"The Nation Needs the MV-22" (See J. Jones, p. 2, June 2000 Proceedings)
Bruce Laingen—As a former hostage in Tehran, I read the commentary of Marine Commandant Jones with interest. From reading about the aircraft, I agree wholeheartedly.
My specific interest relates to the Commandant's judgment that "if the MV 22 had been available in 1979, the long nightmare of the Iran hostage crisis might not have occurred at all." I'm not at all sure I agree with that statement, as much as I wish I could.
Presumably this does not have reference to the rescue attempt, which took place in 1980 and ended with the tragedy at Desert One. Had that been the reference, I believe the outcome of that attempt could well have been different—given the technical advances evident in the Osprey over the helicopters used in 1980.
But it is questionable to state that "forward-deployed naval forces, operating from the sea, could have rapidly evacuated the U.S. Embassy in Tehran before the situation completely deteriorated." It assumes in the first instance that such forward-deployed forces would have been in place when the Embassy was overrun. In 1979, they were not in place, to my knowledge, and extensive and lengthy planning was necessary to get them in place by the time of the rescue attempt in April 1980.
The judgment also assumes that President Jimmy Carter would have been ready to pursue the use of force at the outset. The record is clear that he deliberately chose not to use force, because from the outset he chose a careful and deliberate course of attempted diplomatic contact and probing.
Finally, plans for forcible evacuation of the hostages at the time of the rescue attempt in April 1980 were complex and difficult enough. They would have been far more so in the early days of the crisis, given the massed crowds around the embassy compound.
"The Same Sub Design—Again?" (See R. Miller, pp. 34-36, June 2000 Proceedings)
Admiral James D. Watkins, U.S. Navy (Retired)—The serious conceptual and factual errors in Captain Miller's article oblige me to set the record straight. The author accuses the Navy of neglecting to evaluate properly nuclear propulsion technology that he purports would have dramatically reduced propulsion plant size and weight, allowing reduced cost or increased warfighting capability. The assertions he makes are as incorrect today as they were when made by a small but similarly vocal breed of his colleagues over 20 years ago. Further, I take personal offense at his assertions since I know that these technologies were thoroughly investigated several times, including during my watches as both Vice Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Naval Operations. I will discuss some aspects of those investigations to the extent I can without compromising classified information.
The author deplores the great weight of all the "machinery" in a submarine. He does not recognize that a substantial amount of this machinery supports other critical submarine functions and would be changed little, if any, by the switch to an alternative reactor or turbine design. His error exaggerates the possibility for weight savings. In fact, the author's emphasis on weight ignores the advances the Navy has made in submarine design. Modem submarine propulsion plants are vastly superior to those early designs in major areas such as acoustics, reduced maintenance, reliability, ruggedness, and energy density which enable one life-of-the-ship core. One only has to take a ride on the Seawolf (SSN-21) to witness the striking improvements over those that I once thought were embodied in the classiest submarine ever designed—the Skipjack (SSN-585) class in the late 1950s, one of which I commanded.
The author notes that nuclear rocket development provided fuel capable of withstanding high temperatures for a short time and concludes that this proves the viability of the fuel system for a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor for a submarine. This argument is fallacious. Nuclear rockets do not need to survive the effects of thousands of hours of operation with large numbers of temperature cycles for ship maneuvering. It is easy to understand why such concepts were not employed for practical application, when after more than ten years of development, they demonstrated operating times of only ten hours under laboratory conditions.
The author notes that some experimental commercial gas-cooled reactors had desirable safety characteristics. He admits that core power densities in these reactors would be much too low for submarine application, but he dismisses the importance of this difference, stating that core volumes are a small fraction of the overall plant. There are two errors here. First, a large core size attendant to a gas-cooled reactor requires large weights in the reactor vessel and shielding. Second, if these commercial cores were made small enough to fit in a submarine, their desirable safety characteristics would be lost. In fact, high power density gas-cooled reactors lack the inherent self-regulation that the Navy's pressurized water reactors have, and they are liable to experience significant problems if the flow of high-pressure gas is interrupted even briefly.
What of the closed-cycle gas turbine system the author espouses? It still would require powerful rotating machinery, high-capacity heat exchangers and pumps, yet the author claims that it weighs much less than a steam plant. Designers who don't understand the Navy's requirements for ruggedness, redundancy, maintainability, and safety seriously underestimate the weight impact of meeting these requirements. If these requirements are not taken into account, alternatives often look more attractive initially than they would turn out to be when the engineering is complete.
The Navy has looked repeatedly at high-temperature gas reactor concepts for essentially the same reasons suggested by the author. These studies have shown that modest savings in total propulsion plant weight and volume are possible with a gas-cooled reactor only if the reactor coolant gas is used directly in the turbines. This would make the propulsion machinery inaccessible for repairs at sea. Failures in the gas-pressure boundary would have severe consequences for the small, enclosed environment in which sailors must live for months at a time. The possible improvements in size and weight of a submarine with a gas-cooled reactor combined with a gas turbine plant would be too small, when all the critical shortcomings are taken into account, to justify taking on the operational liabilities that such a plant would have, and would not be worth the tens of billions of dollars required to develop it. Even if the cost for this development were less than the cost for developing the first propulsion plant in the Nautilus (SSN-571), there also is less to gain from such a fundamental shift.
The Navy will continue to look for an alternate nuclear-propulsion system that would lead to a sufficiently better submarine to warrant the cost. The Navy is in the forefront, developing technology that could lead to generating electric power directly from reactor heat. New ideas based on solid technical facts are always welcome and worth the time for serious discussion. Others are not.
"Rethinking the Naval Postgraduate School" (See J. Graham, pp. 46-49, July 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Robert W. Thomas, Jr., U.S. Navy, 7th Company Officer, U.S. Naval Academy—Having recently completed an intensive, one-year program at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) designed for prospective company officers at the Naval Academy, I would like to offer a rebuttal.
The instructors at NPS are familiar with the language and culture of the military, which contributes to a more conducive learning environment. NPS offers curricula that cannot be offered at a civilian university because of a classified or military-specific application. When former Superintendent Admiral Charles Larson identified the need to improve the training of Naval Academy company officers, it was NPS that developed a tailored curriculum to support a critical need. NPS also allows officers from different naval warfare specialties, different branches of the armed services, and even different countries, a unique opportunity to learn and socialize in a familiar environment. These aspects could not be duplicated if NPS were decommissioned.
The Navy could better educate its officers by supporting initiatives already being investigated by NPS, such as improved distance learning and Internet-based education. If NPS is unable to offer curricula available at civilian universities because of congressional mandate, then Navy leadership should take the initiative to change the law. The Navy also must encourage officers to obtain graduate degrees. This might include allowing officers to extend shore tours for an extra six months or a year to complete graduate degrees, or offering preferential choices in billets for follow-on tours.
"The ASW Shift" (See N. Polmar, pp. 87-88, June 2000 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Bernard M. Kauderer, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Mr. Polmar's description of both the emerging worldwide threat to our forces from ever more-capable submarines and the steady decline in our capabilities to counter that threat is right on. The message should be a wake-up call for the decision makers to reverse the trend before we suffer a disastrous and embarrassing casualty. It appears that antisubmarine warfare (ASW) suffers from a prevailing sense of immortality so that resources are diverted to other requirements in a high-stakes gamble. Somewhere out there is a young diesel submarine commanding officer with one eye on his periscope and the other on visions of The Order of the Crescent or The Red Star for Gallantry, who could get lucky with relatively low-tech weaponry. Remember that the cruiser Belgrano (formerly the USS Phoenix) was sunk with a World War II-era straight-running torpedo.
The one bright spot in Mr. Polmar's article is the description of the highly successful Acoustic-Rapid Commercial Off-the-Shelf Insertion (A-RCI) and Advanced Processor Build (APB) programs that have capitalized on the explosion in commercial technology. No longer is the fleet captive to military-specific systems that took years to develop and became obsolescent before they became operational. No longer must the fleet wait years for expensive field changes and modifications for those systems, which often required extensive offline time for installation and tests. Now, software and hardware updates can reach the fleet on an annual basis (if adequately funded), so that operational capabilities never will lag behind the threat again. This revolutionary concept will be extended beyond submarine and surface ship acoustics applications into combat control and support systems for all platforms. When coupled with fresh ideas out of the small business innovative research program, we will have real acquisition reform!
All that aside, the basic problem with ASW remains a lack of credible assets. ASW always has been a team sport. Our team suffers from a long injured/disabled list and we are in danger of falling into the league cellar. It is time to lay out the dollars to fix the problem.
"Virginia Can Be a Streetfighter" (See M. Parry, pp. 30-32, lone 2000; W. Hughes, p. 12, July 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Bryan E. Braswell, U.S. Navy, Strategic Studies Group, Naval War College—The Virginia (SSN-774)-class submarine will fulfill a number of roles in the littoral, but it misses the mark in a comparison with the proposed Streetfighter combatant. The Streetfighter is characterized by numerous low-cost, small, agile, minimally manned platforms capable of sustaining some degree of loss in a contested littoral. At approximately $2 billion per hull, with a top speed of 25 knots and a manning level on the order of 100 people, the Virginia fails to meet these key elements required in a littoral combatant. Streetfighter provides those elements.
Moreover, the mission effectiveness chart comparing the Virginia and the hypothetical Cushing-class combatant fails to capture both the degree and pace of competition in littoral warfare. The brown water environment may contain hundreds of highly maneuverable enemy coastal craft. Lieutenant Parry's assessment has some merit when one makes a one-on-one comparison between the Virginia and Gushing classes. When comparing a single Virginia to the multitude of Cushings operating in the littoral, however, the Cushing's mission effectiveness is far superior to that of the Virginia. In short, numbers count, and serve as a multiplier in terms of mission effectiveness. With the Virginia's price tag, the requisite number of hulls needed to accomplish the full range of littoral missions would be prohibitively expensive.
Lieutenant Parry properly draws attention to the sustainment overhead incurred by operating larger numbers of shorter range, limited-resource platforms. Comparatively speaking, Streetfighter-related sustainment is relatively minor when compared to long-term operations ashore. Operational maneuver from the sea and naval fire support—the endgames in the area-denial contest—drive force sustainment. Despite the Virginia's obvious sustainment advantage, her lack of warfighting applicability in the littoral makes such an advantage moot.
An excellent case was made for the Virginia's applicability in both blockading and mastery of the seas. If the Virginia were to assume the forced entry role as well as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISRT) and strike warfare roles, who would be minding the sea-control store? With her capacity for ultra-quiet deep-depth operations, the Virginia represents the deadliest sea denial capability ever built, and as such should not be squandered in a littoral contest. The Virginia is well suited for both pre- and post-forced entry tasks, as Lieutenant Parry outlines: ISRT and strike warfare. These missions are characterized by stealth and covertness but are not representative of a fierce area-denial competition. The Virginia hulls funded in the program objective memorandum and future years defense plan promise decades of blue-water supremacy. Purchasing more to fill a Streetfighter role would decrease total force effectiveness in blue and brown water. For the cost of approximately seven Virginia hulls, the Navy could purchase a fleet of about 100 Streetfighters and their accompanying logistics support.
At its most basic level, the purpose of developing and fielding Streetfighter is to bring a total force approach to naval warfare, whereby the Virginia and Streetfighter complement each other to ensure success in the dynamic, brown-water environment as well as on the high seas.
"Every Coast Guardsman a Lifesaver" (See K. Lunday, pp. 48-49, June 2000; B. Moore, pp. 12-14, July 2000 Proceedings)
Captain Timothy Terriberry, U.S. Coast Guard—Commander Lunday rightly points out a major dilemma the Coast Guard faces when trying to describe itself: Lifesaving is what the American public most closely identifies with the Coast Guard, but it is not the fundamental reason the Coast Guard and its oldest organizational entity was established. The origins of the Coast Guard spring from the need for our nation to exert its sovereign authority over the maritime borders of this nation. Enforcing customs, quarantine, neutrality, and anchorage regulations, suppressing piracy and illegal slave trade, and defending U.S. coastal waters from foreign military operations were the activities of the Revenue Marine Service for the first 40 years of its existence. Exercising the United States' maritime jurisdiction promoted a healthy commerce and strong economic growth. It was not until 1832 that the act of patrolling to aid mariners in distress was added to the list of duties. Assistance to mariners prior to that time was provided under the ancient customary law requiring mariners to assist other mariners in distress. The first authorizations and appropriations made to the Lighthouse Service to establish shoreside stations to rescue mariners did not occur until 1847.
The Coast Guard, as the successor to these organizations, remains the symbol of our nation's authority over its maritime borders and the adjacent waters. It is much more than a lifesaving service, though we are all justly proud of the effects our prevention and response activities have in reducing the dangers to mariners. We need not require a core competency of boat seamanship to be demonstrated by each individual Coast Guard member. We should require an understanding of our core reason for existing: to exercise our national sovereignty in our maritime regions for the promotion of economic, public and personal well-being.
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Is It Working?" (See J. Kelly, p. 4, May 2000; C. Oakley, p. 16, June 2000; M. Butler, M. Simmons, pp. 10-12, July 2000 Proceedings)
Glenn LeCarl, U.S. Naval Academy Class of 1986—Probably the most insidious argument made against the struggle for gay and lesbian rights in the military and in society is that since they can hide their sexual orientations (while racial minorities and women cannot hide their identities), gays and lesbians do not really face any barriers after all and can make no legitimate claim of discrimination. After nearly eight years of Don't Ask, Don't Tell, servicemembers in particular should be well aware of the relative lack of freedom their gay and lesbian peers enjoy. The Department of Defense's own acknowledgment of widespread harassment illuminates quite clearly the presence of antigay discrimination, intolerance, and hatred within the military.
Many of our nation's allies, particularly those within the European Union, allow gays and lesbians to serve openly. NATO is no danger of collapse. Eventually, gay and lesbian servicemembers will gain the right to serve openly in the U.S. military as well. The U.S. military will undoubtedly respond to this change, as it has to all the challenges it has faced, with resilience and renewed strength. Let's leave the time-worn arguments behind and move on!
"Don't Make SWO the Default" (See I. Scaliatine, pp. 87-88, July 2000 Proceedings)
Commander Thomas P. Darcy, U.S. Navy, U.S. Strategic Command—It has always bothered me that surface warfare has been, in effect, the warfare community of last resort.
As a newly minted Maritime Academy graduate back in 1979, I attended Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) in Newport, eager to commence a naval career at sea. Many of my classmates were not as eager. Several were broken aviators who had been dropped from flight training. A few were nuclear-power program dropouts and handful were at SWOS because the Navy had nowhere else for them to go. Most of the instructors at SWOS back then were in the process of leaving the Navy.
SWOS should be the place where new surface warfare officers are exposed to a positive esprit similar to that mentioned in Ensign Scaliatine's article. Admiral reviews and new designators are good concepts, but the building of a surface spirit should begin at the first professional school SWOs attend, and then continue in the fleet. I know that SWOS is better now than it was and hope that a surface esprit is as much a part of the curriculum as navigation, rules of the road, and tactics.
Why do the biggest, most prestigious sea commands often go to aviators? I've heard all the drivel about surface guys who don't understand air operations and how these deep-draft commands are needed to train senior aviators who will go on to command carriers. What message does that send to SWOs? It is time the Navy made deep-draft commands available to senior SWOs routinely so that SWOs can truly aspire to command the biggest ships in the Navy. It would go a long way toward building the spirit of surface warfare if young officers, serving ably on board destroyers and frigates, could dream of commanding aircraft carriers and helicopter assault ships, as well as the replenishment ships so vital to the fleet.
"Stop Mandatory Anthrax Vaccinations—Now!" (See Anonymous, pp. 100-101, March 2000; R. West, L. Balagurchik, G. Sargent, pp. 18-20, April 2000; C. Uhl, J. Bardouille, pp. 10-12, May 2000 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Sean Kelly, U.S. Navy—Why did the Anonymous Military Officer feel the need to hide when submitting a polemic about the anthrax vaccination program? Is there something to fear when one expresses an opinion? Or is it that the Anonymous Military Officer fears being exposed for the moral equivalent of shouting fire in a crowded room?
The Anonymous Military Officer claims that retribution is being taken against those who speak out and refuse the vaccine. That is correct. If service members refuse the vaccine, whether they speak out against it or not, they are violating a legal order under Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). On the other hand, I know of no service member, officer or enlisted, who has been punished for simply speaking out against the vaccine. That is an exercise of our First Amendment rights and does not violate the UCMJ unless it is disrespectful of the Commander-in-Chief or incites violence.
According to the Anonymous Military Officer, many service members quit rather than take the shot. Why not take a similar stand? I have seen numerous editorials by former military members who have quit and they all allowed their names to be published. Simply put, the Anonymous Military Officer is a coward who is promoting disinformation and hurting the good order and discipline of the military. Instead of educating us, the Anonymous Military Officer is adding to the "undercurrent of worry and fear."
The Anonymous Military Officer's tract is written specifically to strike fear into our servicemembers. Does the Anonymous Military Officer think that our leaders and decision makers are so morally corrupt that they do not care one whit about the lives of our servicemembers? It scares me that such an individual could serve for 17 years while subverting the ideals of this nation. Trust in our command is vital to the functioning of the military and an anonymous attack undermines that trust.
And then there are the "facts" the Anonymous Military Officer presents to scare us. The readers are expected to trust these "facts" because the Anonymous Military Officer did "research," but where did this "research" come from? Personal experience? Discussions with medical professionals? Bull sessions in the wardroom? The Psychic Friends Hotline? The readers do not know, because the Anonymous Military Officer does not identify sources, nor can they verify the veracity of this information because the author is anonymous and can say anything with impunity. All we get are vague details with no substantiation. Without the ability to check these "facts," the readers must trust in the Anonymous Military Officer's integrity.
How are we supposed to trust someone who refuses to be identified? This isn't a Mafia trial where the witness will be killed if identified. This is a polemic designed to present the Anonymous Military Officer's attacks on anthrax policy. How are we supposed to trust such "research," especially when the "facts" are open to such wide interpretation? For example, I work at a major headquarters where the majority of the people have had the anthrax inoculation. I know of no people who have had a major reaction other than a sore arm, which is standard to most shots. Therefore, I can conclude that the anthrax vaccine is perfectly safe. This line of logic is sound, and is just as accurate as the Anonymous Military Officer's. Does anyone else see the flaw in the Anonymous Military Officer's reasoning? (In aviation, trusting other people's research is called "living by the souse and dying by the gouge," because you never know how accurate it is and when it might get you killed.)
The Anonymous Military Officer quotes congressional testimony, but even Congress is willing to become more educated on anthrax and the vaccine. In a hearing held by the Senate Armed Service Committee on 13 April 2000, the stated positions of all the senators except Senator Wayne Allard (R-CO), were concern for the health of the service members. The lone exception initially, Senator Allard said, "I've supported this program from my training [as a veterinarian] and what I know about the disease. I think it would be unconscionable for us to knowingly allow our troops to be at risk from a credible, military threat or weaponized anthrax simply because misinformation and fear have seized control of this issue." At this hearing, Rear Admiral L.E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Intelligence Directorate, Office of the Joint Chiefs Of Staff, testified on the very real threat that anthrax poses to U.S. forces, and Rudy DeLeon, Deputy Secretary of Defense and Lieutenant General Ronald Blanck, Surgeon General Of the Army, testified on the processes through which the vaccine program was started and verified with the cooperation of agencies like the Food and Drug Administration and the Centers for Disease Control. By the end of the hearing, the committee understood the need for the vaccine and the minimal health risks, and their only doubts concerned the solvency of the vaccine manufacturing company and the disinformation that sows confusion and mistrust over this program.
It is unconscionable for an officer to promulgate disinformation and distrust in such a widespread manner and destroy good order and discipline. If the Anonymous Military Officer would rather rely on half-truths and hearsay than engage knowledgeable sources and trust in our military leaders, then perhaps it is time for the Anonymous Military Officer to leave the service. Are there issues with the anthrax vaccine? Perhaps, but I have received four shots and had no more side effects than a sore arm, similar to the typhoid shot we all receive. And let's face it, anthrax kills. I'd much rather have a vaccine that may work than none at all. In order to make a point, one must stand up and be counted. Count me on the side of reason and trust in our leadership, and look for me in the line for my next anthrax shot. I'll be there and I won't hide behind any shield of anonymity.
"Why Can't We Build Quality Software?" (See A. Desmarais, p. 192, May 2000 Proceedings)
Commander Paul J. Eubank, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Commander Desmarais commented that, "The Navy is most experienced at acquiring new mechanical and propulsion systems, but the attempt to apply the same methods to software acquisition has fallen short." He proposes certain steps be initiated to improve the Navy's software acquisition process.
This process already exists and is followed throughout the Department of Defense and much of the world. It is the Software Engineering Institute's (SEI) Capability Maturity Models (CMM). The SEI is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense. It is located on the campus of Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh with offices in Northern Virginia. Its mission is to advance the practice of software engineering to produce better quality software that is produced on schedule and within budget. The SEI has produced a number of models to further its mission. One of these models is the Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model (SA-CMM).
The SA-CMM has five levels. Each level has a focus and key process areas (KPA). Each KPA has goals and common features and organizational practices intended to institutionalize common practices. The acquisition organization can request to be evaluated as to where it stands—level one being the lowest and level five the highest. All organizations start at level one. Related to the SA-CMM is the Capability Maturity Model for Software (SW-CMM).
The SW-CMM is intended to help software organizations improve the quality and maturity of their software processes. One can be evaluated or assessed against this model as well. These models as well as other models developed by the SEI are being used to improve the quality not only of software but also the systems engineering and people using the systems.
"They All Hated Rules of Engagement" (See W. Friedkin, p. 14, June 2000 Proceedings)
Thomas R. Motika—Mr. Friedkin said it is hard to get a positive film about the military out of Hollywood. Hollywood has two objectives. The first is obviously to make money by telling a story. The framework of that story, however, rests on the convictions of those telling it. Given this, Hollywood's second objective is to present those convictions in a way that changes how people see the world.
Movies like Snake Eyes, Three Kings, and even The Iron Giant present an astoundingly bitter view of the military. As I receive my issues of Proceedings, no one speaks about the impact of this devastating attack. Issue after issue is concerned with retention rates, dwindling recruits, and the lack of funds to replace worn-out weapon systems. The film industry—with the most powerful two-hour commercials in the world—never is relevant to the problems the Navy has to solve.
This is not about politics, the media, or limousine liberals in Hollywood. It is about stories that people believe in. The stories about the achievements, dedication, and sacrifices of the armed services are not getting told. A completely different, darker picture is presented. That picture affects how people invest in the idea of the Navy and its people.
I have not served in the military, but standing outside your community I do not hear your story. As a member of the Naval Institute, I do not see essays on improving communication with the media and the public. I have not read about your leadership devoting resources to showing your world to us. I read solutions that target the Navy as if it exists apart from the rest of the country. How can that promote a more balanced understanding of your role and your contribution in our schools, newspapers, film, and television. Recruit the nation and your other recruiting is done.
Someone commenting on the movie U-571 said that World War II was the last good war for film. The Navy cannot afford to let that perception stand and survive. You have the other side of the story. When will you present it?