Prize Winner International Navies Essay Contest
More than a decade has passed since the end of the Cold War. In the aftermath of the East-West reconciliation, European countries have struggled with seeking a purely European security system suitable for the post-Cold War era. The Europeans are not drifting about in the sea without a compass, however. They at least are guided by the experiences of the past 50 years with several security organizations established to deal with the East-West confrontation.
Some of the last debris of the era, on the other hand, remains in the Asia-Pacific region, such as tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Thus far, there is no functional multilateral security system with a military capability in Asia-Pacific. Without its own secretariat, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF) is no more than a place for security dialogue. In addition, revolutionary changes in technologies are making world seem smaller, and many people are reacting to the rapid changes with divisive nationalistic attitudes. We are learning that globalization can lead to economic integration and political fragmentation simultaneously.
Against this backdrop, a long-term strategic view of the Asia-Pacific region requires us to start building a regional security system more functional than what we have today.
Lessons Learned from Europe
Freed from the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Europe is working to construct a new security framework. The Western European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Eurocorps, and the Combined Joint Task Force were founded with varying aims and circumstances; nonetheless, Europe is studying ways by which these security organizations may be strengthened and made complementary. Although NATO long has played a central role in maintaining European security, the focus now is shifting toward a "European security and defense identity," that aims for a more Europe-oriented security system. In addition, within the transatlantic community, war has been devalued as an instrument of settling disputes between states. It is making a tragic comeback, however, among ethnic communities. Therefore, it is appropriate to reorganize the mainstream security organization (i.e., NATO) and other European organizations (e.g., the West European Union and the Eurocorps).
Concerning its relevancy to Asia-Pacific, the OSCE deserves the most attention; it has some similarities with the ARE The Charter for European Security, signed at its Istanbul Summit in November 1999, stipulates how the international community should engage with- states that experience internal conflicts. Even if a conflict is confined within national borders, the OSCE might decide the conflict poses a threat to other member states, and could be entitled to intervene. The OSCE, however, has only a token police force, which leaves it somewhat "toothless." No security system can remain viable without an effective military force to impose its will in a contingency.
Large-membership organizations like the OSCE are better suited to the establishment and maintenance of disarmament treaties, such as the Conventional Force Treaty. The larger the membership grows, however, the more complex both its decision-making and consensus-building structures become. The domestic implementation of the OSCE principles by its member states and the principles' applicability for Asia-Pacific and other regional communities deserve attention. As it stands today, however, the OSCE is not a candidate for a durable security organization.
Continuous debates on the form of security architectures do little to redress the gaps between NATO's European members and the United States in terms of so-called state-of-the-art technologies and conventional force capabilities. European capabilities have not changed much since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. military, on the other hand, has established operational procedures for both real-world operations and training purposes with its allies, both multilaterally and bilaterally. Therefore, only the U.S. military can provide common tactical procedures in possible conflicts based on the doctrines it created with its partners. Moreover, only the United States is capable of deploying large numbers of forces well beyond its national borders and sustaining them for an extended period. The examination of the Eurocorps' sustainability just started in Kosovo in April 2000. Without a major power-projection initiative, present political and economic trends may exacerbate Europe's shortcomings in this area.
European countries will continue to lack funds for a major initiative on strategic transports and logistical equipment. Although their defense spending amounts to twothirds that of the United States, the European members of NATO have less than 10% of the transportable defense capability possessed by the United States for prompt longrange actions. Given multiple centers of decision making and no immediate prospect for a true security and defense identity, Europeans will be hard-pressed to make as efficient use of their defense budgets as does the United States. By focusing on strategic transport, logistics, and munitions stocks, however, they could develop roughly half as much rapidly deployable capability as the United States.
Need Any Threats?
For the smooth formation of any security organization, the existence of an adversary or threat is helpful. NATO's longevity was influenced by the clear and present threat from the Warsaw Pact. Is there any comparable threat in today's Asia-Pacific?
No one in the maritime security community would deny that piracy is a threat to seaborne commerce. Lieutenant Commander Ian Wood of the Canadian Navy and many others writing in the pages of Proceedings have expressed concern with piracy. Commander Wood points out that many countries have displayed a lack of political will to bring an end to this scourge, simply because it has not posed a significant enough threat to their strategic wellbeing. The incident of the Alondra Rainbow, however, forced the maritime security community to confront such violent piracies. Consequently, the Japanese government sponsored the International Conference of All Maritime Related Concerns, Both Governmental and Private, on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships.
The civilian-controlled Japanese Coast Guard, rather than the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), was chosen to deal with piracy. Under current international law, the debate over which organization should be in charge of combating piracy is meaningless. Most piracies in recent years have occurred in the internal waters or territorial seas of a given state. According to the 1982 U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea, it is only on the high seas that warships and other clearly marked government vessels may seize a pirate ship, the property on board, and the persons committing the piracy. In other words, no one can do anything about piracy in other states' territorial waters without violating their coastal sovereignty.
So are there any other common threats? A North Korea led by a dictator? An emerging China? The answer in both these cases is no. We must begin preparing for the days when all the hot issues in Asia-Pacific are resolved. Peacekeeping operations and related activities, such as noncombatant evacuations, could be emphasized as our common concerns for regional security. At the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) 2000, the noncombatant evacuation exercise was highly successful and constructive. In October 2000, the U.S. Navy, the JMSDF, and several other Asian navies held the first-ever multinational exercise where the rescue of a wrecked submarine was simulated. Thus far, these are symbolic and nominal events. In the absence of a clear military threat, peacekeeping and other such operations have been and will be appropriate international concerns that can bring together countries in the region.
Parallel Track
Today, a few broad recommendations can be made to help steer Asia-Pacific away from the kinds of entrapments experienced in Europe. Of all existing international organizations, NATO alone can guarantee the security of its member states against all military threats. The most important mission of any such organization is the maintenance of physical security. An organization designed to cope with high-intensity conflict can cope with less grave situations, such as peacekeeping operations, because it already is equipped to deal with crises of a greater complexity or scale. NATO, therefore, is the most dependable template for a security organization.
The ARF, on the other hand, is a unique and broadly multinational organization for security dialogues in the Asia-Pacific region. It is, however, too loose a regime to maintain stability in the region because it lacks not only command-and-control components for military operations but a secretariat as well. On 1 March 2000, the European Union established transitional military staff components related to the creation of its own military forces. As a first step toward becoming a reliable security organization, the ARF should acquire a command-and-control component similar to NATO's that is staffed with liaison officers from member states. The component should be capable of managing multinational exercises, such as maritime rescue drills, even if only at a symbolic level. Although the enlargement of its membership remains a major question, the ARF should remain as a unique multinational security organization in this region to avoid the unnecessary confusion that has been witnessed in Europe.
In enriching the ARF, the role of the United States, especially its navy, is indispensable. The United States has been a major contributor to regional stability, and will remain so in the foreseeable future, even after the issues pertaining to the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait are resolved. Nevertheless, U.S. forces might be withdrawn from Asia-Pacific as they were from Europe, though the scale and timing of the withdrawal would depend on future conditions in the region. In addition, countries in the Asia-Pacific region might argue for a purely Asian security regime. Whether it is Japan or China that emerges as a regional power, a regional security system will be necessary to regulate the behavior of that power.
Some of Japan's Asian neighbors are concerned with Japan's great military capability, especially its naval and air forces. On the other hand, one prominent newspaper has argued that most Asian countries now welcome Japan's role in regional security for the first time since World War II. Either way, some kind of regional security organization might ensure that Japan or another emerging country will not act as a vicious military power but as a rational and stabilizing regional force.
Asia-Pacific countries should not strive for the establishment of a security regime beyond the horizon only. The solutions to problems on the Korean Peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, and other regional security issues must be realistic. In addition, all of us in the security community should keep our eyes on the reform and revitalization of the United Nations, especially its Security Council. Of course, dual-track security policy making, maintaining a current security system, and seeking to establish a more functional system do not allow for the reduction of military budgets. Instead, all of this undoubtedly will cost more. Despite its longest economic recession since the end of World War II, Japan continues to modernize its ships, aircraft, and weaponry. The absence of a common foe could exacerbate the gap between Japan's will to improve its own defense system and the scarce resources for this purpose. We need to watch the various hot issues in Asia-Pacific with vigilance and, simultaneously, pay greater attention to the establishment of a regional security system. After all, "Heaven helps those who help themselves."
Lieutenant Commander Ito is in the midst of a two-year tour at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. He has been a surface warfare officer for 12 years. He has participated in a number of international exercises, including RIMPAC 94 and 98.