A chemical agent, although immediately recognizable and containable, could have caused hundreds of deaths. A biological agent would have been cataclysmic, given that the first symptoms would not have appeared for six hours (some agents take up to six days). According to conventional response procedures, unknowingly contaminated people would have been removed from the scene. As they dispersed throughout the city and the world, thousands of people would have been exposed.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear, chemical, and biological—is today’s number one threat to global security. It is only a matter of time before they will be used in terrorist attacks. On 20 March 1995, a Japanese cult used sarin gas in an attack on the Tokyo subways. In the United States, cyanide remnants have been found at the site of the World Trade Center bombing in New York, and the FBI has uncovered militia groups that have explored WMD to support their ends. The threat is here and it is real.
Fortunately, the United States already has taken steps to meet the threat of weapons of mass destruction. After the Tokyo attack and the April 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma, President Bill Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 39, a counterterrorism measure that divides U.S. reaction to a WMD incident into “crisis” and “consequence management.” This delineation, however, is somewhat artificial; in a WMD scenario, consequence management is the crisis.
With the potential for casualties so great—particularly in a chemical incident, where a true difference can be made only in the first “golden hour" of response—first-time coordination at the incident site is not good enough. Thus, the first step in combating chem-bio terrorism is preparedness through prior coordination (and preemptive forward deployments to high-visibility events). This requires the sustained participation of multiple agencies at the local, state, national, and international levels.
Prior to the Olympics, no country had ever planned for a chem-bio incident. This spring, the U.S. Marine Corps stepped into this void with its Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). The vision of Marine Corps Commandant General Charles C. Krulak, CBIRF features five cross-trained components—headquarters, medical, security, decontamination, and logistics. It also is supported by an electronic reach-back advisory group of eminent U.S. scientists, who can provide real-time advice. CBIRF is the only force of its kind in the world.
So what would have happened if the bomb in Centennial Olympic Park had been tainted with chemical and/or biological agents? With 130 U.S. Marines forward deployed to downtown Atlanta (six blocks from the park) and an additional 170 Marines at Fort Gillem (about a 20-minute drive away), the chem-bio force was within a mile of most Olympic venues and could have been at the scene within 20 minutes. Within 15 minutes of arrival, CBIRF would have established a decontamination station in support of the incident site commander (the local fire department). In the meantime, CBIRF medical personnel would be providing triage in the contaminated zone, while other CBIRF personnel prepared victims for decontamination. Once through “decon,” victims would be taken to local hospitals. That was the CBIRF mission—turn contaminated victims into patients.
This anticipated response was a reflection of a situation that demanded flexibility and an aggressive liaison effort from all the participating agencies. In the case of CBIRF, for example, the Marines were not armed; local law enforcement officials provided appropriate protection. The CBIRF also maintained close liaison with U.S. Public Health Support, the FBI, the Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. Forces Command, the Army’s Technical Escort Unit and Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty Lab, the Naval Medical Research Institute, the U.S. Coast Guard’s Strike Team, and other federal laboratories that provide chem-bio detection and identification. Visiting this unprecedented lash-up of federal assets. Senator Sam Nunn called the endeavor a “model for the future.”
Unfortunately, this consequence management model remains a skeleton in need of flesh. The United States and the world need to discuss how we will plan for the consequences of chem-bio terrorism—before it happens. CBIRF is a natural starting point for a ground-up approach to this clear and present danger.
Captain Seiple is a Marine Corps officer assigned to the Plans and Policies Division of Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. He served with CBIRF in Atlanta as a liaison officer to the FBI and the Centers for Disease Control.