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Much better to press a wrong button on a shore-based trainer than on the Aegis combat system in a ship at sea. Today’s complex war-fighting environment calls for specialization in the surface warfare career path, providing more time in the classroom and on shore-based trainers.
Today’s surface warrior is well versed in the management and welfare functions of naval society but is dangerously deficient in war-fighting skills. It is a deficiency that is embedded in a career path that emphasizes proficiency in material management, personnel administration, social responsibility, and effective staff officer skills but has no measure of and almost no training focus in war-fighting skills. This lack of war-fighting proficiency will rapidly become more acute as the Navy shifts to operating in the murky world of the littoral region outlined in the Navy’s white paper “ . . . From the Sea.” The surface navy must develop a more specialized approach to career development in order to meet the many challenges that lie ahead.
The littoral operating environment will confront surface warriors with limited operations supported by unclear political and military objectives, with difficult tactical situations involving many neutral air and surface units, and with a wide range of high-technology weaponry in the hands of leaders who are not encumbered with Western morality or inhibitions. They will do so under complex rules of engagement. The main tool for meeting these difficult circumstances is the modem surface combatant with complex integrated combat systems such as Aegis, New Threat Upgrade, and advanced combat direction systems. These systems are heavily dependent upon in- depth operator knowledge of electronics, computer software application, physics, and environment. Their extensive technical capabilities will have to be carefully interlaced with a comprehensive understanding of international and maritime law to be effective.
The Problem
Current career path guidelines are not adequately focused on developing and honing high-technology warfighting skills and have almost no focus on maritime and international law. The average surface warrior will have spent only 8 of his 18 years in seagoing billets prior to going to command. He will have spent an equal time
ashore, most likely in billets unrelated to war fighting, & ^ ther as part of a headquarters staff or pursuing a subsf* lr cialty. He will have spent the remaining two years i* ^ pipeline schools preparing for sea-duty assignments. Th1 0 breakout may not appear to be overly deficient until th‘ u time devoted to pipeline training and sea duty are exafl1 a ined to determine how much of it is used to develop war-fighting skills. ?
Pipeline Training u
----------------------------- ^ n
Pipeline training has three shortcomings:
► Syllabus deficiencies and time allotted to develop higt1 j P technology war-fighting skills
► The lack of high-technology tactical expertise or exp1' 11
rience in the school house s
► The lack of shore-based integrated combat systems traia- ers available for dedicated use in preparing officers c tactical duties
Syllabus and Time: These deficiencies become evidc" s when examining the four major schools a surface warfa*1' 1 officer attends prior to assuming shipboard duties: Sa( ‘ face Warfare Officer Indoctrination, Department Hea^ 1 Prospective Executive Officer (PXO), and Prospecti^ Commanding Officer (PCO) courses. The bulk of th3 * pipeline activity is devoted to management, leadership and core fundamentals in engineering and ship systeim ' Only about 35% is devoted to combat systems-relat1’1 training, most of which is generic in nature. An appr‘v priate amount of time is allotted to electronic fundame11 tals, generic sensor and weapon-system characteristic’ and core threat parameters, but not enough effort is de" icated to building on them as they relate to specific coa1 bat systems. As systems have become more complex a3‘ advances in computer technology have allowed systea1’ to meet reaction times down to the eight- to ten-secoa region, it has become essential to be able to apply thas‘ fundamentals effectively to specific environmental into1 action and computer software.
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Proceedings / February
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The Aegis weapon system is a good example. Th‘
courtesy of u.s. navy recruiting command
AN/SPY-1 radar has a variety of clutter-mapping, moving-target-indicator, and transmission-selection functions. The integrated combat system also has an embedded set of programmable computer doctrine statements that are used to control track load, establish identification, manage air space, and control weapons.
Inexperienced operators have “desensitized” the SPY-1 radar, rendering it ineffective; they were responding to perceived and actual environmental conditions, without being sensitive to constant changes in the environmental effects on the radar or the changing tactical picture. Similarly, the command and decision system resident computer doctrine requires the operator to understand the doctrine algorithmic process, accurate threat flight kinematics, doctrine-to-doctrine interaction, and weapons control system or weapons operational parameters.
A tactical action officer or commanding officer without a complete grasp of all of these technical features could inadvertently neutralize critical elements of his combat system and negate the advantage the system is designed to give him. Complex rules of engagement, international and maritime law, and broadly defined military or political objectives compound the problem.
Instructor Expertise: The lack of instructor expertise or experience in tactical employment of integrated combat systems is the most difficult of the training problems to solve. Only a limited number of surface warriors have a true tactical understanding of both fleet procedures and technical workings of software-driven sensor and weapons systems, because of the limited training focus in the current career path. Therefore, building a cadre of officers that can fill the ranks as tactically proficient instructors in high-technology combat systems will be extremely difficult, until the surface warfare career path is adjusted to make up for the educational shortfall.
Shore-Based Trainers: The complexity of the integrated combat system requires an intense investment in classroom time, reinforced with time spent in simulation/em- ulation training facilities like the Aegis Training Center at Dahlgren, Virginia, and the fully operational FFG-7
combat system facility in Newport. However, competing requirements for software engineering, enlisted C-school requirements, and technical evaluation priorities limit using them to train and evaluate tactical action officers and commanding officers. In addition, these systems do not possess the full range of emulation/simulation features needed to cover many of the environmental and tactical challenges.
Sea Duty
It is at sea that a surface warrior is expected to hone war-fighting skills while also leading a division, department, or ship; completing the next professional qualification requirement; meeting the requirements of the various administrative and technical inspections; and performing a host of collateral duties. He is assisted by recent changes driven by the Afloat Training Organization that have the potential to improve the focus on war-fighting proficiency during the officer’s tour, but do not compensate for the fundamental school house knowledge.
The Result
The surface warrior gets only a small fraction of the training time allocated to focus on the complex operation of weapon systems. Further, he is never realistically tested in his warfare skills before being given the responsibility. The problem is exacerbated for officers who spend the bulk of their sea duty experience as engineers. The demands on these officers to manage complex engineering plants effectively leave almost no time to focus on war-fighting skills.
The Career Path
The current surface warfare officer career path and training syllabus are the result of two important and still valid influences: experience and legislation. For years, agonizing failures in ship’s readiness resulted from officers who were poor materiel managers, marginal leaders, and generally neglectful of the welfare of their personnel. As these problems emerged, the system logically moved to correct them by adjusting the pipeline and training focus to build knowledge in weak areas. Officers are now evaluated on their ability to execute these important functions, and materiel and personnel readiness are currently at a high point.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 is the legislative influence on the career path. It lays down the requirement to develop and maintain a cadre of joint specialty officers, basing promotability and senior billet qualification on meeting joint specialty requirements. The training and job experience required to attain this specialty are time consuming, including approximately a year at a War Col-
lege and a two- to three-year joint tour. This requirement cannot be ignored in view of its place in maintaining upward mobility and the need to have a certain expertise within the ranks for major headquarters functions.
A Solution
Considering the amount of time that is available to prepare a surface warrior for command, a viable solution is war-fighting specialization. Specialization has been either championed or damned ever since the surface warfare community took on a professional identification of its own in the early 1970s. This proposal differs somewhat from previous initiatives, however, because it keys specialization to war-fighting skill instead of the functional areas— deck and engineering. War-fighting specialization in itself, however, will not solve the problem. It must also be supported by redirecting a portion of the existing training effort, reducing time spent in non-warfare related functions for some specialists, and increased focus on technical and legal education.
War-Fighting Specialization:
Career paths should be developed that meet upward mobility requirements for two distinct technically proficient groups of surface warriors: combat tactical officers and ship systems officers.
The combat tactical officer career path should focus on combat systems operations, tactics, and shipboard management requirements. The bulk of the career path should be devoted to supporting the development of tactical proficiency required for command of surface combatants, followed by major command of combatants, tactical destroyer squadrons, and joint task groups. Within this specialty, a cadre of officers would concentrate on technical and tactical skills. These officers would form the nucleus of the combat tactical team at sea and would support the development of combat doctrine and fill tactical training billets ashore. The remaining officers would be available to fill major headquarters and joint specialty billets.
The ship systems officer career path should be tailored to meet shipboard management requirements for complex engineering systems and engineering-related readiness in shore support activities. It should not lead to command of surface combatants but may be suitable for leading to command of fleet logistics force ships or service force ships since tasking for these ship classes requires the experience and training of a materiel or engineering background. The Ship Systems career path also could be tailored to meet command requirements of major shore establishments and is probably compatible with the Material Professional designation.
Both career paths would require officers to qualify as surface warfare officers and meet the qualifications for command at sea.
Training: Several facets of the current surface warfare training curricula need to be reworked. The first priority should be to add significant emphasis on tactics at the ship system level, increase electronic and environmental fundamentals, and add basic courses in international law.
Career paths should be developed that meet upward mobility requirements for two distinct technically proficient groups of surface warriors: combat tactical officers and ship systems officers.
These changes should not appreciably change the amoun of time a surface warrior spends in the school command with the possible exception of those who subspecialize 't tactics within the combat tactical officer career path.
In order to fit all of the new material into the existing course time slots, the existing curriculum should be ad justed to eliminate areas extraneous to the specialty area and lessen some emphasis on areas covered by previous schooling or experience.
Certainly, the development of detailed curricula require close scrutiny to ensure all skill requirements are included However, consider the following strawman as a basis:
► Surface Warfare Indoctrination Course: Maintain thf curriculum as it is currently configured. It is effective i"| preparing division officers for duty on their first ship. The) will not be allowed to select a specialty until they complete surface warfare qualification.
► Surface Warfare Department Head Course: Tailor the course to prepare the officer for a specialty. Seamanship'
navigation, some core engineering, and electronics should be maintained for both specialties Courses should diverge for mos1 of the six-month course to focus on specialty requirements. Combat tactical officers should concentrate on electronics, softwareI basics, and environmental theory, as well as threat and tactics fundamentals, followed by a specific focus on the particular ship class combat system to which the officer will be assigned. The final examination should be a practical examination on the tactical employment of the specific combat system as the tactical action officer.
► Surface Combatant Prospective Executive Officer Course: Lengthen the course to include parts of the Senior Officer Material Readiness Course that help prepare an officer for a command. Include training for the specific combat system if different from previous fleet experience. Add an emphasis in maritime law. Maintain much of the current focus on personnel, administrative' and shipboard management. The final examination for thb course should be an oral and practical exam on the tactical employment of the specific combat system to which he will be assigned.
► Surface Combatant Prospective Commanding Office! Course: Eliminate the Senior Officer Material Readiness Course and focus on preparing officers to employ their specific ships in the environment envisioned in “... Front the Sea.” Add an emphasis on international law, buildin- on the course given in the PXO pipeline. The final examination should be an oral and practical exam on the tactical employment of his ship at sea or more appropriately in an interactive trainer.
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Commander Rushton is the prospective Commanding Officer of the USS Stout (DDG-55). He has served as the Surface Warfare Analyst in tl>£ Office of Program Appraisal for the Secretary of the Navy. Prior to this- he, was the Aegis Cruiser/Destroyer Section Head, Area Antiair W#" fare/Aegis Branch, Surface Ship Combat Systems Division, under the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare. Sea tours included Operations and Combat Systems Officer in the USS Mobil* Bay (CG-53), and Executive Officer in the USS Kidd (DDG-993).
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