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S>nart Careers for Navy Men and Women
Pew issues elicit more reaction from . ,1ormed naval personnel than at- ^ert>pts to tamper with their rights and Refits, especially military retirement. ten touted as a key inducement to r°ln the military and a hypercritical toen*1stment incentive, the opportunity retire in the prime of life (about age ’ ls> arguably, one of our most zeal- dUs'y guarded benefits. But are the ys of our current retirement system n ftbered? Are retired and uniformed djsa* Personnel doing themselves a service by mobilizing against any ^ anges in the system? Is there a better y t(i structure the military career and ■rernent systems to provide a more vi ^ Pectiye system and long-term, le careers to military personnel?
amount of sea time, a 20- or 30-year man certainly could be burned out.
This is no longer true in today’s Navy. The complexities of modern naval warfare have increased the size of the naval shore establishment, creating a more congenial sea/shore rotation situation. Giant strides in physical fitness, nutrition, health care, and life expectancy allow naval personnel to better adjust to shipboard rigors and to have more time to enjoy life after re-
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Although rigorous compared to Ijj. y forms of civilian employment, bleat sea’s considerably more tolera- agVoday than it was even a generation to?' Living conditions on board (S^ S ^egis-class cruisers and Ohio jn | N~726)-class submarines are strik- dg y improved over World War II-era y sttoyers and diesel submarines.
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By continuing with its present retirement system, the Navy may be shortchanging itself and its personnel.
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er J1 tite past, Navy men spent consid- lod ^ more "it116 at sea fiti111 they do Ships often were slower and less *e> requiring more ships and more hasto fulfill a commitment. Shore- s0trainers were few and primitive, Slgnificant amount of sea time
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civij- were transferable to the Com,an sector; retention had not yet be- tifn 6 a crusade; and short turnaround feyeS ^etWeen deployments brought Wr negative consequences. Frequent Kore(World War L World War II, pl0a’ Vietnam) accelerated fleet de- ^ar Cnts’ adding to the rigorous Cold years at sea. After enduring this
tirement. While a 30-year officer retiring at age 52 at the turn of the century could expect less than a decade to enjoy retirement, today, the same individual has, on average, 25 productive years left.
Finally, changes in lifestyles and technology effectively have done away with the citizen soldier. The idea of a 17-year-old lad enlisting in the Navy, seeing the world, and retiring at age 37 to help on the family farm just when dad is getting too old to labor in the fields is an anachronism. Today’s high- tech Navy requires well educated individuals who make a long-term, if not a lifetime, commitment.
The reasoning that ushered in our
current military retirement system is no longer valid. This is not, in and of itself, reason to dismantle the system—if it still provides the Navy with a sound personnel-management system and the Navy career man or woman with job satisfaction. But does it?
Economic Dilemma
The technical complexities of today’s Navy require naval personnel to receive an extraordinary amount of education and training. Their years of service should provide a return on this increasingly expensive investment.
Most Navy schools do require some type of immediate payback (for example, two more years of active duty for one year of school), but what school pushes retirement back? Thus, for example, a naval aviator with 18 years served who is going to a shipboard tour and who also has attended the Naval Postgraduate School and the Naval War College has been in school or training for more than 40% of his career—and he can still retire in just two years.
As life expectancy has risen, so have retirement costs. Retired life expectancy has about doubled in little more than a generation. Adding to this has been a geometric growth in health-care costs for these retirees. It is a cost that captures an increasing share of the total federal budget.
Military Dilemma
The technical sophistication needed in today’s Navy, coupled with the increasingly incompatible requirements of various parts of the Navy sea and shore establishment, have resulted in structured career paths and polarization among communities, particularly in the officer corps. When an officer proposes a deviation, however slight, from a stereotyped career pattern, his detailer must remind him that he doesn’t have time to leave the train hurtling down the track. Career patterns are structured carefully and jammed with important building-block assignments. No deviations are permissible.
As the requirements for each career
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pattern become more stringent, the number of different patterns has grown. Air, surface, and subsurface communities rarely cross-pollinate—and specialization runs deeper. Aviators may fly only one model aircraft during their careers. Surface warfare officers are being steered into specialties (engineering, combat systems, etc.) early in their careers. Recognizing the complexities of the acquisition business, the Navy no longer will shuttle officers between operational and acquisition assignments, because there is not enough time in a normal career path to do both well. This may be a necessary move in light of current career lengths, but it certainly places program managers far from the fleet for whom they are procuring weapons.
The requirements of the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act further exacerbate the problems of all-too-short naval careers. Now, flag contenders must interrupt their jammed tracks to serve three years or so in a joint-duty assignment. Joint duty is beneficial, but, as usual, there is not enough time to do everything right.
Perhaps the most insidious result of this short career and its strict tracking requirements is that assignments that should be broadening, with significant down-the-road payoffs (e.g., Naval Postgraduate School, Naval War College, Personnel Exchange Programs) are shunned by fast trackers who don’t have time to deviate from career-enhancing billets. We risk becoming two navies: fast trackers who move from command to command, often armed with only a rudimentary knowledge of where their ship, squadron, station, or group fits into the overall tactical and strategic equation; and slow trackers who are gaining the technical and managerial skills and the tactical and strategic vision to excel at command positions they will never attain.
The Navy’s success-oriented, compressed career paths often blatantly tell many officers too early that they won’t make it to great heights: No room for late bloomers is the oft-repeated phrase. In a number of aircraft communities, an aviator who fails to screen for department head as a lieutenant won’t ever command a squadron. Neither will the surface warfare officer who fails to screen for executive officer as a very junior lieutenant commander ever command a ship. Without an operational command, these individuals only have about a 5% chance of making captain. What is the motivation for these officers who have been told
at the 8-10 year point that they don’t have the right stuff?
Individual's Dilemma
On the surface, the opportunity to retire from the Navy with a substantial retirement income and pursue a lucrative second career is a powerful elixir.
It may not be that easy, however.
First, it is oftentimes difficult to choose a second career. The range is so vast that retirees can experience confusion and trepidation. Unfortunately, the timing of many retirements coincides with children moving on to college, and retirees may not have the time to arrive at a well-thought-out choice.
Second, many retirees look for work with companies doing business with the Department of Defense. They compete for these positions with thousands of other retirees and, since supply greatly exceeds demand, there are few lucrative positions. Some companies merely supplement retirement pay, so employees won’t “lose any ground” in their standard of living.
Third, if hired by an established company that has nationwide or worldwide commitments, retirees often can face more frequent moves than they faced in the Navy, at a time when the stress associated with moving can be greater. This is particularly onerous if they had been fortunate enough to “homestead” during their later Navy assignments.
Finally, ending a career that, for an officer, might have involved several command positions and responsibility for hundreds or even thousands of people and starting fresh in a company as a middle manager can be a tough adjustment for the retiree. Retired Navy captains working for DoD contractors often handle the administrative workload for Navy lieutenants and lieutenant commanders. They are outsiders looking in—no longer part of the inner circle. They are expected to take advantage of their military contacts, but their ability to do this fades as their military associates also pass on to the retired list. Additionally, within the company they may be viewed as hired help who joined the company 20 to 30 years too late.
Proposal
It is not a question of if, but how, the system should be changed. The first step is for the military establishment to review the current system in an unemotional, unbiased manner, concentrating on its benefits and on the long-term implications of changes. Such a review should include an evaluation of the retirement systems of the armed forcesol several European nations, among then1- Great Britain and Belgium; federal, state, and local civil service systems; and state and local high-risk jobs, such as policemen and fire fighters.
If changes are made, it probably 'V1 be necessary to grandfather all currefl1 military personnel, because the service made a commitment to them when the) joined. Those currently serving who wish to serve for an extended period should be allowed to. After a new system is constructed, it must be subject to rigorous financial analysis, to see 11 it can be achieved at a zero sum or a net gain.
There is no set formula to use in constructing a revised military career path and retirement system. Rational . choices will have to be made, many 0 which may not be palatable to some groups. Elements of a restructured ca" reer path might include:
► Extending the standard career path length to 35, 40, or more years and slowing down promotions and concomitant responsibility.
> Extending the time in each grade a” adjusting pay scales to maintain pay levels at approximately current rates- For example, a 16-year commander might now be a lieutenant command^' but his pay would be about the same> Creating a more balanced career path, alternating operational assignments, educational tours, staff duty- joint duty assignments and making these well-rounded careers the norm to civilians back into the Navy fold
► Gradually decreasing the number operational tours as Navy personnel pass age 45 and increasing the instruc tional and management tours (traim11- command, recruiting command, etc-);
There always will be room for cm zen soldiers in the armed forces, but there is also the need for long-servicC' lifetime professionals. The time cot'1 not be more propitious for such a change. We must convince ourselvcs that this is the best course and then pursue it with vigor.
Captain Galdorisi is Commander, Amphibious Squadron Seven. He previously commanded a*- Amphibious Assault Ship USS Cleveland ltd \ and LAMPS-lll squadrons HSL-41 and HSU '
1970 Naval Academy graduate, he holds a n,aSliter’s degree in oceanography from the Naval graduate School and a master’s degree in inlc tional relations from the University of San D1 ’ and is a 1991 graduate of MIT Sloan School * Program for Senior Executives.
Nobody asked me either but...
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas Drzewiecki, U.S. Navy
Way be nothing more than a hum- I surface line officer, but even the °wly black-shoe community can rea°gnize talent when we see it. This ao‘e incident has become a master- j^ece of immaturity, deceit, and refusal accept responsibility. I am mesmer- ed by the actions—or should I say faction—of those involved. Those in °%Wood involved in the Heidi Fleiss r°curement scandal could learn a
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'1c second failure was, and still is, refusal by anyone involved, except
ftovv does Tailhook look from sea level?
I Would like to take a moment to 1 ar>k publicly all those involved in making the Tailhook debacle the humil- ■ating experience it is today. Their per- ')rrnance has reflected great credit upon emselves and is in keeping with the
'ghest traditions of the Naval service.
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As this whole incident has unfolded, l ear- First, and foremost, was the be- av'0r of those on the third floor who faulted, harassed, groped, fondled, tQaved, disrobed and did whatever else a wdividuals who didn’t want to be faulted, harassed, groped, fondled, or at have you. It was wrong—and if Qa don’t believe it was wrong, not are^ are ^ou *n wronS service, you for the former Secretary of the Navy, H. Lawrence Garrett, to take responsibility for what happened. The fact that no one came forward immediately after the incident and said “It is my fault, and I take full responsibility for what transpired and we are taking the steps necessary to correct the problem” is nothing less than a slap in the face to every single officer in the U.S. Navy. For the piece de resistance, in exchange for the truth, investigators had to grant Navy officers immunity! This shirking of responsibility has continued throughout the investigation—and while it may have saved careers, it has embarrassed the Navy and given the entire officer corps a black eye.
Several individuals have written to Proceedings complaining about the publicity and whining about witch hunts. To those, I can only say “Wake up!” What did you expect? We live in a society where a conflict between the Vice President and a fictional television character quickly becomes front page news. The Tailhook fiasco has given the press a feast of scandal to gorge upon and has presented politicians a perfect soapbox for nonstop preaching.
I can understand such odious behavior coming from politicians. After all, the only thing lower in the food chain than surface warriors like me are staff types and politicians. But I have little pity for those who knowingly break the rules and then try to weasel out of any blame when they are caught. For example, take the recently publicized incidents of drinking on board ship. I don’t think I’m compromising national security when 1 say that it’s not uncommon for individuals to have booze at sea. Those who do also know that it’s wrong—and they’ll get punished if caught. If they decide to keep it up, then they should be ready for the consequences. You pay your money; you take your chances. Why shouldn’t this apply across the board?
All this having been said, I don’t want anyone to go away thinking that I don't like aviators. On the contrary, I have the utmost respect for their professional abilities. Whether it’s being catapulted off the carrier in an F-14, or landing an H-2 on a rolling deck at midnight, I never cease to be amazed.
Like all ship drivers, however, I believe it is my solemn duty to engage in friendly—and sometimes not-so- friendly—banter with them when they are on deck. After all, we surface warriors are doing our part to help our aviation brethren keep their dozen carriers by cutting expenses wherever possible—as in decommissioning a lot of surface ships.
the
Commander Drzewiecki is currently assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
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