CRT was designed for those naval aviators and naval flight officers whose duties prevent them from flying regularly. Without CRT, or something like it, much individual aeronautical skill and incentive would wither and so, too, would the Navy’s operational readiness. But, is it worth what it costs?
Approximately 5,300 Navy and Marine Corps aviators and 1,100 naval flight officers (NFOs) participated in the CRT program in fiscal year 1967. They flew approximately 300,000 aircraft hours and 540,000 pilot and co-pilot hours in that year. Virtually all of this flying was accomplished in a wide variety of obsolete or obsolescent aircraft. For instance, it will come as no surprise to naval aviators that over 30 per cent of the flying was in the C-45, the venerable “Beech Bugsmasher,” which entered service in 1941—before many of today’s pilots were born.
The cost of the FY-1967 CRT program was approximately $95 million. Some $87 million were aircraft operating costs, an average of about $288 per flight hour. Since CRT aircraft were procured for some other purpose and were inherited cost-free, no aircraft investment costs are charged to the program.
Besides operating costs, there were those for the time the aviation officer was away from his primary duty assignment while engaging in proficiency flying, instructor costs for instrument and NATOPS checks, and the cost of CRT aircraft accidents.
Approximately 55 per cent of CRT flying was accomplished during normal duty hours. This time, plus flight preparation and travel time, amounted to about $3.9 million per year for the cost of primary duty time lost for proficiency flying.
The mandatory annual instrument and NATOPS checks required the services of some 26 instructors. Instructor costs, including pay and allowances, and the pro rata cost of their initial training, totaled about $2.6 million for the year.
The records of the Naval Safety Center, Norfolk, Virginia, indicate an average of approximately 7.4 major CRT accidents per year from all causes. At a mean total cost per accident of $173,000, CRT program accident costs are approximately $1.3 million per year.
Above and beyond those immeasurable benefits to the officer’s experience, maturity, and judgment, the CRT program was found to have five kinds of values which could be calculated statistically. By far the greatest of these is the program’s contribution to retention of aviation officers on voluntary active duty. Replies of active duty Navy and Marine Corps pilots who responded to the 1968 Combat Readiness Training personal attitude survey reveal that although there was considerable dissatisfaction—especially with the aircraft used—more than 1,100 officers (of a total of 14,384) occupying the grades from ensign through lieutenant commander said they would cut short their intended periods of voluntary active duty if the CRT program were abolished. Proportionate numbers of NFOs said they would similarly shorten their voluntary active duty. Not surprising is the indication that these losses primarily would be of officers with higher-than-average intelligence scores, education levels, and flying hours.
The additional annual training costs which would result from replacing those lost through these reduced retention rates would amount to approximately $244 million per year, or approximately $149 million more than the cost of the CRT program. Further, the study indicated that an improvement of the CRT program would result in an improvement in retention rates.
A second CRT program value noted was the reduction in refresher training time required by proficiency officers returning to operational units. Flying experience serves to reduce refresher flying time requirements to a degree dependent upon the amount of that experience, the recency of that experience, and the similarity of that experience to refresher training in terms of aircraft characteristics. During a normal CRT tour of 30 months, an overall average of approximately 15 per cent of the CRT training time value is carried forward into refresher training; the remainder is forgotten. If, however, CRT training is not conducted in the same aircraft that is used in refresher training, this training time value is reduced. For example, when different jet aircraft are used, the relative value to jet fighter refresher training is about 14 per cent, and for jet attack refresher training, about 20 per cent. If, however, the jet pilot receives his CRT in propeller aircraft, these relative values decline to approximately 5 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively. The same situation holds true between prop and helo models and classes although the relative values are somewhat different. This relationship between CRT and reduced refresher flying time per year indicates an annual saving of approximately $23 million. This value would be substantially higher if the aircraft now in the program were balanced with fleet pilot qualifications.
Figure 1 shows CRT flight hours available by aircraft type versus flight hours required. There is a wide disparity between the flight hour production of the CRT aircraft forces and the hours required by the CRT officer population. Parenthetically, jet pilots obtain only about one third of their CRT flying in jet aircraft, while helicopter pilots receive almost no time in helicopters. And, in the words of one lieutenant commander: “Much of an aviator’s ‘tiger blood’ is drained from him during CRT duty tours, and his fine, keen edge of aviation skill is dulled considerably . . . After an aviator has thought and flown at 3 miles per minute for two years in a forgiving aircraft, the transition to a ten or 12-mile-per-minute aircraft with narrow safety parameters can be quite startling and at times, extremely dangerous . . .”
Despite this failing, a third value of the CRT program is its contribution to general mobilization conditions. The refresher flying time saved for CRT personnel who would be reassigned to operational seat billets on M-day was converted to calendar lead time. If there were no CRT program, the active force seat billets would have to be increased by approximately 13 in order to produce equivalent force reaction time. Filling these additional billets would cost about $6 million per year.
A fourth value is the reduction in aviation voluntary groundings contributed by the CRT program. Statistically-derived relationships between the amount and recency of flying experience and voluntary groundings indicate that approximately 17 additional voluntary groundings would occur within the naval aviation officer population without the CRT program, resulting in an additional aviation officer training cost of about $8 million annually.
A final value of the program is aircraft accident avoidance. Extensive analysis of data obtained from the Naval Safety Center reveals that pilot error accident rates are strongly influenced by the amount and recency of flying experience.
Statistical analysis shows that approximately 2.4 additional refresher training accidents per year are avoided by proficiency flying training, for an estimated saving of almost $5 million per year.
It was shown by the study that the CRT program produces benefits to naval aviation of approximately $286 million annually, versus its cost of about $95 million—a value-to-cost ratio of about 3:1. (See Table 1).
The major area in which the program could be improved is in the aircraft inventory. A modernized CRT inventory balanced to pilot requirements by aircraft type would yield greater program values in terms of retention in service and refresher flying time saved. Also, since the operating costs of the present inventory are high, there is considerable margin for improvement in operating costs.
Cost |
|
Value |
|
---|---|---|---|
Aircraft Operating Costs |
$86.9 |
Aviation Officer Retention |
$243.8 |
Aviation Officer Time Away from Primary Duty Assignment |
3.9 |
Refresher Training |
23.3 |
Instructor Costs for Instrument |
2.6 |
Force Reaction Time |
6.0 |
CRT Accidents |
1.3 |
Voluntary Groundings |
8.1 |
|
|
Accidents |
4.8 |
|
$94.7 |
|
$286.0 |
Value to Cost Ratio 3:1 |
|
|
|
Before considering alternatives to the present CRT aircraft inventory, some discussion of the general characteristics of CRT aircraft is pertinent. In the first place, a weaponry and carrier qualification (CarQual) capability is not required in CRT aircraft inasmuch as neither skill is an objective of the CRT program. On the other hand, the aircraft should be capable of night operations, instrument operations, and in the case of jet aircraft, precision aerobatics. The aircraft should have performance in those flight regimes within the scope of CRT training which is roughly equivalent to operational aircraft of the same type. Thus, the pilot pacing of continuous control (flight path vector control) subtasks would be comparable to that of the operational aircraft in which he will later refresh. The discrete controls (engine start controls, landing gear controls, etc.) need not be closely patterned after operational models, since it has been found that the preponderance of flying skills are those involving continuous control rather than discrete control.
Provided performance is comparable, there is little, if any, advantage of heavier aircraft over lighter aircraft in terms of training situation difficulty. The difficulty contribution of an aircraft to a training situation is primarily determined by its performance, not by its size and weight. Were this not so, a large transport aircraft would be more difficult to fly than a much smaller jet fighter which, of course, is not necessarily the case. Finally, aircraft endurance should be such as to encompass average length CRT flights, or about three hours.
One alternative to the present CRT aircraft inventory is joint CRT-Naval Air Reserve (NAR) use of NAR equipment. This alternative seems attractive since operational type assets may be available for proficiency flying without additional investment costs. On analysis, however, this alternative was not considered to be feasible. NAR aircraft usage rates are almost as high as those of the active Navy. Any excess usage as may be available would support less than 10 per cent of CRT program requirements. Further, the disparity between the geographic location of NAR aircraft and CRT billets would involve a great deal of inefficient ground travel or aircraft ferry time.
Except for any future operational or contemporary training aircraft inventory fallout which may occur, the only other alternatives which are available to improve CRT aircraft involve buying new aircraft. If, on the one hand, operational models were procured, they would provide a great deal more value in terms of refresher flying time saved and officer retention-in-service than does the present program. However, costs would be relatively high as a result of high operating and investment costs. Not only would the initial investment be high, but also the investment amortization period (useful life) over which these aircraft could be used in the CRT program would be no greater than that of the operational inventory if operational inventory-CRT inventory model balance were maintained. If model balance were not maintained, much of the value accruing from operational aircraft would be lost. This alternative also has several other disadvantages. To gain full value from a CRT inventory composed of operational models, each CRT aviator would have to fly the model in which he would next serve an operational tour of duty. This would involve a high degree of career forecasting and would impose a difficult CRT inventory management problem to match model availability with CRT billets. In view of the above, a CRT aircraft inventory composed of operational models would not be advantageous from a cost and benefit standpoint.
A CRT aircraft inventory composed of newly bought light, high performance, trainer and utility type aircraft, is a third alternative. Since CRT aircraft inventory requirements are relatively low and since the characteristics of CRT aircraft are not so specialized as to require new development, the replacement aircraft could be purchased “off the shelf” from current production models. Considering a CRT inventory useful life of 15 years and historical usage rates, a CRT fleet composed of these aircraft could be procured and operated at less average annual cost than the annual operating costs alone of the present CRT inventory.
Cost |
|
Value |
|
---|---|---|---|
Aircraft Costs |
$39.3 |
Aviation Officer Retention* |
$243.8(+) |
Aviation Officer Time Away from Primary Duty Assignment |
6.2 |
Refresher Training |
35.0 |
Instructor Costs for Instrument |
2.6 |
Force Reaction Time |
5.5 |
CRT Accidents |
1.9 |
Voluntary Grounds |
7.7 |
|
|
Accidents |
5.3 |
|
$50.0 |
|
$297.3(+) |
Value to Cost Ratio 6:1 |
|||
* It is not possible to calculate a retention value of the improved program, although indications are that additional values would accrue. The retention value of the improved program, therefore, is taken as the same as the value to the current program. |
The study found no basis for change in the general levels—100 hours per year per aviator; 48 hours per year per NFO—of program activity. However, some degree of program improvement appears possible through greater differentiation of program participation levels among personnel. For all officer grades junior to commander/lieutenant colonel, the probability of a pilot returning to operational flying duty is almost 100 per cent, while for pilots in the grades of commander-lieutenant colonel it is about 59 per cent and for captain/ colonel, less than one per cent. It is obvious, then, that the value of the CRT program is greater for the more junior officers.
Two other classes of CRT aviation officers, for which a differentiation in CRT program flying hour levels should be considered, are full time students and officers whose duty stations are not very near to activities operating proficiency aircraft. Many of these officers experience real problems in meeting the current flying hour requirement of eight hours per month. Almost half of the CRT survey respondents indicated a preference for reduction of CRT flying hour levels to about four-to-six hours per month for officers in these classes of billets.
There are many aspects to the problem of CRT program level differentiation which were beyond the scope of the study. These include assignment flexibility, professional experience requirements, and indirect career implications. Therefore, the study made no specific recommendations on program activity levels. This matter is currently a subject of policy review by the Navy.
Other recommendations for CRT program improvements had to do with the phased build-up of CRT flying rates during the course of CRT duty tours, emphasis on instrument training, use of syllabi, and certain administrative aspects of the program.
As shown in Table 2, an improved CRT program, with a balanced fleet of new prop, jet, and rotary-wing aircraft to be employed in a somewhat more diversified program, would cost an average of $50 million annually over the next 15 years and would produce a value contribution of over $297 million per year. Thus, a dollar spent on the improved program would produce value benefits of almost six dollars, or about twice those of the current program.
The conclusion to be drawn, then, is that continuation of the CRT program is justified beyond any reasonable doubt. Furthermore, certain changes in program resources and structure would result in substantial program improvements.