"The Submarine Ethos Runs Deep"
(See M. Kessler, pp. 77-78, July 2004 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Eric Jensen, U.S. Navy-Ensign Kessler's analysis of the submarine ethos is what one would expect from an ensign who has never served on board a submarine and is excited about his first duty station. He is, however, misguided and uninformed. Submarine ethos is not grounded in engineering, although engineering is an integral part of what we do. Our ethos is from a warrior past, present, and future. Put simply, we are the silent service, not the nuclear service.
By placing such an importance on engineering, we misunderstand the relationship between engineering and mission accomplishment. The engine room and all the technical marvels within a submarine are there for one purpose, to achieve the mission's objectives. We don't master engineering for fun; we do it to tactically position the ship and kill the enemy. Indeed, if it were the other way around, the navigator would be the reactor positioning officer, the weapons officer would be the "reactor defense officer," and a "nonqual" would stop being a "not useful body" when he qualified as engineering officer of the watch. Instead, it's when he earns his dolphins.
Furthermore, a submariner values the independent and warrior spirit of all his warrior predecessors. Our ethos is founded in the Turtle and grew with the CSS Hunley, USS Wahoo (SS-565), USS Harder (SS-568), and countless other submarines that wrote a distinguished history. In fact, we were a proud service long before the thought of splitting atoms crossed our collective minds.
Submariners draw pride from their independence and their tactical abilities. We feel a certain kinship with German U -boat sailors of World War II, those on board the Kursk, and especially to Rear Admiral Eugene B. Fluckey, Rear Admiral Richard H. O'Kane, and Commander Mush Morton. They, not Admiral Hyman Rickover, are the celebrated heroes of the submarine service, although Rickover's contributions are important to our missions today. Submariners are the elite warriors; that is where our pride rests. My message to Ensign Kessler is, Get hot! Your ship's qual card is waiting for you.
"Special Review: Serving a Nation at War"
(See pp. 59-61, July 2004 Proceedings)
EDITOR'S NOTE: The Web site address in the July issue to the U.S. Army's white paper, "Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities" was incorrect. The correct address is: www.usni.org/ proceedings/Articles04/PRO06army servicenation.htm
The July issue also included reviews of the Army's new vision. In this issue, retired U.S. Navy Captain Peter Swartz adds his analysis to the mix-page 64.
"Martial Law, 2004 Style"
(See E. Fidell, p. 26, April 2004; M. Farkas, pp. 22-23, June 2004 Proceedings)
"We Have Met Our Own Worst Enemy"
(See S, Ukeiley, pp. 26-27, June 2004; B. Goss, C. H. Depew, pp. 10-14, July 2004 Proceedings)
Commander Edward Robinson, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Captain Farkas seems to think that Mr. Fidell, by saying we must remain within the guidelines of our own moral and legal establishment, somehow strikes a blow against our ability to fight terrorism. This is interesting because the foci of Mr. Fidell's argument are the two U.S. citizens who were arrested in the United States but are being held in isolation in much the same manner as those captured during fighting overseas. Because Captain Farkas uses a simplistic approach to analyze Mr. Fidell's article, I will use the same approach on Captain Farkas. One could argue that he proposes that any U.S. citizen who acts on any disagreement with the administration loses all constitutional rights. The basis for this position appears to be an argument that Yaser Hamdi and José Padilla are not civilians because of the nature of this "war." How-ever, this is like saying that the Simbonese Liberation Army or Terry Nichols are not civilians and should have been dealt with as POWs instead of through our civilian courts. That may be his opinion, but God help our country if that position prevails.
Major Ukeiley, on the other hand, sums up Mr. Fidell's argument in the closing words of his commentary, when he notes that "the greatest threat to our constitutionally guaranteed way of life" is not external "but our own self-imposed erosion of liberties we claim to protect." This is the real basis of the article by Mr. Fidell. The issue is not the tearing down of the government's policies as stated by Captain Farkas but the tearing down of our Constitution. The example we set by upholding our Constitution even in the face of terrorism is a clear message of hope to the world. "Do as I say and not as I do" doesn't work in child rearing or in international relations. It never takes more than one Abu Ghraib prison incident to cancel all of the hard earned "attaboys" accumulated on the world stage.
The Commander Failed at Abu Ghraib
Commander Michael Collins, U.S. Naval Reserve-In 1952, the destroyer Hobson (DD-464) collided with the carrier USS Wasp (CV-18). Even though the Hobson's captain was asleep in his cabin, he was held accountable by courts -martial. This issue led to an opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal called "Hobson's Choice" that I have seen on the bulkhead of many an at-sea cabin. The point of the article is that we as leaders assume ultimate responsibility-and more important, accountability-when we accept the privilege of command.
So I am particularly dismayed by the scenes of Abu Ghraib prison-not just the abuse and breakdown of military discipline and leadership that shocks us all, but the visage of U.S. Army Brigadier General Janis Karpinksi appearing on television proclaiming that she is a scapegoat, she didn't have proper guidance, she didn't have policy, or her latest excusedu-jour. Setting policy and providing guidance and oversight for her command were precisely her jobs. The sight of a commanding officer trying to duck responsibility for the activities that happen on his or her watch is depressing. But to see a general officer whining during one interview after another is too much. To whom much is given, much is expected.
"Defeat al Qaeda on the Waterfront"
(See Commander J. Pelkofski, pp. 32-35, June 2004 Proceedings)
Master Chief Torpedoman's Mate (Surface Warfare/Air Warfare) M. R. Vimislik, U.S. Navy-While I applaud Commander Pelkofski's enthusiastic commitment to "hardening" our Navy's collective force protection posture, I remain skeptical that the commitment is yet firmly fixed on the waterfront. There have been notable improvements to the Navy's antiterrorism/ force protection (AT/FP) programs in recent years. Shore installations' auxiliary security force training, manning, and employment have been fortified. While in port, shipboard sailors working with base security forces have enhanced waterborne security at harbors and piers. Formal training requirements for AT/FP courses have been boosted and are now a standardized element of the Fleet Readiness Program. Improvements notwithstanding, it's not surprising that even in the midst of a global war on terrorism, there are still significant gaps in our readiness to meet new terrorist threats.
Increasingly, commercial vendors are used to deliver AT/FP training to our sailors. The merits of commercial instruction for sailors may be debated, but there are benefits to this arrangement, such as drawing on the experience of veterans who have transitioned to the private sector as well as the establishment of a long-term cadre of instructors without the at trition inherent in Navy instructors because of sea-shore rotation. Many of these contractors possess extensive military and law enforcement experience and are highly skilled in AT/FP skills such as close quarters battle, small-arms marksmanship, and small-unit tactics. Significant numbers of them are also combat veterans. Others, however, seem to be merely capitalizing on the burgeoning market in AT/FP instruction. Sailors must receive force protection training from qualified and experienced professionals-warriors should train warriors. We should not entrust any self-styled force protection "experts" with providing high -risk instruction to our sailors without credible experience in exercising the skills our sailors need to defend the fleet.
The commander's admonition, "shoot to kill," is the right tack to take, but is difficult when our armed watch Standers are not trained accordingly. Though force protection is at a heightened state of readiness (and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future) and more sailors are carrying weapons in the course of their duties, the bulk of their marksmanship "training" remains annual small arms qualifications. While it is true that a small percentage of sailors undergo shipboard security engagement weapons training, any proficiency attained is certainly not honed by the traditional annual weapons qualifications they subsequently receive. A decided lack of range facilities combined with mediocre noncombat expenditure allowances contributes to woefully inadequate preparation for our sailors to shoot to kill. Frequent and aggressive training for our armed watch slanders in such areas as firing from covered positions, target engagement training, tactical/combat reloading, and learning to quickly assess and clear weapons malfunctions are all critical to "unquestioned proficiency." Some of this training can be accomplished without a range, but armed watch Standers must log time putting rounds downrange if we wish to succeed against dedicated and extremely well trained aggressors.
Another fundamental area in which our watch slanders do not get enough training has to do with rules of engagement (ROE) and the decision-making skills that allow a sailor to quickly and confidently know when to shoot. Each of the three basic AT/FP courses (armed sentry course, shipboard security engagement weapons training, and force protection fundamentals training) includes discussions of deadly force and the use of force continuum, but no in -depth ROE discussions. It is incumbent on each unit to train, retrain, and train again our sailors in the areas of ROE, deadly force, and the use of force continuum. We need to address this topic to our armed watch slanders with the same constancy of purpose we do when discussing the abuse of alcohol and sexual improprieties. The decision to shoot or not shoot is not always clear, even to those trained and experienced in making this decision. When sailors who are not singular experts in law enforcement or counterterrorism must make this decision, it can be ambiguous and fraught with uncertainty. This topic is complex and understandably difficult to teach; there is no clear -cut checklist or logical decision matrix for sailors to rely on or consult. Only through constant discussion, practical application training with simulators and/or at the range, and a thorough understanding of ROE will our sailors be best poised to prevent another terrorist attack such as befell the USS Cole (DDG-67).
Erwin Rommel stated, "the best form of welfare for the troops is first-class training." Our enemies undoubtedly understand that training is the foundation for success. To prevent more terrorist attacks against naval forces, we must also recognize the importance of expertly delivered and uncompromisingly effective training by competent and experienced warriors.
"Ask Questions about Our Ability to Conduct Antisubmarine Warfare"
(See A. H. Konetzni, pp. 78-79, June 2004 Proceedings)
Commander Dave Bean, U.S. Navy-Yes, we should ask pointed, potent questions regarding our ability to conduct antisubmarine warfare (ASW)-but not in a transparent attempt to defend the force structure of any particular naval platform. Admiral Konetzni misses a terrific opportunity to frame the debate regarding this warfare specialty by engaging the reader in a series of rhetorical questions that are more appropriate to a risk analysis of a potential submarine force reduction. His discussion yields a palpable usversus-them sentiment that does little to move the Navy ahead in this field.
When viewed alone, the author's concerns regarding the level of persistence and performance of distributed systems in hostile environments are indeed valid; likewise his concerns about the ability of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) to transmit and analyze collected intelligence. Here are questions that must be addressed as the Navy attempts to field these new technologies, both of which may constitute an important element of our coordinated antisubmarine warfare (ASW) efforts. As the admiral points out, "[fjuture technologies should be pursued and . . . incorporated into our forces." Yet his counterpoints here and elsewhere serve only to show how submarines can best the capabilities of the new technologies, presumably establishing that a one-for-one exchange is untenable. This evolution (or, to some, revolution) need not come at the wholesale expense of our submarine force as the article implies; a more intelligent application will realize the extent to which the new technologies complement the submarine force, and will achieve an "appropriate force structure" with that in mind.
Distributed systems and UUVs may not match the performance of today's attack submarines, but are those same subs optimized for "the most likely threat and environment"? How willing is any Virginia (SSN -774)-class submarine commander to venture well inside the noisy 100 fathom curve to locate and track a threat diesel boat? How often do today's submariners train to that standard? Here is an area in which new technologies offer great promise at significantly less cost than a multibillion dollar submarine.
Admiral Konetzni has it exactly right when he notes the need to preserve seaborne access to effect power projection; undersea superiority will rival air superiority in importance as potential adversaries continue to develop their submarine capabilities. he also gets it right when he states that "we must maintain enough mixture to prevent a single vulnerability from defeating the entire force." Yet instead of exploring how new technologies might serve as force multi pliers in a reenergized Navywide ASW effort, he seems to denigrate their capabilities through inappropriately direct comparison with submarines. The end result does little to move this important debate ahead.
"Rum, Sodomy, and the Lash"
(See E. T. Ervin, pp. 79-80, july 2004 Proceedings)
Tim Barbosa-I read this article with great amusement. Being dunked in saltwater? Being covered with filth? Eating repulsive substances? Whew! One could be reading about an upcoming reality show episode.
"Assassination and Abduction: Viable Foreign Policy Tools?"
(See J. Collins, pp. 66-67, April 2004; W. H. Parks, J. Collins, J. Sanford, B. Killebrew, pp. 8-16, May 2004; D. Winters, pp. 16-18, june 2004; H. Parks, pp. 18-20, july 2004 Proceedings)
William J. Daugherty, Ph.D.-As a former Marine Corps officer, retired Central Intelligence Agency officer whose last assignment was in covert action policy, and author of a forthcoming book on covert action policies and the presidency, I'd like to correct several significant errors in Commander Winters's letter. he objects to-indeed, appears to take personal umbrage at-the use of the CIA in roles that he asserts are "rightfully the domain of the military," including the use of the CIA's version of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle to kill several terrorists. Let me set the record straight.
First, Commander Winters claims the CIA is a civilian organization and not "militarily accountable" because its personnel do not fall under the Uniform Code of Military justice. That is true, but also is irrelevant. The CIA and its personnel fall under the purview of the Constitution, relevant federal statutes, presidential executive orders, and the CIA's own internal rules and regulations. Personnel violating any of these standards may be held accountable for their actions in federal courts, just as military personnel may be called to account in a court -martial.
It is also true, as Commander Winters asserts, that CIA personnel do not take a "military oath." But neither do our military personnel, for the simple fact that there never has been a separate military oath for Defense Department personnel. all government officers, including military and CIA personnel (and Foreign Service, etc.), take the same oath of office as the President, to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution" (Article II, section 1, paragraph 7 of that document). There is no separate military oath-all military personnel understand their first loyalty is to the Constitution, the country, and civilian leadership, and not to any military organization or commanders.
As for undertaking missions that are allegedly only military in nature, the National security Act of 1947 gave the CIA five missions, one of which was "to perform other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National security Council [NSC] may from time to time direct." While this does not explicitly give the CIA the mission of conducting covert action missions, of which paramilitary operations are one component (propaganda and political action are the other two), the first CIA general counsel, Lawrence Houston, advised that if the President or NSC ordered the CIA to conduct such operations, and if Congress provided the funding, then the operations would be legal. President Truman agreed, and it has been so ever since. Nor is there is anything in the Constitution or federal law that prohibits the assignment of paramilitary operations to the CIA-indeed, quite the contrary.
Since 1947 the CIA has conducted numerous paramilitary operations, often augmented by DoD special operations personnel assigned to the agency, at the direction of the President and the NSC. Since 1974, this authorization has been required by an act of Congress to be placed in writing in a document known as a presidential finding, in which the President explicitly states the operations are in the national interest; the finding is then transmitted to the intelligence committees in Congress within 48 hours of being signed by the President. This presidential authorization, supported and funded by Congress, obviates any allegation that CIA paramilitary actions are (as stated by Commander Winters) "strictly and legally speaking, illegitimate." Indeed, periodic legislative acts by Congress have served to legalize or legitimize covert action, including paramilitary capabilities, by establishing the legal ground rules for these operations. Moreover, the White House also establishes rules for the oversight, approval, and review of these programs.
There are numerous reasons the CIA maintains a paramilitary operations capability, and why the President deliberately opts to use CIA capabilities rather than those of the military. One reason is that the CIA often possesses a capability the military does not. This was the case of the Hellfire-equipped Predators: the CIA had them, the military didn't; the President signed a finding that authorized the ClA to use them in the war against terrorism; and Congress provided the funding. Despite Commander Winters's assertions, there is nothing in law that prohibited the CIA from performing that mission. It is worth noting that in most respects, the capabilities of CIA paramilitary units and Defense Department special operations elements are complementary, not competitive. It is also worth mentioning that it was the CIA that developed the forerunner of the Predator (the GNAT-750) and successfully used it in two deployments to the Balkans in the mid0 -0 1990s before the military deployed its first Predators.
"Our Enemy Is Not Terrorism"
(See J. Lehman, pp. 52-54, May 2004; R. Slennis, pp. 24-26, july 2004 Proceedings)
Commander Markham B. Dossett, U.S. Naval Reserve-I enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve at the age of 31 because of the leadership of President Ronald Reagan and secretary of the Navy John Lehman. After secretary Lehman left the Navy Department, the company I work for was lucky to have him on our team. I am extremely proud to have served with and for him and to have known the only leader in the great United States who has told the unvarnished truth concerning the real adversary in our current conflict. I find it reassuring that we still have at least one leader who has the intellectual honesty and intestinal fortitude to forgo the currently palatable code word terrorism and put the pipper on radical Islamic fun damentalism.
"Where Are the Weapons of Mass Destruction?"
(See R. Riggs, p. 106, March 2004; P. Malone, p. 10, April 2004; F. Possert, p. 22, R. Mcllcy, p. 22, J. McClaran, p. 24, May 2004; W. Thielharl, p. 20, june 2004 Proceedings)
Leutnant zur see Thomas M. Piel, German Navy-Since when did the term liberal become a swear word? Private Possert's use of this term reminds me of a speech Joseph Goebbels held in the Reichstag more than half a century ago. he condemned socialists and liberals as Undeutsche -"unGermans." Whenever President George Bush talks about "un -American" behavior, it sends a shiver down my spine and I see black -and -white TV coverage before my inner eye, showing a small guy from the Rhineland with a crippled foot who had set the Germans' hatred in flames. Maybe Private Possert should read some history books himself and not accuse Commander Riggs of eating covers of books instead of reading them.
Learn from the mistakes we Europeans made. Only a bad military service would prevent Commander Riggs from achieving a higher platform only because of his writings. Commander Riggs followed his orders and launched those missiles. When the smoke cleared and he was safe at home, he allowed himself to question his deeds. he acted in the best military traditions: follow orders first, debrief later. We all want thinking officers. We don't want mere followers. Blinder Gehorsam (blind obedience) is a leadership method needed only in dictatorships, not democracies. That's what the United States and its allies retought us Germans after World War II.
The strength of a democracy shows in how it adheres to its own rules. If it does not follow its own laws and tries to create blind spots, a democracy has become a farce. We see that in a lot of banana republics, in Guantanamo, and in cases of personal martial law.
The Bush administration seems to fear its own set of morals, ethics, and laws. Why are the prisoners of Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo not granted the same rights as child molesters in Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania? Right, they're terrorists-but not guilty until they're put before a trial and found guilty. What would you say to a state attorney who tries to put somebody in prison with whom he worked for decades? That's okay, but looks a little weird. Then the court decides that there is not enough proof against this somebody. The state attorney pulls a gun and shoots this somebody, later stating that deed was to safeguard his vital interest.
The attorney is Mr. Bush, the court is the security Council of the United Nations, the only entity that may declare an attack war (the United States complied with this in signing the U.N. Charter, but President Bush does not seem to care), and this somebody is Saddam now-and who else later?
Weapons of mass destruction are the reason for the U.S. attack on Iraq. It's pointless to ask where they are. They point is: when do you attack Iran, Russia, China, Great Britain, India, Pakistan, and France? They have weapons of mass destruction, too. Attack yourself-you own most of the weapons of mass destruction yourself. Why didn't you attack in 1988, when Saddam used those weapons? Is there a connection I have missed between the 11 September 2001 attacks and Iraq? From my perspective, George Bush turned the United States into a banana republic with everything it needed: strong firms to back him up, a mingling of interests that continues to this day (Halliburton, Carlisle Group, the fact that half of Bush's cabinet worked in the oil industry), justice blind spots, and a stampede on your friends' feelings.
Blinder Gehorsam to a country's leader is something for a banana republic, not the United States. You have the right and the freedom to think and ask questions and you should not diminish those rights yourself.
I'm afraid of the United States. You don't follow your own rules. No judge and jury for prisoners, as your law requires (Guantanamo). No respect for the U.N. Charter that you signed (Afghanistan, Iraq). What about the Geneva Convention in Iraq? Don't mistake those atrocities against prisoners as acts by a few personnel. There are far too many crimes on the record. U.S. and British personnel are badly trained as prison guards, have bad morale, and some shady guys with trench coats and hats tell them to humiliate your Muslim prisoners in the worst way possible. Why were those orders obeyed, when those men and women knew it was wrong, both legally and morally?
Those rules and morals are the difference between the good guys and the bad guys. For Americans, war is a tool of politics. For Europeans, war is the ultimate consequence, the one significant sign that politics failed.
If I didn't care about the United States and its citizens, I wouldn't have taken the time to write a letter in a foreign language. This is a letter from friend to friend. Your best critic is your best friend. he is honest and means well. I mean well. Don't brush aside my arguments. Discuss them. Don't let free speech be the slave of the war against terror!
"Have the Sick and Wounded Been Forgotten Again?"
(See A. Smith, pp. 44-47, june 2004 Proceedings)
Colonel Talbot N. Vivian, U.S. Air Force, Medical Service Corps (Retired)-As the former Chief of Medical Planning, Readiness, and Logistics for Air Combat Command, I read Captain Smith's article with great interest. His critical points boil down to two issues: the need to fundamentally change how the naval medical services manage mass casualties, and the need for jointness.
The Navy lacks the ability to respond quickly and effectively to a mass casualty situation, be it a result of Marine casualties on shore or an attack on a ship. The Navy's shipboard capabilities cannot accommodate more than a few injuries. If a carrier was successfully attacked by a cruise missile there would be hundreds of burned and injured sailors. The small medical staff and supporting supplies would be unable to handle the situation effectively. The Navy does not have rapidly deployable medical teams that could be dispatched to assist in such a situation.
The Navy, like the other services, developed in the early 1980s a 500-bed medical system known as a deployable medical system. The Navy calls theirs a fleet hospital. This system is the primary deployable medical support for Marines on shore. This system takes 28 to 60 days to set up. The other option is the Navy's hospital ships. As mentioned by Captain Smith, these are very user unfriendly. They are deep -draft ships and movement of patients is limited almost exclusively to helicopter transport. If the ship is not placed within helicopter range of an aeromedical evacuation airfield, once the ship's beds are filled she must leave her station.
The Navy needs to develop something similar to the Air Force's expeditionary medical system, a very lightweight, easily transportable 25 - to 144-bed hospital. The 25-bed version can be transported in one and a half C -17s. The Air Force also has a five -person critical care self-contained surgical team (mobile field surgical team) that can be dropped into a critical situation to act independently or in concert with other medical assets. This has proven to be exceptionally effective in environments such as Afghanistan.
Joint doctrine currently specifies who is responsible for all theater medical assets. It is the responsibility of the theater surgeon to establish roles and responsibilities in his or her area of responsibility. The theater surgeon in concert with the transportation command surgeon establishes tactical and strategic aeromedical evacuation routes. Captain Smith asks if there is sufficient authority vested in the theater surgeon to ensure component plans are coherent. The authority is there. But when the theater surgeon is a Navy captain or Air Force or Army colonel vying for flag rank, they listen closely when their component surgeon speaks.
The Navy has not worked well in a joint environment. During the Beirut crisis I was the administrator of the 50th Tactical Hospital. We had been put on alert to deploy to Beirut prior to the bombing. We were to be located at the Beirut International Airport. We were told that senior Navy officials have stated that care of the Marines was a Navy responsibility and did not need or want Air Force help. I dare say if we had deployed, we may have made a difference.
When I attended the Armed Forces Staff College, Atlantic Fleet Commander in Chief Admiral Carlisle Trost spoke to my class. he began his talk with, "I have my own Army and Air Force, I do not need you." This has been a common attitude within the Navy for many years. Though Defense Department policy requires each service to plan and source for their own service, this is no longer a realistic policy. The Army, Navy, and Air Force medical services must learn to work and play together if they are to provide the highest quality of care to our military personnel.
"U.S. Navy, Inc."
(See J. Byron, pp. 48-51, May 2004; R. Lewis, pp. 26-28, july 2004 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Eric B. Verhulst, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve, Chaplain, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, Camp St. Michael, Mahmudiya, Iraq-Captain Byron makes a rather glaring error. It is a common error in both the military and the church (the other area with which I am familiar), but one that renders his prescriptions little more than pie-in-the-sky dreaming. The U.S. Navy is not a business, big or otherwise. It is a government bureaucracy and a military force. To be a business is to cease to be a Navy.
In a military organization, for example, rank matters. Total Quality Leadership did not fail because of the "unwillingness of some admirals to relinquish personal power." The program failed because it was laughably unrealistic in its perception of the Navy. With its bottom-up approach and process action teams and so on, it ignored the fact that in combat-the Navy's primary purpose-one cannot take the time to discuss with subordinates whether to take this or that course of action. One person, and one person only, must decide and decide immediately. That one is the commander. Others must obey, and must obey with equal immediacy. The admiral is not just unwilling to surrender personal power. he is not permitted to do so by the very nature of the military's form and function. It is obvious that a whole different set of incentives and motivations govern the actions of people in such an organization than govern those in an organization whose purpose is to maximize profit.
The second aspect of the Navy's essential character is that it is a government bureaucracy. The restraint on the Navy, therefore, is not primarily fiscal but political. Our funds are not determined by our ability to produce a higher quality product at lower cost, thus underselling our competition and maximizing our profits. Our funding is determined by a vote in Congress. We buy a certain aircraft not because it is the most efficient blend of fiscal and functional requirements but because it is the most efficient blend of political and functional requirements. Even such mundane things as the location of our facilities and who cleans our buildings are constrained by political considerations far more than financial efficiencies.
Politics is the art of getting votes in Congress, city hall, state legislatures, local precincts, and districts. It is these votes that get translated into dollars available for ships, aircraft, salaries, and office supplies. And it may well happen, and often has, that the most fiscally responsible thing is also politically irresponsible. That may be lamentable to those whose only concern is the pocketbook, but it is an essential element of the Navy.
We could turn the Navy into a private enterprise, as did the privateers of yore, but a private enterprise will be concerned with private profit, not national security. We've run into that already in dealing with support contractors. It's dangerous to run convoys with food and parts from Kuwait to Iraq. A lot of contractors don't think it's worth any amount of money to drive that route-what good is profit if you're not around to enjoy it? As a result, for a time anyway, there was a severe logistical crunch at some of our bases in Iraq. How much worse would it be with a contract Navy?
To be sure, the Navy and all other government bureaucracies waste money. Drawing parallels between business and the Navy may prove helpful. But we must not be led astray by a similarity in the amount of money managed. Any program of reform that fails to account for the nature of the Navy as a military and government organization with a unique set of motivations and incentives based on that is doomed to failure. Worse, in confusing the nature of the institutions and their respective purposes, such a program runs a grave risk of causing mission failure.
Interview: Douglas Brinkley
(See p. 56, May 2004; J. Kelly, pp. 16-18, july 2004 Proceedings)
Felix Finch-Captain Kelly states: "The time for antiwar protests is before the war stalls." Sorry, Captain Kelly, that same first amendment that allows warmongers to speak for war during peace allows peace-mongers to speak for peace during war.
Let's start with a definition of war. Even if you were to throw out the first amendment while at war, did war start? I don't recall any declaration of war. I recall the same shameful kind of resolution taken by so -called leaders today, using fudged facts and outright lies to get a vague authorizing resolution passed, then abusing it beyond recognition. That they considered fraud necessary speaks volumes about their faith in their own cause. How could any prewar debate be useful under such conditions? If someone goes to jail based on forged evidence, they get a retrial. Should they shut their mouths as soon as the judge raps the gavel?
But let's get back to that pesky first amendment. Was this war somehow different from other political events? Were we threatened with imminent destruction by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese? What made it imperative that those in opposition suddenly shut their mouths as soon as war started? Shall we have a repeat of Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, where dissent was treason and dissenters vanished?
"I Remember Ronald Reagan"
(See M. Kalleres, N. R. Thunman, p. 30, july 2004 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Bill Thompson, U.S. Navy (Retired), President Emeritus, U.S. Navy Memorial Foundation-I too remember Ronald Reagan, from a luncheon, circa 1972, in the Pentagon. Our party was Admiral E. R. (Bud) Zumwalt, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, Governor Reagan, his aide, and myself, then serving as Chief of Information for the Navy Department. After some pleasantries, the governor asked the CNO how the current U.S. Navy stacked up with the Soviet Navy, Admiral Zumwalt's favorite subject. The "Z" presented his usual outstanding descriptions of the two navies. he pointed out the rapid increase in the strength of the Soviet Navy. Their ships, aircraft, and submarines were good and formidable, and they are far ahead of us in cruise missiles. Our ships were being run ragged in the Vietnam War. he concluded that if the two were ever stood up face to face in a war at sea, the U.S. Navy would have less than a 50% chance of winning.
Reagan was startled and said that was a strong statement coming from the CNO. Why hadn't he ever heard that before? Bud Zumwalt turned to me and said, "Bill, you are on stage." That was also a surprise, but I explained that Admiral Zumwalt was answering a question and that we thought in his situation, his position, he should reply honestly. Whenever we included such information in a speech, the Defense Department deleted it in the clearance process. When I asked for a reason, it was always, "That's policy." When pressed further, it was revealed that "the White House dictates that policy."
I added that it was not for me to question the President and for various reasons did not want to provoke a public discussion of the matter. However, we felt it was something the public should know about.
The luncheon ended with Governor Reagan being rather quiet but thanking Admiral Zumwalt for the lunch and the disturbing information.
I also remember Ronald Reagan for his sharp wit and his one -liners usually emanating from his good humor and optimistic outlook. John Cosgrove, chairman of the Navy Memorial dedication committee, and I called on President Reagan in 1987 to present him with a 24-inch replica of the Lone Sailor statue, the principal piece of statuary at the Navy Memorial. At the presentation, I stated that the Lone Sailor represents all Navy veterans, officer and enlisted, male and female, for the past 210 years of U.S. naval history. The President thanked me and said, "It is always nice to know someone older than I am." That statue continues to reside in the White House, stationed at the entrance to the White House mess. (The Navy provides the personnel who operate the White House mess.)
"Barbarians at the Gate"
(See P. Marx, pp. 32-36, May 2004; S. Ziomek, p. 10, june 2004 Proceedings)
Jack E. Hammond-There is only one problem with Colonel Wasielewski's idea to sprinkle U.S. Marine Corps teams in Afghan border villages, similar to the highly successful Marine Corps Combined Action Programs in South Vietnam: It won t work.
Afghanistan is in no way, shape, or form comparable to South Vietnam. In fact, the Afghan border culture is almost as if it were from another planet. Of all the people on the earth, the Afghans along the border area dislike outsiders the most. At the top of that list are non-Moslems-i.e., Kafir, an Islamic term for a person who refuses to submit himself to Allah, or a disbeliever. (Number 2 is Shiia Moslems.) Anyone who has been in Afghanistan for any length of time or studied Afghanistan (ask the British and the Russians) will tell you that in the strongest terms.
I commend the Flashman series (New York: Plume Books, reissue edition 1986) by George McDonald Fraser and Bugles and a Tiger (New York: Viking Press, 1956) by John Masters to Proceedings readers. These books will explain clearly the point I and others are making.