U.S. Naval Institute Mission Statement
(See pp. 6–9, April 2011 Proceedings)
Admiral Carl A. H. Trost, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I recently became aware of the proposal to change the U.S. Naval Institute’s mission statement to include the term “advocacy.” As a 58-year member of USNI and one-time president of USNI for four years, (when active-duty officers were still permitted to so serve), I want to register my strong opposition to a mission change that includes the term “advocacy.” USNI cannot be an independent forum and also be an advocate. Why mess with success and risk loss of respect/reputation, possible/probable member dissatisfaction, and loss of members? There’s no such thing as an “independent advocate.”
John F. Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy; former member, 9/11 Commission, honorary chairman of the board, U.S. Naval Institute—The U.S. Naval Institute is one of the great intellectual organizations in this country. I joined as an undergraduate at St. Joseph’s University and later became a Life Member. Over the years I have fully participated in USNI as an author, as a speaker, and as a donor.
I have been a fan of the Naval Institute for my entire career—with the exception of six short years when I served as Secretary of the Navy during the Reagan administration. Somehow, the Institute seemed to get off track during that period. I began to read articles in Proceedings by mere lieutenants who disagreed with me. Shocking! But after I left government in 1987, the Institute returned to its grand tradition of truth and wisdom. Despite that experience—or maybe because of it—I feel deeply that this unique independent forum must remain open to participants of all ranks and stations. Listening to your critics is smart—even when it hurts.
It was therefore dismaying to read in the April issue of Proceedings that this independent forum that plays such a vital role in the national-security dialogue is now in jeopardy, with a proposal to include “advocacy” in the mission statement. We all share a common goal—to take the Institute to a brighter future as a stronger entity. Our challenge is to get there, and in my view, changing the mission statement in the way proposed will not do that. There is a very compelling case that we are headed in the right direction now with two strong years of financial and operational performance highlighted in this year’s Letter to Members.
It may be time for the board to step back, re-engage with our members, and build a strategic plan that we can all embrace. I concur with the views expressed here by our 23rd Chief of Naval Operations and former USNI president, Admiral Carl Trost: “USNI cannot be an independent forum and also be an advocate. . . . There’s no such thing as an ‘independent advocate.’”
We Are on the Eve of a Maritime Mistake
(See J. G. Morgan Jr., p. 12, April 2011 Proceedings)
Captain Alan W. Swinger, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I read Vice Admiral Morgan’s article with great interest and complete support. I also believe that in the interest of deficit reduction, we will emasculate our Navy’s strategic capability even more than we have already done. The last thing the country needs to do is follow the Royal Navy’s downward spiral to a force hardly larger than a U.S. destroyer squadron in the name of funding social programs at the expense of long-term national security.
The current maritime strategy and the CNO’s 2011 Guidance documents include the right objectives and goals but must be backed by programs and funding that maintain the U.S. Navy’s primacy. As any Pentagon and Washington veteran knows, “dollars are policy.” The Navy is already shorthanded. For example, we are light one carrier strike group—we have 11 (soon to be 10) with the objective of 12. The Libyan contingency, whether or not one agrees with U.S. involvement, demonstrated this shortfall. Since we have no continuous nuclear-carrier presence in the Mediterranean, and the Enterprise group had passed through en route to Fifth Fleet operations without stopping (or being called back), other, less capable U.S. forces were used in an operation made to order for a carrier strike group. Although I am sure the theater commander weighed many other factors, the non-use of a carrier strike group here is illustrative of a key force-level shortfall.
The Navy is the country’s strategic bulwark and strong right arm. However, we are on a slippery slope toward losing our advantage if the civilian leadership forfeits our maritime supremacy to pay domestic bills generated by fiscal irresponsibility. As Mark Helprin noted in his 2 March Wall Street Journal column, “Despite its necessity, deficit reduction is not the only or even the most important thing . . . . A technological nation with a GDP of $14 trillion can afford to build a fleet worthy of its past and sufficient to its future. Pity if it does not.” The United States cannot afford to have a “break-glass-in-case-of-war” Navy, and the Defense Department can and should realign the service budget allocations to other than the equal 1/3-split paradigm in order to support a strong Navy. Vice Admiral Morgan is correct, and current Navy leadership needs to make the case so our maritime strategy remains executable.
Steven Hertz, Master Mariner (Retired)—Vice Admiral Morgan’s splendid article focuses on the need for a Navy based on our irreducible, global-trade and trade-security interests, rather than on the size of any potential opposition maritime force. I agree with every word.
What he did not say was that the “maritime mistake” to which he refers, if it is made, will be made because the American public and its elected leaders are in no mood to incur risks to defend interests they do not perceive as American. Liberian flags on the sterns of merchant ships do not, in the public’s resource-constrained consciousness, justify such defense. That remains the case, however vital such foreign ships may in fact be.
The principal justification for the regular appearance of American-flagged merchant ships on global sea lanes has always been that, legally and morally, such a presence justifies defense by a right-sized Navy in regular deployment—not, in the words of Vice Admiral Morgan’s analogy “in the firehouse awaiting a blaze.”
There is some indication that the Department of Defense may be ready for participation in discussions aimed at a sustainable American merchant-ship presence in critical sea lanes as a key sea power provision. That will be wonderful if it proves true.
Be Able to Land the Landing Force!
(See B. Trainor, p. 8, March 2011 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)—I happened to be re-reading E. B. Sledge’s classic With the Old Breed when my March issue of Proceedings arrived. Thus, General Trainor’s article struck a chord with me.
General Trainor is, of course, correct that anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) challenges are not new. And as he noted, we should have no illusions about the continued strategic necessity of this capability. We should dismiss the advocates of “post-heroic warfare” such as retired Air Force Colonel John Warden, who extols the “very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood.” We still need disciplined warriors to perform heroically under extraordinary conditions, as Sledge so graphically depicted in his World War II memoir. Sledge wrote his book years after the fact out of a sense of obligation; today, we have the same obligation to prepare future Marines and ensure they have the means to succeed.
I support the thrust behind General Trainor’s argument but would warn that the sophisticated nature of the proliferating A2/AD threat and our own force limitations could dramatically change the character of future amphibious operations. Today, we might harbor second thoughts about having 360 ships damaged in a single campaign, as in World War II, if only for the reason that we don’t have that many ships anymore. Nor do I suspect the National Command Authority or Joint Staff would be callous about risky assault operations if 30,000 Sailors, Marines, and Soldiers were the price tag.
As General Trainor noted, the character of warfare constantly evolves, and so must we. Our amphibious force can be a valuable game-changer, and we should ensure that we have the means to project power decisively, as the general argues. However, warfare does not stand still, and often the tactics and doctrine of the past are dated by threat and technological evolution. Much endures, but senior leaders need to constantly reconcile continuity versus change.
Even in the midst of World War II, there was constant adaptation in doctrine (fire-support coordination), tactics, organization, and equipment (landing craft and flame-thrower tanks). In our current fight, commanders have continuously noted that the adversary did something unexpected or that his tactic “wasn’t what we gamed against.” We cannot afford this kind of thinking as we develop capabilities for future amphibious forces, or we will lose the competition in learning and adapting that is inherent to combat.
Dismissing new threats and the corresponding change in concepts, doctrine, and capability is to consign future PFC Sledges to senseless slaughter. They may have to be heroes, but we owe them a fighting chance in their training, tactics, and equipment. To do that, we must think hard about the past and look outward to the future.
Fortunately, the Marines at Quantico continue to work hard on ship-to-objective maneuver and the requisite capabilities that will provide future forces the means of obtaining our nation’s objectives. As Marine Corps General Jim Mattis once observed, “The only thing worse than obsolete weapons is obsolete thinking.”
Surf’s Up! Energy from the Motions of the Oceans
(See D. Walsh, p. 88, March 2011 Proceedings)
Thomas Wyman—Invariably, Dr. Walsh’s columns are both interesting and provocative. His March offering is no exception. At the outset, it needs to be recognized that the hostility of the ocean environment is unmatched, even by that in outer space. The corrosive effects of saltwater, marine life in all its forms, pollutants including suspended materials in the water column, plus the variability of tide, current, and wave forces have proved to be strong deterrents over the years to harnessing ocean-motion and establishing it as a long-term, reliable energy source. Thus, it remains an important but generally elusive source of energy that could contribute significantly in helping to meet America’s energy requirements.
Recognizing that potential, the Navy should take on harnessing of ocean-motion as a long-term research project. It could be an economically attractive endeavor recognizing the patent-and-licensing opportunities that should develop as the research begins to show results. The challenge is to develop systems that can survive and continue to operate with minimum maintenance in the unforgiving marine environment. Some may assert that this is not an effort in which the Navy should become involved; however, it would serve a vital national objective by seeking to develop domestic, pollution-free energy sources. With years of operating experience in the challenging marine environment, Navy research personnel should be able to contribute significantly to such a project.
As Dr. Walsh suggests, this should be a joint public/private-sector undertaking to moderate the cost to any one entity. Marine-research organizations, along with public-utility operators, would be important contributors. One could reasonably anticipate that, in time, ancillary research findings would evolve that could serve to improve vessel-operating efficiencies and that would have application for Navy ships as well as commercial merchant fleets.
The incentive is there, and the potential payoff could be significant; indeed, as the cost of energy rises, that payoff becomes increasingly attractive.
Things They Don’t Tell You About Command
(See T. Parker, pp. 81–82, March 2011 Proceedings)
Captain Gregory J. Sanial, U.S. Coast Guard—I read Captain Parker’s article during my 96th month in command. Currently captain of my fourth cutter, I will take command of a fifth cutter, albeit for only a few months, later this year. I expect to accumulate 100 months in command of Coast Guard cutters before I am done at sea. I mention these numbers only to offer that I might have some perspective on command at sea and to comment on the article in that context. I was surprised that not once in the article was either the executive officer or senior watch officer/navigator/operations officer mentioned (In the Coast Guard, the operations officer fills all these roles by himself or herself). I sensed from the article that only the commanding officer and the officer of the deck were involved in any of the instances mentioned.
Executive officers and operations officers are extremely valuable resources and can limit the fatigue of the CO when used properly. At sea, there are decisions that only the skipper can make. COs need to make sure they are in the right position to make those decisions. However, not every decision at sea requires the commanding officer. Use the executive officer and the operations officer more. Train these people for future command. They have a wealth of experience above and beyond that of the officer of the deck. A CO who thinks he or she is Superman or Superwoman is setting a poor example and is not using all of the available personnel resources. The CO might not need to be on the bridge for 13 straight hours. Always be on call, but take shifts with the executive officer if you need some rest. The executive officer and operations officer are always available. Use them.
Command at sea is not unlike any other position afloat. Experience matters. COs should come up through the various levels of responsibility throughout their entire careers: division officer, department head, executive officer, then command, then progressively larger and more complex commands. COs need to employ their executive officers, operations officers, navigators, and senior watch officers and build their experience bases to prepare them future command afloat. The entire Fleet will benefit from many officers with broad experience at various levels of responsibility on multiple platforms at sea.
NATO: Still a Force to Be Reckoned With
(See P. Pezzutti, pp. 48–53 March 2011 Proceedings)
Captain Stephen J. Coughlin, U.S. Navy—Captain Pezzutti does an excellent job of arguing that our NATO maritime forces must play a critical role in contesting and deterring future global threats. Just the notion of having to balance these forces between their traditional collective defense obligations and a posture of securing the global commons, where NATO has critical interests, validates the relevance of his discussion. Also, his reference to overarching NATO documents such as the Alliance Maritime Strategy and the NATO Maritime Security Operations Concept gives credence to NATOs broad-reaching vision about where the alliance will participate in forthcoming maritime operations.
Certainly, these documents are important for establishing a strategic framework, but as a former Joint Staff NATO action officer, the document I found most interesting was the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements. This is the “balance sheet” that lists the forces that will be provided to NATO by all nations in the alliance, for any given operation. And quite honestly, it is not as balanced as one might imagine, with the United States providing a considerable amount of the force-structure requirements. Obviously, that is a question of political will but also another area of balance that should be addressed.
As the author stated, whether the forces are balanced or not, there are the ever-present concerns about affordability, budgets, national priorities, and resources matching commitment. Hopefully, by selling the importance of this issue to NATO, we will build the force capacity across the board and develop the training to attain a balance between defense and security. Captain Pezzutti has identified an excellent issue where we really need to put our heads together in order to get out in front of the challenges that await us.