By some accounts, upward of 30 warships now patrol the Gulf of Aden, conducting anti-piracy operations under various task forces and flags. Typically, between five and ten U.S. Navy warships are supporting the effort, officials claim. While a small anti-piracy coalition task force directed from the U.S.-led maritime headquarters in Bahrain has plied these waters for years, the brunt of the anti-piracy forces arrived in early 2009 after several high-profile vessel seizures. To date, assessments on the effectiveness of the effort are mixed, though in general it has been a localized success. The transit corridor and escort schema have worked well, and merchant ships seem to be closely following prudent ship-security practices; fewer attacks in the region resulted in ship seizures over the past year.
Yet despite this significant international commitment, regional piracy persists, with ship attacks, seizures, and ransoms consistently in the international headlines. Indeed, a February 2010 NATO assessment concluded that while Gulf of Aden piracy has stabilized, the Somali Basin/Indian Ocean piracy incident rate is high and growing.1 Because the multinational effort is localized, pirates shifted their operational focus south and east, into the Indian Ocean. In addition, while the Gulf of Aden effort is effective today, the impact will be transient at best unless the warships remain indefinitely. Finally, most analysts agree that the current efforts do not address the core cause of piracy in Somalia or the threat before it reaches international waters.2 Hence, the current multinational effort against piracy, while laudable, has little ability to address piracy at its source.
When one considers the cost of the effort alongside the poor prospects of regional success, one cannot help but wonder if a better plan could be more fruitful. Conversely, one cannot discount options at the other extreme, such as packing it in and letting the merchant vessels fend for themselves. While doing nothing might be an option, it does not seem wise to opt for changing nothing if the current tack offers no prospects for success. On balance, little specific information is available on the long-term financial and opportunity costs if anti-piracy operations continue in their present form. The annual collective operations, maintenance, supply, and refit costs alone for 30-plus warships, though, are surely significant.
Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Europe and Africa, asserted in April that not only were the operations very costly, but that there were higher-priority naval missions elsewhere. He also said that "I don't think we can sustain the level of operation that we have down there forever. . . ."3 Add to that the expenses of maintaining and operating the several regional maritime headquarters focused on anti-piracy, and the sum expands. Regarding opportunity costs, it is not difficult to imagine the myriad maritime missions languishing elsewhere as the warships escort merchant vessels and keep watch around the clock. Roughly 18 months into the larger multinational effort, it may well be worth a fresh look at options to determine a way ahead. Simply put, in the now standard 2003 paraphrase of General David Petraeus, both the international community and individual nation-states supporting Gulf of Aden anti-piracy need to ask the question: "How does this end "
Despite the lack of empirical data, a rough comparison of several courses of action in relation to several key factors may be illuminating. These courses represent a mix of those commonly discussed by contemporary maritime-security and piracy analysts. It is beyond the scope of this article to argue in detail for or against any such course, though I have done so in recent articles.4 The following table is a relatively simplistic but potentially helpful look at several courses of action relative to their expected cost (financial and opportunity cost), the expected time it would take to achieve results, and the expected outcome of the effort. This assessment defines a desirable outcome as a reduction of regional (not just Gulf of Aden) piracy to levels below the "pre-crisis" norm (typical annual attacks prior to 2007). It also deems all courses of action feasible.
If one agrees with the logic of this table, it should be clear that the two courses seeming to present the greatest potential for success relative to moderately acceptable costs and time expected to achieve results (blue highlight) involve constabulary operations (one international in nature and the other organic, albeit created by the international community). One possible course might also involve a combination of the two constabulary courses, with either simultaneous efforts in both areas or a shift over time from one to the other.
Several general recommendations flow from this brief analysis:5
- Release the vast majority of warships to conduct more important missions. Keep only a few for in-extremis support to a new constabulary force. Warships are inherently unsuitable for constabulary duties.
- Attain a UN Security Council resolution to form this maritime constabulary force authorized to operate within Somali territory. Many precedents exist for UN police forces; many have met mission success.
- Global maritime powers provide sufficient dedicated coast guard vessels and personnel to establish a viable inshore policing capability. All states benefiting from maritime commerce should also provide commensurate funding.
- Expand the current Gulf of Aden regional/international anti-piracy collaborative network, but with a distinct shift to law enforcement. Exploit the successes of the current international anti-piracy initiative.
- Hold vessel owners, crews, and flag states responsible when they do not adhere to prudent security practices ("best management practices" in NATO Shipping Centre parlance). The fruits of a secure maritime commons should come at a reasonable price.
- Derived from the UN resolution, establish clear, common security protocols for the arrest and detention of pirates, evidence chain of custody, use of deadly force, and prosecution in court. A viable enforcement effort could have palpable deterrent effect, ending the current "catch-and-release" practice.
Without question, there has been a success of sorts in the Gulf of Aden multinational anti-piracy effort. Yet it would be a sorely missed opportunity if the effort simply plods along under a "better than nothing" mantra that achieves only a localized maritime security status quo. It is high time that a prudent examination of courses of action occur and the collective power of the international community finally be brought to bear on the scourge of Somali piracy.
1. NATO Shipping Centre, "Half Yearly Report: February 2010."
2. See CDR John Patch, USN (Ret.), "The Overstated Threat," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2008.
3. Adam Entous, "U.S. Admiral: military ships can't stop Somali piracy," Reuters, 16 April 2010.
4. See "The Overstated Threat" and John Patch, "Send the Warships Home," Armed Forces Journal, April 2010.
5. These recommendations reflect an abridged version of those found in "Send the Warships Home."