“Deep Secrets Revealed”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 30-31, February 2000 Naval History)
Lieutenant Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy
I concur with Mr. Polmar’s theory about the Israeli submarine Dakar, that an accident or a freighter running over her probably caused her tragic sinking. Having grown up in the Middle East, however, the persistent story of the Egyptians sinking the submarine is popular. What seems to add to this rumor is the fact that the Soviets were constructing their first naval base in the Mediterranean at the Egyptian port of Mersa Matrouh, near the Libyan border. Many speculate that the Dakar’s skipper seized the opportunity to conduct a reconnaissance off the coast of Egypt. Finding the wreck off the coast of Crete, however, seems to dispel this notion. It will be interesting to see if the Israeli government decides to raise the wreckage and bring her sailors home for burial—in observance with Jewish custom and in the interest of examining the sub closely.
“Pearl Harbor—Attack From Below”
(See J. Rodgaard, P. Hsu, C. Lucas, A. Biache, pp. 16-23, December 1999; G. Turner, p. 6, J. De Virgilio, p. 6, February 2000 Naval History)
Burl Burlingame
While perhaps appearing to the lay public as new material, the article draws heavily on the previous work of others. Naval historians have been aware of the theory concerning the apparent midget sub in the photograph for nearly a decade. In 1990, while researching the history of the submarine assault on Pearl Harbor in 1941, I noticed in going over the damage reports that one of the torpedo holes in the side of the West Virginia (BB-48) was substantially larger than the other holes. The Ko-Hyoteki midget subs used 21-inch torpedoes, while the B5N “Kate” torpedo bombers dropped 18-inchers. I remembered that during Operation Seamark in 1988, an anomaly the size and shape of a midget submarine had been found a couple of hundred yards away from Battleship Row. I knew that Danny Martinez (the historian at the USS Arizona [BB-39] Memorial) had been scrutinizing photographs of the attack, so I went to him and explained this idea and asked if there were any photos that show this particular area, and he pulled out the photo we subsequently used. There is a fuzzy disturbance in the water behind what appears to be a whaleboat. I took the best print I could find, scanned it, and enhanced the area in question: the characteristic sail and bow of a midget submarine jumped into focus.
In 1991, I presented a paper on the submarine attacks at Pearl Harbor at a conference in Austin, Texas, and included the enhanced image of the submarine. I pointed out the torpedo tracks, concussion rings, and the “roostertails” of spray. I said that it was possible that this was a midget sub, but further analysis was needed. The next year, my book Advance Force Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Navy’s Under- water Assault on America was published. In the meantime, a precise aerial mapping photograph of Pearl Harbor, taken a few days before the attack, was discovered at Hickam Air Force Base. In 1994, the pho- togrammetry firm Autometric concluded that my thesis was correct. They were able to measure the size of the anomaly precisely, thanks to the calibration provided by the aerial mapping photo—and it matches the submarine within inches. Autometric and I disagreed only on the cause of the “roostertails.” Autometric believed the tails were an artifact of the concussion rings; I think they are symptomatic of a trim problem caused both by the torpedo firing and the lack of dynamic control in a craft designed to fire only under way.
I chaired a joint press conference on 6 December 1994, with the Park Service and Autometric, and the notion that a midget submarine participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor hit wire services worldwide. It caused little stir at the time, however, likely because of an over-saturation of stories on the 50th anniversary of World War II. Autometric also issued a slim report, and acknowledged that the historical material came from Advance Force.
Naval History’s article simply expanded on this investigative process, and although it was triggered by myself and Danny Martinez, it has since become the work of many hands. Peter Hsu’s expertise in the field of naval-damage analysis, in particular, has been invaluable.
Commander John Rodgaard, U.S. Naval Reserve
We appreciate Mr. De Virgilio’s critique of our research. We were surprised, however, by his comments that our findings were “debunked” six years ago. Frankly, we (that includes Mr. Burl Burlingame, who originally raised the issue, and Mr. Dan Martinez of the National Park Service) were surprised by the total lack of interest in our findings. We would have welcomed Mr. De Virgilio’s critique, but we never heard a word. If he has additional information that would aid us in our research, we would like him to share it with us.
We think Mr. De Virgilio has missed the point of the article. It was not a review of the earlier research that was presented in December 1994, but rather it highlighted the additional results of an independent analysis conducted by Peter Hsu in 1999. His findings are based on his own observations of the hydrodynamic phenomena seen in the photograph. These findings reinforce our own research.
We are happy to know that Mr. De Virgilio has seen a better photograph in Japan. We assume he has seen a second generation print. If he would let us know where to find this photograph, it would aid us in refining our analyses.
Mr. De Virgilio is correct about the presence of a small craft near the submarine. In fact, the “motor launch” that he sees appears to be a canvas-covered Navy utility boat. We would be delighted to work with Mr. De Virgilio on further research concerning our analyses. A better photograph would be useful in the mathematical analyses of the hydrodynamic phenomena surrounding the submarine and in the vicinity of the West Virginia (BB- 48) and the Oklahoma (BB-37).
“The Real Sand Pebbles”
(See B. Cole, pp. 16-23, February 2000 Naval History)
Hugh L. Farrior
My parents were missionaries of the Presbyterian Church, serving in China from 1910 to 1950, during the turbulent time Mr. Cole discusses in his article. I was born and grew up in Zenjiang (Chinkiang), a port on the south shore of the Yangtze 40 miles east of Nanjing (Nanking). The ships of the Yangtze Patrol were frequent visitors, and my mother, a hospitable individual with strong ties to the Navy, regularly invited the captain of each visiting vessel to come to dinner with two or three of his officers. They enjoyed it especially, since she put a dribble glass at the place of the captain.
In the late 1930s, after the Japanese occupation, these visits became more important. Read Admiral William A. Glassford, who was in command of the Yangtze Patrol, became a warm friend of my parents. Mrs. Glassford visited us in Zenjiang. She and the Admiral made substantial contributions to the work my parents were doing in feeding Chinese refugees. They were kind enough to buy the dress in which my sister graduated from the Shanghai American School in June 1940. During the summer of 1939, when I was 13 years old, Admiral Glassford invited me to ride with him on the Luzon (PG-47) for a trip up the river. It was only overnight, but you can imagine the thrill it was for me. I have vivid memories of the Guam(PG-43) and Luzon. My parents brought the family home in 1940, but went back in fall 1941 and spent 18 months in a Shanghai internment camp before being repatriated.
“Last Veteran of World War II Retires”
(See “Naval History News," p. 56, February 2000 Naval History)
Alvin S. Bogart, U.S. Naval Academy Class of 1942.
I cannot find Captain Earl Fox listed in the U.S. Naval Academy register of alumni for 1942. Did he graduate under another name? Did he ever attend the Academy?
Editor’s Note: After graduating from the University of Richmond in 1941, Fox went on to the Naval Academy. After several months there, he was rushed through an accelerated program for those who already had undergraduate degrees and was posted to the fleet in early 1942.
“Friend or Foe?”
(See R. Browning, pp. 42-45, December 1999 Naval History)
Lieutenant John F. Lyman, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Dr. Browning describes the defensive armament of the Blue Jacket as a “4-inch .50 [and] two 3-inch .50s. . . This construction is incorrect; a slash is more appropriate. The term caliber has three distinct usages. It is used as a general term for the size of large naval guns and artillery. It also is used as a specific term when describing the bore diameter of small arms, particularly when using English units. Finally, caliber is used to express the length of the gun barrel of naval guns, where it is an uncharacterized number that represents the ratio of bore diameter to bore length. This is the correct usage here. The 4-inch/50 naval gun has a barrel that is 50 times four inches, or 200 inches long.
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