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More Precious Than Peace:
The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World
Peter W. Rodman. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1994. 654 pp. Ind. Notes. $35.00 ($31.50).
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Paul R. Johnson, U.S. Naval Reserve
With this study of the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Third World, Peter Rodman bas made a valuable contribution to the literature on the Cold War. Using historical analysis—and his personal experience as an assistant to Henry Kissinger during the Nixon years and as a State Department and National Security Council official during the Reagan and Bush ad- mmistrations—he traces the development °f this competition from the advent of Leninism through the collapse of the Soviet Union. The book is well-written, and offers readers both analysis and policy Prescription.
Dr. Rodman begins by examining the roots of the ideological differences between the U.S. and Soviet foreign policy—differences founded in the conflict- lng philosophies of Woodrow Wilson and Lenin. The twists and turns of each nation's policies toward the Third World then are followed from the 1917 Bolshe- V|k revolution to the beginning of the Cold War. The Soviet Union’s attempt to take advantage of colonialism’s decline and the U.S. desire to manage the transition from colonialism to self-determination are described in both idealistic and Practical terms.
In the historical part of the book, Dr. Rodman does an excellent job of highlighting certain foreign policy dilemmas that were brought on by the struggle in the Third World. On the Soviet side, these included the initial debate about whether to cooperate with existing power structures or to bolster emerging, but Weak Communist parties. He also describes the ebb and flow between internal and external emphasis in Soviet decisions regarding policy opportunities and Problems. On the U.S. side, he illustrates very well the dilemma between purely strategic interests and more idealistic ones—such as the U.S. reluctance to intervene, and, later, the desire to protect human rights. An excellent discussion of the Congressional debates over foreign a*d from the early Cold War period— which is instructive as to the origins of the current intellectual arguments on this subject—is included.
Although More Precious Than Peace primarily is about the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, Dr. Rodman is careful to include the impact of Communist China on the policies of the primary antagonists. In the discussion of many conflicts—such as Vietnam, Angola, Afghanistan, and Cambodia—the interplay of China’s interests and actions in the development and resolution of these areas of crisis are described. Dr. Rodman clearly illustrates the interaction of Chinese policy and Soviet policy. In many instances, therefore, he identifies the triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China as responsible for events and eventual outcomes.
The impact that several crises—e.g., the Suez Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Persian Gulf War—have had on the politics of the developing world and on the behavior of the Americans and Soviets is interspersed throughout the analysis. For the most part this is done skillfully, but more time should have been spent discussing the Suez Crisis, not only because it is relatively unfamiliar to most Americans but also because Dr. Rodman appears to agree with Richard Nixon that the U.S. response to Suez was the greatest postwar U.S. foreign policy mistake.
After giving the historical and ideological background on the competition in general and on certain areas of crisis in particular, the author moves to a detailed analysis of the superpower competition in Angola, Afghanistan, Central America, Cambodia, and the Middle East. In these discussions, Dr. Rodman is at his best, weaving analysis of internal and external debates in the countries involved, giving balanced accounts of the positions of the various factions, and drawing out lessons for future foreign policy challenges. He often inserts his personal reflections and relates personal experiences, which tilts the discussion slightly in favor of the Republican administrations in which he served—and tends toward a self-congratulatory tone at times. Nevertheless, the overall result is a highly readable and informative review of events, with lessons drawn that are valuable without being judgmental.
The author is particularly adept at following at least three important themes in his analysis. First, he identifies and traces the effects of the so-called “Vietnam Syndrome” on U.S. policy after 1975. He shows its immediate effect—i.e., the cancellation of aid to the UNITA and FNLA forces in Angola—and follows the thread all the way to the influence it had on Saddam Hussein’s decision to challenge the United States during the Persian Gulf War. Interestingly, Dr. Rodman identifies the similar effect that Afghanistan had on Soviet foreign policy after the early 1980s. He also is alert to the institutional struggles within the United States over the control of foreign policy, describing in detail the wrangling between the Congress and the Executive Branch over policies in the areas discussed as well as on other important subjects—e.g., the proper role of covert operations and the impact of the Iran-Contra scandal (an episode for which no apologies are made). Finally, Dr. Rodman powerfully demonstrates the impact that the “new thinking” in Soviet foreign policy had on the resolution of several of the crises during the late 1980s.
Dr. Rodman draws several noteworthy conclusions. The first deals with the efficacy of backing up conventional diplomacy with appropriate action “on the ground.” This is illustrated in several examples in which a two-track strategy— engaging in negotiations while providing lethal or nonlethal aid to our allies— achieved a satisfactory outcome. The second important lesson deals with the proper perspective from which to view Russia in the post-Cold War era. Dr. Rodman counsels—wisely, I think—that Russia is neither an ally nor an enemy. The United States should not stake its policies on a moral conversion of the former Soviet state, but should remember that Russia is “a great power, impelled by a conception of its national interest and destiny, acting according to morally neutral laws of geopolitics.”
More Precious Than Peace represents a worthy effort to inform and enlighten, written by someone who has been at the center of policy formation in Republican administrations since the early 1970s. As such, the work is invaluable to anyone interested in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War era.
Commander Johnson is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and Harvard Law School. A former surface warfare officer, he is teaching negotiation at the graduate level while pursuing his Ph.D. in political science at Arizona State University.
In mid-1943, Germany’s U-boats were forced into a climactic battle in the North Atlantic. Thanks to advances in intelligence, tactics, and technology, Allied ASW forces overwhelmed the wolfpacks and broke the back of the U-boat menance.
The Defeat of the German U-Boats: The Battle of the Atlantic
David Syrett. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994. 344 pp.
Append. Ind. Notes. Photos. $39.95 ($37.95).
Reviewed by Dr. Marc Milner
The renowned British naval historian Sir Julian Corbett once observed that "the great dramatic moments of naval warfare have to be worked for.” By that he meant that decisive naval battles usually are the result of many years of blockade and pursuit, and by the time they are fought the strategic issues and, indeed, the operational issues already may have been decided. The same was true of the U-boat campaign in the Atlantic Ocean. By the spring of 1943, despite almost consistent tactical success and some stunning operational and even—perhaps—strategic victories, the U-boat fleet had been hounded, harried, and harassed from one comer of the Atlantic to the other for more than three years. Finally, in 1943, there were no easy theaters left and the U-boats were forced in to a stand- up battle in the main theater of action: the North Atlantic. That “dramatic moment” is the subject of Dr. Syrett’s book.
Dr. Syrett’s stated purpose was to write a narrative of the battle, to illustrate just how the weapons, tactics, technology, and intelligence employed by each side shaped the outcome. This he does by drawing heavily on the reports of actions—trying to reconcile their often cryptic notations of individual ship movements with those of others around them and with details from surviving U-boat and U-boat headquarters accounts. He also has drawn extensively on U.S. and British intelligence files, especially those concerning Ultra. In fact, his systematic integration of the intelligence picture into the narrative is one of the great strengths of the book. Each point of contact between Allied and Axis warships is chronicled and explained. Thus, many events treated cursorily in other accounts are outlined in full here.
The book follows a familiar pattern— not surprisingly, since this is a well-worn trail. After a workmanlike introductory chapter, the operations of April and May 1943 along the main convoy routes of the North Atlantic are recounted in detail. The same detailed narrative technique is then applied to the summer campaign by U.S. escort carriers in the central Atlantic, to the renewed U-boat offensive—based on the acoustic-homing torpedo—in the fall, and on the final collapse of wolf pack operations along the Gibraltar routes in October and November. Each of these sections ends with a solid analysis of the events just recounted.
The burden of Dr. Syrett’s case is that superior Allied technology, well-applied through equally superior application of naval intelligence, conventional as well as special, carried the day. This is not a new conclusion: in fact, it is the original—pre-Ultra hysteria—conclusion. Dr. Syrett demonstrates conclusively that the defeat of the wolf packs in 1943 owed little to the direct application of special intelligence. As others before him, he points out that the Germans were simply no match for Allied aircraft and warships equipped with 10 cm radar. The success of U.S. escort carriers in the summer is a case in point. When summarizing the kills made by these small carriers, Dr. Syrett observes, “In the majority of instances, cryptographic intelligence did not play a big role . . . .” Ultra helped locate the general area of concentration, but fixes from shipborne direction-finding sets provided the “numerous hints or pointers as to the location of particular U-boats.” In poor visibility, radar did the rest. The same was true of convoy battles farther north.
Although the author’s purpose was to focus on “combat” to show how the two sides employed “tactics, intelligence, electronic devices and weapons systems to fight the battle,” he has produced an operational narrative, thin on tactics and weak on larger context. There is no systematic discussion of tactical doctrine, although there is much detail on what was actually done on the day. For the most part, the tactics just happen. Admittedly, Dr. Syrett did not set out to discuss the higher direction of the campaign, but those more elevated issues profoundly shaped the story he has told. For example, at the Washington Convoy Conference of March 1943 (mentioned briefly at the bottom of page 17), it was agreed that operational control over the main theater of the Atlantic—the mid-ocean— would pass to the British, effective 30 April 1943. Thus, it was not just better spring weather and more aircraft that brought such a dramatic change to the U- boat war in May 1943. As the Washington Conference’s minutes record, the British believed that the U-boat fleet was now “fixed” and ripe for defeat. The crucial battle of Convoy ONS-5 in early May—fought largely in the western Atlantic—was conducted under British operational control; a week earlier, it would have been run from Washington once it crossed roughly 35° West.
Moreover, the British pursued the offensive relentlessly throughout 1943. The Bay of Biscay offensive of July and August 1943 was a highly successful assault against U-boats transiting to and from their French bases. Unfortunately, this crucial offensive is mentioned only in passing in Chapter 1. Setting his story in a larger context also would have mitigated Dr. Syrett’s overly harsh criticism of the Germans. The U-boat and its command- and-control system were remarkably effective at their primary purpose: sinking merchant shipping. That they were unsuited to fight Allied naval and air forces in 1943 was as clear to the Germans then as it is to us now; that is why, when forced to fight, they were beaten decisively.
Given the scale of the battle and the volume of the information to be shifted, it is unremarkable that there are gaps in Dr. Syrett’s account. And specialists in the field will find bits to quibble with, especially in his introductory chapter. It is less forgivable that Dr. Syrett should be so badly served by his publisher. Infelicities in style, repetitious passages, and a few egregious errors—e.g., U-boat concentrations “northwest of Newfoundland” (p. 42)—remain. More importantly, however, there is not a single map in the whole book! Detailed narratives of convoy battles, no matter how well written, are impossible to follow intelligently without a track of the action. None of the battles recounted here has so much as a sketch to accompany it. It is a pity that Dr. Syrett’s prodigious effort was not better supported.
A Professor of History at University of New Brunswick, Dr. Milner is the author of The U-Boat Hunters: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Offensive Against Germany’s Submarines (Naval Institute Press, 1995) and North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle for the Convoys (Naval Institute Press, 1985).
Books of Interest
Navy (Retired)
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S
Adventures with Warlords: Insight into Key Events of World War II
^illiam R. Burt. New York: Vantage Press, 1994. -95 pp. Append. Ind. Maps. Notes. $17.95 ($17.05).
ln his foreword to this book, renowned author John Toland writes, “Adventures with Warlords should be must reading in Washington. Our present leaders might well profit from the mistakes of their predecessors.” Burt was an Air Corps colonel whose job during World war II involved the allocation of aircraft and crews to the several theaters of operation. His ■nstders account reveals much about how air Power came into its own during this crucial Period.
^ Captain Cook’s Endeavour
(Ctrl Heinz Marquardt. Annapolis, MD: Naval ostitute Press, 1995. 136 pp. Ulus. Photos. $36.95 ($29.56).
The subject of the latest in the Anatomy of the Ship series is a stoutly built, but relatively humble collier, the Earl of Pembroke, that was taken into naval service in 1768 and con- Wfted for an expedition to the Pacific as His Majesty's Bark Endeavour and was, for three ^ars, the ship of Captain James Cook, the Sfeat explorer of the Pacific. Therefore, hers ls a fame almost as immortal as her erstwhile CaPtain’s. In the stunning detail always found ln this authoritative series, almost every aspect °f the Endeavour is examined and described, ’he author goes one step further, however, "'hen he evaluates the many models and at •east two replicas of this famous ship based °n the information now known about her.
T Count Not the Dead: The Popular Image of the German Submarine
”r- Michael L. Hadley. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 253 pp. Bib. Illus. Ind. photos. $38.95 ($31.16).
past in such images as “grey wolves” and steel sharks,” the submarine is an icon of the German naval tradition that was forged in two World Wars—and a central metaphor for Germany’s role in World War II. Based on 250 German novels, memoirs, fictionalized histones, and films,
Hadley examines the public perceptions °f the U-boats and the men who served in •hem and how ’hey have developed over more than eight Meades.
From Navy Blue to Corporate Gray:
A Career Transition Guide for Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard Personnel
Major Carl S. Savino, USAR, and Ronald L. Krannich, Ph.D. Manassas Park, VA: Impact Publications, 1995. 380 pp. Append. Ind. $17.95 ($16.15). Paper.
For all their many attributes, military personnel may not be prepared for the challenges of finding a new career in the civilian world. As the armed forces shrink, thousands of officers and enlisted men may need assistance in conducting market research, writing resumes, networking, dressing properly, interviewing, and negotiating salaries. Specifically tailored for Sea Service personnel, this book is designed to help in this challenging and important transition. Included is a great deal of specific, up-to-date information on current trends and projections for job markets, cost- of-living comparisons for geographical areas, many useful resume samples covering the needs of different individuals, advice on starting up a business, the ins and outs ol researching the jobs potential in specific industries, and clarification of the myths and the realities of making career transitions.
Inside Hanoi’s Secret Archives: Solving the MIA Mystery
Malcolm McConnell with research by Theodore G. Schweitzer, III. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. 462 pp. Gloss. Ind. Notes. Photos. $25.00 ($22.50).
Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird describes this book as “meticulously documented, insightful, and compassionate everyone interested in the Vietnam War should read this book." Debunking many of the sensationalized theories of what happened to U.S. servicemen who were declared missing in action during the Vietnam War and providing convincing evidence of more rational explanations, this book is based on inside information gained from Hanoi’s official archives. The answers exonerate the North Vietnamese and U.S. governments of some of the accusations that have been leveled against them, but confirms some of the other charges.
The International Law of the Sea
E. D. Brown. Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing, 1994. 787 pp. in 2 vol. Ind. Notes. Tables. $67.95 ($67.95). Paper.
These two volumes are designed as a self-contained study pack for those who wish to learn about the Law of the Sea. The first volume introduces the reader to the principles of the Law and their origins, while the second volume contains relevant documents, cases, and tables.
James Cook and the Conquest of Scurvy
Francis E. Cuppage. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994. 192 pp. Append. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. Tables. $55.00 ($52.25).
During his three world circumnavigations in the late 18th century, Captain James Cook played a major role in medicine as well as seafaring. Naturalists who sailed with him helped locate plants known as antiscorbutics which led to the conquering of the dreaded disease known as scurvy. This is a detailed account of those voyages and the resulting medical achievements.
Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe, and the Challenges of the Mediterranean
John W. Holmes, Editor. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995. 251 pp. Ind. Notes. Tables. $36.95 ($35.10). $15.95 ($15.50). Paper.
A multinational group of experts brought together by the World Peace Foundation examines the policy issues raised by the challenges of the Mediterranean region. Contending that the end of the Cold War has done little, if anything, to alleviate tensions throughout the region, Holmes, in his introduction, explains that the essays in Maelstrom attempt to provide both information and analysis as well as policy recommendations. Some of the essays are “Relations with the Maghreb,” “Interests in the Middle East,” and “Southern Europe and the United States: The Community Approach.”
Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting
National Research Council. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994. 528 pp. Append. Bib. Figs. Gloss. Ind. Notes. Photos. Tables.
$54.95 ($52.20).
Marine safety is this book’s concern. How pilots are licensed and trained, the effect of these procedures on marine safety, the integration of modern technology with traditional navigational practices, and the difficulties encountered in assessing navigational risks are some of the issues discussed. Air and marine traffic-regulation methods also are compared, including the use of vessel-traffic services.
Nuclear Power from Underseas to Outer Space
John W. Simpson. LaGrange Park, IL: American Nuclear Society, 1995. 480 pp. Append. Figs. Ind. Notes. Photos. Tables. $50.00 ($50.00).
Historical, anecdotal, technical, and revealing are all adjectives highly applicable to this unusual book. The former president of both Westinghouse Power Systems Company and the American Nuclear Society, Mr. Simpson is a key figure in the history of the development of nuclear power for both industrial and military use. His recollections and revelations include those of Admiral Hyman G. Rick- over and the early days of the Navy’s nuclear program, the technical problems encountered in military and commercial nuclear power, and the specifics of the various applications of nuclear power—including using nuclear power for spacecraft propulsion.
& To Foreign Shores: U.S. Amphibious Operations in World War II
John Lorelli. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 416 pp. Bib. Ind. Maps. Notes.
Photos. $38.95 ($31.16).
This one-volume study covers the development of U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps amphibious operations during World War II. Coverage includes the entire spectrum of modern seaborne assaults, including ships, landing craft, ship-to-shore movement, command relations, air and gunfire support, mine countermeasures, and salvage. Extensively using oral-history accounts, the author explores assaults in the several theaters in depth, emphasizing planning and tactics as well as the evolving technology that changed amphibious warfare so markedly in these formative years.
World Politics and the Evolution of War
John J. Weltman. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 275 pp. Ind. Notes. $38.50 ($34.65). Hardcover. $14.95 ($13.45). Paper.
This thought-provoking treatise explores the development of strategic thought during the
past two centuries, the effects of technological and political change on war, the fate of the post-Cold War world, and a host of other related concepts and topics—including the bellicosity of democracies. Among his many conclusions, Dr. Weltman sees a trend toward attrition warfare in which wars will be “slow- burning and difficult to spread” but warns that outside intervention will be costly. He sees this trend not because of “a growing civility. . . . or to an emergent ideological homogeneity, but largely to a growing lack of utility in getting desired results.”
True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics
James H. Toner. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1995. 216 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. $25.00 ($23.75).
Air Force Colonel Bryant P. Shaw writes of this book: “This very readable work will interest those who believe that while the military reflects the values of the society it serves, in a democracy the military must also personify the very highest ethical standards of that society.” Essentially a work of moral philosophy, this stimulating book addresses many of the key issues facing men and women who don the uniform —and, therefore, the expectations—of the United States, Through illuminating case studies and probing analysis, Professor Toner’s book serves as both microscope and mirror for those willing to take a penetrating look at the military services and what they mean to individual members and to society as a whole.
VIDEO
Navajo Code Talkers: The Epic Story
Produced by Brendan W. Tully and Francine M- Rzeznik. Tully Entertainment, 1995. 55 min. Color/B&W. VHS. $19.95 ($17.95).
During World War II, the Marine Corps recruited more than 400 Navajos to serve as special communicators. Using coded Navajo that the Japanese could not break, these men participated in many battles in the Pacific theater.
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