that had been established at the Vertol Division, tracking certain components since manufacture of the first H-46, and maintained largely through Field Service Representative (Tech Rep) communications channels, now become more active.
During this time, records were maintained of requests for dynamic component historical data from military H-46 operators throughout the world. Most of these requests to the data bank at Boeing-Vertol were via the Tech Reps in the field.
In September 1969, Boeing-Vertol presented its Overhaul Support Program, including the data bank concept, to a number of Navy commands— Aviation Supply Office (ASO), Navy Plant Representative Officer (NavPlantRepO), and the Naval Air Systems Command (NavAirSysCom). From September 1969 to February 1970, Boeing-Vertol continued its data bank overhaul support program at the Navy’s request, while formalities were arranged to approve the data bank support effort as a part of the existing overhaul contract.
An internal Navy disagreement developed in February 1970 as to funding responsibility for the H-46 dynamic component data bank. Its value was recognized, but the responsibility for funding was shuffled from one Navy office to another, with almost effortless ease. Numerous trips, letters, and calls to Washington resulted in assurances to Boeing-Vertol that the funding problem was being worked out and that the H-46 Dynamic Component Data Bank responses to field queries should be continued in the interim.
Trips to the central repository in Norfolk by Boeing-Vertol personnel, resulted in better understanding of the problems faced by each unit. The central
108 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Deoember 1972
repository attempted to respond to Fleet queries relating to components coming from any and all types of aircraft the Navy owned. In contrast, the Boeing- Vertol data bank was concerned with only one type of helicopter and its related components.
In working with the central repository, under the cognizance of NASCRep- I.ant and the NavAirSysCom, the data bank was urged to develop a model program that would be capable of unlimited component expansion. This was done.
Reconstruction was begun of the history of the total number of specified dynamic components selected to be included in the data bank. Selected dynamic components and the total number of each type manufactured are listed here: aft transmissions—1,154; forward transmissions—1,121; aft rotor heads— 1,075; forward rotor heads—1,071; forward symmetrical blades—849; aft symmetrical blades—856; forward high lift blades—2,912; aft high lift blades— 3,089; forward swashplates—1,075; aft swashplates—1,098; aft vertical shafts— 962.
In the development of a data bank suitable for adaption to other helicopter fleets, it was felt that the tandem-rotored H-46 would be an unusual test because of the number of different components to be included. Further, the more than 600 helicopters that would be built would provide an optimum fleet size for this pilot study. Certainly, no foreseeable helicopter fleet under consideration would have more different components, or a larger overall total of units to be managed. There were more than 16,000 items which required the development of history data and updated information. Configuration panels on every new H-46 helicopter delivered to the Navy and Marine Corps were collated. The thousands of spares were traced through shipping documents, and the data needed was extracted. A current survey of every helicopter still active in the H-46 fleet was requested and received from Boeing-Vertol representatives throughout the world.
With the data already fed into the data bank from original aircraft delivery configurations, from continuing spares deliveries, and with the data from the current survey, a "then” and "now”
picture of components on aircraft emerged. Thousands of removals and replacements of components on aircraft had occurred between the "then” and the "now.” Thousands of repairs and overhauls had been completed at the several overhaul facilities. New configurations of components, with many improvements, such as longer life bearings, had to be fed into the data bank.
With the knowledge of how many of each type components were manufactured and delivered to the Fleet, and with the current reports of how each helicopter was configured, a vast grey area developed where uncertainty existed as to where all the spare components were. In addition, both Boeing-Vertol and the Navy knew that more than 180 helicopters had been destroyed through combat damage or operational accidents. This meant that more than 1,000 rotor blades at $9,000 per item were written off in the Navy inventory. The question, however, was which blades, transmissions, rotor heads, and so on? Involved was $9 million worth of transmissions alone; $200 million worth of equipment was the grand total to be reckoned with. Surely, someone in the Navy would know what components were on destroyed helicopters, so that these could be eliminated from the data bank.
Data extracted from Field Service Reports provided coverage on 70 H-46 strike aircraft. This still left more than 100 destroyed helicopters to determine component configuration.
Cognizant Navy offices identified the National Records Center (NRC) at Suitland, Maryland, as the national repository for strike aircraft records. Clearance was obtained to gain access to these records. In October 1970, the task of reviewing H-46 strike aircraft records was undertaken. The strike record information available, however, was minimal. With the data obtained from the National Records Center, the total available strike aircraft records increased only to 82.
Since it could not be determined what components were involved in every destroyed helicopter, a large number of components continued to be included in the data bank’s active category. This obviously gave an unreliable picture of the total spares count, and
further study was required to achieve a realistic usable status.
A program was developed based upon Navy 3M maintenance data, to indicate use of components by serial number. This was done on one-, two-, and three- year studies. If a serial number of a component did not surface within the three-year time span, it would be relegated to an inactive status, and was presumed to be destroyed unless events proved otherwise. These studies led to many interesting developments. As an example, it was learned from studying shipping documents, that more than 70 transmissions had been shipped as new spares to Lakehurst, New Jersey, in 1967. In 1970, the discovery was made and follow-ups were conducted, and so all 70 transmissions were moved from Lakehurst into active supply channels where they could do some good. The Navy’s H-46 data bank was beginning to prove its value. More than $3 million in spare parts were recovered, which meant that the 70 spares would not have to be re-purchased.
As aircraft units in both the Navy and the Marine Corps became aware of the Central Repository in Norfolk, it became more active in its efforts to respond to Fleet queries for component histories from many different types of aircraft. The queries on H-46 components increased tremendously as quick, helpful responses were provided. Direct liaison between the data bank and the Central Repository allowed most queries to be responded to in moments. In some cases, where the Fleet queries were passed on to Boeing-Vertol, from NASCRepLant and the Central Repository, via the Navy office at Boeing- Vertol, by message, these were answered the same way. This method was extremely unwieldy and was used only for unusual requests. Most queries came by telephone or by letter. The few Tech Reps remaining in the field were continually serving as communication links between H-46 users and the data bank.
Records were kept of all queries, historical data provided, and of dollars saved. These cumulative totals were reported regularly to the NavAirSysCom, NASCRcpUnt, and to the Central Repository.
Through 1970, the H-46 data bank had, by the Navy’s formula, saved the
Professional Notes 109
Navy and the Marine Corps at least $4.2 million. A similar savings was achieved in 1971, although the total savings, could not be precisely measured.
After more than two years of Fleet support to the H-46 helicopter and with proved savings to the Navy, the program to develop an accurate, responsive, dynamic component data bank, has now been declared an unqualified success. The data bank is adaptable to other helicopter fleets. It is an example of the Navy’s continuing search to get the most for its dollar.
If the data bank had not been developed, what would have happened? Who knows just how many millions of dollars would have been wasted in unnecessary spares purchases, component overhaul, or in, scrapping of components for which no historical data has been provided? It is difficult to measure. But how much did the data bank cost the Navy? What did the Navy actually have
to spend in order to save this money?
If the Navy saved $4 million in 1970 and again in 1971, by their own calculations, would 10% be a reasonable expectation as a reimbursement for the creation, development, and use of this prototype data bank? Or would 5% on each dollar saved be an equitable sum to be paid to the creators and operators of this unique saver of Navy dollars? Disregarding the indirect savings from reduced spare parts purchase, and any savings that comes from the locating of suspect components throughout the Fleet, the Navy pays less than 5% on each dollar that is known to have been saved because of the data bank.
Think about the Navy’s total unnecessary spares purchases, and of the Navy’s dollars paid to its NARPs for unnecessary component overhauls of all different kinds of helicopters, and the unnecessary spare parts usage. How many millions of dollars are involved?
What could the Navy do with the dollars saved by more efficient management of the fewer spares that need to be purchased in the future? With efficient component management within their grasp, what will happen or be done? These are highly interesting questions.
One also wonders if the H-46 data bank will even be funded in the coming years. Many things have been accomplished through its use that might not be to the liking of spares salesmen. Deficiencies in management of spares have been pointed out that are potentially embarrassing to some military offices.
This has been the story of a successful solution to a big problem. With a little vision, courage, dedication, and a little sense, many dollars were saved. Is this really the end of the story, or the first deposit into what can become a very large Navy savings account?
The Marines Cut a Gordian Knot
By Lieutenant Colonel William V.
Kennedy, U. S. Army Reserve, Civilian Member, U. S. Army Combat Developments Command Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
One of the first major problems of national defense policy addressed by the young American Republic was that of providing an effective military reserve. The most acute form of the problem then, and now, has been the creation of major land combat formations at a high state of readiness. All sorts of solutions have been proposed, the most recent being former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s attempt, in 1964 and 1965, to merge the Federally- administered Army Reserve into the state-administered National Guard. Like the ill-starred McNamara proposal, most of these efforts have ended in a storm of political invective with little or no change in the status quo.
The U. S. Marine Corps has been embarked for the past decade on a solution of its own. Theory has been translated into a working model, and the effectiveness of that model is beginning
to produce a demand for change in the much larger Army National Guard and Army Reserve.
The working model is the 4th Marine Division, the major element of the 45,000-man Marine Corps Reserve. The division is commanded by a regular Marine with a small nucleus staff. The commanders of the three infantry regiments, the support regiment, and the artillery regiment are Reservists ordered to full-time duty.
The organization of the 4th Marine Division took place over a six-year period from 1962 to 1968. The Division replaced a loose aggregation of separate units, whose function in time of war had been to supply individual reinforcements to existing regular units.
A Reserve division with its companion air wing offered the Corps the means to achieve a 25% expansion in force structure immediately upon mobili-
zation. In the past, such an expansion had been achieved only after a long and difficult process of piecing together individuals and small units. On the other hand, the Army’s long experience with large National Guard and Reserve combat formations indicated that the organizational expansion did not assure an equally rapid gain in usable combat power.
The Army National Guard and Reserve forces made substantial progress, particularly during the decade 1951 to 1961. Between the Korean War and the Berlin mobilization of 1961, the time required for a Guard division to achieve operational readiness had been cut from a year to approximately five months. This was largely a product of the active duty training program mandated for National Guard and Reserve recruits in the mid 1950s. Some further, but marginal, progress was achieved in the 1960s
no
through abandonment of the traditional two-hour weekly drill in favor of one full weekend of training per month.
The small-scale mobilization carried out in the spring of 1968 revealed a new problem. The reservoir of World War II experience among Guard and Reserve officers and non-commissioned officers was rapidly disappearing into retirement. The scope of mobilization during the Korean War had not been sufficient to provide a new and younger increment of experience in the senior grades. The places vacated by the World War II officers were being filled by men who had never served on active duty, or whose total active duty experience consisted of a few months in service school or enlisted basic training.
The hope that this deficiency would be overcome by the return of Vietnam veterans to Reserve status has been dashed, thus far at least, by peculiarities of the Army Reserve component personnel system inherited from the volunteer militia of the 19th century.
The volunteer units were private clubs, often with a distinct ethnic or social character. Admittance to or exclusion from the units was a function jealously guarded by the unit membership. Since the units were supported largely from the private resources of the membership, both state and federal governments were quite content to go along with the arrangement.
Increasing federal support during this century has been accompanied by a gradual increase in federal standards. Unit control of officer and senior enlisted careers remains substantially unchanged, however, in both the federally-run Army Reserve and the state- administered National Guard. Since most Guard and Reserve units were not mobilized during the Vietnam War, the officer and, in some cases, the senior NCO spaces continued to be occupied by men whose careers depended upon retaining their assignments in the particular unit, or at least in the major command to which the unit was assigned. Recent studies of the subject indicate that, as a result of this situation, relatively few Vietnam veterans have found a place in the leadership echelons of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.
Because of this continuing dearth of
active duty experience, the Army is in danger of losing the ground gained in Guard and Reserve readiness during the past two decades.
The Marines had no reason to be aware of the full extent of this problem, when they undertook to organize a Reserve division in 1962. As noted, however, they were well aware of the difficulties the Army had experienced in achieving a satisfactory level of readiness in large units led entirely by officers in a part-time training status. It seemed plain enough that some new departure would be required if the desired increase in readiness were to be achieved. The full-time headquarters was the vehicle selected.
The necessity of establishing a fulltime division headquarters was dictated, in part, by the fact that the new Marine Reserve division would be spread from coast-to-coast. A part-time headquarters could not cope with so broad a span of control. The decision to appoint a regular as commanding general, and to staff the nucleus headquarters with regulars, was influenced by the belief that officers who had served in comparable assignments on active duty should be able to be ready for deployment earlier than officers lacking such experience. This same philosophy influenced the decision to convert the regimental command billets to full-time, active-duty status.
Reservists who attain the requisite degree of active duty experience are eligible for assignment to the full-time billets. All of the officers selected as the initial full-time regimental commanders are, in fact, Reservists. The necessity of obtaining two years’ leave of absence from civilian employment, however, may limit the number of Reservists available for such assignments in the future. So far, this has proven to be less of an obstacle than had been supposed.
The establishment of the 4th Marine Division has been followed by a rapid increase in the level and scope of training. Combined air-ground exercises arc being conducted during weekend training. Amphibious exercises are being conducted on each coast during annual training duty. Each battalion of the Division is rotated through a five-year- cycle of training, designed to culminate in a combined division and air wing Marine Amphibious Force (MAI;) exer
cise. A prototype of such an exercise was conducted by the Marine Corps on the West Coast in 1970.
It is impossible to determine, at this stage, the degree of increased readiness attributable to the full-time headquarters concept. That an appreciable gain has been achieved is apparent from the dramatic increases that have occurred in the scope and tempo of training. This, in turn, has won over Marine Reservists who resented the conversion of the regimental command billets to an active duty status. The provision of meaningful training assignments for senior Reserve officers in staff training groups, also, has been a factor in winning support among the Reserves.
The organizational concept of the 4th Marine Division attracted the Army’s attention at once. Inquiries into the subject and visits to units of the Division produced somewhat unexpected results in an entirely different area.
As noted earlier, the present-day Army National Guard and Army Reserve operate under a localized, unit- managed officer procurement, assignment, and promotion system. The peculiarities of that system have acted to bar many Vietnam officer veterans from participation in the Army Reserve component unit program at the very time when the need for their experience is becoming critical. In contrast, visits to Marine Reserve units indicated the presence of a large percentage of Vietnam veterans among their officers. Further inquiry indicated that this is the product of policies that limit unit officers’ tours to two years, when a qualified replacement is available. Hence, whenever such vacancies might occur, unit commanders of company level or above, arc required to extend a written invitation to all Marine Reserve officers residing in the locality of the unit to apply for projected vacancies. Applications arc forwarded through the chain of command, with final selection by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Inevitably, this has given the Vietnam veteran, with his recent combat experience, a considerable, and rightful, advantage in the selection process.
Officers displaced under the Marine system are eligible to compete for another unit vacancy after they have been in non-unit status for one year. Promo-
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lions are based on the officer’s total past performance, to include performance on active duty, rather than on occupancy j of a unit position.
In addition to opening the door to the Vietnam veteran, these policies provide effective safeguards against the local i economic, political, and social pressures that have been the plague of the civilian components since their inception. Since the Marine Reserve unit commander does not directly determine who shall he promoted, and since his latitude in regard to other personnel actions is limited, he is afforded considerable protection against pressures for special favors applied through his employer, customers, or even members of his own family. With logistic support in the hands of the regular inspector and in
structors, the Marine Reserve system, in general, offers slim pickings to the local "operators.”
By virtue of the fact that they have been tried and proven successful on a national basis, the Marine Reserve organizational concepts and personnel policies indicate a possible solution to problems that have beset the Army for generations. The fact that the Marines have won the enthusiastic support of their own Reservists for these policies, offers further hope that the solutions indicated may prove to be not only practical but attainable in the much larger and the much more volatile context of the Army Guard and Reserve program. Indeed, certain aspects of the Marine program may prove to be equally attractive to the Air Force.
The Marines make no claim to clairvoyance in evolving what is, in many respects, an innovative, refreshing, and, above all, workable approach to a seemingly insoluble problem of American military policy. They admit that the full-time headquarters is as much a product of geography as of perception. The personnel policies they attribute to nothing more than a desire to "share the wealth,” i.e., drill pay, among as many of their Reservists as are willing to participate in the unit program. Be that as it may, these pragmatic approaches have cut through a centuries- old snarl of traditions and practices. They are showing the way to what could be one of the most important advances in Reserve component readiness in our history.
Malta—A Maritime Base for Rent
By Vice Admiral B. B. Schofield, Royal Navy (Retired)
The three islands of the Maltese group—Malta, Gozo, and Comino— have a long and interesting history. They occupy what, for a considerable time, was regarded as an important strategic position in the central Mediterranean. The largest island, Malta, 95 square miles in area, lies 65 miles south of the coast of Sicily and 180 miles north of that of North Africa. Although the Italian island of Pantellcria, 160 miles West of Malta, occupies an even better position in the center of the Sicilian Narrows, it is only 32 square miles in area and lacks Malta’s two great assets, the Grand Harbor, dominated by the fortress city of Valetta, and the first-class air Base in the center of the island at Luqa.
In 1530, the newly-crowned Emperor, Charles V, gave Malta to the Knights of St. John in place of their former home on the island of Rhodes. In 1565, the Turks laid siege to Valetta, then known as Mount Sceberras, but failed to capture it, and the tide of Turkish conquest began to recede. The Knights then set about improving the island’s
fortifications and the reigning Grand Master, Jean Parisot de la Valettc, ordered the construction of the city which bears his name, and which has since been the island’s capital.
The Knights of St. John governed Malta as they thought fit, and under their somewhat self-centered rule, the Maltese multiplied, although they could hardly be said to have prospered. The Knights ignored them politically and, not surprisingly, the desire for independence and a say in their own affairs grew. On 9 June 1798, the French Com- mander-in-Chicf, Napoleon Bonaparte, appeared off the Grand Harbor with a fleet, and was welcomed by the Maltese. After three months of government by decree, however, the Maltese realized they had made a mistake. When news of Nelson’s victory over the French Fleet at Aboukir Bay reached therri on 2 September 1798, they raised the flag of revolt and imprisoned the French in Valetta.
They then turned to the British Fleet for help in ousting the French.
During the latter part of the 19th century, British seapower, now firmly based on Malta, was used successfully to restrain expansionist ambitions of France and Russia in the Middle East, but it was profoundly affected by two events—the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the advent of the steam- propelled warship. The great increase in Mediterranean shipping, brought about by the Canal opening, and the value of Malta as a coaling station halfway between Gibraltar and Port Said on the new route to India, increased the responsibilities of the Royal Navy in that area. In 1889, a breakwater was constructed to protect shipping in the Grand Harbor from the violence of the Gregale (northeasterly) winds and also from attack by the newly-invented torpedo weapon.
In 1894, Britain’s relations with both France and Russia deteriorated to a point that war was considered possible. From its base at Malta, the British fleet had the double task of watching the French fleet at Toulon and, at the same
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1B72
time, being ready to deal with a possible sortie by the Russian fleet through the Dardanelles. So formidable did these twin tasks appear to the British government, that there was talk of abandoning the Mediterranean. The braver counsels prevailed, however, and it was decided that in the event of hostilities, the Mediterranean Fleet would join the Channel Fleet at Gibraltar and operate from there against the French in the western basin, while a small force would be sent to the Levant in the hope of deterring the Russians from leaving the Black Sea.
As the century drew to a close, Britain found itself strong but alone. Although the Dual Alliance (France and Russia) and the Triple Alliance (Germany, Italy, and Austria) disagreed with each other over Huropean issues, they were united in their opposition to Britain on the wider issues with which Britain’s fate was becoming increasingly linked. The conclusion of the Anglo- French Convention on 8 April 1904, marked the turning point in relations between these two countries, which had fought each other since the end of the 17th century. It was brought about by a new threat to Britain’s sea supremacy arising in Germany.
One of the first changes made by Admiral Sir John (Jackie) Fisher when he became First Sea Lord in October 1904, was to concentrate the British Fleet in home waters to meet the German threat. It was, up until that time, primarily based at Malta. Although no firm commitment was made, it was understood that, if war broke out with the Triple Alliance, France would take care of the Italian Fleet and the western basin, while making use of the naval facilities at Malta as it might require. In 1915, however, Italy became an ally of Britain and France, giving the Allies such naval preponderance in the Mediterranean that no threat to Malta developed. Full use was made of the dockyard facilities by the Allied ships operating in the Aegean and Adriatic seas.
After World War I, Great Britain returned to the Mediterranean in strength and resumed its position of influence in those waters. Gradually, however, a mistaken belief in the effectiveness of the League of Nations to
solve international disputes, and a policy of retrenchment in defense expenditure, undermined this position. One result of this unwise policy was a failure to provide Malta with any defense against air attack, a form of attack made possible by the rapid development of the airplane during and after World War I.
In 1935, when relations between Italy and the other members of the League of Nations became tense following Italy’s unprovoked attack on Abyssinia, the British Mediterranean Fleet was obliged to abandon its traditional base at Malta and move to Alexandria, where it was outside the range of Italian bombers. The idea that Malta could have been defended by a strong force of fighter aircraft, backed by adequate gun defenses, was precluded because of expense. It was ruled out as impracticable by those who believed in the absolute supremacy of air attack. Despite a steady deterioration in the international situation, nothing was done to repair this grave omission. When, in June 1940, Italy entered World War II on the side of Germany, and France lay prostrate, Malta, instead of being able to play its part as a bastion of British strength, became a beleaguered fortress which, at all costs, had to be maintained. Had it fallen into enemy hands, the passage of troops, stores, and reinforcements to the Axis armies in North Africa could not have been disputed effectively, while those needed for the British army in F.gypt, however urgently, would have had to take the long route around the Cape of Good Hope.
The heroic resistance of Malta to the onslaught of German and Italian aircraft has also passed into history. The British government made an award of £31 million to Malta towards the cost of reconstruction after the great damage done during the war. In September 1947, a new constitution was granted, in which universal adult suffrage was conceded, and Maltese was substituted for Italian as the second official language. Malta also shared in Marshall aid to the extent of $2,300,000, to which was added £l'/2 million from the British Colonial Development Fund.
In 1956, the British government decided that the amount Britain spent on defense must be reduced. This decision, accompanied by the failure of the
Anglo-French attempt to seize the Suez Canal, because of the lack of American support, marked the beginning of Malta’s decline in prestige as a maritime base, and opened the way for Russia's incursion into Middle East affairs. Massive reductions in Malta’s dockyard labor force, was followed by its transfer from a naval to a commercial basis. The cutting down of the Royal Navy’s ships and establishments based at Malta, combined with a reduction in the size of the garrison, dealt Malta’s economy a severe blow.
The population, large numbers of whom directly or indirectly earned their living by service to the British forces stationed on the island or on board ships, was nearing the 320,000 mark, and increasing at the rate of 8,000 annually. At 2,162 people to the square mile, the density was the highest in Europe. The most skillful cultivation of the island’s 70,000 acres could not provide sufficient food to support such a vast number of people, nor could the island’s only exports of beer, lace, and onions earn sufficient to make the economy viable.
Apart from such values that the base facilities might have, it seemed that a great increase in tourism held out the only hope of making ends meet. Unfortunately, the number of hotels which can be built is limited by a shortage of water. Emigration has helped, and there are now more Maltese living abroad than on the islands.
On 24 September 1964, Malta was granted independence and, as a token of good will, Britain made a grant of £51 million to assist with the economic development of the islands. With the abolition of the post of British Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, in June 1967, Britain finally abandoned the dominance it had held for over 200 years.
The collapse of British seapower in the Mediterranean has been compensated for, to some extent, by the presence of the U. S. Sixth Fleet, although the United States is not a Mediterranean power in the same way Great Britain was. The growing presence of the Soviet Fleet has also injected a new factor into Mediterranean strategy, as has the rapid development of air power on a scale which even 25 years ago could not have been foreseen. Today, the Mediterranean
is, in fact, an air-dominated lake which can be traversed by modern aircraft from cnd-to-end in under five hours, and crossed at its widest point in an hour. Hence, surface ships no longer have the same importance as they once had in I those waters, as a means of exerting political pressure. The primary value of the Sixth Fleet carriers is their role as powerfully-equipped airfields; similarly, it is the air facilities which Malta is able J to offer that are more important today than the Grand Harbor and the dockyard. The geographical location of an airfield, however, within fairly wide limits, is of less importance than that of a harbor, because of the much higher- speed of an aircraft, compared with that of a ship. Thus, although Malta is strategically well situated, vis-a-vis the Sicilian Narrows, its function as an air base can equally well be performed by airfields in Sicily, situated only 65 miles to the north. In the same way, the ships which Russia maintains in the Mediterranean are of less importance than its ability to dominate the Eastern basin from airfields in South Russia and Egypt, with the probable addition of facilities in Syria and Iraq, if required. The possibility of the construction of a wholly Soviet airfield at Aswan-on-thc Nile would enable Tu-22 bomber/reconnaissance aircraft to cover the whole Mediterranean from Gibraltar eastward to the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Arabian Sea, as far as Bombay.
It is doubtful whether, when the Suez Canal re-opens, there will be the same quantity of through-shipping by Western countries as before its closure, mainly because of the changing pattern of oil distribution, using supertankers around the Cape. Losses through the Suez Canal, however, may well be made up by Soviet ships trading from Black Sea ports to those in East Africa, India, and Australia. Hence, Soviet interest in the eastern basin is likely to grow stronger. At the same time, the 17 littoral and island states bordering on the Mediterranean are vitally dependent on seaborne trade, which includes a steadily increasing demand for petroleum products. In time of war, the ships thus employed, amounting to about 2,000 at sea or in port on any one day, would need protection against air and submarine attack. The responsibility for this
importance as a NATO base has decreased.
lies with NATO and, until September 1971, the Commander, Allied Navies, South (ComNavSouth) had his headquarters at Malta, where the close proximity of the island’s principal airfield at Luqa was most advantageous. Operated by the Royal Air Force, this airfield serves both military and civil requirements. It is equipped with some of
the latest radar and control apparatus, and so requires skilled personnel to operate it.
In common with other NATO naval commanders, ComNavSouth has no ships allocated to his command in time of peace. This is of less consequence to him, however, than the provision of effective air reconnaissance so that he is
cognizant of what is going on in his area. Once again, however, the volatile- political sentiments of a considerable- section of the Maltese people, led by a quixotic Prime Minister, Dom Mintoff, pursuing the conflicting aspirations of economic self-sufficiency and complete disentanglement from international commitments, led to the ousting of ComNavSouth, who has been obliged to move to less satisfactorily situated headquarters at Naples. This was followed by demands for payment for the facilities used by British forces on behalf of NATO, of a sum which neither NATO nor Britain considered to be reasonable. It was accompanied by an insistence on the withdrawal of these forces unless the demand was met. The British government responded to this ultimatum by initiating the evacuation of all its troops and equipment, which would have ultimately included the classified equipment at Luqa airfield and the skilled personnel who operated it.
The problem facing NATO is that it does not need the facilities which Malta has to offer but, at the same time, it does not want Russia to have the use of them. As previously mentioned, the eastern basin of the Mediterranean will undoubtedly one day become the highway which Russia has coveted for centuries, providing it with a link, through the Suez Canal, with the warm-water regions to the south. It would, therefore, be an area of primary strategic importance to the Soviet Union. The use of the air and harbor facilities of Malta on the western flank of that area would enable the Soviet Union to consolidate its already extensive hold on that part of the world, and provide a stepping-stone to westward expansion like that achieved by the Ottoman empire four centuries ago.
Desirable as this objective must be to the Soviet planners, when it comes to
cash payments, the Russians can be very coy. They prefer barter every time, but it is not guns and tanks, nor watches and radio sets which Mintoff needs. He wants convertible currency to meet Malta’s economic deficit. Hence, after nine months of the toughest bargaining in the records of international diplomacy, on 26 March 1972, Dom Mintoff signed a Seven-Year Defense Agreement, accepting the £14 million annual payment offered by Great Britain and NATO, even though it was £4 million less than he had demanded. On signing, he received an advance payment of £12% million, and thereafter, advance payments of £7 million will be made at six-month intervals for the remainder of the period covered by the agreement. Of this amount, the United States will contribute 25%, Britain 34%, the balance being paid by the other member nations of NATO.
The agreement stipulates that ", . . except by agreement between tlie- two governments (Britain and Malta), no forces of other states shall be allowed to share the facilities afforded to the United Kingdom or given other facilities.” With the exception of ships and aircraft from countries that are members of the Warsaw Pact—which arc specifically excluded—those belonging to other countries may use harbors not exclusively reserved for the Royal Navy, and also Luqa airport for non-opera- tional purposes. The control of both civil and military air traffic using Luqa airport, is to be "a matter of joint consultation” between the two governments. Britain has promised to train selected Maltese for duties as air traffic controllers, preparing them for standards laid down for International Civil Aviation requirements. Ships and aircraft in distress, regardless of their nationality, arc permitted to make temporary use of the island’s facilities.
Immediately after informing the Maltese Parliament of the terms of the agreement, Mintoff flew to Peking, where he obtained an interest-free loan of £17 million from the Chinese government, spread over six years, from 1 May 1972. It is repayable over ten years beginning on 1 May 1984, and the major part of the loan is to be used on unspecified development projects, for which the Chinese will provide the machinery and technical aid. The intrusion of China into the already complex Mediterranean situation cannot be welcome to Russia, but it would probably be a mistake to attach too much political importance to the event. It will provide China with a point d’appui from which to launch anti-Russian propaganda in support of countries such as Libya and Algeria, which have so far resisted pressure to draw them into the Soviet camp.
The British withdrawal was completed, on schedule, at an estimated cost of £6 million despite the 11th hour signing of the agreement. On 14 April 1972, the first group of British Servicemen, comprising 124 Royal Navy and Royal Air Force personnel, returned as allowed by the new agreement. It is understood that the garrison will be somewhat smaller than the 3,500 officers and men previously stationed there, and that at Mintoff’s request, wives and families could accompany their husbands, although this was not the original intention of the Ministry of Defense.
As for the future, Dom Mintoff has expressed hope that by the time the agreement expires in 1979, Malta will be financially independent and economically viable, and there would be no need to renew it. Everything depends on the plans he has for the development of his barren inheritance, but should he fail. Mintoff or his successor may once again be obliged to advertise this once desirable maritime base for rent.
The High Cost of Survival
A Navy recruit lost his rifle on the firing range. When told that he would have to pay for it, he protested: "Suppose I was driving a Navy jeep and somebody stole it. Would I have to pay for that, too?”
He was informed that he would have to pay for all government property he lost.
"Now,” said the recruit, "I know why the captain always goes down with his ship.”
—Contributed by John Behnke