The Sea Control Ship System
By Rear Admiral Donald V. Cox, U. S. Navy, Program Coordinator, Surface Ship Aviation Integration Program, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Recently there has been a great deal of interest, discussion, and, unfortunately, some misconception concerning the Sea Control Ship, a new class of ship being planned for the U. S. Navy. The Sea Control Ship was formerly known as the Air Capable Ship.
What is a Sea Control Ship? Most recently the press has termed her a mini-carrier. That she is not. The Chief of Naval Operations has repeatedly said she is neither carrier nor escort. True, she will most probably look like a pocket-size carrier but there the resemblance ends. She certainly will be completely different in appearance and armament from the destroyer escorts we have known. The Sea Control Ship is a true child of requirement; and physical similarities, which might exist to ships as we know them today, are somewhat coincidental and somewhat tribute to lingering design philosophies. To understand the Sea Control Ship, she must he examined in light of the missions for which she has been created, and should be examined as a total system, not just a ship.
The Sea Control Ship System provides a new concept in naval warfare. It sprang primarily from the imaginative linking and calculating analysis of a few naval officers: the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt; Rear Admiral Tom Davies, Chief of Naval Development; Vice Admiral Pete Aurand, Commander ASW Forces Pacific; and others. The CNO has defined sea control as one of the major Navy missions—Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of Forces, and Presence, and the Sea Control Ship System was specifically conceived as a major means to bolster sea control. There are, of course, varieties of ships, aircraft, and systems already in the Fleet which contribute to the Sea Control mission, and which include our carrier and destroyer forces. It is a hard but indisputable fact, however, that as increasing threats make the sea control job both more difficult and more important, our current assets to achieve sea control are diminishing. Budgetary constraints and increasing prices of new ships and aircraft make augmentation of these assets a real problem. To understand why the Sea Control Ship has been chosen as a major factor in “closing the gap” in sea control, we must examine the spectrum of sea control.
The sea control spectrum can be visualized as extending from the very low threat environment of the mission of Presence to the very high threat of Projection of Forces. The CVA is useful and vital across the entire spectrum—but the CVAs are relatively small in number. Because of the limited number available and existing higher priority assignments, some missions in the lower threat range—for example mid-ocean convoying—cannot be handled. Enter the Sea Control Ship System, powerful enough to be effective in the spectrum where employed, inexpensive enough to become available in the kind of numbers which our worldwide ocean interest demand, and simple enough to be a low-risk attainment.
Although the Sea Control Ship (or ships, depending on threat level) will be the focal point of the SCS System concept, the system also includes the air group(s), the escorts (DE[s], DDGs, PFs), other sea control assets which might be available or specifically provided, our worldwide intelligence and communication systems, and all ships being escorted.
The system has two major functions: first, to provide a moving sanctuary for any convoy, or underway replenishment group, or amphibious force; and second, to provide a force to sanitize any desired area. The convoying operation is the real raison d’être of the system, and the value of our sea-bridge to support friendly allies and our deployed forces is well-known. Although some authorities maintain that proliferation of high-speed submarine opposition and improved enemy reconnaissance may make convoys unprofitable, this system provides a concept in convoying which the Navy firmly believes will succeed. The alternatives to convoying in this environment of an enemy’s improved reconnaissance and high-speed submarines may be unprofitable indeed. The ability to sanitize an area, to seek out and destroy the enemy in an offensive measure, is an important offshoot of the first mission.
Picture a cylinder of space around the system force; a cylinder composed of air, of depths of water, and of the important sea-surface interface. Our potential enemy has created weapons for all three environments. He can shoot anti-ship missiles at our force from his aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. These formidable weapons must be countered by our force, preferably before launch, but if necessary, after launch. These are his sophisticated weapons, and, for the defense, are difficult to handle. If we do nothing—or little—to protect ourselves, he can use them with impunity but he will not really need them. If we do nothing, he can safely fall back on iron bombs, shells, and torpedoes. The steps taken by our system to counter these destructive forces are the use of intelligence, the exercise of tactical reconnaissance in all elements of the cylinder, and, finally, the prosecution of the attack and destruction of intruders and/or their weapons. Does it sound easy? It is not; but we believe this system can work.
The SCS provides the platform for command and control and for aircraft operations that provide airborne early warning of air and surface, undersea surveillance, and tactical prosecution of air, surface, and subsurface contacts. We are now planning to fly VSTOL aircraft (perhaps Harrier-type) in air intercept and surface attack roles and for protection of our surveillance aircraft. We will fly helicopters which are dedicated to AEW and ASW roles. Primarily, these helos will provide surveillance in the mediums for which they are responsible, and will have the capability of exercising local tactical operational control in contact prosecution. All of these aircraft, and LAMPS aircraft from the escorts, will be maintained on the Sea Control Ship. Surface escorts—for example, DE[s], PFs, and DDGs—will also provide anti-ship missile area defense for the formation. The ships being escorted will, as possible, also provide some measure of self-defense and will be advantageously positioned therefor. Through the use of intelligence, the convoy will move where the threat appears least. It will move more rapidly than heretofore, primarily because the capabilities of our aircraft will give us a high level of surveillance and increased assurance of safety along our route, and also because the use of aircraft in local tactics will preclude the necessity of peeling off escorts to investigate and prosecute contacts, with the resultant slowing of the formation and weakening of its integrity.
We believe we can detect, destroy, or tender impotent enemy aircraft, ships, or submarines which venture within our protective cylinder. By so doing, we can either prevent enemy action or force him to take action earlier than he would desire—with a resultant higher failure-rate of his efforts. Weapons launched from beyond our cylinder remain to be dealt with, but we have lessened their effect by increasing the time available to us to counter them. With our sensors detached from the main formation, in aircraft and in escorts, we can be silent without playing blindman’s buff. We can readily employ any friendly information or assistance. The same general principles will apply to an offensive mission. The force is flexible. The aircraft composition can be changed to match a specific mission or threat. As more capable weapons and sensors become available, we can operate them from the SCS without expensive and lengthy ship overhauls, conversions, or modernizations.
Characteristics of the SCS, herself, are now being established. She will be a simple ship, of about 15,000 tons displacement, capable of providing command and control for the system, capable of self-defense against missiles, and primarily capable of operating the embarked VTOL/VSTOL aircraft. The ship is low-risk and inexpensive (less than $100M per copy). The SCS will have no sonars or area defense weapons—the functions of these weapons and sensors will be handled by the embarked air group of accompanying escorts. We now plan that the SCS will be gas turbine-powered, and that she will carry a respectable air group designed to provide one AEW helo and two ASW helos airborne, with a VSTOL detachment available in a deck-launched reactive role.
How is such a ship being designed? The CNO and his Executive Board (CEB) call all the turns. Presentations of alternatives are made by the OpNav Program Coordinator (Op-03H), assisted by the Systems Analysis Division (Op-96), and selections and guidance are provided by the CEB. These guidelines are then used by the Project Manager in the Material Command (PM-15) and the Ships Systems Command Ships Acquisition Program Manager (SHAPM), working in close coordination with the Naval Air Systems Command, to design the ship.
We are extremely fortunate to have the opportunity for an early and meaningful test and evaluation program. The USS Guam, (LPH-9), has been made available as the Interim Sea Control Ship. The Guam returned from deployment at the end of October 1971 and entered the Norfolk Naval Shipyard for necessary modification. At this writing, the Guam is in her early days at sea as the Navy’s first Sea Control Ship, operating as an interim testing platform.
The U. S. Marine Corps is providing Harrier VSTOL aircraft to fly from the Guam. HS-15 was commissioned on 29 October 1971 as a dedicated Sea Control Squadron and will provide the embarked helicopter force. The essential interplay with LAMPS will be evaluated when a LAMPS-equipped escort operates in conjunction with the Guam during this evaluation. The evaluation will be conducted by the Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OpTevFor), in Norfolk.
Evaluation of the Guam fits neatly into the SCS schedule. During the first six months, prototype evaluation will be conducted with direct feedback between the evaluation and the preliminary design authorities. The next phase will be tactical development, followed by operational evaluation. A deployment of the interim SCS and her air group may occur in this last period. The Navy stands to learn a good deal in this evaluation—and learn it in time.
We are pushing for the first SCS to be funded in the FY 1974 budget and delivered in FY 1978. The number of ships now planned for the first generation is eight—which, obviously, must be considered only a start in view of the Navy’s total requirements.
Summed up, the Sea Control Ship is quite unlike anything before—an exciting concept of the future, aimed at ensuring an old Navy responsibility—today, more important than ever before—control of the seas.
Ship Classification—Time for Overhaul
By Lieutenant Commander William D. O’Neil, III U. S. Naval Reserve-R, Office of Program Appraisal, Department of the Navy
Navies have been sorting out their ships by type and class for as long as there have been navies. Usually, the type designation has been established with respect to general function and, within functional group, by size, firepower, major equipment, and the like. The various types have always had distinguishing names, but 50 years ago, the N. S. Navy added a system of letter codes. These simple, convenient, mnemonic codes have added greatly to the strength and flexibility of warship taxonomy. Many of the U. S. Navy codes have come into almost universal naval use, even among navies which do not officially apply them.
While the U. S. Navy’s ship classification and coding system has been modified many times, it has not been basically revised in the half century of its existence. In fact, almost all of the original codes are still in use. But of course there have been vast changes in naval technology and strategy in these 50 years, and the attempts to adapt the original two-letter codes and their corresponding classifications to these changes have led to a sprawling, confusing, unstructured “system.”
Consider, for instance, that the letter “S” appears to mean: “antisubmarine warfare” in CVS; “ship” in MCS; “sweeper” in MSO; “surveying” in AGS; “stores” in AKS; “salvage” in ARS; “submarine” in AS; “supply” in AVS; “swimmer” in LCSR; and, finally, “combat” in AFS. Perplexing indeed, is a system which makes an ATSS an auxiliary training submarine, while an ATS is a salvage tug.
Figure 1
Subsidiary Code Letters
Subsidiary | Meaning |
A—Assault airlift | |
B—Beaching | |
C—Command and communications | |
D—Docking | |
E—Carries heavy equipment, wheeled or tracked | |
F—Fire support | |
G—General or all purpose (for type) | |
H-Heavy | |
I—Intelligence gathering or surveillance | |
J—Rescue or salvage | |
K—Carries cargo or nonvehicular equipment | |
L—Light | |
M—Minesweeping | |
N—Minelaying | |
O—POL replenishment | |
P—Carries personnel or troops and their equipment | |
Q—Submarine support or operations | |
R—Repairs or supports ships or craft | |
S—Anti-ship operations | |
T—Training | |
U—Antisubmarine operations | |
V—Operates VSTOL aircraft (only) or, transports (but does not operate) aircraft of all types | |
W—Fleet air defense operations | |
X—Unclassified | |
Y—Ammunition replenishment | |
Z—Stores replenishment |
Compounding this confusion of codes is a lack of order in the underlying scheme of classification. Frigates (DL) were to have been larger and more capable than destroyers (DD), but the new Spruance class DDs are far bigger than the DLs and DLGs of the 1950s. Worse still, some Soviet warships smaller than most U. S. frigates are classed as cruisers by the U. S. Navy. The Kyndas and Krestas are termed CLGMs—no bets taken as to what the “M” denotes.
Perhaps it is time, after half a century, for a keel-to-truck overhaul, or even a complete rebuilding. This author’s proposal is outlined in Figure 3.
All aircraft carriers would receive “A” designations; surface combatants, escorts, and patrol craft would be “B” through “I,” depending on size; amphibious assault ships and craft would occupy the alphabet from “L” through “O;” conventional and nuclear attack submarines would be “R” and “S,” respectively; the various types of auxiliary vessels would run from “T” to “Y;” and “Z” would mark Polaris-type submarines.
Distinctions within types would be indicated by additional, “subsidiary” letters. The general scheme is laid out in Figure 3, while Figure 1 gives the subsidiary letter meanings in isolation.
Figure 2 is intended to give an idea of how the system would work in practice, by showing the revised classifications and codes for a few existing ships.
Figure 2
Some Examples of Revised Classifications and Codes Applied to U. S. Naval Vessels
Ship | New Classification | New Code |
Lafayette (SSBN-616) | Strategic missile submarine | Z |
Nimitz (CVAN-68) | Heavy aircraft carrier | AH |
Hancock (CVA-19) | Aircraft carrier | A |
Long Beach (CGN-9) | Battleship (AAW) | BW |
Bainbridge (DLGN-25) | Cruiser (AAW/ASW) | CWU |
Belknap (DLG-26) | Destroyer (AAW/ASW) | DWU |
Spruance (DD-963) | Destroyer (ASW) | DU |
Sherman (DD-931) | Destroyer | D* |
Garcia (DE-1040) | Escort (ASW) | EU |
Brister (DER-327) | Frigate | F |
Sturgeon (SSN-637) | Nuclear attack submarine (ASW) | SU |
Saint Paul (CA-73) | Battleship (command/fire support) | BCF |
Blue Ridge (LCC-19) | Large assault command ship | LC |
LHA-1 | Assault carrier (docking) | AAD |
Austin (LPD-4) | Large assault ship (docking/personnel) | LPD |
Newport (LST-1179) | Medium assault ship (beaching) | MEB |
Asheville (PG-84) | Guard vessel | G |
Agile (MSO-421) | Minesweeping guard vessel | GM |
Kilauea (AD-26) | Ammunition ship | UY |
Sacramento (AOE-1) | Underway replenishment ship (multipurpose) | UOY |
L. Y. Spear (AS-36) | Submarine tender | VRQ |
Edenton (ATS-1) | Salvage tug | VJ |
* This class just about straddles the displacement line (4,000 tons) dividing D and H designations. In such cases, the ships would have to be assigned to one classification or another by administrative fiat.
This proposed new classification system offers some worthwhile advantages over the present U. S. Navy system:
(1) It concentrates on the major, observable, or measurable differences between ships. A ship’s classification would not have to be changed simply because of slight alterations in mission or equipment.
(2) It emphasizes distinctions of function rather than those of equipment. If a DLG were converted so as to shoot down aircraft with lasers rather than missiles, why should it be necessary to change its classification?
(3) It is universally and objectively applicable to ships of all nations, regardless of the vagaries of their owners’ classification schemes. Ruritania could refer to its 900 spit-kits as “destroyers” if it liked, but we would know them for “Gs” beyond doubt.
Figure 3
A Proposed New Classification Scheme in Outline
A—Aircraft carrier, with full-length flight deck (able to operate conventional fixed-wing as well as VSTOL aircraft, unless “V” subsidiary designation used)AH–Heavy carrier, 64,000 tons or greater
AL–Light carrier, 31,999 tons or less
AV–VSTOL aircraft only operated (no catapults or arresting gear fitted)
AA–Specially fitted for amphibious airlift
(Note: Compound subsidiary classifications are possible; USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) would be an ALA.)
B—Surface warship (first rate), or “battleship;” 16,000 tons or greater
BC–Specially fitted flagship or command ship
BF–Armed and equipped especially for fire support
BS–Armed and equipped especially for anti-ship operations
BU–Armed and equipped especially for antisubmarine operations
BW–Armed and equipped especially for fleet air defense
BN–Specially fitted as a minelayer
BT–Specially fitted as a training ship
BV–Fitted to hangar and operate eight or more VSTOL aircraft
(Note: Compound subsidiary classifications are possible; Moskva would be a BUWV.)
C—Surface warship (second rate), or “cruiser;” 8,000 to 15,999 tons
CV–Fitted to hangar and operate four or more VSTOL aircraft
(Other subsidiary designations follow “B” pattern.)
D—Surface warship (third rate), or “destroyer;” 4,000 to 7,999 tons
DV–Fitted to hangar and operate two or more VSTOL aircraft
(Other subsidiary designations follow “B” pattern.)
E—Surface warship (fourth rate), or “escort;” 2,000 to 3,999 tons
EV–Fitted to hangar and operate VSTOL aircraft
(Other subsidiary designations follow “B” pattern.)
F—Surface warship (fifth rate), or "frigate;” 1,000 to 1,999 tons
FM–Specially fitted as minesweeper or mine countermeasures ship
(Other subsidiary designations follow “E” pattern.)
G—Surface warship (sixth rate), or “guard vessel;” 200 to 999 tons
(Subsidiary designations follow “F” pattern.)
H—Small warcraft; 50 to 199 tons
(Subsidiary designations follow “F” pattern.)
I—Inshore or riverine fighting vessel; less than 50 tons
(Subsidiary designations follow "F” pattern.)
L—Large assault ship; 10,000 tons or greater
LC–Specially fitted assault command ship
LD–Designed to dock smaller craft
LE–Specially fitted to carry vehicular equipment (primarily)
LK–Specially fitted to carry supplies and cargo (primarily)
LP–Specially fitted to carry troops (primarily)
LV–Fitted to operate five or more transport VSTOL aircraft
(Note: Compound subsidiary designations are possible; USS Thomaston would be an LED.)
M—Medium assault ship; 2,000 to 9,999 tons
MB–Designed to beach
MV–Fitted to operate two or more transport VSTOL aircraft
(Other subsidiary designations follow “L” pattern.)
N—Assault vessel; 800 to 1,999 tons
(Subsidiary designations follow “M” pattern.)
O—Assault craft; less than 800 tons
(Subsidiary designations follow “M” pattern, except that beaching capability is understood.)
R—Non-nuclear submarine (non-strategic)
RL–Light (coastal) submarine, less than 1,000 tons
RU–Specially fitted for antisubmarine operations
RA–Fitted for assault operations
RS–Fitted for long-range anti-ship operations
S—Nuclear submarine (non-strategic)
SU–Specially fitted for antisubmarine operations
SS–Fitted for long-range anti-ship operations
T—Transport ship
TE–Specially fitted to carry vehicular equipment
TK–Designed for general cargo (break-bulk or container)
TP–Specially fitted to carry troops
TD–Designed to carry cargo-loaded lighters
TO–Designed to carry bulk POL
TZ–Specially fitted with refrigerated holds
TV–Specially fitted to transport aircraft
TL–Light transport ship, less than 10,000 tons
U—Underway replenishment ship
UO–Oiler
UY–Ammunition ship
UZ–Stores ship
UL–Light replenishment ship, less than 10,000 tons
V—Base support ship
VB–Repair ship or tender for surface ships
VRQ–Repair ship or tender for submarines
VJ–Rescue or salvage ship
VJQ–Submarine rescue ship
W—Miscellaneous support ship
WC–Communications relay ship
WI–Intelligence-gathering ship (non-warship type)
WT–Training ship (non-warship type)
X—Technical or scientific research ship
XQ–Research submersible
Y—Harbor craft
Z—Strategic missile submarine
________
Note: All tonnages taken at full load.
There is room for a certain amount of patching, to meet any deficiencies thought especially egregious. For example, if it is believed that nuclear power sets a surface ship so far apart from the common herd as to justify a special classification, then one might prefix the nuclear ship’s classification with “Q,” as in QAH. Since “Q” is not used as a primary classification letter, no confusion could result.
Not everyone will be pleased with any one system. Some, for instance, will object to the new system as not being as mnemonic as the old method. It must be admitted, too, that the letter “V” does not instantly call to mind the idea of “base support ship,” nor does “R” immediately suggest a conventional or “non-nuclear submarine.” On the other hand, however, it is not obvious to everyone that CV in the present system has anything to do with aircraft carriers, or DL with frigates. At any rate, with the rapidly changing U. S. Navy, of today—and the future as well, now is the time for an overhaul of the ship classification system
The Royal Netherlands Navy in the Caribbean
By Lieutenant Frans P.H.M. Koch, Royal Netherlands Navy, Naval Air Squadron One
Verification of the permanent stationing of the Royal Netherlands Navy in the Caribbean up to the present day is, apart from historic grounds, to be found in the constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Netherlands Surinam, and the Netherlands Antilles) and is laid down in the “Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands.” This Charter was affirmed by Her Majesty Queen Juliana of the Netherlands on 15 December 1954 during a ceremony held in the Ridderzaal in The Hague and was promulgated on 29 December 1954. It is an unusual agreement and is the result of spontaneous and mutual cooperation within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The three countries harbor close kinship with the Dutch Royal House, they share mutual legal convictions, and thus, they are in accord that such a Constitution can best serve the ideals and material interests of their peoples. It is in the third Article of the Charter that we find the basis for the presence of contingents of the Dutch Armed Forces in Surinam and in the Netherlands Antilles.
This Professional Note defines the maintaining of the independence and the defense of the Kingdom as a whole, as being a Kingdom affair. For this purpose, units of the Royal Netherlands Army, the so-called "Troops in Surinam” (TRIS) are based in Surinam, while the same line was taken with units of the Royal Netherlands Navy in the Netherlands Antilles.
Surinam is situated in the northern part of the South American Continent, squeezed in between Guyana (the onetime British Guiana) and French Guiana. The country has an extensive southerly border which loses itself in a vast, barely accessible expanse of jungle. The westerly and easterly frontiers are generally well-marked country borders which are formed by the Courantyne and Maroni rivers. To the north, the country is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean.
The Royal Netherlands Army has the primary task of safeguarding these borders, but, if necessary, reinforcements from the Navy and the Marine Corps, stationed in the Netherlands Antilles, may be used.
In contrast with Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles consist of a number of islands, a part of the group known as the lesser Antilles, spread out over the Caribbean, which, with the exception of St. Maarten, have no borders with other countries. The territory is made up of the islands of Curaçao, Aruba, and Bonaire, situated near the northern entrance to Venezuela’s Lake Maracaibo, and the Leeward Islands of St. Maarten, St. Eustatius, and Saba, which are situated approximately 150 miles east of Puerto Rico. The separation of these islands, by long stretches of open sea, has made maritime safeguarding necessary, and this is the task of the Royal Netherlands Navy.
The international-political factors determining the safety of the Netherlands Antilles are formed by the general relations within the Caribbean and their strategic significance. This is partly dominated by the strategic importance of the area to the United States. Because of recent Soviet activities in the Caribbean, the security situation in the area, which also effects [sic] the Netherlands Antilles, must be considered fundamentally unstable.
The strategic significance of the Netherlands Antilles in the Caribbean is determined by the geographical position of two islands, Curaçao and Aruba. These islands are situated outside the area of the Caribbean hurricanes. Moreover, some very important shipping lanes run via or very close to these islands. The shipping traffic on these routes has increased enormously during the last few decades, especially after the opening of the Panama Canal, and after vast quantities of oil had been found in Venezuela. Curaçao and Aruba are important bunker ports along these tracklines. Bunkering is reasonably cheap because of the relatively low levies and very large oil refineries on these islands.
Curaçao has an excellent, natural harbor, having modern quays with the capacity to supply bunker fuel for large tankers and even the largest freighters passenger vessels. It also has a well-equipped dockyard, capable of handling large ships in its drydock.
The Royal Netherlands Navy’s resources for its security task in the Netherlands Antilles area—and possibly the entire Caribbean—seems sufficient at present, but should the situation arise, reinforcements will be available on short notice.
In peacetime, the most important units of the Royal Netherlands Navy in the Caribbean are stationed on Curaçao and Aruba, and includes one destroyer of the Friesland class, one air squadron of the Netherlands Naval Air Service, and the Marine Forces, Netherlands Antilles.
Willemstad, on Curaçao, is the destroyer’s homeport, and is under the operational command of the Flag Officer, Netherlands Antilles. She routinely takes part in exercises with other units of the Royal Netherlands Navy as well as with units of the U. S. and British navies. The vessel also makes “show the flag” trips to other countries and islands in the Caribbean.
Naval Air Squadron One of the Netherlands Naval Air Service, based at the Dr. Albert Plesman Airport on Curaçao, has ASW aircraft of the S2N type and UH-1 helicopters. One of the squadron’s tasks is the transition pilot’s training of student pilots who have completed their initial training in Holland. The squadron is also available for operational flights on behalf of the Flag Officer, Netherlands Antilles, and for search and rescue (SAR) duties.
Cooperation with the Rescue Coordination Center of the U. S. Coast Guard at San Juan, Puerto Rico, is very close, since the SAR actions are mainly executed in the sea area within the Curaçao Flight Information Region, a part of the San Juan Rescue Sector, Antilles Area.
Apart from national maritime exercises in the Antillean waters, Naval Air Squadron One takes part in the annual U. S. Navy “Springboard” exercise in Puerto Rican waters. During this exercise, a number of aircraft of Squadron One operate from the U. S. Naval Station at Roosevelt Roads.
The Marine Forces, Netherlands Antilles, consist of units of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps. They are stationed in two Marine Barracks—Suffisant on Curaçao, and Savaneta on Aruba. The Marines in these barracks may be formed into QPO contingents on short notice (QPO stands for Qua Patet Orbis, meaning “Throughout the World,” which is the motto of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps). These contingents consist of an infantry company and supporting units.
To maintain their state of readiness, the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps holds combined exercises with the U. S. Navy’s Amphibious Force and the U. S. Marine Corps. During one such exercise, Doria Salute, U. S. and Dutch Marines hold realistic landings on the beaches of St. Eustatius, one of the Leeward Islands of the Netherlands Antilles. The name of the exercise was chosen because, on 16 November 1776, four months after the American independence, a salute was fired by Fort Oranje on St. Eustatius in reply to a salute fired by the American ship Andrew Doria, flying the flag of the new American Republic. The Netherlands was thus the first country to recognize the sovereignty of America.
Since 1963, Antillian conscripts have been trained by the Marine Forces, Netherlands Antilles. After their initial training of about six months, these Antillian Marines are assigned to Marine units and are detailed to guard duties.
Still another activity in which the Royal Netherlands Navy takes part is that of the Cooperative Investigation of the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions (CICAR). In 1970, the Netherlands was one of nine countries initially taking part in this extensive oceanographic survey. The others were the United States. Great Britain, Russia, Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Venezuela, and Jamaica. Data are being collected and research is being made in subjects such as geophysics, geology, sedimentology, seismology, marine biology, physical and chemical oceanography, bathymetry, fishery, and meteorology. Two to six scientists are on board survey ships of the Royal Netherlands Navy, as a part of the project.
The Royal Netherlands Navy and Marine Corps have had, since 1954, a permanent force in the Caribbean area and in the Netherlands Antilles. Up until now, little has been known about the presence or purpose of these units. It probably can be summed up best by a portion of the Charter which commits the three member states, collectively and equally, “. . . to the safeguarding and support of certain general principles common to the Kingdom in its entirety.”
The Dilemma of the Junior Officer
By Commander Arthur M. Osborne, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Bradley (DE-1041)
The junior officer in the U. S. Navy today, along with his contemporaries in the other Services, is one of the most sought-after young men in the nation. He is college-educated, he has lived in a controlled environment where discipline is the way of life, and he has reached a maturity beyond his three years out of college. In addition, he has completed his military obligation. What more, then, could a prospective employer desire?
What is the background of this young man who is so much in demand? In the first place, he is the product (or victim, depending on your position) of a wartime atmosphere during a declared peace. Although at the present time there is no enemy threatening our shores, he has been trained to fight when the nation’s security and that of the Free World is threatened by the specter of nuclear holocaust or, at the other extreme, the slow encroachment of “Wars of Liberation.” In any case, he is serving during a period when national policies are the subject of a wide range of public feelings and which, in fact, change rather dramatically and without much warning or apparent reason.
There is very little doubt as to why the majority of our junior officers are in uniform. The reserve officer simply applied for a program that seemed more in keeping with his station in life as a college graduate and one that offered excitement and intrigue (usually called foreign travel in the recruiting posters). At the same time, by joining the Navy, he could provide himself adequate insurance against any future requirement for a foxhole in the mud. The old cliché of “Three squares and a dry sack,” no doubt also had a place in the original decisions. It is also likely that a substantial number of our regular officers, below the rank of lieutenant, are in the Navy today as a direct result of draft pressure.
Extensive studies have produced long lists of oft-quoted reasons, for not choosing a naval career, on the part of the young man completing his minimum Service requirements. Family separation, inadequate pay, seemingly unendurable command relationships, and many others. The unendurable command relationships situation is usually a “personality conflict” which results in the junior officer thinking unkind thoughts about the senior officer and the senior officer writing the report on the junior officer. Although some of these reasons are sincere, others are merely rationalization to conceal the real reasons. Quite often, these reasons are least known to the individual himself.
The basic fact is that the young men in question are in high demand. Officer retention (a nasty word which should be replaced) even among regular officers, faces serious competition. The ability to inspire the Reserve officer to completely change his previous life’s ambition and make the Navy a career is indeed incredible. At present, the number of surface-designated Reserve officers, who augment into the regular Navy and are still on active duty at the end of ten years’ commissioned service, is between 6 and 7%. Although this percentage appears low, these ex-Reserve officers still represent some 38% of the total surface officers in their year group. For comparison, about 45% of the officers still represent some 38% of the total surface officers in their year group. For comparison, about 45% of the officers initially commissioned as regulars are still on active duty after ten years, and they are slightly over 60% of the career surface force.
Any program that is conceived to inspire officers to become career officers must be centered around their commanding officers. He is the one individual who competes with the employment agencies and with the attractive job opportunities, the high salaries, and the unbelievable fringe benefits available in 'he civilian world. His policies can make or break the program.
Apparently, we must achieve a higher degree of patriotism and esprit de corps to inspire the young man to seek a life of dedication in our present junior officers. Such an implication is simply not true. The junior officers are ready, willing, and able to accept any degree of responsibility that we are willing to give them. They can and do respond with remarkable professionalism. But they will also reject a life that does not appear to provide that feeling of responsibility. The Navy must continue to provide the challenge a responsibility that is inherent in life at sea. But we must add at least one more factor to the other well-known and accepted incentives toward a naval career. Whether we believe it or not, enjoyment is the most often ignored factor.
Every man retains a shred of his pleasure-loving youth. Indeed, most men feel they are at least ten years younger than they actually are. We can and must capitalize on this trait. If we do not, there is a host of recruiters from business and industry who will.
The finger then points back to the one individual in a junior officer’s experience who can provide this factor of enjoyment. No doubt many (indeed most) naval officers will scoff and say that work is work and the pleasure belongs in the mess after duties are completed. The fact remains that duties can be enjoyable. If one does not actually enjoy going to sea, then it obviously would not be pleasure, and therefore he would be well advised to choose another life’s-work. But the tendency that we must guard against is making life so dreary and so overburdened with paperwork, watches, journals, and tempo of operations, that no end is in sight.
What has happened during the past few years to spoil the fun of going to sea? Many factors are involved, but there are two which appear to stand out as the most conspicuous. The first is paperwork and the other is tempo of operations. The two cannot be completely divorced, because not only does tempo of operations increase the paperwork, but it also consumes time normally available for required reports and correspondence. These two specters also have a devastating effect on the commanding officer. One commanding officer of a destroyer reported that during one month, 360 pieces of paper crossed his desk requiring his action or his signature or at least his initial. Now it is axiomatic that no commanding officer is going to sign his name to or release any correspondence that does not meet his own professional standards. These standards were developed over 12 to 18 years’ experience both at sea and on staff duty. On the other hand, the same correspondence presents no end of challenge to the young ensign who must write to meet these standards. Good professional experience, yes. But when 360 opportunities for professional experience are divided among ten to 14 officers every month, this alone can provide the most awe-inspiring challenge imaginable.
Tempo of operations is another problem that is normally not controllable within the command. However, the approach to the operating schedule is very much subject to command influence. By far the most inspiring event that can happen to a warship is to go into action. Enthusiasm and unit spirit come forth in abundance. Effectiveness, however, is a direct result of the degree of effectiveness achieved during training when the added impetus of “shooting and being shot at” is not present. As Sir Winston Churchill said “Nothing is so exhilarating as being shot at with no effect!” The commanding officer who can provide the feeling of participation and preparation for joining against the enemy during exercises will find the results most rewarding. This is one of the ways in which pleasure and reward can include the junior officer.
There are many ways that we can compete for the young men we need to continue on to be the leaders of tomorrow. The competition is great. But the competition from industry and the remainder of the great civilian world must be met almost single-handedly by the commanding officer. How he meets this challenge, and whether or not he succeeds will depend on his own past experiences and abilities. The single most important factor, however, is his personality. He can lead, inspire, demand respect, or any of numerous accepted methods and, most likely, a combination of them all. But he would be well advised to give considerable thought and attention to the most often neglected factor—is it enjoyable for the junior officer to serve in his ship?