The Joint Support Ship will mean a plunge into deeper international defense waters for the Canadian Navy—but at what cost?
In the next six years, the Canadian Navy likely will acquire the Joint Support Ship (JSS, formerly the afloat logistics and sealift capability ship). A combination of fast sealift and auxiliary oil replenishment ship (AOR), the JSS may mark the transition of the Navy from a blue-water, destroyer-based fleet to a globally deployable green-water fleet with a more land-support-oriented mission. It also may drag the entire Canadian Forces (CF) kicking and screaming into being a fully fledged joint institution. However, because the ship is fundamentally the result of the peculiarities of Canadian defense budgeting, it may be another Canadian defense white elephant.
Canada's approach to security has been warped by the presence of the United States. Undefendable yet unassailable, Canada always has adopted a laissez-faire approach to its own security. Reacting to a resurgence in this sentiment following the end of the Cold War, the CF rearticulated the foundations of Canadian military power, led at first by the Navy. As far back as 1993, the Navy attempted to assess its role in the post-Cold War environment in documents such as The Maritime Command Vision. Some of this was part of the effort to justify the service to a skeptical public burdened by massive public debts in a recessionary period. However, one also can see a service struggling to define its mission in an era when the constants it had taken for granted for almost 50 years suddenly were removed.
Thus, it is all the more interesting that when replacing the Canadian Navy's three ageing AORs began to be considered in this period, the Navy seemed to be thinking in a very strategic fashion. Rather than simply requesting that Protecteur, Preserver, and Provider be replaced in a one-for-one program, the Navy conceived of a multirole support vessel (MRSV) that would combine the traditional AOR functions of resupply and replenishment with the duties of a fast sealift ship and possibly a command-and-control ship. Sealift had been an area long identified as a shortfall by the CF. The Navy had argued for a greater sealift capability throughout the 1960s, while exercises conducted in the 1980s had identified the critical deficiencies the CF faced in deploying its forces for NATO commitments.1 Still, in proposing the MRSV, it is likely the Navy was responding to traditional Canadian pecuniary tightfistedness when it comes to major defense capital projects. Any AOR replacement project that could demonstrate increased utility to the other services and other government departments would have that much greater chance of approval. In other words, naval strategy was being led by the budget rather than by service doctrine and Canadian strategic interests.
And yet the JSS, as the MRSV came to be called, may represent a transformative project for the Canadian Forces. It has the potential to change the CF from a force configured to fight armored engagements in Central Europe and blue-water naval engagements into a lighter, more globally deployable expeditionary force able to address the changed international context in the 21 st century.
The 1990s were a busy time for the Canadian military. More globally active than ever, the CF had to rely on the United States and commercial charter companies to provide the critical lift to move and sustain it in theater. While lift also was important during the Cold War, the CF was (and remains) not organized for global expeditionary warfare except in a piecemeal, ad hoc fashion.
The CF vision document, Strategy 2020, is a fundamental shift in that it calls for global strategic mobility by the CF. Preceding Strategy 2020 by seven years, the JSS will be the first major capital project that will conform directly to several of the objectives outlined in that document. And while relations between the Canadian national defense and foreign affairs communities remain chilly, there is a growing acknowledgment of the need to focus on capabilities that enhance Canada's participation in peace-support operations. With its ability to lift CF equipment to distant shores, the JSS opens other avenues to government decision makers, such as support to the nongovernmental organization/private volunteer organization (NGO/ PVO) community, enhancement of Canadian disaster relief efforts, and increased ability to mount evacuation operations. The JSS represents the "integration of national strategy and vision, force development, and force employment doctrine as it pertains to Canadian maritime forces."2 As such, it would be a radical departure in terms of Canadian force development and military diplomacy.
The JSS is designed to accommodate three missions within a single hull: underway replenishment, sealift, and command and control for joint and combined operations, including a limited capability for logistics-over-the-shore support. It will lack the purpose-built amphibious features of ships commonly associated with the Royal Marines and U.S. Marine Corps, but will seek to move the CF away from its current ad hoc approach to amphibious operations. Joint, interoperable with our major allies, and globally deployable, the JSS must be capable of meeting a "wide range of policy options dealing with the increased demand for Canadian Forces participation in peace keeping operations and mid to low intensity peace support operations." The platform also has to be "capable of providing solutions to a wide variety of military needs and purposes."3
This demanding list of tasks will require a relatively large hull, in the neighborhood of 27,000-35,000 tons displacement. The JSS must be able to:
* Carry out a three-point replenishmentat-sea evolution
* Provide 7,500 lane meters of sealift capacity within three ships
* Accommodate a 75-man joint headquarters, including all command, control, and communications facilities
* Conduct noncombatant evacuation operations and administrative over-the-beach landings
* Provide helicopter support operations, including helicopter second-line maintenance
* Provide task group medical and dental support4
This will enable the JSS to carry 85% of the materiel for a Canadian battle group, together with a 10-day supply of ammunition and fuel and a 30-day supply of other commodities.
While amphibious in nature, the JSS is meant to land forces in benign environments; there is no intention presently to develop a capability to land Canadian land forces in the teeth of armed opposition. The JSS concept of employment calls for the transport of equipment by sea with the transport of troops by air.5 Still, the shift from the Protecteur/Sea King combination to the JSS/new maritime helicopter duo will represent an enormous leap in capability for the Canadian Navy.6
Medium-power navies must provide sufficient forces for their governments to deal with not only typical naval contingencies but also unexpected ones.7 Given the continuing focus on human security and the developing expeditionary nature of the Canadian Forces, the JSS is the force multiplier that will enable the Canadian government to react to many diverse situations.8
If anything confirmed the need for some organic CF sealift capability, it was the summer 2000 incident involving the containership GTS Katie. During the CF redeployment from Kosovo, the Katie was chartered to transport 500 tons of ammunition, including 390 containers for the battle group deployed there. Also on board were close to 600 CF vehicles, including some of its modern Coyote LAV Ills (light armored vehicles similar to U.S. Strykers). According to one shipping expert, penny pinching on the part Department of National Defense, combined with the department's failure to examine sufficiently the nature of the charter contract and the histories of the subcontractors, led to the surprise dispute that stalled the vessel just outside Canadian territorial waters. HMCS Athabaskan had to insert a boarding party onto the Katie to commandeer the vessel. The political embarrassment of losing control of some of the CF's most valuable equipment has aided the cause of the JSS.'9
As attractive as the JSS may be for both the CF and government decision makers, problematic issues remain.
* Tasking. As a sealift ship, the JSS will be a strategic asset for the Canadian Forces controlled by the head of CF operations instead of the maritime commander. This is a significant risk for the Navy, as it will mean one or both coastal fleets may be without replenishment support at times. Currently, the JSS project calls for at least three ships, four if funding permits. One or two ships will be needed on each coast. In the event of a major contingency, both coasts could be denuded of operational support ships, restricting the operations of the Navy's surface combatants. The Navy has been able to work around these occasional absences by using U.S. assets, but in the event of a national crisis during the deployment of the JSS fleet, U.S. assets may be unavailable. Regardless of Canadian desires for interoperability, strategic dependence on U.S. assets makes for poor sovereign policy.
The Army has serious doubts about the utility of the JSS for land operations. With only 7,500 lane meters of sealift capacity, the JSS will not begin to resolve the strategic sealift needs of the Army, which requires 36,200 lane meters do perform sealift. As such, the CF will continue to be heavily reliant on commercial shipping in times of crisis. Similarly, the lack of any ability to transport both equipment and personnel at the same time will pose significant logistical problems when the ships move into theater.
* Operational Identity. The capital budget of the CF is under intense pressure. Because of its utility, the JSS may survive any cuts to capital programs; however, there is a risk the Navy may attempt to load more capability onto these ships in lieu of pursuing other projects. Locating sealift and replenishment together with air defense on a single hull, for example, would complicate further the tasking of the vessel, and raises safety issues as well. Although the Canadian Navy has a long tradition of design innovation, this would be a radical departure from standard naval design and operational practices.
* Joint Issues. Almost certainly, the JSS will be a catalyst for the CF in improving joint relations among the services. The individual Canadian elements (services) are more interoperable with their U.S. or NATO equivalents than they are with each other. The Army needs reassurance that the Navy's proposed amphibious capabilities do not envision high-intensity, high-casualty battles fought in the teeth of enemy opposition. Within the larger defense community, amphibiousness often is regarded as "incompatible with Canadian defense policy."10 Further, given the division of naval assets between two coasts thousands of miles apart, land and maritime staffs will have to coordinate to ensure high-readiness units are situated in the same geographic regions in the country.11 The JSS may stimulate the rebirth of naval gunfire support within the Canadian Navy to support forces ashore in littoral operations, and will require improved coordination with the Air Force for close air support. all these issues remain to be doctrinally developed and necessary personnel trained.12
Perhaps more difficult for the Navy will be the departure from its destroyer tradition to something as yet undefined. The Navy's focus in the Cold War was solidly on antisubmarine warfare, and in this it excelled. Its role in expeditionary operations employing the JSS slowly may change it from a more or less independent player on the Canadian defense team to a member of the supporting cast. As one naval analyst has remarked, "the navy and the air force must accept the fact that they will be enablers of the army, the latter must recognise that its continuing rationale will not be based on an armoured thrust capability."13
The JSS represents a new direction for both the Canadian Navy and the CF. It may take on a life of its own and lead the CF down alleys it might prefer not to travel. It could prove too useful, either from a design sense, in which the ship becomes a jack of all trades and master of none, or from a political sense. The Canadian Navy has operated on a global basis in the past decade. As attractive as the Navy has been to politicians, the JSS might make it even more so. The ship's capacity to transport virtually anything to international hot spots might see it employed as a sort of NGO/PVO taxicab, which may earn the plaudits of politicians but will distract the Navy from its other duties. Similarly, as often is the case in Canada, the Navy might see the demands for its services skyrocket as its budget stagnates or even shrinks. The JSS is part of a historical trend: the Navy proposes a multipurpose ship after realizing the difficulties of funding a single-purpose AOR.
It is not yet apparent what the events of 11 September 2001 mean for the Canadian Forces. What has been apparent within the Navy, however, is a recognition of the changing international context and the place of the Navy in it. The Joint Support Ship is a harbinger of this recognition and a real attempt to forge a defense policy consistent with Canadian foreign policy and Canada's role in international affairs. It remains to be seen whether the JSS will transform the CF or be another defense white elephant, but it is apparent that the project represents a conceptual transformation.
1 Peter Haydon, "Canadian Amphibious Capabilities: Been There, Done It, Got the T-Shirt," Maritime Affairs, Winter 2001, pp. 14-15.
2 Canadian Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability Ships Concept of Employment Guidance, p. 3/17 (hereinafter ALSC COE).
3 ALSC COE, p. 5/17.
4 See "ALSC: An Affordable Solution to a Complex Requirement," Warship Technology, October 1999; Advanced Report of the Sea Based Expeditionary Joint Operations Study (Halifax: Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre, 10 January 2000), pp. 11-12/16 (hereinafter SBEJO); ALSC COE, p. 11/17.
5 Cdr. Greg Aikens, CF, "Beyond ALSC: We Need to Get Amphibious and Joint to Stay Relevant," Maritime Affairs, Winter 2001, p. 12.
6 SBEJO, pp. 11-12/16.
7 James Goldrick, "The Medium Power Navy in the 21st Century," Naval Review 89, no. 2 (April 2001), pp. 107-9.
8 Capt. (N) Kevin Laing, CF, "Congruence of Opportunity: Canada's Navy 'In the World,'" unpublished paper, p. 34.
9 Heinz Gohlish, "GTS Katie: The High Cost of CutPrice Transport," Maritime Affairs, Fall 2000.
10 SBEJO, p. 7/16.
11 Laing, "Congruence of Opportunity," p. 33,
12 4995-5 (DDMS), Observations on Sea-Based Expeditionary Joint Operations Study-Advanced Report, 15 February 2001.
13 LCdr. R. Gimblett, CF, "A 'Transformational' Fleet for Canada in the 21st Century," Maritime Affairs, Spring/Summer 2000, p. 44.
Dr. Mitchell is director of academies at Canadian Forces College, Toronto.