Faced with no airborne Air Force tankers to support the Kitty Hawk’s Hornets, the F/A-18s tanked from the carrier’s S-3s and returned with limited fuel in order to deliver strike packages to Baghdad.
Our nation's aircraft carriers established a solid record of contributing their aircraft to the joint arena in Desert Storm and in the years since, but Operation Iraqi Freedom reminded contingency planners of the U.S. Navy's unique capability to sail anywhere in the world and operate autonomously in support of both peacetime and wartime missions.
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm brought together the tactical capabilities of naval aviation and the strategic capabilities of the Air Force. The air-tanking assets of the Air Force and the strike assets of the Navy brought extended capabilities to the table. This development became an important element of the air war over Iraq in 1991 and the beginning of a new joint relationship for the next decade.
Following Desert Storm, the Air Force recognized the aircraft carriers' contributions and the independence they offer to global presence. In light of the restrictions of deployable basing rights, the Air Force reversed its 50-year stance against the need for naval aviation. Contingency planning began to rely increasingly on aircraft carrier battle groups in national response options. By using carriers, their aircraft, and ship and submarines armed with Tomahawk land-attack missiles as quick response stopgaps, land-based assets could begin deploying to troubled regions after foreign basing rights had been secured. When the buildup period had run its course, such as the six months prior to Desert Storm and the months before and during Iraqi Freedom, naval aviation aircraft could then continue attacking with Air Force strike forces.
Operations Southern and Northern Watch, the follow-on missions over Iraq after Desert Storm, enforced U.N. sanctions on Iraq. These soon became bread-and-butter missions for the Navy; most deployments to Eurasia supported these operations in some fashion throughout the 1990s until the spring of 2003. In the course of this enforcement, naval aircraft continued to use extensively Air Force tankers, extending mission times from one to three launch-and-recovery cycles from their aircraft carriers. This eased carrier deck loading and enhanced flexibility in employing the carriers. Over time, the use of these tankers became commonplace.
It soon became accepted that strategic tanking was a requirement for the no-fly zone enforcement mission. Navy acquisition efforts to develop its own strategic tanking aircraft were bypassed in large measure because of Air Force assurances that its tanking assets would be adequate and available to support any contingency into the 21st century.
During Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001-2002, Navy missions over Afghanistan were never planned without the employment of "strat gas." This assumption naturally flowed with the Navy into the Persian Gulf in the winter of 2002-2003. When planning for Iraqi Freedom approached realization, it was clear the multicarrier presence being assembled would require vast numbers of tankers, and the Air Force would be called on to provide that airborne fuel.
The gathering forces in the Gulf had maximized regional basing availability by March 2003. Long-time staunch allies Saudi Arabia and Turkey were to be counted on to provide basing for the air and land components of the Coalition forces. The support infrastructure of the Gulf region necessitated the use of these airfields and staging areas. As war became imminent, traditional regional allies suddenly declared they no longer would support most of the warfighting assets of the Coalition. This significantly limited the regional basing support infrastructure and severely strained the land-based tanker capability. Dependence on local refueling trucks alone soon increased tanker turnaround times, thereby reducing the tankers' availability. It became obvious that there would not be enough tankers airborne to support the fighting forces of both the Air Force and the Navy's five carrier battle groups (three in the Persian Gulf and two in the Mediterranean).
In the south, it was determined that the limited available tankers would be able to support the Air Force and two of the three carriers in the Gulf. The two carriers deployed to the eastern Mediterranean would receive little strategic tanking initially because of the denial of basing rights. The two aircraft carriers that had been on station in the Persian Gulf the longest—the Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and the Constellation (CV-64)—were selected to receive tanking support, and planning began to incorporate their capabilities for the opening days of air strikes. The last carrier to arrive on station—the Forward-Deployed Naval Force's Kitty Hawk (CV-63) that had sortied from Japan—was assigned the close-air support role in southern Iraq in support of the overland attack of the Army's V Corps and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. The Kitty Hawk's Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) was tasked to complete its mission autonomously.
Organic Tanking Support
Realizing the relative paucity of the Navy's contribution as compared to the original three-carrier design, CVW-5 sought ways to provide more assets to the strategic missions in the north. Recalling the techniques refined in the Vietnam War, the Kitty Hawk's, organic tanking capabilities would be tapped to their fullest potential. In Vietnam, A-4 Skyhawks that had flown from Yankee Station routinely returned to their carriers with enough fuel for only one pass before recovery tanking was required. This concept was employed for the Kitty Hawk's returning F/A-18s. For the first time in more than a decade, the strike aircraft were allowed to return to their carrier with minimum fuel. A plan was developed that employed the advantages of carrier cyclic and the flex-deck operations. Combining these capabilities for an expected five-day surge option, the Kitty Hawk would be able both to support her close-air support mission and still provide strategic packages going to Baghdad. The S-3, flying its final days as the Viking sunset plan heralded that platform's demise, became a crucial participant in the plan.
The "Organic Tanking to Baghdad" concept was briefed to Commander Task Force 70 (CTF-70) on the Kitty Hawk and then to the senior carrier's CTF-50, embarked on the Abraham Lincoln. The possibilities of the plan were evident, and support for the idea grew. Not only did the Kitty Hawk enter the game with her own tanking, but the other two Gulf carriers employed similar plans to supplement their strike capabilities. The organic tankers in the Gulf were sufficient to release some of the strategic tankers allocated to the Abraham Lincoln and the Constellation. These tankers flowed to support other strikers in the Gulf region, eventually to include the Kitty Hawk, as well as the strategic bombers arriving in the theater from Diego Garcia and elsewhere.
The concept was tested in the waning days of Southern Watch—front and backside tanking allowed the Hornets to fly two 1.5 hour cycles easily with their tankers launching and recovering immediately before and after the tanking evolutions. The plan also increased the amount of on-station time that could be offered to the close-air support missions in the south at such trouble spots as Basrah and Nasiriya. It became apparent the five-day surge would continue through the coming weeks, and the concept continued to work flawlessly over the course of the war.
Close-Air Support and Air Interdiction Missions
On 19 March, strike elements from the Kitty Hawk began limited strikes against Iraqi tactical targets to prepare the battlefield for the imminent ground assault across the Kuwaiti border. On 21 March, the "Shock and Awe" campaign began—with mixed reviews—and the Kitty Hawk's independent operational capability allowed her aircraft to respond immediately when the air-tasking-order-directed missions fell short of achieving their objectives. Alert strike packages launched daily as previously untargeted Iraqi strong points were discovered.
Soon the Hornets were flying air interdiction strikes ahead of the fire support coordination line, striking both pre-assigned targets and responding airborne to tactical and strategic targets of opportunity. The rapid rate of the Coalition's advance across the Iraqi desert soon necessitated close-air support farther north. Before long, Coalition aircraft were running short of targets. Strike operations allowed ordnance loads of up to three joint-direct attack munitions (JDAMs) or laser-guided bombs per Hornet, but a maximum of 2,000 pounds of "bring back" ordnance was soon dictated by the dynamic conditions of the ground advance for tactical missions. On some missions no guarantee could be offered of targets that could be identified positively and attacked without risk of collateral damage or fratricide; sometimes the Hornets were required to return to their carriers with unexpended ordnance.
The close-air support load out tended toward laser-guided bombs because forward air controllers could not provide precise coordinates. When precise targeting could be determined and provided, JDAMs proved even more flexible in the deteriorating weather conditions often encountered in the spring skies over Iraq.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)
The end of Desert Storm marked the end of the Air Force's investment in the airborne electronic warfare jamming mission. The EF-111 Raven and F-4 Phantom II "Wild Weasel" team had performed well in 1991, but their mission fell victim to funding cuts and a perceived diminished requirement for jamming in the post-Cold War world. The realigning Europe of the 1990s quickly dispelled that notion, and the Navy-Marine SEAD team found its limited numbers of EA-6B Prowlers supporting the Air Force around the globe.
The Prowler quickly proved its worth in Iraqi Freedom as the only combined jammer and HARM (high-speed anti-radiation missile) shooter platform in the U.S. inventory. When joined by the Navy-Marine F/A-18 and Air Force F-16CJ "HARM Trucks," multi-axis countering of the enemy defenses was possible. When the suburbs of Baghdad came into view, so did the threat of the much-touted "Super MEZ" (missile engagement zone). Strategic strikes into Baghdad from the opening days of the campaign had degraded much of Saddam Hussein's integrated air defense system, but the Russian- and French-made missile systems had to be honored as credible threats until the end of the war.
B-2 and F-117 stealth aircraft and conventional B-1 and B-52 bombers did not enter Baghdad air space to deliver their weapons without the Prowler's SEAD jamming and HARM support. In addition, Navy tactical aircraft routinely delivered their bombs in the Super MEZ concurrently, effectively drawing Baghdad's defensive systems away from the less-agile strategic bombers.
Even during close-air support missions well south of Baghdad, entering the "kill boxes" meant much more than engaging tactical threats on the battlefield; it involved confronting the same complex surface-to-air missile systems, in addition to shoulder-mounted infrared missiles and countless antiaircraft guns. If a SEAD support package was not dedicated to a given mission, airborne SEAD assets could be called in to counter surface-to-air missile threats to Coalition aircraft. Tactical surface-to-air missiles and local gunfire often were suppressed by the strike packages working the area or simply avoided.
Airborne Early Warning Support
Naval aviation also had grown to rely heavily on Air Force E-3 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) coverage during no-fly zone enforcement. Loss of the predicted basing rights for Iraqi Freedom drove most AWACS assets to another coalition country. Orbiting at points north and west far from the customary southern tracks soon showed its disadvantages. Aerial coverage was spotty, and communication systems were stressed beyond range limits.
It was in this arena that the carrier-based E-2 Hawkeye adapted its mission to overcome the problem, despite the limitations of a system designed for overwater operations. The E-2C aircrews were able to provide a communication link between the air and land component commanders and the tactical air arm of the Navy. This became the vital interface that engaged Navy tactical air in the close support war. Providing connectivity among the various close support controlling agencies of Army, Air Force, Marine, and British units, Navy E-2s were able to provide quick-response assets to these controllers, who in turn supplied targets for the strike aircraft. The numbers of lives saved can never be measured, but the tonnage of ordnance delivered in close-air support was increased dramatically because the Hawkeyes were present.
Myriad Air Force and Navy control agencies required coordination when transiting through the many regional areas of responsibility. The "fog of war" for ingressing aviators was reduced greatly by the Hawkeyes' ability to sort through the chaff and direct critical and timely contact between units on the ground and strike aircraft.
Aircraft Carriers Are the Future
As the F/A-18E/Fs join the fleet in greater numbers, the air wing's independent tanking abilities will improve beyond the success of Iraqi Freedom. Harsh realities in the Gulf, however, showcased the errors of blind dependence on joint support of carrier battle groups. There are not enough Air Force tankers available to the Navy—nor guarantee of foreign basing rights—to allow for the continued assumptions of adequate Air Force tanking support in the Navy's future planning.
The value of the aircraft carriers often has been questioned during budget debates, especially in peacetime. Prior to September 2001 there was talk of mothballing carriers to align with the Defense Secretary's vision for the future. The terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent combat in Afghanistan and Iraq prove that the defense of the United States will continue to rely on its aircraft carriers for decades to come.
Commander Paulsen is the commanding officer of Strike Fighter Squadron 192. The World Famous Golden dragons fly from the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63), the oldest aircraft carrier in the Navy.