“Keeping the Generation X Junior Officer”
(See H. Goetsch, pp. 66-69, October 1995; F. Caldwell, pp. 15-16, November 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Joseph A. Listopad, U.S. Navy—(Former) Lieutenant Goetsch’s thesis seems to be that submarine junior officers can no longer be induced to remain in the Navy by larger paychecks, and that they “need a real purpose, a true calling, and a genuine chance to lead.” Are these lacking in the submarine community? I cannot speak for Mr. Goetsch’s experiences, but my own tell me that the purposes of the submarine force align with the purposes of the Navy itself, and thus go back hundreds of years. Submarining as a calling, or vocation, is self-evident. Mr. Goetsch himself alludes to this by relating the sacrifices involved and the camaraderie developed among submariners (and their families).
Mr. Goetsch loses the bubble when it comes to the issue of leadership. He contends that before long, lieutenants find watchstanding “not too difficult, stimulating, or fun. . . .” The midwatch officer of the deck, usually the senior officer awake, has in his care a billion-dollar ship, a nuclear reactor, possibly nuclear weapons, and the lives of more than 100 men. With the ship’s resources at his disposal, he is tasked to maintain the ship in a safe condition and to carry out the commanding officer’s, navigator’s, and engineer’s night orders. This always requires leadership, is frequently difficult and stimulating, and normally is fun. Mr. Goetsch completely ignores the leadership inherent' in being a division officer. The young junior officer must simultaneously utilize his division in the most effective manner, gain leadership skills and technical competence from a chief subordinate to him, and aid in counseling his men through the difficulties involved in being a junior enlisted man.
I agree with Mr. Goetsch that an increase in the bonus (which, incidentally, I have never heard mentioned) will not contribute to alleviating the retention shortfall. The junior officers who we want to retain are not primarily motivated by the money involved in submarining, but by the challenge and quiet sense of pride and accomplishment traditionally enjoyed by the submarine force. If this demonstrates what Mr. Goetsch terms a “high threshold of pain,” I submit that the corporate world will call for much the same level of sacrifice that submarining does, but without the attendant benefits.
By stressing the monetary aspects of employment inside and outside the submarine force and by leaving the Navy to pursue a career in investment banking, Mr. Goetsch runs the risk of being termed, as he put it, an “underemployed whiner.”
Commander Mike Conner, U.S. Navy— After first reading Mr. Goetsch’s parting shot at the Navy and the submarine force, I sympathized, because I have felt many of those same things at various times over the last 15 years. But after careful thought, I decided that the article bothered me, because he is what he complains of—focused on the negative and rattling deficiencies without making any recommendations.
I felt compelled to address several items to separate fact from fiction. First, is there a coming crisis in submarine officer manning? I don’t think so. The last time I checked, we were a few percentage points shy of optimum retention as the rate of the drawdown slowed. It is pretty natural when you think about it. The submarine force is getting smaller. There will be fewer ships to command down the line, and young officers should take an honest look at themselves, their prospects, and their choices. This is not a crisis. Are we losing our best young officers? No, again. Young officers who show the most promise in their initial sea tours are staying. If you want to find a crisis here, look at the many talented people who have not advanced to the next stage in their careers because of unexpected downsizing. Corporations downsize, too, in response to changes in demand for their services. They often call it restructuring, but the result is the same—people who thought they were there for the long term are out looking for work. Is it bad? No, it’s part of the reality of a dynamic, capitalist economy.
Second, no officer ever resigned from the Navy for lack of enough sea time? Wrong again. And I know, because I am one of them. One of the groups that has characteristic low retention is officers assigned to extensive overhauls. In my case I reevaluated my decision and waited for the opportunity to get back to sea. The reason people get so frustrated with lack of sea time is that they joined the Navy to go to sea. That’s right—some people, commonly referred to by the general public as “sailors,” actually like to drive ships at sea.
Let’s talk about that culture shock he got when he arrived on the ship. He must have made at least one six-month deployment in three years, maybe two. He missed Christmas? The final four? Broke up with his girlfriend? I feel his pain. Don’t show this to some poor Marine or surface warfare officer in Little Creek who completed the Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia marathon. He or she likely would fall overboard laughing.
Watchstanding, officer-of-the-deck submerged—that’s where it’s at. That is where officers improve their skills and gain the experience they need to earn the opportunity to be a commanding officer. It also is where officers establish credibility with the troops, teach them, and lead by example. There is no pill or video that will give you all the tools to make the right decision in a situation that you never before encountered. It also is how we earn our paychecks. We are, after all, ship drivers. Operating a submarine in a forward area in a high-contact environment is a challenging experience; it is not a terrifying experience—unless you do not know what you are doing. He will face difficult issues in the business world, too. Will he be terrified or quit every time it gets too hard? I have found that the typical six-hour OOD watch feels like a fraction of that. Those two-month special operations feel like about two weeks—at least until you look at yourself in the mirror. Most officers do not feel terrified by the responsibility of driving a billion-dollar ship. Real people just do not think that way; they think about what has to be done—and they do it.
I do not believe that Mr. Goetsch speaks for even a significant fraction of his age group. I know, because I talk to his peers on the midwatch, and I hit the beach with them on port visits. They are smart, too. They remain enthusiastic. They work as hard as I did as a junior officer. I remember advising one of my best junior officers to take a careful look at what the civilian sector had to offer. He was a very strong performer, and I was concerned that downsizing might limit his potential. His answer summed up my feelings as well as his own. “I know I could do well at something else, but this is really the only thing that I want to do.”
I keep track of my friends both in and outside the Navy. I have some grim messages to pass on to Mr. Goetsch. On the whole, people who succeed in any line of work are people who work hard. It helps to be smart, but even the smart people work hard to succeed. I do not work nearly the number of nights, weekends, and holidays as my friends who are physicians, lawyers, and investment bankers do. Apparently, people get sick at the most inconvenient times; you must be ready for trial even if it’s on a Monday; and if you cannot put together the financing by your client’s deadline, he will find another investment banker who can. Kind of mean, isn’t it? Someone should put a stop to it.
There is a new aviation bonus message on the street that provides bonuses of up to $12,000 per year to pilots with certain qualifications. Eligible officers can commit to up to seven years and collect a maximum of $81,000—half of which is payable immediately. I have not seen a groundswell of protest from the aviation community indicating that this was proof positive that the needs of the junior officers were being neglected or that the leadership in the F/A-18 community was inferior to that in the P-3 community—since the P-3 pilots do not currently qualify for a bonus. No, it is well understood that there is a need to balance manpower with the mission, and bonus is one of the tools by which this is achieved.
When you occupy a unique position of trust, it is not unusual that someone will, from time to time, verify that you are maintaining that trust. Mr. Goetsch never will endure another Operational Reactor Safeguards Exam or Tactical Readiness Evaluation; he will, if successful in business, deal with auditors, the Securities Exchange Commission, and the IRS. And those pesky stockholders act as if they own the company.
I realize that many of the things that Mr. Goetsch complains about happen, in varying degrees, on different ships. Some ships operate more efficiently than others, and some do a better job of incorporating ideas from all levels of the command structure. In general, people underestimate the impact that they have to make things operate better. It is a lot easier to be a critic than a performer.
The biggest problem I have with his analysis is that it is negative. If you want to ensure that more top performers stay in the Navy, don’t just ask people who got out why they got out, ask the ones who stayed. The answers to that question provide all of the positive things that you need to do to help more top performers stay. Otherwise, you are just crossing off items from a list of deficiencies.
Looking at the positive aspects that he missed, let’s start with the mission. Right now, the submarine force and the Air Force strategic forces are the only part of the Department of Defense that is actually engaged in the defense of the United States. Everything else that the U.S. military does defends the interests of the United States—some of which are fairly concrete and some of which are kind of hard to get your arms around. You will not find many people walking around talking about this, because the Cold War is “over.” Therefore, it is difficult to say that there might be any doubt as to whether or not a certain country will succeed in converting to democracy and capitalism without a backlash that would put the nuclear weapons that still are accounted for under hostile control. Those who labor in this most important mission of the U.S. military will have to be content to do it in relative anonymity, but at least should realize the importance of what they do.
We have been at the nuclear submarine business for a while now, so it is easy to say that the challenges are fewer and that the job now involves the rote execution of a checklist that was developed as a result of the experience of the true pioneers in the business. But don’t tell that to the wardroom of the submarine which—with no notice or workup—went on its first mission in the counter-narcotics business, threw away the rules they were given when they recognized that their target was not conforming to the rules of the game, and produced the biggest cocaine seizure on the high seas in history. I was not there, so I do not know if the commanding officer made all of the decisions himself, or if some junior officer figured out what was going on and what had to be done. But I do know that creativity and heads-up play were the keys to success.
I had a neat conversation with a lieutenant commander from my office the other day. He and a few other people had just figured out how to ram 38.4 thousand baud through a standard old BRA-34 multipurpose antenna. What this means for those of us who are not computer heavies is that we can transmit things in real-time video anywhere in the world, much faster than you can get all that stuff off the Internet. No big deal, I guess—except that I read a few weeks before that a congressman thought that we needed to delay procurement of the New Attack Submarine because it physically was impossible to make a submarine a player in an information-intensive battlefield.
The pace of similar breakthroughs that are multiplying the power of sonar and weapon systems is fast and getting faster. The abundance of computer talent and creativity—which are hallmarks of Generation Xers—are driving this process and reducing our dependence on big, clumsy, long lead-time systems. Young, creative people are making these things happen. It will be fun for those who are there.
“Service Academies: Critical to Our Future”
(See C. R. Larson, pp. 32-37, October 1995 Proceedings)
Captain M. Lee Minnis, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Larson certainly has my vote as a taxpayer to continue the service academies—but not by providing politically correct officers. As stated, developing leaders of character is what the service academies are all about, but this cannot be done through character development. Character is many things, but— like affairs of the heart and religious beliefs—it cannot be identified by any known means of testing or other evaluation. Each of us is born with a certain character that is determined by our ancestry—unrelated to racial mix—just as our physical attributes vary in degree from person to person. The environment to which we are exposed then takes over, and our character attains its full growth roughly between the ages of about six and eight years. It cannot be changed, but can be kept partially under control through dedicated self-examination and fear of punishment. In moments of extreme anxiety, nothing can replace that gift of character—as modified by early stimulation. Is not the POW who bears cruel and inhumane punishment to maintain his honor and dignity sometimes the husband who later may cheat on his wife? Are not both of these examples of one's character, although some may give them different weight? These are not things that can be taught or developed, because none of us really knows what we would do until the situation arises in full fury.
Admiral Larson cites the Jeffersonian view that “moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm.” No one would argue with this quote, but it is taken out of context—and the entire letter from which it comes needs to be read, to understand Mr. Jefferson’s intent in writing to his nephew, Peter Carr, as he commenced his studies at the College of William and Mary in 1787. Mr. Jefferson went on to say:
“It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given to them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body.”
He began this paragraph on moral philosophy by stating: “I think it lost time to attend lectures in this branch.”
Nowhere in this letter did Thomas Jefferson suggest anything resembling the so-called Naval Academy’s Character Development Program. He put more stock in common sense, stating that if one presented a moral case to a plowman and a professor, the former would decide it as well—and often better—because he would not be encumbered with artificial rules. Mr. Jefferson’s recommendation was to read good books to encourage— as well as to direct—one’s feelings. Exercising one’s gift of character at every turn would strengthen moral acumen and increase one’s worth.
Of even deeper concern is Admiral Larson’s HERO program, which sounds like another wishful-thinking acronym. Others have used political officers in an attempt to make everyone believe the same. With the current mindset, this pro gram will produce more resentment—for its intrusiveness—than compliance. A person whose parent was an abusive alcoholic may have little faith in even a social drinker. Similar personal experiences may lead to other nearsightedness. Some may be opposed to the notion of women in combat, without their view influencing their own performances or those of others.. Disagreement over the cause of racial problems is a healthy thing, so long as discrimination doesn’t take place. Adopting a politically correct view as the only course of action is far too damaging to the rights of individuals.
Admiral Larson quotes a retired Marine Corps major general who looked up to Naval Academy graduates in his early years as an officer. That retiree spoke of leadership and standards but not once of character, because he saw only what appeared on the surface. Most of us can judge the character of others only when they are sorely tried. Their personal conduct and leadership are what we see, and they can often cover up the weakest aspects of character until a traumatic event brings out the true hidden traits.
The taxpayers, through their elected representatives, will not buy this program. Even more important, the Brigade of Midshipmen will not, either. Perhaps a look toward the peak of the pyramid of officer structure—instead of its base—might produce better results in image. The performance of senior leadership in handling recent media releases has demonstrated a considerable lack of character in many high places. Placing all the blame at the lowest level is not a privilege of the captain, because the final responsibility rests upon him.
As Admiral Larson stated, the Naval Academy’s role is to produce officers with actual warfare specialties. To do this better, it should:
- Drop the degree program and teach nothing but naval science.
- Improve the selection system for new candidates by looking for strength in character, at higher levels than that demanded for scholastic and athletic skills.
- Make the proven lack of integrity cause for dismissal at all levels—not just for midshipmen.
- Do not be embarrassed when someone fails from their gift of character; no one is perfect. Success at rating integrity in ourselves and others is even worse.
- Stand up to the competition at all levels and prove that the Naval Academy’s output exceeds all others. Failure to do this is in itself a sign of weakness in character, whatever the position on the pyramid.
Admiral Larson stated that the Naval Academy graduate starts out ahead but that all becomes equal at the ten-year level. That doesn’t have to be the case, because a skew can be placed in any distribution if the individuals involved want it enough. If all is equal after ten years, then the other sources are working harder to catch up—and if they can, then we have nothing to complain about, except our own weakness.
Ensign Matthew J. Bowen, U.S. Naval Reserve—I agree with everything Admiral Larson wrote, but he neglected to mention the two other federal academies that also are very important to our nation. The U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut, and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in Kings Point, New York, often are forgotten—but their importance to the nation cannot be questioned.
The Coast Guard Academy trains cadets to be Coast Guard officers, who ultimately will protect our coastlines, patrol inland waterways, inspect merchant ships, and save thousands who are involved in boating accidents or other mishaps at sea.
The Merchant Marine Academy trains midshipmen to be licensed merchant officers on U.S.-flagged ships. The Merchant Marine helps the United States compete in global trade and can be used by the government in the event of war. Along with a Merchant Marine license, midshipmen also are graduated with a Naval Reserve commission. Many of each year’s graduating class choose to go on active duty in the military.
Both the Coast Guard Academy and the Merchant Marine Academy are operated by the U.S. Department of Transportation. The Naval Academy, Military Academy, and Air Force Academy are all operated by the U. S. Department of Defense. All five academies are funded by U.S. taxpayer dollars. It does not matter what department they fall under. When we speak of the service academies, let’s remember all five.
“Rethinking the Ship”
(See M. Vlahos, pp. 81-88, October 1995 Proceedings)
Bryan Alan Richards—The subject of this article is ideal for your magazine, and I still long for a thoughtful exploration of it. Unfortunately, reading this article was like watching an infomercial on how to make money—lots of puffing and little substance. It took forever to make the simplest points. As the article bounced and gyrated with bold text and questions and bulleted text and headings, the readers must have been assumed to be members of the short-attention-span navy.
I really expected the conclusion to be a pitch to attend a seminar on this subject, all for a nominal fee of course. The author never seemed to get to his point. This is not a technical article; it is a big-picture article. While I did not want to get lost in a prose engineering blueprint, it was hard to see the forest from orbit—this article must have been written to satisfy tenure requirements.
James R. Brooke, Ph.D., Director, Strategic Assessment, Pacific Business Development Group, San Diego—Michael Vlahos takes us down a road we’ve been before in attempting to shore up one warfare community at the expense of another. I do not quarrel with the author’s view of the future threat. I agree that although we do not know what that threat will be, history tells us there will be one and we should plan accordingly. My central criticism with the article is this: I really do not care if the surface warfare community—or any other single warfare community—is advanced one iota on its own, and I really don’t think those who determine force structures should care either. What we should care about is how to get the right mix of naval warfighting capability to sea. That means aviation, subsurface, and surface warfighting capability. The last time I deployed, it was in a battle group, not as an individual warfare community.
We see now some definite trends emerging as to what wins in future warfare as well as areas of concern. Stealth works in airframe design and in ship design. Precision strike works from both air-delivered and unmanned vehicles. Intelligence collection is paramount to know who and where the enemy is and what kind of capability he has. And what of the future of the so-called “safe standoff distance.” How far out will “safe” have to be, given the speed and range advances we are seeing in antiship cruise missile development? All of this suggests that capability, not community, will hold the key to how we develop our military of the future.
It would behoove us all to stop trying to define our Navy in terms of one community or another and to start devoting the best possible thinking to the conduct of future warfare and how best to assemble the right combination of platforms and weapon systems to win these wars of the future. Once national defense planners accomplish that difficult feat, then the “real challenge” for Mr. Vlahos and the rest of us will be how to convince the American public to pay for it.
“The UCP: Time to Change”
(See D. P. Loren, pp. 11-14, August 1995 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Irve C. Le Moyne, U.S. Navy, Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff, U.S. Special Operations Command—Captain Loren’s article was timely and thought provoking. I am compelled, however, to set the record straight on an error made in terminology that may have confused readers. In several instances, the term “Southern Command” is used when describing U.S. Special Operations Command’s functions and responsibilities. This honest mistake likely originated by a misinterpretation of our acronym, USSOCOM. While it is true USSOCOM can be considered a southern command, since we are headquartered in Tampa, Florida, the “SO” in our abbreviation represents “special operations” not “southern.” I hope this small faux pas did not distract the reader’s focus when considering the many thought-provoking points made by Captain Loren.
“Maneuver Warfare at Sea”
(See J. J. Tritten, pp. 52-54, September 1995 Proceedings)
Captain J. H. Patton, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Dr. Tritten is on the mark when he writes of manoeuvre warfare at sea, particularly with the chess game analogy. In that context, the naval players in this match can be related to specific pieces. For example, as with the knight, the nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) cannot win the “. . . From the Sea” endgame alone. However, unlike those that slash across into other forces, batter the center of the board, or race down the flanks of an opponent once an opening is created, it can go “right downtown” early on to engage principal targets or wreak havoc in the rear and create gaps in the opposing ranks that more powerful forces can exploit when they arrive.
Dr. Tritten’s reference to the sinking of the General Belgrano in the Falklands Conflict tells only part of the contribution of one such agile piece, the British SSN Conqueror. The scenario on 2 May 1982 included not just the World War II cruiser General Belgrano at sea some 200 miles to the southwest of the British main force, but also the aircraft carrier Vientecinco de Mayo some 200 miles to the northwest. Admiral Sandy Woodward was faced with an imminent coordinated attack from the carrier’s air wing, perhaps including air-launched Exocet sea- skimming cruise missiles, along with some 16 additional Exocets from the two destroyers escorting the General Belgrano. This multi-azimuthal strike almost certainly would have saturated the British battle group’s air defenses.
It might do well once again to draw a parallel between a naval force’s submarines and an army’s cavalry, whose classic role is to reconnoiter, to surveil, to disrupt an opponent’s command-and-control structure, to surprise enemy forces from unexpected directions, and to attack logistic tails with a broad selection of carried weaponry. These neat manoeuvre tricks require not only the ability to engage at will, but also, if survivability is an issue, the unquestioned ability to disengage at will—and to show up again somewhere else. Here is the defining requirement for the U.S. naval cavalry— probably even more important than the high degree of mobility needed to ensure the commanders of the more observable forces they serve that the SSNs, like John the Baptist, will be there first to “make straight the way of the Lord.”
When the widely dispersed and geographically precise battlefield awareness that Copernicus and other joint variants promise is coupled to the long ranges of available weaponry (Tomahawk, et. al.), Jim Tritten’s point regarding “the temporary massing of firepower” takes on a different spin. When operating in a true geographic reference (courtesy of such as GPS) versus a relative one, the modern equivalent of “crossing the T” requires only massing aimpoints in the time domain, not actually getting together to form a column—an observation that highlights his caution not to confuse the word manoeuvre with maneuver in a naval sense.
“Strategic Air Power Didn't Work”
(See S. T. Ganyard, pp. 31-35, August 1995; R. G. Davis, pp. 14-16, October 1995 Proceedings)
Captain Frank C. Gilmore, U. S. Navy (Retired)—At the end of World War II, a Strategic Bombing Study commission said that strategic bombing in that war had failed. It did not: (1) turn the German people against Hitler, (2) stop industrial production or rail transport, or (3) end the war. All true, but that was not the goal set by the Allied Commander for strategic bombing. Those were the goals set by the strategic bomber folks themselves.
Major Ganyard says the goal of the strategic air planners was “. . . the progressive and systematic collapse of Saddam Hussein’s entire war machine and regime.” Since that goal was established by the strategic air planners themselves it must be suspect, and since Saddam’s regime did not fall and since his war machine was not destroyed, strategic air power failed. However, if we measure strategic air's performance against Major Ganyard’s chosen quote from Rear Admiral Mike McConnell of the Joint Chief’s Staff—“the overall objective of the strategic attacks was to degrade the war fighting infrastructure in the country, to eliminate the ability to wage war”—then strategic air was successful.
It is easy to set goals that are too all inclusive, especially when any group is too insulated from the “real world” as apparently Checkmate’s staff, operating in their Black Hole functioned. However, Major Ganyard errs in accepting, at face value, goals set by planners, and then evaluating those goals in absolute terms. Strategic air had an important role in Desert Storm—but it was only a role, only part of the overall play. Major Ganyard gives great credit to tactical air, but it too was but a part of the overall plan and the resulting action. In a 100-hour war, anything strategic that has real input to the outcome, has to have been well done.
“The Few, The Proud, The Cautious”
(See S. M. Crittenden, p. 71, September 1995 Proceedings)
Captain J. M. Duke, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)—Colonel Crittenden does a splendid job of pointing to misuse of fitness reports as symptomatic of deeper leadership problems. It was during times of military poverty (peace) that leaders were developed with the ability to prevail at Tripoli, at Belleau Wood, and at Guadalcanal. Doing more with less is neither new nor bad as an element in leadership development. What does seem counterproductive is the abject fear of political correctness that currently pervades every echelon of government and subsequently rains heavily upon our military leaders.
Going back to basics would be an excellent course for our current leaders to set:
- The service secretary has only two jobs: (1) Keep the military from overthrowing the country; (2) Keep the government off his organization’s back. Anything more than that is a disservice to the taxpayers.
- The military leader must develop and maintain a loyal and capable force. Loyalty is a two-edged sword, and he must give loyalty to obtain it. The military leader can ask a great deal of his people, but must protect them from above and take the heat for mistakes or mavericks that are a positive part of a military in a republic.
Were these things to happen as they should, fitness reports would revert to being a useful tool instead of a part of the problem.
“That Ain’t No Lady”
(See C. D. McKee, p. 100, April 1995; J. B. Davis, p. 25, August 1995 Proceedings)
Robert B. Hunt—Ms. Davis expressed displeasure with the Proceedings's anecdote by Mr. McKee. What Mr. McKee related appeared to have happened a long time ago. Any sailor can remember an incident similar to Mr. McKee’s. It was a real-world flashback into the past, and it illustrated one of the great strengths of the U.S. Navy for more than 50 years. Our officers and enlisted have an enviable relationship: We get along and are tolerant of each other and have great respect for one another. Is Ms. Davis suggesting that any story that does not support modern politically correct thought be forbidden?
The Return of the Squadron Augmentation Unit
Commander J. P. Haggerty, U.S. Naval Reserve—Last June, the BRAC 95 committee decided to preserve the Sea Control Community in the Jacksonville area. This presents a superb opportunity for naval aviation to make a decision that is likewise being contemplated by the strike/fighter community: the return of the Squadron Augmentation Unit (SAU). This type of naval air reserve entity was seen last in fiscal year 1992. The elimination of the SAU was one of many steps the Navy made to downsize the naval air reserve with minimal loss of hardware.
During the last three years, there have been some difficult cuts that were deemed necessary. The elimination of the medium attack A-6 community, along with its tanking ability, brought the S-3 community to the forefront by fact of its inflight refueling capability. A deployed S-3 squadron typically is manned for eight aircraft, each equipped with a D-706 inflight refueling package. No other air asset integrated into the carrier airwing can provide such a refueling capability. This is evident with the remaining Reserve carrier airwing. We should bring back the S-3 SAU. There are 17 S-3 As mothballed, and the cost of converting all of them to S-3Bs that include the inflight refueling tanking package would amount to less than the reengining of six F-14 operational aircraft. Will the U.S. Navy be proactive and make that first decision by taking steps to stand up a S-3 SAU?
“The Rise & Decline of Coercive Statecraft”
(See J. Nathan, pp. 59-65, October 1995 Proceedings)
William Huffman—In the equation of strategic operations, the unknown element with regard to the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was a sea- based system called Polaris.
In 1958 we had placed a forward- based system of 60 Thor missiles in England. We followed this action with 30 Jupiter missiles in Italy and 15 in Turkey. But land-based systems such as Jupiter are the most vulnerable, because they are fixed platforms and cannot quickly be repositioned. The liquid-fueled Jupiters were obsolete assets whose retaliatory value was highly questionable. The deployment of Polaris by the Navy made Jupiters and Thor missiles redundant, and eventually all Thor and Jupiter platforms were withdrawn in 1963.
Few weapon systems in history have combined more dramatic technological innovations than Polaris, a bold concept for a submarine-launched ballistic missile that was formulated by Admiral W. F. Ray born and a team from Lockheed. The two most fundamental decisions were to use solid propellant (a technology not yet adequately developed by the Soviets) and to expel the missiles from vertical launch tubes while the submarine remained submerged. But the project also introduced many other novel technologies, including lightweight ablative reentry vehicles, miniaturized inertial guidance, miniaturized nuclear and thermonuclear warheads, cold-gas launch techniques, submarine inertial navigation systems, and submarine noise reduction.
When Polaris reached operational status in November 1960 it changed the nature of strategic warfare. It was the first nuclear armed, strategic ballistic missile ever deployed on U.S. Navy submarines. On 15 November 1960, the USS George Washington (SSBN-598), armed with 16 A-1 Polaris missiles, sailed from Charleston, South Carolina, on her first operational patrol for strategic deterrence. This was two years prior to the Soviet move into Cuba. The strategic concept of target acquisition as a result of stealth and survivability of Polaris from the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea places the probability of arrival for Polaris at 80%; Turkey was not lost during the Jupiter withdraw.
Polaris was a countermove by our Navy in the chess game of global military supremacy. As early as 1970, when the Poseidon missile system replaced Polaris, four submarines carried 16 Poseidon C-3 (UGM-73A) missiles with an average of ten W-68 warheads per missile. As a result of this strategic concept, these four ballistic missile submarines carried a total of 640 warheads. Retreat was never an option!
“Naval Academy Memories”
(See E. L. Beach, J. Carter, J. H. Dalton, i. S. McCain III, R. C. McFarlane, and W. M. Schirra, pp. 38-41, October 1995 Proceedings)
Richard S. Gardiner, Class of 1947—It would seem that the Proceedings should get the U.S. Naval Academy class years and dates of graduation correct, but it often does not. For example, Jimmy Carter had his bars pinned on 5 June 1946, not 1947.
Captain Elihu York, Medical Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired), Senior Medical Officer and Flight Surgeon on board the USS Essex, 1966-68—Robert C. McFarlane stated, “Just before June Week in spring 1958,1 was thrilled to learn of my assignment to the carrier Essex (CV-38) for first class cruise.” The Essex was commissioned on 31 December 1942 as CV-9, later designated CVA-9, and finally CVS-9. □
Captain L. R. Fiore, U.S. Naval Reserve—In reference to Mr. Carter’s “torpedo scare” in which “one of four propellers was bent severely,” I was a lieutenant on the sister ship and remember there being only two propellers.
“Thank You Navy”
(See D. C. Bowman, pp. 26-27, September 1995 Proceedings)
Commander A. L. Bader, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Colonel Bowman expresses his desire “to find out who did such a superb job shooting for us” in providing naval gunfire support near Hue, Republic of Vietnam, 26 January through 28 February 1968. The most accurate answer to his question is “several ships.” I was executive officer and navigator on board the USS Lofberg (DD-759), whose main armament was three twin 5”/38 mounts. That configuration was popular with the troops ashore because “fire for effect” with a six-gun salvo could quickly saturate an area. We were in Subic Bay when the Tet Offensive began on 30 January. We later arrived in the area off the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and Hue on 6 February. After refueling from the USS Passumpsic (AO-107), we conducted a fire mission from 1346 to 1718, expending 87 rounds of 5'738 antiaircraft common and 41 rounds high explosive point- detonating projectiles.
From 2100 to 0500 the next morning, we conducted a harassment and interdiction mission, expending 454 high explosive point-detonating projectiles and 69 antiaircraft common rounds. From 0949 to 1444, we conducted another fire mission, expending 78 rounds high explosive point-detonating projectiles and 20 antiaircraft common. That evening from 1647 to 2049, we rearmed from the USS Fire- drake (AE-14) and returned to station to conduct harassment and interdiction missions throughout the night, and fire missions intermittently throughout 8 February. At 2136, while conducting a fire mission, we received counterbattery fire, the closest burst falling about 150 feet off our starboard bow. We cleared the area but continued the mission until 2237. On Friday, 9 February, we were directed to proceed to the southern part of I Corps near Quang Nai for further naval gunfire support missions, thereby terminating our operations in the Hue area.
Because our area of operations off the Vietnamese coast was between Hue and the DMZ, it is possible that the Lofberg may have been one unit of many that supported both Army and Marine units on shore during the Tet fighting. On behalf of all of the destroyers on the gunline, I would like to say, “You’re welcome.”
“Manning the (Smaller) Nuclear Fleet”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 87-88, August 1995 Proceedings)
Commander T. D. Fredrick, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Stephen W. Groves (FFG-29)—As a nuclear-trained surface warfare officer, I was not surprised to see the dismal nuclear junior officer retention percentages. I was surprised at Mr. Polmar’s attempt (attributed to an unnamed BuPers official) to explain why surface nuclear officer retention is so low and that it is expected to increase. The decision to decommission all nuclear-powered cruisers probably is a factor in low retention rates, but I doubt that many lieutenants at the five- or six-year point are concerned if they will be assigned to command a nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser. I also disagree with Mr. Polmar’s statement that retention will improve because opportunities in conventional surface combatants are being expanded. Nuclear-trained surface warfare officers always have had those opportunities—even to command Aegis cruisers. The Navy always has maintained that we are surface warfare officers first and nuclear-trained second.
Mr. Polmar’s conclusion that the nuclear community is seeing a brighter future is unsupported by his numbers. Twenty-nine percent retention in the face of a 38% requirement eventually leaves the nuclear surface navy undermanned by almost 25%. Retention will not improve until we address the issues that drive out young officers. There are many issues affecting surface nuclear officer retention, but the two most salient to our young officers are related to work schedules and a lack of professional mobility. Nuclear officers are taught that a concentrated work ethic that revolves around the safe operation and maintenance of a nuclear reactor is the expected norm. This leads to a demanding schedule—first to qualify so that an already stretched watchbill remains workable, then to maintain a five- on, ten-off rotation under way while performing as division officer, working on surface warfare qualifications, and other duties. Even in-port periods offer little respite as the department struggles to complete required maintenance with attendant testing and paperwork while juggling training schedules and in-port watchstanding requirements. Add to that an annual visit by the ORSE team, quarterly assists by the Type Commanders Training team, and daily drills. The job is harder than what the young officer’s conventional peers are doing and offers little or no additional reward beyond the annual bonus provided for those who stay beyond their initial service obligation.
A second issue is young surface nuclear officers’ inability to distinguish themselves as surface warfare officers. This stems from two sources: a lack of ability to complete surface warfare officer qualifications on the same time line with their peers, and an unwarranted stigma associated with assignment to an aircraft carrier whenever they are serving in an afloat nuclear billet. BuPers has addressed the first of these issues with a new career path that allows nuclear surface officers to qualify before entering nuclear power training. The second issue is much harder to address. Because the nuclear officer is only one of so many in his paygrade and because he might think that his commanding officer will be more conversant with the jobs performed by his contemporaries, he might believe that his fitness report will suffer when he is assigned to an aircraft carrier. He also might believe that he will be lost in the shuffle professionally; we in the surface navy have perpetuated for years the myth that cruiser-destroyer experience is the only way for surface officers to succeed.
It is not hard to see why surface nuclear junior officer retention is poor. Until we change the current perception—that such work is unrewarded and leads to a career of being rated second best—our retention of surface nuclear officers will not improve.
“The Future of Joint ASW”
(See B. R. Linder, pp. 66-70, September 1995;
T. J. Dayton, pp. 14-15, November 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Gerald J. Butkus, U.S. Naval Reserve—This article highlights two recurring themes in 20th century warfare: the forgetting of the importance of ASW and that an enemy may adapt a strategy to attack our weaknesses rather than most of our strengths head on. After World War I, it was felt that the development of sonar had solved the submarine problem. But as Germany’s submarine campaign and the U.S. submarine campaign against Japan in World War II proved, this was not the case. After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. is again making the same mistake. Our ASW structure in the air, surface, and subsurface communities is undergoing large cuts. The United States’ ability to conduct ASW will be greatly reduced, and as the article showed, could be a disaster.
What happened to Iraq during the Gulf War is a warning to any opponent that it must not face U.S. strengths, rather weaknesses. ASW is becoming a weakness, and the United States must turn this around. The Navy will have to rely upon assistance of the other services, because ASW is a joint concern and resources are constrained. In a time of reduced force levels, new ideas are needed, and joint ASW may just be one that will contribute to success in a future conflict. This will increase in importance because of the proliferation of advanced diesel subs throughout the world.
“Truth Without Fear”
(See J. Hoffman, pp. 57-63, May 1995; H. L. Elman, pp. 20-21, August, 1995; J. H. McGrath, p. 27, October 1995 Proceedings)
“OSD Directs White House Clearance of All Pentagon Testimony”
(See p. 62, May 1995 Proceedings)
Captain Albert H. Vito, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Reading the serious comments on the subject of “Truth Without Fear” and the “Obey-or-Resign” syndrome, I was reminded of a framed statement that was hung on a wall of the Pentagon office of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) when Vice Admiral Bob Pirie held that position. As best I can recall, it said: “I have never believed in that sort of obedience which entails carrying out an order exactly as it was given. Instead, I subscribe to that higher order of discipline which requires one to do what his superior would have told him to do had he known what he was talking about.”
This philosophy was authored by Alexander Botts, a salesman for the Earthworm Tractor Company and a familiar figure to readers of the old Saturday Evening Post. One can only admire the confidence of an officer who was not afraid to make his subordinates aware of such heresy.
“A COLA Catch-22 in Japan”
(See T. Philpott, p. 90, August 1995 Proceedings)
Rich Bruce—I am glad someone has addressed the cost-of-living allowance (COLA) issue facing our service people in Japan. The Stars and Stripes cover stories in fall 1988 reported the same events. The Yen had dropped to its lowest level ever, to that time. Simultaneously, the COLA was reduced for the exact same reasons Mr. Philpott brings out. In 1988, there was no outcry from senior officials. I was disappointed in January 1989 that the pay raise received cost me in take- home income. As an officer, however, I was much better off than most.
“Nineteen, Talk to Me!”
(See T. Beard, pp. 66-71, August 1995; G. Skinner, pp. 16-18, October 1995 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander M. E. Woodring, U.S. Coast Guard, Public Affairs Officer—I was both saddened and excited at the opportunity presented by Mr. Skinner’s comments concerning Commander Beard’s article. Obviously, the Coast Guard public affairs community, myself included, has not done a very good job of letting the general public and our shipmates in the other services know about the new nationally syndicated reality television series “Coast Guard,” which is based on the activities, missions, and people of the U.S. Coast Guard. I am excited to say, however, that the new show debuted the week of 18 September nationwide. “Coast Guard” is a half-hour weekly program, internally managed by the Coast Guard Motion Picture-Television Liaison Office. The show does exactly what Mr. Skinner envisions: provide the public with an enhanced awareness of the Coast Guard’s role on the high seas—not only as a lifesaving agency but also as a law enforcement entity.
“U.S. Naval Battle Force Changes”
(Sec S. L. Morison, pp. 217-221, May 1995 Proceedings)
Jack L. Schmidt, President Gulf Copper Manufacturing Corporation—A column entitled “Errata Table for Previous Editions” lists the Adept (AFDL-23) as a commercial lease to “Gulf Cooper,” [sic] address unknown. The drydock is now in service at our facility in Aransas Pass, Texas, and is the sole available facility to support these ships, devoted solely to that purpose. Since the Adept's recertification at our location in early 1995, it has performed three MCM dockings.
“A Bridge Too Far”
(See D. Maquera, pp. 105-107, October 1994 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Camilo O’Kuinghttons, U.S. Navy, Strike Fighter Weapons School, Pacific—If the Navy were to follow Lieutenant Maquera’s advice, it would:
- Buy a new forward-looking infrared (FLIR) camera/laser pod (used for large- guided bomb [LGBJ targeting and guidance) for the F-14 Tomcat and the F/A- 18C/D Hornet.
- Buy another FLIR/laser pod for the F/A-18E/F.
- Integrate the GBU-28 advanced hard- target penetrator LGB with the F-14.
Although improvements to the Hornet are part of his advice, the emphasis is on making expensive and risky improvements to the F-14 so it can carry out LGB missions autonomously—an emphasis wholly misplaced. The Navy would be wise to stress improvements to the F/A- 18 instead.
His assessment of the LGB’s importance to the Navy, and of the Navy’s need for a new FLIR/laser systems, are bullseyes, but his justifications for a new F-14 FLIR—the Hornet FLIR’s limitations and the Hornet’s ability to exploit the GBU-24 fully—either scratch the surface or fall completely off target. The Navy, however, must deal with costs; it cannot purchase two new systems.
Since the Tomcat is not the only naval aircraft capable of employing GBU-24s, it follows that the justification for a new F-14 FLIR must arise from the F-14’s promise to become the Navy’s primary future strike aircraft. The F-14, however, entered service in the early 1970s; to expect it to fulfill this role for the next 20 or 30 years, in the numbers the Navy requires, is unrealistic. Only the two versions of the F/A-18 can fulfill this role for the long term and only these aircraft should receive a new FLIR.
Lieutenant Maquera claims that the prospect for capability growth in the Hornet FLIR is “tenuous,” since such growth is hardware-limited, but he neglects to mention that a Tomcat FLIR, laser, and terrain-following radar are all hardware enhancements. He also fails to mention that prospects for a new Hornet FLIR are bright and that an operational requirements document is now being sent to industry. A fly-off of the new FLIR is scheduled to take place within two years.
Air Force—and Navy—experience discloses that two seats are better than one when dropping LGBs. It seems logical that the Navy would prefer the two-seat version of the new F/A-18, the F/A-18F, to carry out the LGB mission in the future. In this case, why should the Navy pursue a new, expensive F-14 laser/FLIR program to bridge a very short two-seat gap?
The overriding considerations are cost and risk. The energy and money spent on a new F-14 FLIR would be diverted from programs that promise longer life; the Navy could buy two-seat F/A-18Fs that would become operational long before any new F-14 FLIR program (as opposed to the current program to equip F-l 4s with Air Force-developed, off-the-shelf Low-Altitude and Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night pods.) Ironically, the F-14 will be nearing the end of its service life by the time any new FLIRs arrive. Purchasing a new F-14 FLIR to solve a short-term two-seat problem would not be cost-effective.
Maquera takes the Hornet out to the woodshed because of its FLIR/laser pod, the “limiting factor” for Hornets carrying LGBs—and he has a point (more on this later). To understand the limitation, however, think of the FLIR as a day-night camera with a telephoto lens that picks out far-distant targets and displays them inside the cockpit, buying the pilot time to pick out the proper aimpoint for his LGBs. The Hornet’s FLIR has a shorter lens than the Air Force’s LANTIRN pod, which gives the Hornet pilot less time to pick aim points. As a result, Hornet pilots must release medium-range laser- guided weapons such as GBU-24s and Laser Mavericks relatively close to their targets—not a factor with older LGBs since their simpler guidance systems require release closer to the target anyway.
This is a significant but not insurmountable limitation. The GBU-24 can still attain maximum penetration performance, and the Laser Maverick can still kill a tank even if released close to their targets. Thus, standoff—not weapon effectiveness—is the limitation of the Hornet’s FLIR/laser pod—and only when compared to a future system.
Neither the Hornet’s’s FLIR nor the LANTIRN—despite the latter’s magnification advantage—is powerful enough to allow standoff GBU-24 employment. My conversations with F-111 and F-15E drivers revealed that standoff GBU-24 employment is not a major LGB game plan.
But standoff GBU-24 or Laser Maverick employment are not the point. The single most debilitating result of the Hornet FLIR’s low magnification is the difficulty Hornet pilots have with acquiring targets. The number one reason LGB missions fail is the inability to find the target, and our Hornets carry one of the worst FLIR systems extant.
The Hornet’s FLIR is installed on the left fuselage station where it is susceptible to masking (seeker-head obstruction by aircraft fuselage or stores) during post-release designation maneuvers. Optimally, it would be located under the aircraft’s nose, where masking is reduced. In the F/A-18C/D such an installation is impossible; in the F/A-18F it would require removing the gun, which, if one appreciates strike-fighter pilots, is also impossible. But the F/A-18F could use a FLIR-unmasking scheme like that in the F-111 or the F-15E Strike Eagle, in which the seeker head of the fuselage-mounted pod is telescoped downward into the wind stream to extend below the aircraft, affording a clearer view.
These problems argue for an improvement to the Hornet FLIR; nothing here justifies a new F-14 FLIR program.
Lieutenant Maquera criticizes the Hornet for its alleged inability to “employ the GBU-24 throughout its operating envelope,” implying that the Tomcat can. Since he attributes this limitation to the Hornet s maximum speed, the concern must be about the way the weapon-release airspeed affects the GBU-24’s penetration capability or its release envelope. Release airspeed is only one of the many variables affecting the GBU-24’s ability to destroy hardened targets; the other variables—release altitude and dive angle, among others—are almost completely pilot-controlled. The GBU-24 itself is configured with an advanced guidance unit that maximizes the weapon’s inflight energy state until impact. Indeed, when released at the highest permissible speeds, the GBU-24 will actually slow down. The bottom line; if one examines the penetration performance charts, the Hornet is able to exploit the full capability of the GBU-24.
If the issue is instead release envelope, the extent to which the Hornet’s speed deficit reduces the GBU-24’s employment envelope is not discussed. Longer- range GBU-24 employment is available for faster aircraft; but the faster you go, the smaller your earned benefit from a marginal increase in speed. Comparing maximum release ranges for each aircraft at the speeds we expect them to travel inside enemy territory (i.e., as fast as the pilot can go), the increase in employment range amounts to a mile or so—about six seconds at those airspeeds—and is hardly significant.
The Hornet’ s new technology system will provide better magnification, a more powerful laser, reduced masking, a laser spot tracker, and possibly a thermal-crossover capability. It will be the most capable FLIR system ever fielded, and it will fulfill Lieutenant Maquera’s desire that the F/A-18E/F program develop a FLIR/laser that “considers fully LGB employment.”
The Hornet will in fact be able to step up to the plate—and connect.
“Lessons Learned from the USS Conolly”
(See J. L. Gibson and R. L. Holt, pp. 101-102, October 1995 Proceedings)
John J. O’Neill, Jr.—Having worked at Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) during the “Deming Years,” I enjoyed reading the Total Quality Leadership (TQL) experiences of the USS Conolly. I’m not surprised to see that the U.S. Navy has the same problems with total quality as the rest of industry.
Dr. Gibson and Captain Holt point out three lessons learned; some comments on these lessons follow:
- Competing TQL Structure. I am frustrated often when organizations insist on developing a separate management (or leadership) structure; total quality is a philosophy of leadership and management combined with the methods, structures, and culture to make it happen. Any action that makes it seem like something separate or extra is bound to delay or sidetrack the transformation.
There probably does need to be a committee to help birth this baby, get training going, and promote the initial application of total quality, but that is about it. This committee should not compete with line management for resources or to establish priorities.
Aside from this committee, there may be some internal personnel picking up collateral training or facilitating duties, to get the word out and build problem-solving and process-management skills. Even at the height of FPL’s quality effort, we were spending only about 1% of our annual budget on training and education. The rest of the resources are devoted to practice, practice, practice!
- Application of Total Quality to Noncore Business Practices or Non-Priorities. At FPL, we experienced an early proliferation of quality improvement teams, most of which accomplished little or nothing. Two reasons existed for this phenomena: (1) Our executive steering committees chartered process improvement teams composed mostly of workers, without involving middle management. But middle management had to approve the solutions generated by these teams. Because they were initially cut out of the loop, their approvals were not very easy to get. (2) Early FPL team charters included improve communications, add an employee gym, and develop a plan to update power-plant drawings. I chuckled (yes, just the plan) when I read about the Conolly’s Scheduling of Barber Shop Appointments team. It sounded like one of ours! We had a saying about these kinds of teams: “Well, guess they moved another water cooler!”
Total quality is about continual improvement, but it also is about the way we manage our daily work. I read nothing in the Conolly’s experience about the application of quality control to daily work processes and rotating the plan-do- check-act cycle for these. Is this not part of the Navy’s TQL?
Let’s rewind and repeat one part of the Conolly experience from a total quality perspective:
An overhaul is scheduled beginning in March 1993 at Newport News. Three months are allowed, but ship’s leadership thinks it can be done in two months, with proper planning and execution (and without “killing” the crew and shipyard personnel). Detailed assessment of ship’s condition is conducted under way (a check of the plan-do-check-act cycle), overhaul jobs are identified, and joint planning with shipyard begins (using critical path method) to sequence and plan jobs. “Catchball” between ship’s leadership and crew adjusts overhaul duration target to two months, one week.
The ship’s overhaul, managed through critical path, detailed planning, and execution is completed on-target with all jobs done successfully—Total Quality Management (TQM) at work!
► Ship’s Mission, Vision, and Guiding Principles. This is one of the Conolly’s lessons that needs to be emphasized up and down the line. Total Quality will not work where there is fear and distrust. Organizations that are practicing the “Total Downsizing Management” philosophy will not achieve total quality.
Last Points. As an ex-Navy nuc, I’m in a fair position to compare industry with the military. Total quality is consistent with many systems and structures that the Navy already has in place. Many total quality methods (reliability methods, quality assurance systems, etc.) were delivered by the military. In addition, I think the Navy is ahead in leadership. Deming pleaded with industry to institute leadership. At least the Navy talks about it and tries to make it a part of everyday work. I often get embarrassed silence when the subject of leadership comes up in a civilian quality workshop. One of my frequently used total quality references is the Naval Institute’s Naval Leadership: Voices of Experience (1987).
The Conolly went through the same total quality startup as FPL and other companies. I personally made some of the same mistakes. There comes a point in an organization’s transformation, however, when the line starts to take over from the consultants and staff. When they see that total quality makes sense and helps them achieve better results, a real acceleration occurs. I hope the Navy is starting to see examples of this phenomenon.