The American military is the most powerful and technologically advanced warfighting force the world has ever seen. Few countries will be able to rival this advantage for years to come, yet this lead is at risk of being neutralized or lost without a single enemy effort.
The proliferation of wireless devices is putting immense strain on the finite resource known as the electromagnetic spectrum. The phrase "electromagnetic spectrum" in the context of this article refers to the range of frequencies, including very low-frequency radio waves measured in Hertz (Hz) to microwaves measured in GigaHertz (GHz). While electromagnetic radiation exceeds these parameters into infrared, visible, ultraviolet light and beyond, in a tactical military sense a warfighter needs to be most concerned about the use and availability of the subset of the electromagnetic spectrum commonly referred to as the "radio spectrum."
The strain on this resource has on occasion caused electronic fratricide, or friendly interference, which has the potential to bring the U.S. warfighting machine to a halt in the same way airport search radar can negate a cell phone signal.
Electronic fratricide has significantly affected tactics in Iraq. Without a change in U.S. warfighting behavior, it will create more problems for American forces in the coming years. Unless the United States wants to neutralize its defense spending advantage, officials must increase the understanding of spectrum use throughout the ranks and ensure that the most joint of resources, the electromagnetic spectrum, is available for their ever-growing demand. Furthermore, they must ensure that their spectrum priorities match up with their warfighting priorities and better allocate and manage this critical resource or risk a devastating cell phone-like "dropped call" phenomenon during a future conflict.
Wireless Warfare
One need only reach into one's pocket or handbag and pull out an iPhone or Blackberry to realize how much the world has changed in the past two decades. When U.S. forces routed the Iraqi military in Operation Desert Storm it was hard to find a commercial cell phone. Today they are everywhere. Other wireless technologies are quickly overwhelming our ability to manage and regulate them. Since the days of Guglielmo Marconi's wireless telegraphy experiments in 1895, we have seen an exponential, drastic vertical ascent in spectrum use
particularly in the past ten years.The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has embraced this technology to gain an advantage over adversaries. The number of systems using wireless communication links in Iraq and Afghanistan today is difficult to assess because of the vast number of coalition entities that would have to take inventory and report. We need only look at the bandwidth requirements of U.S. forces in Iraq compared with those required during Desert Storm to get a sense of the magnitude of this expansion. In his article, "Net-Centric Warfare Is the Battlefield Environment" (CrossTalk: The Journal of Defense Software Engineering, January 2004), Lieutenant General Harry D. Raduege Jr., then commander of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), reported that Operation Iraqi Freedom was consuming 30 times more satellite bandwidth for a force 45 percent smaller than its Desert Storm counterpart.
While satellite bandwidth does not correlate directly to total electromagnetic spectrum use, it does indicate an enormous increase in wireless use for U.S. forces. When combined with coalition and host-nation use, one can see the challenges are daunting. When jamming is added, both friendly and hostile, it's easy to see how the electromagnetic spectrum can reach a level of saturation in which coherent wave forms, meant to travel orderly between transmitter and receiver, become incoherent noise.
Nearly every aspect of contemporary life is going wireless. High-end services such as satellite radio, personal Global Positioning Systems (GPS), and streaming video, are commonplace in the commercial sector. Previously the military led commercial applications, but today the military and commercial arenas feed off one another to maximize the flow of information.
Tech-Hungry Troops
Soldiers on today's battlefield are extremely tech-savvy. They adapt to new technologies quickly and embrace them in their personal lives, while the military acquires new systems at a bureaucratic rate, rarely providing anything newer than the previous generation to the battlefield. At times this leads to unapproved commercial devices migrating, covertly or overtly, to the battlespace, where Soldiers give little thought to the interference or chaos they may be causing.
This trend is not confined to the U.S. military. The expansion of technology is global and in many smaller, less sophisticated countries the wireless explosion is even more widespread. In areas where governments are unsophisticated and have few regulatory agencies, past investments in hard-wired infrastructure were minimal and the ease and low cost of wireless systems is thus attractive. These areas happen to be in regions where the United States will likely be called on to engage in future conflicts. Host-nation use, however, will not be the primary threat. American forces' own insatiable demand and fuzzy understanding of its own needs and priorities will likely be the cause of catastrophic U.S. failure.
The electromagnetic spectrum is a permanent resource but, given a particular frequency, finite in terms of time and space. Overload that frequency with transmitters, and, depending on relative power levels, receivers will start to pick up multiple and conflicting signals. To illustrate this phenomenon, imagine tuning in an AM radio station in your car and listening for the conflicting signals as you drive away from one transmitter and closer to another. Sophisticated systems are more discerning than a simple AM transceiver, but the concept of spectrum overload remains. In the electronic signal game, the adage goes, "He who has the most power at the receiver wins," and in today's world, it is becoming harder to guarantee that the intended signal for the receiver will win this ad hoc fight.
From Marconi to Spectrum XXI
Military forces embraced Marconi's wireless technology evolution throughout the 20th century, and we have seen a steady expansion of wireless systems in each conflict. From World War I through Operation Desert Storm, the electromagnetic spectrum was more than adequate to handle the volume of systems relying on it. That is not the case today. In some radio frequency bands, ultra high frequency (UHF) in particular, the demand for the resource is outpacing supply in congested areas. This is primarily due to the physical properties of UHF, which make it highly attractive for mobile communications.
The concept of frequency management employed in modern warfare does not vary much from the U.S. national system conceived in the Communications Act of 1934. In that act, Congress established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as the government's regulatory agency, and frequencies and power output were licensed to entities in a similar fashion to real property. Previously, radio entrepreneurs dominated the communications industry. In the military a similar regulatory system is employed, and spectrum managers use a joint restricted frequency list and a software program known as Spectrum XXI to manage and allocate requirements. Like its FCC counterpart, frequency assignments are segregated on the battlefield as would real property.
While the Windows-based software of Spectrum XXI is a significant improvement over previous tools, it still cannot handle the dynamic tactical environment, and it is exclusively used by the often-overlooked J6/Directorate for Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems. Operational warfighters do not know about it or use it regularly.
Licensing Frequencies
The system of assigning frequencies as if they were real property is outdated and limits our ability to meet future demand. In the commercial sector, restricting frequency bands exclusively to licensed users, regardless of transmission periods, reduces spectrum efficiency and restricts economic growth. Imagine if the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) licensed air space similar to the FCC. Applying the FCC model to the FAA, if weather required that a flight be canceled from New York to Baltimore, the airspace allotted for the flight would be "owned" by a specific company and would therefore be unavailable to other airlines. This would be a disaster to air traffic control and the airline industry and would reduce flight capacity to a fraction of what it is today.
This is exactly the sort of draconian system we use in the United States and in most countries and take with us to our battlefields. It is a system ill-equipped to deal with demand. Instead of a rigid airspace allocation model the FAA uses a dynamic and flexible model capable of rerouting and shifting aircraft as required for fuel, weather, comfort, and emergencies. They have real-time controllers who manage the airspace and aircraft. To the traveling public and media it may seem imperfect, but it is vastly more efficient than the system employed in our country and on our battlefields. If we applied today's frequency management system to airspace, airlines would simply operate their aircraft on specific flight routes in specific time slots. If they deviated from the planned flight route or schedule they would be operating "at their own risk," uncontrolled and risking the lives of anyone else in the air or on the ground in the vicinity. Luck, not control, would be their strategy.
Recently, I approached a multilane intersection experiencing a power outage. The traffic light had shifted operation to a four-way flashing red, leaving the intersection with a form of traffic control about equal in sophistication to the spectrum management system employed in today's battlespace. It did a poor job of controlling the high volume of traffic and required drivers to devise their own prioritization schedule. It reminded me of driving in Naples, Italy, where the apparent rules are, think offensively, don't make eye contact, and never forget the law of gross tonnage.
Such is the present state of battlespace spectrum: a primitive regulatory system, where the law of gross tonnage
in this case transmitter power often trumps warfighting importance. This would never be the case with destructive munitions employment. No joint force commander would leave the success of a kinetic force operation to sheer chance or dumb luck. If you take into account the variables, unknowns, and uncertainties in a modern battlespace regarding spectrum availability at a given place and time, it's easy to see just how much chance and luck play in a modern tactical event.Theory versus Practice
Currently, warfare commanders have limited information available to them for making decisions. Most managers compile a data base of systems and use Spectrum XXI. They are relatively junior personnel, which further increases the likelihood that critical decisions could be made without their input. Most such managers began their careers without combat experience or knowledge of such operations. They live in the communications world of a J6 directorate, are rarely invited into tactical mission-planning discussions, and don't possess the tools to manage spectrum use in real time.
In today's environment it's likely that a low-priority battlespace system can negate a critical tactical system and cause a failed operation. We know this to be true, because it is the type of tactic we employ when we jam. When jamming, an unwanted signal is intentionally introduced into a target receiver. But jamming also occurs when any unwanted signal with similar electromagnetic properties arrives at a receiver. Whether the effects are significant depends on the relative power of the undesired signal to the desired one. If the conflicted receiver happens to be in the hands of a special forces Soldier attempting to capture a high-value enemy combatant, or an unmanned aerial vehicle executing a time-sensitive weapons delivery, the tactical advantage can be lost and the mission scrubbed. Billions of dollars in training and equipment and countless hours of surveillance and intelligence assessment can be wasted by an unwanted signal arriving at the critical receiver at the wrong time.
Ever wonder why wireless devices are prohibited on airliners? Because it's possible that a signal transmitted by a passenger's cell phone or computer could interfere with the aircraft's navigation or communication systems and cause a serious mishap. This is how the FAA controls the spectrum in and around the aircraft.
Does the joint force commander have the same control in and around a critical tactical operation? Certainly not in today's battlespace. Luck is still largely at play.
If the United States hopes to maintain its edge, it must change this dynamic and change it soon. We need to institute an organizational change providing future joint force commanders with the information tools and proper oversight to ensure that effects-based operations are not hindered by electronic fratricide.
New Command and Oversight
I propose a new warfighting commander, the joint force spectrum component commander (JFSCC), equivalent and on a par with other joint force commanders. The JFSCC would be responsible for allocating and prioritizing friendly spectrum use across the battlespace to maximize warfighting effects. He would assess white (host-nation), gray (coalition), and potential red-force (enemy) spectrum use, highlight conflicts, and recommend changes to blue-force operations to negate or minimize unwanted interference. He must be a commander, not an adviser or coordinator, and must be of general or flag officer rank. He must have the power to direct and adjust spectrum use across the five warfighting domains (land, sea, air, cyber, and space), to enable and enhance effects-based operations. Since all electronic emissions are inherently joint, and since none of the warfighting domains can succeed today without electronic emissions, the JFSCC will, over time, become a major player in future combat operations.
The concept of a JFSCC and the perceived ceding or sharing of warfighting power with a non-kinetic commander will be difficult for some, but it is a transition that must take place. One need only observe the countless cyber attacks on U.S. government computer systems to see a parallel phenomenon. In recent years DOD was caught nearly flat-footed in defending its networks and the information stored on them before it was forced to become serious about protecting them. The United States is now playing a catch-up game in the cyber world, one that we hope to win. Nevertheless, the cost to the U.S. taxpayer in terms of money and lost information has been staggering.
For years DOD recklessly permitted hackers to attack, unencumbered by a lengthy chain of command or approval process, while it attempted to react and defend at the speed of bureaucracy, hindered by a desire for consensus. The parallel to our challenges is eye-opening. Will we wait until a combat failure occurs to take action? We ought not. Assuredly, combat failures have already occurred from electronic fratricide; we just didn't know it at the time. Will we allow our conventional warfighting bravado blind us to our vulnerabilities? We hope not, but it will take time to convince our military leadership of the importance of continued investment and education across the ranks to understand and control this resource.
Despite our powerful and technologically advanced fighting force, U.S. military leaders are largely using hope as a plan regarding spectrum, and hope is never a wise strategy. The time has come for a new commander to allocate, manage, and command, to the greatest extent possible, the most precious of all battlespace resources: the electromagnetic spectrum.