This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Fiscal realities and the future threat environment dictate a single follow-on surface escort for the U.S. Navy. But which ship—the low-cost, moderate-performance frigate or the high-cost, high-performance Aegis destroyer—will best meet future challenges?
In the 1970s, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations, institutionalized a concept of escort procurement that the U.S. Navy had pursued from the beginning of World War II—the high-low mix. In his memoir, On Watch, Admiral Zumwalt defines the high- low concept as follows:
“High” was short for high-performance ships and weapons systems that also were so high-cost that the country could afford to build only a few of them at a time; there are some missions the Navy cannot perform without the great flexibility and versatility of such ships. “Low” was short for moderate-cost, moderate-performance ships and systems that could be turned out in relatively large numbers; they would ensure that the Navy could be in enough places at the same time to get its job done.1
The plan called for the United States to build both a high-capability, relatively expensive cruiser/destroyer-type carrier escort focused on antiair and surface warfare and a less capable, less expensive frigate/corvette-type convoy escort with an emphasis on antisubmarine warfare. This mix maintained capability in the most intensive aspects of naval warfare, while providing the number of ships necessary to ensure the safe passage of the wide- ranging noncombatant fleet.
The United States is now at a crossroads. Fiscal realities no longer will permit the acquisition of two types of surface escorts, and the future threat environment may not require it. The Navy must reexamine the high-low mix and determine what type of follow-on surface escort would best meet future challenges.
In general, three strategic factors influence U.S. warship procurement policy. The first is the abandonment of global and attrition warfare in favor of regional and more precise warfare as the United States’ major force driver. From the early 1940s through the Bush administration, the United States has organized its military around the need to fight a global war—against Japan and Germany, and later the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, the United States no longer must be prepared to fight everywhere at once. International competition is no longer a zero-sum game, in which even a relatively small gain by the former Soviet Union is considered a loss by the West.
In addition, there has been a gradual but significant shift in U.S. policy away from wars of attrition toward wars of precision. The Gulf War offers a glimpse of this style of fighting. Throughout most of its history, the United States has relied upon a strategy of attrition, planned to overwhelm its foes through the steady build-up of massive quantities of men and material. This was a successful strategy, but it was resource intensive and resulted in significant numbers of casualties, two luxuries the country no longer can afford unless fighting for vital interests.
The second factor influencing U.S. surface combatant procurement is the decline in the global submarine threat posed by the former Soviet Union. Although submarine technology and platforms are proliferating, the U.S. Navy no longer is concerned with the Russians flushing 200 submarines out into the Atlantic to cut our sea lines of communication. The submarine threat, like U.S. war-fighting doctrine, has moved from the global, strategic realm to the regional, tactical level.
The third factor is the federal budget dilemma. An uncertain economy has led many to turn to reductions in defense spending. Although this factor relies less upon geopolitical reasoning, it probably will have a greater impact upon defense decision making than the other two factors combined. Indeed, former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin made “economic dangers” one of the four guiding principles of his Bottom-Up Review.2
In its 1993 Posture Statement, the Navy announced that it will build a single follow-on to the Spruance (DD-963)- class destroyer and the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigate.3 This decision raises the question of whether the surface combatant follow-on will be a destroyer or a frigate. Clearly there are distinct advantages to each. To decide which would best meet the nation’s interests, one must catalog the attributes of each class and compare them with the strategic assumptions just mentioned.
Follow-on Frigate
There are a number of advantages in procuring another frigate class, the greatest of which is that they are relatively inexpensive—about half the cost of an Aegis
destroyer.4 The frigate’s lower cost would allow the procurement of a greater number of platforms, which translates to a larger fleet, more ships showing the flag, and greater global presence. A large number of frigates also would increase the number of helicopter platforms at sea—providing the fleet with a greater antisubmarine warfare capability—and would sustain a larger shipbuilding industrial base. Finally, frigates may be seen as expendable; they could be assigned to missions where cheap kills are possible, and more of them could be sunk or disabled before the fleet would begin to suffer a significant loss of effectiveness.
Since World War II, the U.S. Navy has maintained the world’s largest oceangoing surface fleet. The desire to preserve superiority in both technology and numbers brought on a variety of initiatives to maintain or increase the size of the fleet, including Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s push for a 600-ship Navy and even President George Bush’s Base Force—the result being the procurement of a large number of frigates. Indeed, since World War II, one-third of the U.S. Navy’s surface-combatant force has been composed of frigates, and this number blossomed to between 40% and 50% during the 1980s.5 This policy was justified by arguments similar to Admiral Zumwalt’s, in which he stated, “In most cases seven or five or even three ships of moderate capability would contribute far more to the success of this mission than one supership. . . .”6 This may have been true during the Cold War, but it remains to be seen whether the frigate’s continued utility will outweigh its anticipated vulnerability in an era of supersonic, stealthy, sea-skimming missiles.
The argument that more frigates would help increase global presence would seem logical except that, traditionally, frigates have acted in the role of escort for convoys and amphibious task forces. At times, they have been employed in the carrier-escort role, but frigates rarely have been independently deployed on missions to “show the flag.”7 Indeed, it would be unwise to use these ships in this manner because they lack a real strike warfare capability and would be vulnerable to mass air attack. Nevertheless, an increased number of frigate escorts could free up other destroyers and cruisers for the global presence role. The General Accounting Office has even suggested that with the reduced threat from the former Soviet Union, carrier task forces need not operate as compactly as before and that groups of escorts could be detached to perform specific missions or increase presence.8
Along with increasing the total number of ships in the fleet, a follow-on frigate class also would expand the number of helicopter platforms at sea. Because frigates are antisubmarine warfare-oriented escorts, nearly all contemporary classes have been designed to embark one or two helicopters. These helos have extended the detection
as well as weapons-delivery range of the host ship. It would seem wise to maintain the helicopter capability of the fleet by deploying another large frigate class.
On the other hand, with the decline of the former Soviet threat, the United States no longer faces the prospect of mass submarine warfare in the Atlantic, and the frigate has lost its primary mission—to get its charges safely through these submarine-infested waters. There is increased submarine proliferation in the Third World, but these regional threats can be handled by the cruisers, destroyers, and other assets at hand.
What does require another frigate class is the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. Currently, two yards build the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class guided-missile destroyer, the only major warship class in production, Bath Iron Works in Maine and Ingalls Shipbuilding in Mississippi. A large frigate class would support a stronger shipbuilding industrial base. Of course, if the future frigate did not have the Aegis combat system—which it most likely would not—the United States would risk losing the computer suppliers of the Aegis system.
The least convincing reason to procure another frigate class is that they may be seen as expendable. During an era bracing for global, attrition warfare, frigates provided significant antisubmarine warfare capability on a platform that, if lost, would have less of an impact on overall fleet performance. The post-Cold War attitude toward casualties and losses is much different; it may be more prudent to deploy a system that does not rely on ex- pendability as a justification.
Follow-on Destroyer
The primary feature of the proposed 21st-century destroyer is enhanced capability. Aegis ships are the most capable surface escorts in all aspects of naval warfare: antiair, antisubmarine, antisurface, and strike. Because of its capability, the destroyer would be a force multiplier—in some situations it could negate the need for a carrier deployment or do the job of three or four frigates while exposing fewer sailors to harm. And perhaps most important, only an Aegis follow-on destroyer will have the capability of intercepting theater ballistic missiles.
The mission of the frigate was to blaze a submarine- free path across the Atlantic, but Aegis destroyers have focused on antiair warfare. The importance of this capability is highlighted by the budget cuts made by the Navy for fiscal year 1994: the Navy favors retiring the nuclear
cruisers before the Aegis ships of the same type.9 These older cruisers possessed neither the Aegis antiair warfare system, nor the vertical launch system, and only a limited number of Tomahawk cruise missiles—the three developments that have had the most significant impact upon surface combat.10
The primary reason capability has eclipsed numbers is that new technology and increased crew training have made it possible for one advanced system to be significantly more combat effective than a number of lesser systems of a comparable cost. This was the case when the F-14s replaced the F-4s in the 1970s and were deemed to be three times as effective." This trend has continued in a number of other areas, including precision munitions, stealth technology, and naval warfare. For example, it would be possible for an Aegis Flight IIA destroyer to do the work of at least two frigates, and in a number of mission areas—such as antiair and antisurface warfare and shore bombardment—it could do the equivalent of three or four. It also should be noted that frigates do not have and probably never will have the ability to conduct strike warfare with the Tomahawk land attack missile.
An added benefit of having a smaller number of destroyers fulfill the same mission as a larger number of frigates is that fewer sailors would be exposed to harm. Destroyer crews are somewhat larger than those in frigates, but the sum total of sailors deployed would be lower. Fewer ships and sailors at sea also would reduce manpower and support requirements, with potentially significant savings.12
NAVY
A corollary benefit is the increased protection provided by a more capable ship. There is no doubt that an Aegis destroyer, through sheer bulk alone, can absorb more damage before sinking than a modern frigate.13 Even more significant, the Aegis weapon system will in nearly every case have a better chance of preventing the ship from being hit in the first place. Only Aegis ships and their follow-ons, for example, will have the capability to intercept theater ballistic missiles. The importance of this capability was emphasized when an Iraqi Scud missile struck a U.S. barracks in Dhahran during the Persian Gulf War, killing 28 and wounding 99 service members.14 An Aegis ship with the future lightweight exo-atmospheric projectile would have had the capability to engage this missile before it broke apart during descent. Furthermore, a few of the wayward Scuds that landed in the Gulf struck fairly close to Coalition vessels. A direct hit, whether intentional or not, would have had devastating results. With the proliferation of these types of weapons, it would seem foolish to procure a warship whose only defense is to steam out of harm’s way.
U S NAVY
The lower-cost frigate would allow a larger fleet more helicopter platforms at sea, a greater global presence, and a larger shipbuilding base. The frigate also would be more expendable—and more vulnerable to sea-skimming missiles, as witnessed by the Stark (FFG-31).
Finally, in an era of computer-aided command and control, it is important that a warship not only be able to defend itself, but that it also has the capability to engage different threats simultaneously. Although frigates are equipped with various weapon systems, they are designed to focus on only one aspect of naval warfare at a time. In contrast, the Aegis system not only allows the larger combatant to simultaneously defend itself and others from multiple threats, but it also gives it the capability of taking the offense and engaging the platforms that are generating those threats.
Now that the main features of both a follow-on escort frigate and destroyer class have been reviewed, it is essential to match these capabilities and characteristics with the strategic environment faced by the United States.
The chief advantages of a future frigate class are its price tag and its ability, if produced in mass, to support a larger shipbuilding industrial base. Other attributes of the frigate, such as its ability to provide greater global presence or more helicopter platforms at sea, are no longer needed in the absence of a superpower threat. Also, putting more ships in the fleet would generate significant support costs. Finally, expendability is no longer a virtue in an era where “mass armies, attrition warfare, and the traditional acceptance of casualties in search of victory [are] no longer publicly acceptable under any reasonable scenario for military action. . . .”15
On the other hand, the destroyer follow-on provides significant capability with only one drawback—the initial investment. Although a future Aegis destroyer follow-on could cost nearly twice as much as a frigate, the benefits it would provide more than make up for the expenditure. The most capable escorts in the fleet, a single destroyer would be able to fulfill the missions of a number of frigates, while reducing risk to the sailors on board. Fewer escorts in the fleet also would provide savings in operations and support costs and require fewer combat logistics support ships. These destroyers could engage theater ballistic missiles while simultaneously protecting the fleet and shore-based forces from a multitude of other dangers. In comparison, the Aegis follow-on, the 21st-century destroyer, is the escort of choice.
'Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, USN, On Watch (New York: QuadrangleTThe New York Times Book Co., 1977), p. 72.
;Les Aspin, The Bottom-Up Review: Forces For A New Era (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1993), p. 2.
'Adm. Frank B. Kelso, USN, and General Carl E. Mundy, USMC, Department of the Navy 1993 Posture Statement (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1993), p. 27
'This is a contentious point. Some, especially those in the destroyer community, believe that the cost difference for both types is not as extreme. Although the cost ratio is debatable, the point is that a lower quality ship, if procured in quantity, will be “significantly” cheaper than a higher quality ship.
5Capt. Bruce R. Linder, USN, “The Frigate Still Fits,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1993, p. 37.
"Zumwalt, p. 65.
'Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 109. "Comptroller General, Navy Carrier Battle Groups: The Structure and Affordability of the Future Force (Washington: General Accounting Office, 1993), p. 27. "Robert Holzer, “U.S. Navy Axes 17 Ships, Preserves Most Weapon Systems," Defense News, 15-21 February 1993, p. 32.
"’Comptroller General, p. 33.
"Zumwalt, p. 80.
"Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 43.
‘Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dunn, eds.. Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views From the United States (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), p. 32.
"Keith B. Payne, Missile Defense in the 21st Century: Protection Against Limited Threats (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991), p. 28.
"Gene I. Rochlin and Chris C. Demchak, Lessons of the Gulf War: Ascendant Technology and Declining Capability (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1991), p. 11.
Mr. Bender is a senior analyst with Syscon Corporation, where he supports the Navy’s Aegis shipbuilding program. He holds a master's degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University and previously has been published in Military History magazine.
The higher-cost destroyers would mean few er ships but greater capability. Aegis-equipped surface escorts can perform in all aspects of naval .warfare, including the increasingly critical theater missile defense.