“A United States Navy for the Future"
(See R. H. Smith, p. 18-25. March 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Herbert Pendergast—It was heartening to read Captain Smith’s essay in the PROCEEDINGS. The PROCEEDINGS has never shrunk from controversy. The Smith article, however, indicates that you have gone further than ever before in the publication of healthy dissent to established Navy policy.
Phillip Quarre—Please advise if Captain Robert H. Smith and Commander Stuart D. Landersman are in the same Navy. If negative, identify the “other” Navy with the DE-1052 class ships. Bewildered.
Commander P. C. Collins, U. S. Navy—In order to understand the dilemma of today’s U. S. Navy and its reactive stance vis-à-vis the Soviet submarine and surface forces, one must study the strategic truths which have molded great power military development over the past 30 years. As Captain Smith rightfully points out, carrier power emerged as the dominant force in World War II. The United States was unmistakably superior in this area of naval warfare. The CVA represented the ever-moving base from which the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) commitments of the U. S. worldwide strategic bomber force would keep the peace. Later, when deprived of the big nightstick which our nuclear uniqueness had afforded and having subsequently applied this new scientific discipline to propulsion, we moved to the extraordinary marriage of missilry and platform by producing the Polaris deterrent. To this point our supremacy of the seas went rightfully unchallenged. The Soviets found themselves hard put to react to this strategic and control of the sea superiority.
When the post-World War II alliance lines were drawn, Russia’s immediate concern was to achieve strategic parity. Its bomber and nuclear missile force afforded little comfort after our first Polaris began its patrol. Finally recognizing the importance of seapower, since the most creditable threat to its survival in an uncertain world resided Colossus-like in the sea, Russia began to develop seapower in earnest.
Captain Smith pays tribute to the Soviets, observing that “. . . the existence and varied capabilities incorporated in new types of ships, their imaginative liberation from stereotypes of the past, indicates a high order of professionalism and creativity . . . .” What past? In developing their navy, the Soviet Union, not unlike the Japanese merchant marine, could build from scratch, incorporating the finest in maritime technology without the restraint which comes with trying to be the world’s ocean policemen with its implicit requirement for omnipresence.
Having danced to the seapower tune which we have called for nearly three decades, the Soviets have finally reached a plateau of seapower in which we find ourselves forced to react. Our progress in expanding and updating our conventional Navy has been impeded by the fascination our national planners have entertained that the world rested under a Damoclean sword which was nuclear rather than conventional. Korea and Vietnam have hopefully shattered that preoccupation. However, it is not possible to change overnight the national defense philosophy of two decades. Captain Smith faults our intra-service competition for our budget share. Yet, if we have learned nothing from history except that it is preferable to fight wars on soil other than our own, as harsh as this may sound, it is obvious that we need balanced forces. In assessing whether or not the U. S. Navy has failed its commission to provide a first line of protection to our national interest and pax Americana, it is wise to consider that perhaps we have done our job too well, and created a threat to which the Soviets have reacted vigorously. Surrounded as the Soviets are by land buffers, they have no defensive tactical need for carrier or amphibious forces. Their development of a formidable sea presence has required attention only in the strategic and interdictive areas. And in an era where the world is crying for more consumer goods associated with the higher standard of living which we Americans have long served as a global showcase, military spending is subject to harsh scrutiny whether it be Soviet Union or the United States. With fewer options vying for the defense dollar, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union has been able to develop the variety and the quality of naval force which faces us now.
How has the Soviet Union met the threat which our Polaris boats and attack submarines represent? What is its ASW effectiveness? Has it come up with any radical new departures in technology which would lead us to believe that we have been exploring the wrong areas? From intelligence, it does not appear so. It appears that the Soviet Union may be substantially behind us in this area, thwarted as we are by an environment which refuses to yield its secrets easily.
Not unlike the albatross and the Ancient Mariner, the 1052-class destroyer escort has boded ill for the black shoe. It has represented to the surface officer what the TFX augured for the naval aviator. Pressed on the Navy in an either take-this-or-nothing gesture, its analogy with the ill-fated TFX is well drawn. Its lack of engineering redundancy was never to Navy liking. Its engineering plant unfortunately represents a classic stretching of the state of the art of which Captain Smith describes. The accusation that it is incapable of self defense is unfair. When equipped with light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS), basic point defense missile system (BPDMS), plus a surface-to-surface missile capability, it should perform in a far better manner than the role for which it was designed, viz, ocean escort. Speedwise, it was never designed to run with CVAs, but rather to escort open ocean convoys. The antisubmarine rocket (AsRoc) serves as the speed equalizer against high speed SSNs. Its successor, the new PF surface escort vessel will incorporate a Navy-dictated engineering plant which should rise above the engineering shortcomings of the 1052.
It is unfortunate that to most naval officers and perhaps to all civilians, the 963-class destroyer represents no more than an expensive bare bones creation which does not speak competitively to the Soviet surface navy threat. Examining the design concept of this newest acquisition, one sees a radical departure from conventional ship design. She represents a rare example of a total ship system designed by competitive contractors. She incorporates the latest in non-nuclear engineering design, but of even greater value, she comes down the ways with room for growth. For the first in a long time, we have designed a ship which can accommodate growth in her sensor and weapons systems. Our recent exciting experiments with major-caliber lightweight guns systems (MCLWGS) give promise of a conventional gun capability which should meet and surpass Soviet long range guns. Her planned passive and active sonar suites, plus the sensor extension and long range attack capability which LAMPS brings, gives us hope for her ASW capability. Her missile system will provide AAW protection: she appears to possess the old and primary virtues of “. . . speed and endurance, reliability and redundance, versatility, firepower, the reach of weapons . . .” which Captain Smith feels we have either “forgotten or slighted.”
Buried in his fine article is the observation that “. . . many naval officers shun Washington duty because of a far deeper aversion than simply a healthy preference for the sea over desk and papers.” I submit that it is much simpler to exclaim from far-off provinces that the king is stupid than it is to cry in the palace confines that the king is naked. I have run into very few officers in Washington who have not expressed a preference for sea duty, yet we come; and some do many repeat tours in this economically and ecologically unsatisfactory environment in order to serve the Navy and our country in this vital arena.
At least four recommendations round out this year’s prize winning essay: the need for inspired, brilliant leadership; the ability to see the obvious; better ship design; and the resurgence of the military mind. At the risk of being branded a toady, I submit that naval leadership has never excelled the present for inspired brilliance or daring initiative. The obvious will always be more obvious in hindsight than foresight, but admittedly there is always room for improvement in this area. I see an upsurge in ship design. The surface effects ship, air cushion vehicle, and hydrofoil all represent innovative and exciting new possibilities for achieving speed and versatility in our surface forces. It is necessary to think as military men. We cannot afford to compete with the civilians, who complement our Navy, by trying to emulate their logic. To do so is to waste long years of training and experience.
Disappointingly enough, Captain Smith’s article slights one very important ingredient in fleet readiness, i. e., training. This is the key to the here-and-now of Fleet readiness. It matters little how technically superior our vessels may be; if we have second rate operators, it is not unlike casting pearls before swine. The corollary to readiness which training represents is not an easily defined element. Training effectiveness encompasses morale, personnel stability, purpose, and conviction as well as intimate job familiarity. The basic responsibility for this aspect of readiness so often slighted, in the press of “meeting commitments” rests with the individual commanding officers.
In assessing military might, one must consider it in the light of a specific scenario, and in the final analysis, is not achieving it a matter of reacting? Germany reacted to the inferiority of her naval surface force following World War I by building and developing the U-boat and its strategy. The aircraft carrier was our answer to superior surface forces in World War II; the submarine-launched cruise missile was Russia’s answer to our CVA in post-World War II, just as their “Yankee” is a reaction to our Polaris. We are now reacting to their submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM). That we have not achieved parity in this field of naval warfare is clear; however, to say that we have neither recognized the threat nor are seeking ways to counter it belies the truth.
Captain P. F. ErkenBrack, U. S. Navy (Retired)—A real thought-challenger, not so much from its content as from the fantastic possibilities of ensuing discussion, the article is a beautifully written piece of over-simplification and over-statement. This is not to fault the author since, on a subject of such far reaching implication, some kindergarten black or white approach to positions is a necessary liberty if reasonable coverage is to be attained in relatively few words.
The members of the Board of Control demonstrated great courage and wisdom in the selection of this particular article for the 1971 prize. Its composition and substance aside, I would applaud a position that only such action could adequately spotlight a “straw man” to draw a much-needed pro or con discussion. If this aim is not now fully and honestly served, the Navy has exposed itself to damning criticism from the uninitiated where relatively radical positions have been taken and might be assumed, at face value, to have been condoned. Hopefully, then, Captain Smith is correct in his assertion that there do exist, within the Navy, military and civilians alike who know the answers and have the courage not only to present them, but to defend them as well.
It would appear to be our job to take advantage of the opportunity given us, both by the author and the Board of Control, to place this subject in proper context to the synergistic good of the country by finding the proper middle ground between charges of political or personal incompetence or misdirection on the one hand and the exercise of shouting alleged wrongs from the rooftop of the Pentagon on the other. The position for either of these extremes is untenable. Unless, however, there are those who will now come forward, it would seem foregone that both of these extreme trenches will be occupied where they have not heretofore been.
Lieutenant Commander David R. Cox, U. S. Navy, Executive Officer, USS W. S. Sims (DE-1059)—The charges made against the DE-1052-class escorts by Captain Smith in an otherwise outstanding article demand a rebuttal. Many of his specific complaints do not withstand a detailed examination. Captain Smith charges that:
The SQS-26CX sonar represents a vain attempt to gain increased detection ranges. Not so. In actual use, detection ranges achieved with this sonar have often exceeded expectations, in some cases defying explanation by correct prediction methods. With this sonar, long-range active detection has become a reality. And we are just beginning to learn how to use it to best advantage.
The SQS-26CX sonar has given up irrecoverable features of simpler, less costly sonars. This is just not true. The CX model of the AN/SQS-26 sonar can do anything the SQS-23 or 29 series can do. It performs as well in shallow water, and is superior to earlier sonars in target classification capability. We have even used this sonar effectively as an aid to low visibility navigation.
The very operation of this sonar is tactically self-defeating. While the use of any active sonar does reveal the presence of an ASW ship, the submarine does not necessarily know whether or not she has been detected. In regions of high ambient noise, such as crowded shipping lanes, active sonar is the only way to achieve reliable detection.
The engineering plant is unreliable. The engineering plant of the 1052-class is essentially the same as one-half of a DDG plant, a system with proven reliability. If anything, the 1052 plant incorporates enough minor improvements to make it even more reliable.
The single screw does not provide the speed necessary for ASW. Just how much speed is needed for ASW? In fact, the 1052-class maximum speed is within a few knots of that of a FRAM destroyer. Furthermore, it can make this speed with no increase in watchstanding requirements. In any event, maximum effective sonar speed is well below the maximum speed of any ship.
The single screw does not provide the redundancy that a worthy warship must possess. We would all feel more comfortable with more redundancy. But the need for redundancy in an ASW ship is questionable at best. It is unlikely that any destroyer would survive a torpedo hit in a main engineering space long enough to make the redundancy operationally useful while in a combat situation.
While on the subject of the limitations allegedly inherent in a single-screw ship, it is worth mentioning that the DE-1052-class escort is an extremely maneuverable ship even in close quarters. The large single screw and offset rudder of this class, coupled with the extremely quick engine response inherent in the 1,200-pound plant, results in a ship which is a sheer pleasure to handle. Her maneuverability is not exceeded by the twin-screw, twin-rudder FRAM I. The W. S. Sims for example, often backs into her assigned berth without the use of tugs. Control of the ship during this maneuver is as easy as riding a bicycle.
The single gun barrel shows that the ship is poorly equipped to perform the many general purpose missions traditionally performed by destroyer types. This is true only to a limited extent. The 5-inch/54 MK 42 MOD 9 gun is extremely versatile and reliable. In the hands of a well-trained and co-ordinated crew, the gun is even capable of firing night shore bombardment missions. It would, of course, be better to have two guns rather than one for this mission, and I would personally like to see another of these guns installed aft, but space, weight, and cost considerations preclude this.
The ship cannot defend herself, much less anything else. It is true that in its present configuration, the 1052-class is particularly vulnerable to attack from astern. There is, however, ample space on the fantail to install a point-defense missile system, and plans have been drawn up to place such an installation on at least some ships of this class. One of the missions contemplated for the light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) helicopter is antisurface missile defense. The installation of LAMPS, which is vitally important to the ASW mission, would thus also materially enhance the self-defense capability of the ship. Incidentally, the HH-2D helicopter which will be the vehicle for the interim LAMPS program, successfully landed over 100 times on board the W. S. Sims helicopter deck, including some night landings and some under adverse weather conditions.
The 1052-class escort can, if need be, perform all of the missions of the FRAM I destroyer, most of them at least as well, many of them much better, and with fewer men. But this is not a multipurpose ship. If a serious mistake is to be made with the Knox-class ocean escorts, it will be the attempt to use them as multipurpose destroyers.
The crux of Captain Smith’s argument is that a surface ship cannot perform the ASW role in the modern world, therefore the procurement of an entire class of ASW ships was a terrible mistake. He seems to imply that the ocean escort makes sense only in a World War II context, screening “. . . massed convoys slogging across the oceans.”
The truth is that the greatest potential contribution of the 1052-class to a modern maritime strategy is precisely in the field of strategic ASW. The realization of an operational long-range active detection capability now puts the surface ship back into the ASW picture. Working in conjunction with long-range passive detection devices and aircraft, the 1052-class escort can effectively sweep vast areas of the ocean for submarines. At the detection ranges involved, the submarine does not always know she has been detected. If she speeds up enough to escape the active sonar, she increases her vulnerability to detection by passive means. But to be effective, the ocean escort cannot operate alone. Aircraft support is vital to assist in tracking the contact, to assist in contact classification, and to deliver weapons at extreme ranges. Aircraft support could be provided by manned helicopters such as LAMPS operating from the helicopter deck. With relatively minor modifications the 1052-class can be equipped to support manned helicopters. I am also convinced that the 1052-class can operate effectively in conjunction with patrol (VP) aircraft.
The capabilities of aircraft and the Knox-class destroyer escorts are complementary. We have the physical capability right now to work in co-ordination to meet the strategic challenge of the Soviet submarine. We lack a true operational capability owing to deficiencies in doctrine and operational experience. If we take the submarine challenge seriously, as Captain Smith rightly insists that we must, then it is imperative that we devote the resources now in hand, including the 1052s, to a concerted effort in the area of ASW.
Lieutenant Bernard D. Cole, U. S. Navy—The apt comments of Captain Smith certainly cast a shadow on Commander Landersman’s comments about the USS Hepburn (DE-1055) in the same issue.
I have always believed one of the basic design requirements for a destroyer-type to be placement of the maximum firepower in the minimum size hull. The 1052-class is the antithesis of this requirement. Commander Landersman points out that the 1052-class is “. . . a foot longer than the Adams-class DDG.” Yet, the Adams-class DDG mounts two 5-inch/54-caliber guns, Tartar, six trainable antisubmarine torpedo tubes, and antisubmarine rockets (AsRoc), while the 1052-class mounts only one 5-inch/54-caliber gun, four antisubmarine torpedo tubes, and AsRoc. From amidships aft, the 1052-class is presently devoid of weapons. The ship size/fire power ratio of the 1052-class is incredibly high, and, when combined with the relative lack of speed characteristic of this class, raises serious doubts about the decision to build it.
Commander Landersman cites the cost of the Hepburn as “about $28.8 million,” but a more meaningful figure will be the cost of the ship after installation of her “potential:” a strengthened flight deck, variable depth sonar (VDS), stern torpedo tubes, and a Point Defense Missile System.
Now that the 1052-class has joined the Fleet, Commander Landersman’s closing phrase, “. . . we must learn to employ the new ships effectively,” is certainly appropriate, but can it be meaningfully fulfilled?
Lieutenant Commander Richard C. Davis, U. S. Navy—I believe your March 1971 issue is the most stimulating issue I have ever read. The articles by Captain Smith, Lieutenant Harris, and Lieutenant Commander O’Neil may be tied together as a penetrating analysis of the single greatest need of our Navy today: we need a modern Mahan to tell us what navies should be and do in the closing decades of the 20th century, and we need strong, honest, aggressive, capable leaders to implement the theories of such a Mahan.
There is no doubt that the vigorous, critical, honest leaders whom Captain Smith feels we need to redirect and reinvigorate the Navy, and to regain for it the respect of the administration, the Congress, and the American people, are the same broadly knowledgeable, intellectually stimulating, personally interesting officers whom Lieutenant Harris feels we need to give inspiration and vigorous leadership to our junior officers. That kind of leadership, bold, imaginative, not tied to outmoded theories of seapower derived from Mahan and the Pacific combats of World War II, is the kind of leadership that could develop the weapons we need now, such as the gun systems mentioned by Lieutenant Commander O’Neil for close-in defense against attacks by low-flying aircraft and submarine-launched tactical missiles, attacks of a kind which, today, our ships are appallingly unprepared to counter.
Using as credentials my graduation from destroyer school, service in two World War Il-vintage destroyers, and love for the traditional toughness, readiness, and “can do” spirit of the Navy’s destroyer force, I will state unequivocally my agreement with Captain Smith that the 1040, 1052, and 1078 classes of ocean escorts are the most poorly designed warships ever perpetrated upon the nation. I have never been able to understand why the Navy accepted these atrocious ships in the first place, and why, in view of the miserable performance of those built to date, the Navy has not cancelled the unbuilt ones.
As for the Spruance 963-class destroyer, from what I have learned about her, were I Admiral Spruance, I would turn over in my grave at the abortion that is to carry my name. The most notable defect of the 963 is her paucity of armament, her inability to destroy. The 963 is outgunned by the 931- and 945-class destroyers, and would be outrun, and outfought in a surface action with a modern Soviet destroyer.
Like the 1052, with her single-screw, unreliable boilers, multiple design deficiencies, deep draft, and delicate sonar dome which must be protected at all costs, the 963 will neither get underway nor make landings, without a pilot on board and tugs alongside, except in the most perfect conditions of dead calm, no current, and lots of room. Goodbye to the proud destroyerman’s tradition of smart shiphandling, and, incidentally, one of the real challenges and pleasures of being a naval officer afloat.
I have not seen all the tests and analyses that were run to prove the feasibility (un-naval jargon) of the 1052 and the 963. Speaking as a sea officer, one who will be required to take ships to sea and destroy the enemy, both the 1052 and the 963 appear to be markedly inferior in killing ability to the DDG (which herself is inferior in gunpower to the 2200 destroyers). I have often wondered why, instead of the 1052, and now the 963, we did not build more DDGs, incorporating into them lessons learned from those already afloat, in order to make newer ones simpler, more rugged, and, of equal importance, more reliable.
To those who say that more 1052s can be built than DDGs for a given amount of money, I ask of what use are more hulls if the unreliability of their propulsion plants and the weaknesses of their detection and weapons systems make it possible that they will not even be able to reach the battleground, and uncertain that they will be able to fight effectively if they are able to reach it? Would it not be far better to have fewer hulls, but know they will be there for a fight?
To those who say the 1052 is designed specifically for ASW, while DDGs are designed to be general purpose ships, I point to statements like that of Commander Landersman, in the same issue, that because of the retirement of our World War II destroyers, the 1052s will increasingly be used in a general purpose role. It is a role for which they were neither designed nor intended.
In surface combat against a DDG, the 1052 is as distinctly inferior, and will be as readily defeated, as she is inferior to, and will be defeated by, the modern nuclear attack submarine. In truth, the 1052, designed and built to fight submarines, is inferior in speed, cruising radius, reliability, detection capability, and weapon capability, to a modern, nuclear-powered submarine armed with tactical missiles. Surely this is the first time in history that a navy has set out to build a class of ships inferior to the ships it is specifically built to fight. It is not surprising that the Navy that could do such a thing is distrusted by the nation, which now suspects the Navy’s ability to protect it, as well as by the young men who serve in it, and who now suspect its honor and integrity.
Admiral Zumwalt says that no matter how sophisticated the Navy’s weapons are, they are useless without trained, motivated men to man them. There are two sides to that coin. The most highly trained and motivated sailor is not going to win battles if his weapons are inferior. Admiral Zumwalt’s statement assumes that the U. S. Navy’s weaponry is superior to that of the Russian Navy. That assumption appears to be questionable.
In our weapons systems, we are overspecializing and over-sophisticating ourselves out of business. In our strategic and tactical concepts, much of our reasoning appears as grounded prejudice and self-interest, instead of objective, impartial analyses.
For example: we will never again see the concentrated convoys of World War II, because a single submarine with nuclear tactical missiles can destroy them. We cannot let fast ships proceed independently, because nuclear submarines are faster. Indeed, there is considerable doubt that there will be any need for convoys at all in a nuclear war, which means there may not be any need for the 1052s we are spending so much money to build.
Tactically, in setting PGs to trail the Russian vessels which trail our aircraft carriers, we are tacitly admitting that our carriers, the “impregnable” fortresses around which our Fleets have been constructed, are unable to protect themselves against the smallest seagoing craft if those craft are missile-armed. What is more, the PGs do not have a missile to shoot at the Russians, anyway. Why don’t we put a DDG to trailing the Russians, both of her 5-inch/54-calibers trained and ready? If the reply is that this ties down too much power for a limited task, I would agree and say that it is a sad commentary on our weapons systems that it takes a DDG to match a missile boat. A better solution would be guns and surface-to-surface missiles on the carrier herself. After all, no one will be more interested in seeing the carrier survive than the men who are in her.
But the carrier’s role in nuclear warfare is questionable, and perhaps her protection in a nuclear war is not very important. After the ICBMs, the Polaris, and the Poseidons have been launched, there just will not be many targets remaining for carrier aircraft to hit. In addition, there will be no bases for the carriers to return to, and in a real surprise attack there is every possibility that carriers in port will be destroyed without firing a shot in anger, caught unaware on Sunday morning, or Christmas Eve. When Russia launches its surprise attack, it will make sure our carriers are in port, not at sea, as they were on 7 December 1941.
The Navy is in trouble. Improving habitability, pay, and personnel services does not get at the root of the problem. In the 1880s and 1890s, the Navy, within its own officer corps, largely untouched and unassisted by civilians, experienced a renaissance in strategic concepts and technology. What we desperately need now is a second renaissance. I sincerely hope we have enough Captain Smiths in the Navy to lead that renaissance. Our Navy is old, creaky, and antiquated as much in its thinking as in its ships. It has had things its own way for too long. It now faces a serious challenge from the Soviet Navy, a challenge that requires a better answer than just building new ships. The future of the United States depends on how capably that challenge is met. Meeting it successfully will require tough thinking, hard decisions, and a restructuring of Navy hardware. We had better get busy.
Richard H. Kohn, Assistant Professor of History, The City University of New York—As a military historian, I should like to commend Captain Smith for his forthright and perceptive judgments.
By civilianizing its role and allowing budgetary-political-foreign policy considerations to color its advice, the military has ruined its own credibility and robbed the nation of the value of its views. The purpose of the military is not to make policy or win acceptance of its ideas. It is to provide strictly military judgments on a wide variety of security problems. It is up to the civilian leadership to evaluate and then use this advice to decide policy. By lobbying and mitigating their advice with factors beyond the traditional military ken, officers invite suspicion and skepticism, not to mention outright disbelief.
The military should function like plumbers for a contractor (the civilian leadership). In outlining the options, costs, and implications of the plumbing, they must leave the wiring, walls, windows, and so forth to other experts. They should not try to mold the house for the plumbing, or second guess the other experts in giving their advice about the plumbing. Integrating and rationalizing all the advice is the contractor’s job.
One note of caution, however. If the military eschews politics and returns to this professional style, it must be prepared-even after all the warnings in public and private—to see the house severely damaged by fire, weather, termites, and the like, or even utterly destroyed. Without such discipline and will, the house may endure, but its architectural style will gradually turn Prussian.
Angelo Golan—If Captain Smith is going to knock the DEs, then start from the beginning, and that is the Bureau of Ships [sic] which approved every inch of the plans for the ships, and at the time submitted, the DE program was already five years late because of our esteemed short-sighted, numb-skulled Congressmen and Senators. Had this program gotten off the committee floors in time, a lot of changes could have been made and the original cost of $11 million would not have jumped to $17 million per vessel.
I worked for Todd Shipyard, the builders; I was the civilian engineer in charge of the fireroom on board the USS Hepburn (DE-1055), at San Pedro. I hold a first assistant license in the U. S. Merchant Marine. The Hepburn was fired up and handled with kid gloves for five months prior to her sea trials, and when she did go out on sea trials, she did everything expected of her as far as the power plant was concerned. In my opinion, she had the best running plant of any ship that I have been on, including the USS Bennington (CV-20), on board which I served as throttleman during World War II. I like boilers and this is why I know the Hepburn’s characteristics.
I go along with Captain Smith on one thing; “That it makes no sense to plan to build a ship, that even now, on paper (and the first of which is not to be delivered for years) is inferior to competitive Soviet ships which are already at sea.” This is true of the DE program; it was an early vessel built too late.
The crew of the Hepburn, though they were young and had never seen a vessel of this type, were eager and willing to learn, and after two sessions in the boiler room could meet any emergency. Each man appreciated being shown individually or in a group, and I take this opportunity to say that I am proud that the Hepburn was the first to go on active duty. I stated to Commander Landersman that he had a wonderful ship, and, if well taken care of, she would carry them any where in this world.
Captain Frank Lynch, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Smith makes a persuasive case for the evils of non-professionalism in the management of the Navy but he fails to define what he means by “professionalism.” However, he does state that the foundation must be tested by officers of “. . . independent judgment and stubborn confidence.”
Surely by this he does not seriously suggest that the management of the Navy should be by a class of officers characterized by “. . . independent judgment and stubborn confidence.” This would, in the end, produce nothing more than chaos and conflict and leave the direction of the Navy in the hands of non-professionals—a situation he argues against. The effectiveness of any organization, and particularly that of the military, lies in a corporate leadership fully-supported by a consensus (however it may be achieved).
“Navymen,” he asserts, “. . . are waiting for that sense of direction and movement so desperately needed . . . The cantankerous image of Admiral Rickover . . . is a hundred-fold virtue. We need more such voices now . . . .” In spite of the almost miraculous things he has accomplished, the thought of two, let alone many, Admiral Rickovers in the Navy staggers the imagination. Indeed, there must be a better way to manage the Navy than to have an Admiral Rickover supporting the interests of each segment which must be welded into a harmonious whole.
A better way would be through the development of a truly professional class of naval officers; a class which would have the knowledge, the skill, and the ethics to manage the Navy as a rational instrument of national policy. The Navy, as well as the other military Services, must rid itself of the image of advocacy for its own growth, of hucksterism for more and more weapons.
Professionalism in the military should be such that professional opinion would be respected on how to make better use of ships, guns, and planes in the national interest rather than how the national interest demands more of each. Naval professionalism is not attained by graduating from the Naval Academy, an assignment to a staff, or even by qualification for command. It is marked by a body of knowledge which is unique to it, by a skill which breeds foresight, and by a set of ethics which serves to husband the use of violence for truly useful ends.
Naval professionalism must be defined, its ethics established, and its standards of excellence well developed. This should not be done by administrative edict from political sources; it must be the expression and the responsibility of the profession itself acting through its professional society. The U. S. Naval Institute is the professional society of the naval profession, and it should dedicate itself to the same ends as do other professional societies such as those in the field of law, medicine, engineering, and architecture.
The British experience with military professionalism during the period 1905 to 1918 is an excellent illustration of the problems inherent in today’s military establishment. A feeling for the British problem can be found in Winston Churchill’s description of the Royal Navy in 1911 (World’s Crisis, Vol. I):
We had competent administrators, brilliant experts of every description, unequalled navigators, good disciplinarians, fine sea officers, brave and devoted hearts; but at the outset of the conflict we had more captains of ships than captains of war. In this will be found the explanation of many untoward events. At least 15 years of consistent policy were required to give the Royal Navy that widely extended outlook on war problems and of war situations without which seamanship, gunnery, instrumentalisms of every kind, devotion of the highest order, could not achieve their due reward.
A professional naval man is a “Captain of War.” What qualifies him for this command?
Chief Boatswain Charles W. Bond, U. S. Naval Reserve-R, Naval Architect and Marine Consultant—Captain Smith has said some things which have needed saying in the open for a long time; I salute him for saying them, and the Proceedings for selecting and presenting his essay. Captain Smith has reaffirmed my faith in the moral integrity which we have been led to feel was the fundamental quality of a good officer.
Command is one’s highest duty, and incumbent upon all persons, irrespective of grade or rank. Therefore, we cannot feel that it is in any way improper to point to areas which harbor problems, or present views which may be unpopular if they have some relevance to the improvement and well-being of the country and the Navy. Not every man is a Hyman Rickover, but Hyman Rickover may not always be right, either, when it comes to that. Whether a person is infallibly right or not, is not the important consideration. It is more meaningful that he speak out, and participate in the betterment of the Navy.
We have seen much discussion in the PROCEEDINGS, and elsewhere, devoted to enhancement of the Navy petty officer’s position, retention by increasing ship habitability, most of which is off the mark. Prestige of any man or officer in any command is maintained by himself alone, and pastel paint jobs in the mess, two-button coats for petty officers, sideburns, or any other sort of diverse attractions are not going to be a substitute for self-respect, and I mean basic self-assurance that a man is doing his moral best. Only then can he be really respected by others as a human being. Military respect and deference to superiors is a vital and basic ingredient amongst men joined together in a fighting organization, yet we all know cases where people have deferred making decisions which would be “unpopular,” when it would have been better in the long run to make them and retain respect and authority, and let the “unpopular” part solve itself, which is what it usually does anyway.
Yet the “career” syndrome has resulted in many otherwise fine men shrugging off authority and responsibility on the theory that they were saving “points” on their fitness reports. Interestingly, no Chief of Naval Operations is remembered as being a shrinker from the tough decisions along his career. In like manner, no man can refrain from speaking out when a vital issue is involved; and the continuing betterment of our Navy is certainly a vital matter.
As Captain Smith observes, such people are not usually very popular, and if usually wrong, even if well-meaning, are a positive pain in the neck. But their duty to speak out is always clear. Naturally, it is also their duty to be sure of the facts before raising a ruckus.
There are many things wrong in the Navy today, some of them the same sort of things which are wrong in the country and the world, but some of these matters are the sort which can be addressed by those people who, by their reluctance to “get involved,” become part of the problem themselves. Many people regard uniformed members of the defense establishment as people who have “copped-out” of the American society, and are hiding from the burdens of a civilian life by riding the benevolence of their respective services. We know that this picture is quite false today, but unless we contribute by real concern and participation in the advancement and improvement of our Navy, it becomes relevant.
Frederick C. Dyer—Captain Smith is too hard on himself and other naval officers. He is right to be hard on the fact of “. . . the unready Fleet of today. . .”
But he is too hard in his judgment that the fault lies in “. . . failure to do our jobs as naval officers . . . decades of mismanagement and inefficiency . . . leadership that has been thin on naval professionalism, weak in imagination, and slow to perceive vital, new emerging strategic and tactical truths.”
Perhaps one can imagine that if naval officers during the past 20 years had really done their jobs, they would have convinced the public, the Congress, and the other executive branches of the proper use and mix of seapower. But such was not possible, and therefore Captain Smith takes too much blame on himself and his predecessors.
During that period the Navy was not working in a vacuum. The Air Force (with more people and a bigger budget) and the Army (at least equal in clout to the Navy) were also addressing the public, the Congress, and the other executive branches. I suspect that a third of the work of each Service was generated by the need to offset, not an overseas enemy, but the other two Services. Once, after a presentation on planning for air warfare of the future, I overheard an officer remark: “Why, these programs are directed toward shooting down our own planes, not those of the Communist aggressors.”
But the impossible is now becoming possible: consciousness of the importance of seapower is percolating to the top. For instance, Ronald L. Tammen (a consultant on military spending for a group of Senators and Representatives) in an article titled “Wolf at the Pentagon Door” in The New Republic, 20 March 1971, states: “Gradually, liberals and conservatives alike are reaching toward some sort of tacit understanding that the nation’s deterrent is most effective when moved to sea.”
That such a conclusion has been so gradually arrived at has been due to many forces, most of which have been absolutely beyond the power of even the most “super-officers” to counter.
Captain Smith does well to warn the Navy and others who might listen that finally recognizing the importance of seapower is not enough: one must also make the decisions to allow the Navy to concentrate on its mission to build seapower forces and not to have to spend so much time and brains in the juggling of bureaucratic priorities.
Commander John A. Henry, U. S. Navy—I was encouraged by the beginning of Captain Smith’s essay. He was going to tell us, what was wrong with our Navy, to set the stage for telling us what we should do to right ourselves. But, I finished the essay somewhat disappointed.
In short, the corrective measures he expounded are the same as those talked daily among naval officers. They are general, rather than specific. And phrased in such general terms, they sound old, not new. He courageously condemned the insufficiency of the new ASW destroyers, but like so many of the dissidents of our day, he failed to offer a viable alternative. What we really need, as Captain Smith strongly suggests but never gets around to treating, are some fresh, new specifics—specific actions to give us the Navy “. . . this nation should have.”
Toward the end of his essay, he did give us a glimmer of positivism, when he told of the necessity for a new leadership, for pragmatic thinking and programming, for trying new systems before buying them in production quantities. As noble as the sentiment “. . . inspired and brilliant leadership . . .” is, it is a quality I have heard about ever since my earliest midshipman days. It is a quality which has been, and probably will forever be held in highest regard. What is needed, to give meaningful action to these words, is the establishment of a Navy-wide climate which encourages responsible creative expression. Admiral Zumwalt has done much to establish this climate, and with permeation of his practices down through the ranks, perhaps its realization is not far off.
Captain Smith says that we need those people who will, in effect, deny themselves and strike out for the common good. This has been said before, and the very fact that he has to say it again is testimony to the fact that saying it, alone, is inadequate. Again, the natural human aspiration to climb up the ladder of success is a tough obstacle to the exercise of “independent judgment,” especially when we see those who are “painful to have about” so often fall off the ladder, their careers impaled on the sword of their “independent judgment and stubborn confidence.”
The message is clear that the climate for creative ideas can stand improvement, for only in this way can we get our best minds steaming full speed ahead. The alternative climate, one requiring a fellow to stay on constant guard lest he step on a sacred toe, would doom us to wallow in mediocrity, in half-solutions, indeed in relative deterioration.
Credit Captain Smith with a hand in pioneering the way down the difficult path toward a more creative climate. The message of his essay is: we must gear our Navy hardware for the massive challenges that beset us now and over the years ahead; we must do it with the objective ever in mind of achieving the greatest overall good for our country; our arguments must be honest and credible as well as convincing; and our Navy leaders must take the lead, as Admiral Zumwalt is doing, in providing a climate which encourages the imaginative thinking and expression so essential to the development of meaningful ship systems.
For daring to voice this psychology, we are indebted to Captain Smith. For the greater good, let us pursue our creative dreams, even if we must topple some old ways as we go. Now I offer a concept, and a recommended point of departure for positivism. Since our Navy exists for the protection of our seagoing commerce as well as for national defense, and since it must operate in the vast sea/undersea environment, I am convinced that for naval seapower to attain its potential, its development must be integrated with that of the other two arms of seapower—the arms of the merchant marine and the underseas, which together with naval seapower will form the Trident of Seapower.
The optimum development of our naval seapower will come to pass only if we take advantage of the fast-moving developments in the merchant and underseas areas. Our new breed of ASW ships, for example, could advance their effectiveness by better integrated use of underseas technology. The watchword, then, is the Trident of Seapower—naval, merchant, and underseas. Together, integrated, this trident can fulfill our best hopes for synergistic solutions to problems of the national defense and economy.
The future can be ours only if we provide viable seapower solutions, and we must get the scenarios and their solutions out into the open now. Tomorrow may be too late, with technology moving so fast and those of opposite political philosophy coming on so strong.
From the way his essay reads, I believe Captain Smith would welcome such solutions, given in terms of specific ship systems required, and I should think the PROCEEDINGS would want—indeed demand—to serve as the leading forum for a discussion so vital to the future of your country.
And thus to our Navymen, one and all, the challenge goes out: step up, tell us what course we must take, for never has the time been more right for all good seamen to come to the aid of their Service—and their country.
Lieutenant Commander Barry Tiernan, U. S. Navy—Captain Smith’s prize essay was very provocative and easily the best article you have published in a few months. I feel, however, that the captain treated operations analysis and wargaming unfairly.
Neither operations analysis nor wargaming can or should make decisions. They can only be used to quantify the variables or develop insight for the decision-maker, presumably a competent naval officer, in the hope that his decision will have less probability of being wrong. The responsibility for the decision rests, as it always has, with the decision-maker.
Operations analysis and wargaming are tools for the decision-maker, as such they possess no goodness or evil of their own, but only that with which they have been imbued by their use or abuse.
EDITOR’S NOTE: Additional evidence of the lively nature of the comment elicited by Captain Smith’s Essay may be found on the Secretary’s Notes page of this issue, wherein is recounted the substance of the spirited reaction of Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, U. S. Navy (Retired), who telephoned the Publisher to express his views on several aspects of the Essay, in particular, and of the PROCEEDINGS in general.
Pictorial—“R/V Hero, Assignment Antarctic”
(See W. R. Curtsinger, pp. 56-68, February 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
William J. English—Mr. Curtsinger is to be congratulated on the fine pictorial on the R/V Hero. It is unfortunate, however, that the text failed to mention that the Hero is crewed, operated, and supplied by Marine Acoustical Services, Inc., of Miami, Florida, under contract to the National Science Foundation (NSF). This important fact in no way detracts from the role and excellent performance of both the NSF and the U. S. Navy relative to operations of the Hero.
Pictorial—“The Odd Ones”
(See pp. 71-81, September 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
William Arthur Dupee—I was stationed at the Naval Air Station, New York, Floyd Bennett Field, during World War II in a seaplane squadron. There was based there for several days, or perhaps even weeks, an experimental R4D on twin floats. They were experimenting with both unassisted take-offs and jet-assisted take-off (JATO). I tried to engineer a ride on it, but perhaps it was just as well I was not successful, as it eventually turned turtle and sank. I assume the project was designed to bring supplies into outposts which did not yet have landing strips. It was supposed to be a secret project, but it was pretty difficult to keep secret an R4D out in the middle of Jamaica Bay.
Lieutenant Commander William E. Eaton. U. S. Naval Reserve—What? No pictures of autogyros?
Lieutenant Commander John R. Shackleton, U. S. Naval Reserve—For what it is worth, I am enclosing a photograph of some real “Odd Ones,” the trapeze aircraft of the airships USS Akron and USS Macon; aircraft that could be launched and recovered without ever having to return to earth.
Ward A. Newschwander, CIBA Pharmaceutical Company—A possible addition to the album of aircraft oddities is this sawed-off, pusher-type fighter (circa 1944)[.]
EDITOR’S NOTE: A check of local sources indicates this to be the Kyushu J7W Shinden (Magnificent Lightning), the only aircraft of canard configuration to be ordered into quantity production during World War II. This Japanese Navy interceptor was powered by a 2,130-h.p. engine installed behind the cockpit and driving a six-blade pusher propeller. Four 30-mm. cannons were mounted in the nose. The first of only a few test flights occurred in August 1945, and only one other prototype was completed by the end of the war. The lower photo is that of an American look-alike, the Curtiss P-55 “Ascender,” of approximately the same period.
Lieutenant Commander Douglas G. Andreoli, Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve (Retired)—A most important airplane has been omitted, namely the Vought XF5U-1 and its flying scale model predecessor, the V-173.
EDITOR’S NOTE: Omission corrected, herewith.
Lieutenant Colonel Guy R. Claybourn, Jr., U. S. Army (Retired)—The illustration of a Lockheed (actually a Detroit-Lockheed) on the bottom of page 74 is that of a U. S. Army Detroit-Lockheed Y1C-23 (DL-2, metal, powered by a Pratt and Whitney) assigned as a personal command plane of F. Trubee Davison, Assistant Secretary of War and was flown by Captain Ira C. Eaker.
The caption to your illustration is not, however, incorrect because the U. S. Navy did acquire a (Detroit-) Lockheed Altair (DL-2A), which was designated XRO-1. This new metal Altair was acquired largely at the instigation of Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Aeronautics David S. Ingalls. It was the first U. S. Navy aircraft with retractable landing gear and its first low-wing monoplane with the exception of imported Junkers float planes and a racer.
The XRO-1, coming later than the Y1C-23, had a 625-645-h.p. Wright Cyclone, while the latter was powered by 450-h.p. Pratt and Whitney Wasp (C). The XRO-1 rudder had vertical red, white, and blue stripes and the Army’s Y1C-23 had a vertical blue stripe at the leading edge of the rudder with alternating red and white stripes toward the trailing edge—as in the illustration you published. I think the “star plate,” shown on page 74, is Department of the Army (War Department in those days) and not Department of the Navy.
The authority for the foregoing—less the star plate speculation—may be found in Chapter XIV and Supplement “A” of the Appendix of Revolution in the Sky by Richard Sanders Allen, Library of Congress card catalog number 63-20452.
“Piloting Techniques”
(See L E. Pellock, pp. 99-100, February 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander Lyle E. Pellock, U. S. Navy—There are four errors which need to be corrected:
On page 99, the last paragraph should read, “. . . in Figure 1 the observer ‘O’ (not θ) is located . . .”.
On page 100, the second sentence should read, “. . . be shown that while point 'O’ (not θ) moves around . . . .” On page 100, brackets should be inserted in the formula, to read:
On page 100, the table value of d/s for θ equals 5 should read “5.7150,” while θ equals 50 should read “0.4196.[”]
EDITOR’S NOTE: Our thanks to the author and other PROCEEDINGS’s readers who pointed out these typographical errors.
“Navy Medicine: A New Prescription”
(See P. A. Flynn, pp. 42-47, February 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander Richard F. Armknecht, Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Perhaps I have been fortunate, but the Navy doctors and dentists I have met since 1919 have seemed a singularly dedicated lot.
Now, 18 years past retirement, some trifling ailment or an occasional casualty gets me into the emergency room of a nearby naval hospital several times a year. The doctors there handle patients with considerable understanding of the human values involved, as well as with medical know-how.
I have never observed a hint of condescension, nor of impatience, although there was frequently a press of business. The fact that they were treating dependents or retirees, not active duty personnel, seemed not to occur to them.
As for dentists, consider this: It is Sunday afternoon. I feel something foreign in my mouth. It proves to be a piece of amalgam filling. The telephone watch at the dental dispensary says the duty officer is probably available, and will call back. Within an hour I have a new filling installed. Where but in the Navy could you get service like that?
Of course, many of these young doctors and dentists are only waiting until they can get into private practice (my Navy-dentist son-in-law did), but the way they handle their current assignments is not time-serving in the least.
I fully agree that more of them should be persuaded to make careers in the Service, and to do that we must make those careers as fulfilling as possible. One way may be to mention, from time to time, some of the satisfactions of our own careers, and, at least occasionally, to let them know that we know how well they are doing their jobs. Nor would it hurt to curb our impatience when we have to wait to be seen. Enough impatient patients can, quite naturally, produce an impatient doctor.
“The Silent Vote”
(See F. G. Dengler, pp. 34-37, February 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Commander D. D. Boerner, U. S. Navy—The following editorial, which appeared in the 14 February 1971 issue of The Virginian-Pilot in Norfolk, Virginia, reflects my feelings and so I pass it along for what it is worth:
The young naval officer, one of them writes in the February U. S. Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS “. . . has many thoughts of his own,” some of “. . . which go unasked because of the seniority of the men who have the answers . . . or because the would be inquisitor suspects that his question will (receive) a ‘stock’ answer, such as ‘The Commodore wants it that way.’ ”
So, after three or four years in the Fleet, the young officer takes off his uniform and enters a civilian pursuit.
The author doesn’t say what happens to our hero then, because he doesn’t know. But we know.
He keeps on developing thoughts, and he learns once again when not to frame them into questions, and this time he sweats it out, having nowhere else to turn and finally he becomes a Boss, and people under him tell people under them to do things thus-and-so because “The Boss wants it that way”—which is how the story would have ended had the young officer stuck with the Navy and become a commodore.
Lieutenant R. E. Fronczkowski, Supply Corps, U. S. Navy—There seems to be two schools of thought about leadership, the traditional and the modern. The traditional school holds that motivation is learned at the pointed end of a shoe. The modern school believes that the Navy must change to meet the demands of present-day American society. Contemporary motivational psychology studies indicate that people have social and psychological, as well as biological needs. The social and psychological needs are more subtle, and their importance grows with the intelligence and training of the individual. The professional is not motivated in the same manner as the unskilled. The true professional enjoys his work and demands respect for his expertise. The professional wants general guidance, responsibility, and the authority to carry out the responsibility. He wishes to know where he stands in the organization and where he is going.
Frederick L. Hetter, Counsel, Beneficial Military Retired Association—The vote of many career servicemen is not at all silent these days. Many men who gave 20 and more years to the Service are explicitly telling their sons not to consider a military career because the United States has gone back on at least two of its promises and agreements with career Servicemen.
When a man entered the Navy in 1938, for example, he had a right to expect on retirement that he would secure a retired pay; that his retired pay would be a given percentage of the salary of active duty personnel of similar rank or rate. When this man retired in 1968 after 30 years, the rules were changed: his retired pay is frozen at the 1968 level with small increases based on the rise of the standard of living. No longer is he paid a percentage of active duty pay.
A similar situation developed with the recent civilian reductions in force at many installations. How many members know that a 20-year military veteran is not a veteran for purposes of reduction in force in Federal Civil Service? He is a veteran when he hires on. He is not when there is a reduction in force.
The Veterans’ Act of 1944 provided that all veterans of military service, who served over six months would have certain rights, including, among others, the right to a five-point preference in hiring and a five-point preference against firing. This was the law until 1964.
The Dual Compensation Act of 1964 stipulated that any new employee with 20 years of military service did not have a preference against firing; he was classified for Civil Service purposes as a “nonveteran.” Thus, rights which every man in the Service from 1944 to 1964 had anticipated were stripped from him.
Lieutenant Commander Thomas B. Buell, U. S. Navy—The vulnerability of the Fleet confirms the author’s suspicions. Our guns have had only an incremental improvement during the past quarter- century, and it seems incredible that the very best we can put on the 7,000-ton Spruance-class (DD-963) destroyer are two lightweight guns of the same caliber and general characteristics of that developed 15 years ago. When the last FRAM destroyers are retired, gunfire support for the Marines will effectively disappear as well. The remaining guns will be futile in a surface engagement with a surface-to-surface, missile-equipped Russian surface ship.
We have regressed in the development of our surface-to-air missile (SAM) capability. The transition from the long-range Talos and Terrier to the very short-range Basic Point Defense Missile System (BPDMS) is not progress. We need a SAM system that can reach out and destroy the long-range, air-to-surface missile (ASM) threat that the Russians now possess. The BPDMS and medium-range Standard missile systems, the missile systems of the future, cannot do the job.
The commanding officers of our under-armed destroyer escorts (DE) and Spruance-class destroyers will wonder, as does the author, how they will protect themselves when the attack carrier (CVA) is not around. The DE commanders will be especially aware that their single-screw economy engineering plants can neither outrun the Russians nor keep up with the CVA. Not surprisingly, the young officers and enlisted men question their chances of survival.
John T. Gotjen—Lieutenant (j.g.) Dengler mentions the unreliability of the 5-inch/54-caliber gun. This weapon on my ship was rendered even more ineffectual because the command to fire had to pass from the commanding officer through five other people, receiving and reiterating the order, before the firing switch was closed.
The fresh breeze blowing in the Navy today offers hope that many obsolete practices may yet be set aside. Impartial wisdom must come to grips with witless concepts—and win—to keep us from the day when every PROCEEDINGS article comes under the heading of “The Old Navy.”
“Drug Abuse in the Navy”
(See J. A. Pursch, pp. 52-56, July 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Thomas T. Bellino, Medical Service Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve, Clinical Psychologist, Mental Health Clinic, Pearl Harbor—Dr. Pursch has offered a more compassionate, salvation approach, via “. . . a rational, factual, and above all, dispassionate, ‘cool’ approach . . .” by means of an educational program, “. . . using pamphlets, movies, lectures, and leadership type of counseling.”
The Navy encourages increasing responsibility with merit, and along these lines, I feel that we are probably overlooking, or at least underestimating, the leadership potential of leading petty officers, chief petty officers, division officers, and the like. These individuals have shown their leadership and influence ability through their ability to advance successfully in rate or rank. An approach of using these leaders in conjunction with Dr. Pursch’s second recommendation of “. . . probation for the ‘casual’ or ‘one time’ offender . . .” should be very seriously considered. This approach, as Dr. Pursch suggests, is “. . . rehabilitation oriented and based on the notion that anybody can make a mistake but that maladaptive life style will not be endorsed.”
Use of these on-the-job leaders, coupled with mental health guidance and consultation, can no doubt lead to a better understanding of the problems which are bothering today’s young people who are searching for identity, and hence, promote a potentially better integrated, reality-oriented individual, with a consequence being a more effective Navy.
If given this individualized attention, the potential drug user, the experimenter, and perhaps even the addict, will realize that we have not given up on him, and through a joint effort may find a better life with no need to escape either “from reality or to reality.”
“The Career Officer as Existential Hero”
(See D. G. Deininger, pp. 18-22, November 1970; and p. 91, April 1971 PROCEEDINGS)
Rex S. McCoy—Two things are apparent in Lieutenant (j.g.) Deininger’s article—first, it was written while he was in school (a sophomore, no doubt), and secondly, he has never seen at close range a mob of “activists” with their little sacks of rocks, their steel rods and wooden clubs, and four-letter intellectual quotations.
My son graduated from Ohio State in June 1970, and had the happy experience, not granted to the insulated inhabitants of the student editorialists at Annapolis, of having been reviled, spat upon, physically attacked, and kept prisoner in his classroom by these activists to whom Lieutenant (j.g.) Deininger feels spiritually akin. My son will be a more dedicated officer because of it.
My son and five others also felt “romantic and idealistic” enough to fight the mob for the U. S. flag . . . rescued it, too, while the police and the “existential heroes” stood by and watched.
God save us from an officer corps not dedicated to the “. . . burden of a top-heavy ideological banner . . .” as the author calls it. The enemy bears its banner with dedication and pride. The existential hero can never be a Stephen Decatur—Lieutenant (j.g.) Deininger need have no fears on that score—but neither is he capable of winning any battles.
Gene Giordano—I am a high school student, and I long for a commission and a career in the U. S. Navy, but my chances are not good because I wear glasses. Yet, I think I see some things better than Lieutenant Deininger. When he states, “Do not try to make us into Stephen Decaturs. . .” he seems to be saying that his generation, which is also mine, will not defend America’s honor unless we are convinced that the country is right. Just as I would defend my father, right or wrong, I would defend my country. You are not my spokesman, Lieutenant.
“The Fine Line at the Naval Academy”
(See J. Calvert, pp. 62-68, October 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Robert J. Clark, U. S. Naval Reserve-R—I have often pondered the fact that after a few short months of shipboard experience, it is virtually impossible to differentiate between a Naval Academy graduate and an NROTC or officer candidate school (OCS) graduate. Admiral Calvert’s article attempts to prove that there is indeed a difference, and that the reason is a sense of accountability. I firmly believe that our civilian colleges also produce a quality naval officer, who is vested with accountability, and in more-than-just-adequate amounts.
As a taxpayer and naval officer, I am interested in the direction of the Naval Academy. The Academy is necessary to ensure an input of high-caliber young men who are contemplating the Navy as their career. However, one immediately realizes that this one institution cannot be our only source of competent, career officers. A cursory glance at our ROTC and OCS graduates will show that some of these men are also of a superior quality and are, in some comparative instances, preferable to certain Naval Academy graduates, not all of whom are of superior quality.
The debate between professionalism and academics has been strained on too many occasions. The Naval Academy, rather than innovating new approaches, has merely reacted to sharp and justified criticism. Indeed the improved structure of the Naval Academy has closely followed our civilian colleges. Hazing and harassment, spit-shined shoes, and blind obedience certainly are not creative or conducive to a learning atmosphere. The emphasis today is on academics, thought, and insight.
For these reasons, the ROTC and OCS graduate has, in many cases, proven himself to be the more professional naval officer. He is not an automaton, but a thinker. His past experience comes from dealing with a diverse university community. He can easily adapt himself to changing situations, and he is a liberally-educated person who can easily communicate with people in a complex, working environment.
Is it really possible to develop a professional in any college—civilian or military? A true professional emerges with time and experience, the acquisition of knowledge, the development of a dedicated love for his work, and of course, with the development of his sense of accountability. These ingredients are embodied in the individual as he works in his chosen field. His professionalism cannot be a facade of false spirit and pride, but it must be real and have meaning. Therefore, I believe an ROTC or OCS graduate can be just as professional a Navy man and function just as effectively as his Naval Academy peers.
Along with our civilian colleges, the Naval Academy must, and will, continue to change to meet the needs of society and the Navy. There is no true formula for balance between Athens and Sparta. The proof of the test in any school is its ability to produce an educated person who can function efficiently, but more importantly, effectively, in this changing society. It is the responsibility of the Naval Academy to produce officers who can function in the military arm of our society. Let us not believe, however, that the Naval Academy provides a special key to success to each of its graduates. The responsibility and emphasis—the accountability—is on the individual,—not on his diploma.
“River Patrol Relearned”
(See S. A. Swarztrauber, pp. 120-157, May PROCEEDINGS, NAVAL REVIEW ISSUE ; and p. 83, December 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander Sayre A. Swarztrauber, U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Commander Canaday took issue with the opening quote in my essay:
Then, during Tet 1968, PBRs found themselves in fire fights at point blank range, defending villages and outposts on narrow waterways. They did so well that they have been on the narrow waterways ever since.
He very correctly pointed out that until October 1968, normal river patrol boat (PBR) patrol procedure was to operate on narrow waterways only during special operations. In fact, until Tet (January-February) 1968, PBRs seldom operated on narrow waterways.
Nevertheless, this statement must be defended as accurate. The narrow waterway combat experience during Tet demonstrated that the wide-river philosophy was denying PBRs a significant opportunity effectively to engage the enemy’s waterborne traffic.
Although no formal policy change was issued, during the spring and summer of 1968, narrow waterway operations became increasingly common under the “special operations” provision of the operation order. Most river sections became involved in “special operations” weekly or bi-weekly—frequently on waterways so narrow there was scarcely enough room to cast about. This was true in the Mekong Delta, the Rung Sat, and I CTZ. So, by October 1968, when Operation Sea Lords formally instituted narrow waterway operations as standard procedure, it was anything but novel for most PBR crews; but from then on, it was a matter of steady diet.