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“T .
Will shake my little finger,”
:,°Scph Stalin is said to have told Nikita Khrushchev, ar|d there will be no more Tito. He will fall.”
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Tto’s gamble was successful, and Yugo- deVla ^as since not only pursued an indepen-
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e now know how badly Stalin misjudged the Yugoslav situation. He |. -y to comprehend that Tito would have on f Slcic not only a loyal army but also help 0tu abroad. This help was possible only be- Use Yugoslavia’s Adriatic seaports were on
e ocean highway controlled by the West’s
mari r
policy, but also her example was the yst that led to a series of uprisings, which ^Willingly ended in 1956 when the Red Army Wfed out a popular Hungarian govern- ent. That resentments, revolts, and uprises8 are endemic to the satellite area is vividly titrated by recent events in Romania and, JPPcially, Czechoslovakia. Clearly, East Cen- Europe will long be an area of high in- jWj danger, and challenge.
Qj.t'0r this discussion, East Central Europe, ^ en referred to as Middle Europe, includes q01^ Eastern Europe and the Balkans, less j,reece and Turkey. It embraces the Soviet ^atellites—East Germany, Poland, Czecho- *Wakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bul- Ua plus Yugoslavia and Albania.
land area and population, this region eounts for about one-fourth of all Europe, ^elusive of the Soviet Union. One of its Untries—Poland—covers approximately as Uch area as Maryland, Delaware, New nerscy, Pennsylvania, New York, and Coni ctlcut combined. But, the combined popu- lQn of East Central Europe is only about half that of the Soviet Union. i *he parties of East Central Europe have of ^ a different history and a different pattern development from Communist parties sewhere, including the Communist Party of e Soviet Union.
E)f the many reasons why this area can be Usidered as an entity and should be studied
separately from the Soviet Union, none is more important than the often overlooked fact that there is a strong relationship between this area and seapower.
Three seas—the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean—penetrate deeply into East Central Europe. The distance from the head of the Adriatic to the Baltic is only about 500 nautical miles. Modern carrier aircraft can easily range over the whole region from Mediterranean launch points, and missile-launching submarines and other ships can use all three seas. The effect of seapower on this part of the world is clearly indicated by the western border of the region—the line at which Soviet ground expansion was halted belatedly by NATO—a coalition of maritime powers.
East Central Europe is Western-influenced precisely because it is influenced by the sea. All countries of this area except two, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, have seacoasts. All, even the landlocked countries, have important seaborne trade. Poland has a large merchant marine which is important to both Soviet Russia and Communist China. Even Czechoslovakia owns ten merchant ships, displacing 123,000 dwt. tons, which fly the Czech flag on the high seas.
Jean Gottman, the eminent French geographer, has pointed out that traditions of freedom have developed throughout history largely among sea-trading peoples. He sees the oceans as mixers of cultures and as unifying forces, rather than barriers. Gottman’s thesis helps to explain the dynamics of Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
But Eastern European man does not move on deep water alone—an extensive river and canal system brings world trade, culture, and ideas to these diverse peoples. Consider, for example, the Danube, which is about 1,750 miles long, and has several major tributaries.
<’l"'^‘ianr?'-ssion n Science
:rom The Christian Science Monitor Publishing Company, R. Lens.
© 1968.
76 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 7969
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, can all be said to be
part of Danubia. Bratislava (the second city of Czechoslovakia), Budapest, and Belgrade are all on the navigable Danube. Bucharest is only 30 miles from this vital commercial and cultural artery which connects the area to the
Black Sea.
Czechoslovakia is also connected to the North Sea by the Elbe River and its tributary, the Vltava. The Oder-Neisse system and the Vistula connect Poland to the Baltic.
The strength and enduring nature of this network of trade connections are well illustrated by its historical appellation of the “Amber Route.” Prized for its beauty and magical attributes, amber, in the Bronze Age and in Greek and Roman times, was traded regularly from the Baltic (where true amber originates) to the Adriatic and Black Seas.
East Central Europe benefits climatically from its nearness to the seas and in general enjoys milder, more productive maritime weather than its neighbor to the east. Poland, for example, has almost English weather in the warmer half of the year, although it is more like Russia in the colder half. The Adriatic Coast of Yugoslavia has a climate not unlike California’s.
Because of these unifying influences, East Central Europe can be considered as a unit. Otherwise, it is difficult to comprehend the existence of solidarity in an area which contains Germans, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Bulgarians, Macedonians, and Albanians. To complicate matters, many of the “states” contain several nationalities, with differing languages, customs, and religions.
As important to the Soviet Union as is the domination of these people, their lands, and economy, more important still is the fact that, by their occupation of most of East Central Europe, the Soviets can now project the Red Army to the Elbe, and have available fleet bases in Poland, East Germany, Romania, and Bulgaria.
Such Soviet domination of this area is a relatively recent phenomenon. For a long time, ending with World War II, Germany tried to achieve hegemony over what it termed Mittel Europa. Germany failed, and the Soviet Union now acts in this area with
the support of the Red Army and the Recl Navy.
In examining the role of seapower in ‘e lation to Middle Europe, it is interesting 10 note that the two breakaway satellites, Yug0 slavia and Albania, have relatively open sc3’ coasts. The two satellites which have be*-11 most conspicuously kept in line by actual rtc of the Red Army—Hungary and Czech0' Slovakia—are completely landlocked. Ebl1' lient Romania might be even more so if S^L faced on other than the Black Sea, whk*1 Russia strives to make a Satellite Lake.
To those who understand that the frigb1' fulness of war may prove to be no more of3 deterrent to mankind today than it has in tl'c past, and to those who wish to use forcC wisely to prevent a world holocaust, EaSt Central Europe is of critical importance. we forget, it was the contest for control of trts area that touched off both World Wars. Th‘s region is still unstable, and is the core of mart of the world’s long-range problems and shod' range tensions.
Many political theorists agree with Machi2' velli that morality and success in intern2' tional relations do not necessarily go hand 111 hand. Yet, for us, only an essentially moral policy towards the satellite countries can have meaning. Our principal strength in Easter*1 Europe—and it is by no means insignificant^ comes from the peoples themselves. The aspirations of East Europeans are similar t0 our own. In many respects, our strong^1 allies are behind or near the Iron Curtail1' The satellite peoples are far different from the neutralists or others who have experienced only the blandishments of the soft voice of Soviet propaganda.
The history of the nations of East Central Europe is a long story of struggle for freedom from foreign domination—Turkish, Austrian) German, and Russian. Thus, there is probably a stronger desire for freedom in captive Europe today than ever before. For indications that the struggle will continue, even against great odds, we need not look back beyond the past two decades to see the Berlin and East German uprisings, the Poznan riots in Poland, the bloodily suppressed revolution in Hungary, and recent events in Czechoslovakia.
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^ c Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in Qni lst f^68, dramatic as it was, constituted
V] °ne a series of events which ady ^ suPP°rt the thesis that the relatively lonanced satellite peoples will be restive so Vr 9S are rePressed by the Soviets. But, pj0 ’ an°ther Berlin Wall could not be em- by the Russians. No wall dividing the lte countries from the West could seal >e seaports and seacoasts.
[• East Germans, Poles, Hungarians, and a*b l0sE,vaks of today are probably at least oflrave and freedom-loving as the Americans ... . 6. Why, then, has not each country had
i, Answers suggest themselves. Geography p.. been less than kind to the satellites, "'-larly to the two with no seacoasts. And, ,ncnaPs most important, they have not been S(rii°Uraged or assisted as we were during our Sgle for independence.
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llj 'e explanation most often advanced for (■ ,a°viet drive to achieve hegemony in East ral Europe is the desire to spread Com- vr.. n,SlTl- However, the Soviets have done a \y ■ Poor job of selling Marxism to their r °stern neighbors. Despite—or perhaps be- °f—25 years of a Soviet “hard sell,” ji ^ast Central Europeans have not bought k rv enough of the product to suit the ® hilin.
seph Stalin was not much of a salesman. , Was very inept in his occupation policies rf| bis successors have been only slightly ere flexible. And, in many of their actions—
’ t^le rePressi°ns in Hungary and Czecho- (j akta—the Soviet government has sacri- oiessianic Communism in the interest of 7;r goals.
... > as is often said, it is the minds of the to . e peoples that the Soviets are battling
e q by their subjugation of these people, the L- let Union derives only the most transitory (>r)r °f benefits while, at the same time, it Senders long-term hatreds. Still, a sullen of tklaUon is no new experience to the heirs j^be October Revolution. Myopic policies, to Crtla^ an(f external, will probably continue ^ result from the barbaric power struggle at seems to be the principal feature of modern Soviet-style Communism.
There is also much discussion of old-fashioned economic imperialism as a motivation for the Soviet Union’s domination of the satellites. There is good evidence that the Soviets plundered their satrapies in the early postwar period. Today, however, they are
finding that it is almost as difficult to make crude imperialism pay as it is to show a profit in war. It is true that, despite obstacles to economic integration, which are greater in East Europe than in the West, the Soviet Union is achieving a large degree of coordination of the satellite economies. Still, there is little likelihood that the Soviet Union will receive enough financial benefit from this and similar measures to pay for more than a small fraction of the costs of occupation and armaments made necessary by its satellite policies. The economic costs of the military showdown with Czechoslovakia are a burden on the Soviet Union as well as her “allies.”
Pan-Slavism is also advanced as a contributory reason for the Soviet poor neighbor policy in Europe. This explains very little, for the Soviets seem intent on carrying out PanSlavism even where there are no Slavs. Whether or not they wish to be identified with Russia, it is true that Poles, Czechs, Bulgars, and Yugoslavs qualify in one way or another as Slavic brothers—in Moscow’s view. On the other hand, Finns, East Germans, Hungarians, Romanians, and Albanians are neither ethnically nor linguistically related to the Russians, so we must look further for the main motivation of Moscow in East Central Europe.
The compelling urge to spread Communism, economics, and Pan-Slavism, then, are but three of the many reasons advanced for the Soviet Union’s tyrannical policies in East Central Europe. Yet, it might be more accurate to say that the Soviet leadership views the satellite countries and adjacent states principally in terms of military security and prestige. Any conceivable peaceful settlement of the dangerous tensions between East and West will have to take these two motives into account. These motives are not new; they antedate Communism by hundreds of years. They explain why the satellites have for so long been on the Kremlin shopping list. They also explain such widely spaced
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ideological goals abroad and living standa1’ at home. Moreover, they have goaded 1 j
historic events as Peter the Great’s establishment of a Russian foothold on the Baltic in 1703; tsarist Russia’s demands on her World War I allies for control of the Turkish straits in the event of victory; and, in part, the recent establishment of a Soviet Naval Squadron in the Mediterranean—the southern anchor for Middle Europe.
Soviet foreign policy toward East Central Europe has always been consistent with military security. Soviet Russia permits Finland a precarious and circumscribed freedom in exchange for a weak Fenno-Scandic peninsula whose principal power is neutral Sweden. Austria got a peace treaty and a forced status of neutrality because it was not vital to the satellite barrier and because it drove a militarily-important wedge between West Germany and Italy. Yugoslavia and Albania owe their peculiar form of independence to a complex of reasons, including access to the sea. The Kremlin decided, among other things, not to risk a decision under such unfavorable conditions, because Yugoslavia and Albania, like Austria, were not in direct geographic contact with the Soviet Union.
most vivid illustrations of the importance military security in Soviet policy toward * satellites. As Raymond L. Garthoff points0 in The Tragedy of Hungary, Moscow’s decis1 ^ to unleash the Red Army for the second 111 was made only after Imre Nagy said Hungary would leave the Warsaw Pact-"' action which would have toppled the sha ' structure of Soviet military security in Europ Recent events in Czechoslovakia are a rep^ of the Hungarian drama, by two seemtfljb wilier and more cautious adversaries, seek11''' to avoid some of the worst mistakes of | previous tragedy, but ultimately succumb13 to forces they poorly understand.
tary security in East Europe by sacrificl^f
West to rearmament. These are high inn1 costs, but still not the final reckoning. * j satellite countries remain a continual a11 costly problem to the Red imperialists.
Soviet foreign policy reflects some of 1 headaches that the satellites must cause
id
lands on the western periphery of the So'w
Union. They may well conclude that there 1 j no true security for any one who employs ‘ policy of classic military imperialism.
There are few constants in Satellite Europ1•'
In the past 25 years, only patriotism al1'
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Communist imperialist pressure have seemc'| permanent; the political structure has change radically.
is*
The change initially was in favor of (|11
Soviets and against the West. Common imperialism reached its high-water mark 111 Europe with the coup d'etat in Czechoslovak1,1
in early 1948. Since that time Soviet po"^1 has been slowly eroding in Europe. There
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be further changes—some dramatic, evolutionary.
Beginning with the Yugoslav schism of J111’1 1948, we have seen convincing evidence th3* the worldwide nationalist movement is strong in the satellites as in Asia, Africa or
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e East. Matching the political ferment ln the satellites has been the West’s impressive recovery of strength. The Soviet Union ‘*Ccluired domination of Middle Europe at a ttie when Western Europe was prostrate and Vp United States was bent on disarming. If "e European countries make full use of their tte\v economic strength by some form of in- eSration and if the United States stays ^'li tardy strong, the West may again influ- I "ce events in East Europe.
| Contrary to Soviet propagandists, as well as Pr°fessional pessimists in the East, we have tr*any advantages over the Soviets in peaceful cornpetition. Our economic system, despite Sorne obvious flaws, has performed well in Peacetime and during the Cold War. The , "ch-propagandized Soviet economy shows 8l§ns of rapidly reaching maturity after applying the accumulated technology of the . est under forced draft. It has done rela- tlvely little for its own people and seems less CaPable of raising living standards abroad.
. Erom the Western standpoint, conditions East Central Europe have been improving j. ‘n no small part owing to the success of our °reign policy. Yugoslavia has changed from Svv°rn enemy to shrewd neutral; Albania has °Pted out. The Iron Curtain has been dismantled in Austria. Poland, Romania, 'uingary, and Czechoslovakia have shown l^at they will struggle to achieve a degree of "eedom. And, most important, the peoples of ^ast Europe have remained emotionally and Culturally oriented towards the Free World, therefore, we should not seek a radical change in our policies and implementing ac- hons. They are working.
One way to improve our contact with the Stellites is to make better use of our natural ahy, the sea. To improve maritime contacts between the United States and the satellites, lhere should be a government-encouraged Program of regular calls by American flag Vessels at important satellite ports. To support "'creased merchant contacts and to keep them °n a healthy and sustaining basis, we should ''''den commercial and cultural contacts with ^ast Central Europe as much as possible. American trade with Middle Europe will not he large in comparison to other areas, but 'here is room for expansion.
We cannot, of course, force ourselves into East Central Europe, but most of the satellite countries, even those with hard-line Communist governments, would welcome increased trade with the United States. If the governments become nationalistic to any extent, the possibilities for beneficial commercial contact will increase greatly. Our experience with all the satellites shows this.
The U. S. Navy has an important role to play in keeping satellite hopes alive and in ensuring that our views are understood behind the Iron Curtain. Not only must it maintain a strong Atlantic and Mediterranean posture, but also it must continue to reject the Soviet “Sea of Peace” (i.e., Soviet Lake) concept for either the Baltic or the Black Sea because if these seas were closed, discussion of independence for the satellites would become academic. It must also be ready to meet the challenge posed by a burgeoning Soviet Navy.
Calls by U. S. Navy vessels at satellite ports would be of great value Other Western navies have arranged to make calls at Soviet and satellite ports with excellent results. The U. S. Navy would make a particular impact at satellite ports for two reasons. America has strong bonds of blood with Central Europe and our country has always been a symbol of freedom and hope for oppressed nations.
If we make naval visits to Polish or other satellite ports, we must be ready to accept return calls; in fact, we should welcome them. We stand to benefit if navy men from behind the Iron Curtain learn about America first hand rather than through their political officers. For the present we should aim to step up maritime contacts with the satellite countries. Such contacts have greater meaning than those with the Soviet Union itself. We should not accept increased contact with the Soviet Union—by sea or otherwise—unless we can increase exchanges of all kinds with the satellites.
The Navy has vital interests in three broad, related policy matters affecting East Central Europe; they are: reduction of tensions, negotiation of changes, and disengagement.
But we should remember that reduction of tensions is a more meaningful issue to Americans than to Russians, who regard conflict as the normal state of affairs.
82 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1969
We should not make unilateral concessions to the Soviets merely to avoid difficult situations, nor should we forego advantage because the Reds might be nasty. But, at the same time we should be ready to negotiate with the Soviets whenever there is a chance for mutual benefit. In fact, we should take the initiative by making proposals for self-enforcing agreements aimed at solving broad security problems. Such constructive proposals would be everywhere applauded and would benefit everyone.
One such proposal is an East European Regional Organization guaranteed by the major powers and the United Nations. It should include Yugoslavia and Albania, if the latter wished to join. The question of East German membership, of course, would be dependent on the issue of German unification. There is historical precedence for such an organization. Between World War I and II, the nations of Central Europe tried to compensate for their political, economic, and military weaknesses by a network of multilateral and bilateral treaties. By 1941, these had been snuffed out by Hitler and Stalin with the tacit consent of the weak or isolationist countries of the Free World.
A regional organization is the only means of achieving stability in East Central Europe. Individually, the countries of the region have great difficulty in maintaining their freedom, nor can they develop their economies adequately without some form of close co-operation. The countries of this area have great strengths collectively. They are clearly victims of a policy of “divide and conquer.”
The Soviets might not reject a move towards unity in East Europe. Indeed, the Soviet Union might prefer the stability of popularly-based governments along its western border to the present instability. The Kremlin can also appreciate that a stable regional organization between the two major power centers of the world reduces the possibility of a chance war which might mean ruin for the Soviet Empire.
A unified East Europe enjoying political, military, and economic independence is the key to settling major explosive issues such as German reunification. Parenthetically, representative democracy might do better in this part of the world if the individual states
A graduate of the Georgy town School of Foreign Stf vice, Captain Murphy b°, an M.A. from the Universl1' of Maryland and a Dip*011^ in International Affairs fr0" the University of Lond°" During World War H . served in USS gane (DMS-* ^ and commanded USS Ch^ dler (DMS-9). Following ^ sian language and area training, he served for *"_ years (1948-50) as Attach^ in Poland, travelling e* tensively behind the Iron Curtain. His Staff assig1' ments afloat have been with Commander Cad1 Division 18 and Commander Sixth Fleet. From 1” to 1966 he served as Assistant Chief of Staff to Co*J mander U. S. Naval Forces Europe and later 1 rected intelligence production on Europe, the Minn East and Africa for the Defense Intelligence AgcnC'j Currently he is Deputy Assistant Chief of Nav‘l Operations (Intelligence).
could speak more as one to their stroff- neighbors. If the United States and its all1^ gave formal and credible assurance against a1 threats to East Europe, including the chime*3 of German irredentism, there would be a solid basis for a specific, self-enforcing agree" ment—the only kind which can have mea**' ing between us and the Soviets. Wester*’ guarantees are important, because in East Europe there is not only a deep-rooted resen*' ment of Russia but a strong fear of a resurge*’1 Germany. Poland, for example, feels insecure about its “recovered territories,” formerl) East Prussia, Silesia, and Pomerania. Like the other satellites, Poland will look to the Soviet Union if no one else will guarantee **5 borders. It is significant that military ar' rangements between Russia and her satellite have specifically named Germany as the threat to be countered. The fear of Germany in East Europe is difficult for many to under' stand, yet the same thing existed in Western Europe for a long time after World War 11"'' until Stalin clearly showed the nature of the Soviet threat.
Lest this proposal be dismissed out of hand as wishful thinking, consider again ho"* strong would be the weight of world opinion in its favor. Consider Soviet problems i*1 East Europe, Soviet desire for a truly secure frontier, and Soviet need for “reinsurance of its foreign policy based on a somewhat
^Predictable China. And, of course, consider at we cannot say what will be the reaction the Soviets until we confront them with the Pr°posal.
And, finally, consider the alternative. Urely, both the Soviet Union and the United ‘j,ates can agree that, so long as Satellite trope remains a buffer, benefiting and proving either the East or West to the detri- ,ller>t of its own interests, it will create world Pr°blems. The only hope for an enduring '°bition lies in the formation of an East Central Europe for East Central Europeans.
A free, united East Europe whose status is ^taranteed by both West and East is not a Perfect solution to existing world tensions nor ls ^ the only solution. But it would be an l,riPortant first step worth striving for. Sea- P°Wer can play a vital role in attaining and Reserving this objective.
A regional organization in East Europe jv°uld not mean disengagement for the . r*ited States. The present perilous situation lri Europe and the precarious balance of peace result from our disengagement following
World War II. We must not repeat that mistake. Because we have undertaken to help stabilize Europe, we should think in terms of more engagement with European security rather than less. If U. S. forces decamp completely from Europe, they will leave behind them the shattered hopes of the East Europeans. Because our security is connected with Europe’s, disengagement for us is a fallacy.
Naval power, making use of modern weapons systems, strongly influences East Central Europe. With the advent of new weapons systems this influence will be even more pronounced. Seapower did much to check Soviet Russian postwar political and military expansion into Europe, and the sea was an important factor in the first step of the rollback, the Yugoslav revolt. Only if the West continues to maintain maritime superiority will it be able to play a meaningful role to the benefit of all concerned. For these reasons it is important for everyone, especially naval officers, to understand satellite Europe with its problems, challenges, and opportunities.
★
Declare Yourself
A few years ago, an ASW Task Group was conducting some night hunter/killer operations off the Virginia Capes. As the destroyer squadron and the carrier were working together for the first time, there were naturally some organizational uncertainties. The fact that darken ship was in effect and all running lights were extinguished did not add to one’s feeling of security. During the maneuvering of the two plane guard destroyers to stations following the signal for impending flight operations, I heard the flag watch officer in the carrier demand of one destroyer, which seemed a little closer to the carrier’s bow than was comfortable,
“What are your intentions, over?”
“Honorable, over,” was the saucy reply.
Thoroughly flustered, the flag could only mumble a meek, “Roger, out.”
-------------------------------------------- Contributed by Lieutenant, Robert W. Sherer, U. S. Navy
Safety First
An ensign was on duty in the engine room, when suddenly, a fireman came in and started to drill a hole in one of the bulkheads. Oil immediately spurted out, for he had drilled into one of the 5,000-gallon oil tanks.
The ensign rushed over, shut off the drill, and after a while was able to stop the flow of oil. He then reprimanded the man for the damage done, but curiosity prompted him to ask him what he was trying to do.
The fireman replied, “Hanging up a safety sign, sir.”
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Contributed by Sebastian Slone
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)