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Current cutbacks challenge existing roles— and the very existence—of our aircraft carriers. But while Congress plays the numbers game, the burden of survival rests on the shoulders of those at sea.
New strategies and missions combine with expected force-level reductions to demand new peacetime deployment patterns and uses for our aircraft carriers. Some small steps have been taken recently in restructuring carrier battle group (CVBG) deployments, but making best use of our diminishing assets to better satisfy new roles and missions requires more radical changes in CVBG deployment cycles, force composition, stationing, and peacetime employment.
Under the new administration, further reductions below
the Base Force’s 12 deployable carriers are likely, and if the face of a free-falling budget, traditional force planning approaches are meaningless. In the new world order carriers must assume non-traditional roles if they are t< survive. The unified commanders-in-chief (CinCs) and th< Navy simply must commit to getting the best use out ol the carriers in commission at any given time. Their sue cess at enhancing the efficiency and efficacy of the air craft carrier in meeting today’s strategic needs m3! determine where Congress will hold the line on cuttin- carriers.
The Senate has already voted to delay funding of tW next carrier, CVN-76, until the Secretary of Defenst submits a report on alternatives that would “ . . . pefflii the Navy to maintain a higher level of forward presend with current forces.”1 If the carrier cannot adapt, it m3.’ well be destined for extinction.
Our military no longer faces a unified global threat. TP shift to a multipolar-world regional focus with an efl1 phasis on coalition warfare dictates reductions in oil1 forward-stationed combat forces in Europe and elsewhere but as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said re cently in his highly publicized report on role and missions, “ ... as forward stationing d? creases, forward-presence operations will i" crease in importance.”2 Meeting that chat lenge is a task that falls heavily on nave forces.
Continued naval presence complements o3 interest-based strategy goals of regional st3 bility, collective security, military interops ability, deterrence of hegemony, econom'1 freedom and growth, and good will. With’ traditional missions such as combined exef cises, security assistance, military-to-militat1 contacts, and port visits assume heighten?1 importance, non-traditional missions such3 humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, A3 tion building, counterterrorism, and coni’ temarcotics vault to the forefront as well. 011 carrier battle groups must be equipped a"1 trained for both traditional and non-tradition3 purposes alike.
Many naval officers seem traditional bound to viewing the aircraft carrier as a W* fighting machine only. This self-impos?‘ corollary advocates keeping the carriers m°(' closely tied to home waters, in order to matf tain surge capability when a major cris1 arises.3 This approach, however, misses ^ point: there is a need to be positively engage to preclude the crisis in the first place.
A new strategy focus is not the only cat3 lyst for changing the ways we employ 011 carrier battle groups. In addition to shift*11; strategy and the inevitable force-level redn1
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Table 1: Deployment Cycle Structures with 50% OpTempo | ||||||
Option | Cruise Length (mos) | Turnaround Length (mos) | At-Sea OnTA (mos) | % Time Deployed | % Time On-Sta (15-day Transit) | % Time On-Sta (30-day Transit) |
Current | 6 | 14 | 4 | 30.0% | 25.0% | 20.0% |
A | 6 | 12 | 3 | 33.3% | 27.8% | 22.2% |
B | 6 | 10 | 2 | 37.5% | 31.3% | 25.0% |
C | 7 | 15 | 4 | 31.8% | 27.3% | 22.7% |
D | 7 | 13 | 3 | 35.0% | 30.0% | 25.0% |
E | 8 | 18 | 5 | 30.8% | 26.9% | 19.2% |
F | 8 | 16 | 4 | 33.3% | 29.2% | 25.0% |
G | 8 | 14 | 3 | 36.4% | 31.8% | 27.3% |
With continuing cuts likely, remaining carriers like the Theodore Roosevelt—shown here in support of Operation Provide Comfort—face the task of maximizing our forward presence.
hons, the force structure of our Navy has changed. Technology, as well as policy, is having an impact.
Among the carriers themselves, the growing predominance of nuclear propulsion is important. Seven nuclear- powered carriers (CVNs) are in commission, and two more are under construction. Providing significant advantages in transit speed and sustainability °ver conventionally powered carriers (CVs), the CVNs allow more flexibility in their employment. Even pe
r°leum-powered supporting combatants have improved ^abilities: the Aegis-equipped cruisers (and destroyers), r example, are vastly superior antiair-warfare platforms, C°mPared with the older guided-missile cruisers. Standardization is another critical factor. The six Nimitz vN-68)-class carriers are similarly outfitted, and their eWs are similarly trained. Detailed procedures standardize eir internal functions in all major areas such as engi- teering, aircraft maintenance, and flight-deck opera- 0lls, and supporting surface combatants enjoy similar andardization. This interchangeability allows the possi- ‘ty of non-traditional manning schemes.
^ The policy to remove nuclear weapons from our ships s opened the door for port visits to previously reluctant uutries, while other countries that once desired to re- tQain “nonaligned” in a bipolar world are also beginning ^elcome our ships for exercises or visits.
Te demands of a changing world force us to redefine— jj' a°ut encumbrance from the past—when, where, and . w to use aircraft carriers to support our national secu-
uy interests.
a (jAvCcePt'ng that forward presence of aircraft carriers is C|- esifable policy, maximizing that presence despite de- (jUntig ship numbers is a worthy goal. The ultimate ques- “ho ?/ ^ow t0 more with less addresses not only >Hc ^ ^Ut a'so *lh°w often,” and three options exist for de r,eas'ng forward-deployed availability of the carriers: p0^Oyrnent-cycle adjustments, East Coast or foreign home-
The first option is to change the carrier deployment cycle. The current cycle for ships without an overhaul due is a six-month cruise followed by a 14-month turnaround for upkeep, independent training, aircrew carrier qualification support, and workups for the next cruise. Under way for a total of four to five months during the turnaround, the carrier thus maintains an operational tempo (OpTempo) of 50-55% over the 20-month cycle.4 OpTempo and personnel tempo (PersTempo) are rightly considered sacred cows by naval leaders, because increases in these historically lead to lower personnel retention rates and—ultimately—lower readiness.
Any cycle adjustments should protect the overall OpTempo. Three inputs determine the cycle: cruise length, turnaround length, and time at sea during the turnaround. Fixing OpTempo at 50% means that only two of the three inputs can be independently adjusted before the third time factor automatically follows. In other words, cruise length cannot be simply extended unless the turnaround is lengthened or the time at sea during the turnaround is reduced. Table 1 lists a range of various cycle structures which meet a 50% OpTempo standard.
The important measure for forward presence, however, is on-station time—the cruise length minus the transit time required to get from the homeport to the area of interest and back. This varies from about 15 days each way for an Atlantic Fleet ship stationed in the Eastern Mediterranean to 30 days for a Pacific Fleet carrier assigned to the Indian Ocean. Such a measure places a bonus on extending deployments. For example, a six-month cruise to the Indian Ocean nets only four months on station, but a 33% increase in cruise length to eight months gains a full 50% in on-station time (six months as compared to four months).
In Table 1, Options D and F offer the most realistic choices for deployment cycle structure with regard to on-station times. The disadvantage of Option D, which simply trades a month of workups for an extra month of cruise, is somewhat decreased readiness as the cruise be
popular among the many enlisted ratings with 42- to 60-month sea duty rotations, personnel who frequently have to make three cruises per tour but would usually make only two under the new plan.
Both Options D and F have the crucial advantage of significantly increased on-station time percentage per carrier. Even after factoring in periodic overhaul requirements, a ten-carrier fleet adopting one of the proposed cycles could roughly meet the on-station commitments of the Base Force’s 12-carrier fleet using the current deployment cycle structure.
Other possible methods for increasing on-station time concern East Coast and foreign homeporting. Both schemes, however, hold more fault than promise. The East Coast homeporting method calls for an increase in the percentage of Atlantic Fleet- based ships, which, within this scheme, would support forward presence in the Indian Ocean almost exclusively.5 This would take advantage of a roughly
Table 2: BIue/Gold Crew Swapout at Homeport
Option | Ship OpTempo | Crew PersTempo | % Time Deployed | % Time On-Sta (15-day Transit) | % Time On-Sta (30-day Transit) |
Current | 50.0% | 50.0% | 30.0% | 25.0% | 20.0% |
Blue/Gold | 12.1% | 36.4% | 54.5% | 45.4% | 36.4% |
Figure 1: Sliding Homeport Swapout Schedule
Month 0 3 6 9 12 15
18
CVN #1 | Cruise | RA/TO | Cruise | RA/TO | ||
CVN #2 | RA/TO | Cruise | RA/TO | Cruise | ||
CVN #3 | Cruise | RA/TO | Cruise | RA/TO I Cruise | |||
CVN #4 | workup carrier | |||||
Crew A | Cruise | RA/TO | Train | WU/TO | Cruise | |
Crew B | WU/TO | Cruise | RA/TO | Train | WU/TO | |
Crew C | Train | WU/TO | Cruise | RA/TO | Train | |
Crew D | RA/TO | Train | WU/TO | Cruise | RA/TO | |
Crew E | Cruise | RA/TO | Train | WU/TO | Cruise |
RA: 60-day Restricted availability
TO: 30-day Turnover to new crew
WU: 60-day Workup / CQ period (45 days at-sea)
Train: Independent schools and training for crew / CVW
Table 3: Sliding Crew Swapout at Homeport | |||||
Option | Ship OpTempo (average of 4 CVs) | Crew PersTempo | % Time Deployed (average) | % Time On-Sta (15-day Transit) | % Time On-Sta (30-day Transit) |
Current | 50.0% | 50.0% | 30.0% | 25.0% | 20.0% |
Blue/Gold | 72.7% | 36.4% | 54.5% | 45.4% | 36.4% |
Sliding HP | 62.5% | 50.0% | 50.0% | 41.7% | 33.3% |
gins; however, this could be quickly remedied with a continued emphasis on training early in the deployment.
Option F merely extends the deployment and the turnaround by two months each. Some may consider an eight- month cruise too long for morale to endure, but the 24- month cycle would be_____________ ten-day savings of transit time in reaching the Persian Gulf from the East Coast through the Suez Canal, as compared with the transit from a West Coast port.
Assuming an expected ten-carrier homeporting plan of five East, four West, and one Japan (5/4/1), a shift to a 7/2/1 mix would generate an extra six weeks of on-station time per 20-month deployment cycle. However, this equates to only an extra one fourth of a carrier in terms of generating on-station presence. Against this minor improvement stands the specter of a Middle East crisis in which the Suez Canal is closed or unsafe for passage, leaving our carriers stuck on the wrong side. Heavier shifts than the 7/2/1 mix would never pass the criterion of supporting our Pacific interests, and, therefore, this scheme should be dropped from consideration.
Through the foreign homeporting method, transit time can be eliminated completely by homeporting a carrier i( the area of desired presence. To some extent, that is tb case with the USS Independence (CV-62) stationed i Yokosuka, Japan, though even that ship makes regular de ployments to the Indian Ocean.
__________________________ The notion of a Meditei
ranean homeport is sin)' Iarly attractive. Twenl years ago, the Navy wa forging ahead with plans t base the Independence i Greece when a coup in tha country scrubbed the idea Resurrecting such a pla today is highly unlikel) and finding a host natio! that would not place unaf ceptable restrictions afll prior restraints on usagec the carrier is doubtful (Even Italy, the most ff£ quently mentioned prospe1' tive host, displayed its j( risdictional sensitivity iu faceoff with U.S. forc« after the forcing down c the airliner carrying Achille Lauro hijackers11 the U.S. base in Sigonell3 The littoral Mediterrane3 countries have comply and delicate diplomatic lations with other states1 the region, and these re Is tions would probably pr‘ elude allowing such a IP presence.7 Though one ception might be Israe that proposal would be $ with a world outcry th! could not be overcome pc litically.
Even if a host we( found, that country wo' certainly not pay to support the carrier in the same ion as Japan, whose strong backing keeps the Yokos^ homeport solidly attractive. The specter of sudden eV*1 tion by a Mediterranean host country is another negat|V consideration. In all, little promise exists for either c' panding our foreign homeporting arrangements or plJ‘ ing an emphasis on East Coast homeporting.
The final option for increasing forward-deployed av'3' ability of the carriers is multiple crews. As an example1 this scheme, ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) h3' long operated with two complete crews. A submarl11 patrols with a Blue Crew, returns to homeport f°f turnover with the Gold Crew, and then the Blue C(c' takes leave and trains in schools and simulators until11 Gold Crew returns. Could some variant of this multip| crews system work for an aircraft carrier and its air wi3-'
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Figure 2: Sliding On-Station Swapout Schedule Month 0 8 16 24 32 | |||||
CVN #1 | Cruise B / RA C/RA/A | ||||
CVN #2 | C B / RA C/RA/A | Cruise | |||
Crew A | Cruise Train | #2 | Cruise | Train | #1 |
Crew B | T/#2| Cruise | Train | #1 | Cruise | Train |
Crew C | 7| Train [#2 | Cruise | Train | #1 | Cruise |
RA: Cruise: 1-2, A-C: Train:
Restricted availability upkeep 6-mos deployment
3-mos workup / CQ with matching crew / ship (60 days at sea) Independent schools and training for crew / CVW
... Table 4: Sliding Crew Swapout On-Station | |||||
Option | Ship OpTempo | Crew PersTempo | % Time Deployed | % Time On-Sta (15-day Transit) | % Time On-Sta (30-day Transit) |
Current | 50.0% | 50.0% | 30.0% | 25.0% | 20.0% |
Blue/Gold | 72.7% | 36.4% | 54.5% | 45.4% | 36.4% |
Sliding HP | 62.5% | 50.0% | 50.0% | 41.7% | 33.3% |
Sliding On-Sta | 71.9% | 50.0% | 53.1% | 46.7% | 43.8% |
Note: 2-week turnovers not counted as “on-station”
If so, it would hold the promise of huge increases in on- station time per carrier.8
If multiple crews are to be implemented for carriers, two basic options are available: crew swapout at home- Port—akin to the SSBNs—or crew swapout on-station. Since no suitable simulation exists for flight-deck operations, some period of Workup on a real aircraft carrier is mandatory for the safety and readiness of aircrew, maintenance Crews, and flight-deck crews. Additionally, pilots must keep flying while ashore to maintain a decree of proficiency. In Vlew of these restrictions, each option must carefully account for issues of train- lng, readiness, logistics, ship life, and overhaul retirements.
A straight Blue/Gold Astern, with two crews and two air wings per ship, might have the fol- owing cycle schedule: a S'x-month Blue cruise, two Months of restricted availably and turnover, two Months of workups and carrier qualifications sup-
P°rt, a one-month prepa- _________________
ration period, and then a
Slx-rnonth Gold cruise. Table 2 summarizes the tempos and on-station percentages for this cycle.
. In effect, before ship-life and overhaul considerations, ji Would take four carriers and eight crews and air wings 0 give the same on-station time that seven carriers with Seven crews and air wings do now, but with more frequent °Verhauls stemming from the increased at-sea time, the ^niparison becomes more like 5/8 to get the effect of 7/7.
’th the added, more frequent cost of acquiring a reP acement carrier because of shortened ship life, the ad- antage almost disappears completely. Further disadvan- pges include the inefficient personnel use with the low j,ersTempo (36.4%) and the lack of major savings in air- attie acquisition. In other words, such a plan is stillborn. However, the standardization enjoyed with a future carer fleet composed almost entirely of Mm/rz-class ships p rrnits another version of the homeport swapout concept.9 t ’gure i depicts a sliding deployment schedule in which carriers and five crews and air wings rotate cruises c 'Ie one additional carrier with a permanent skeleton ew provides the workup and carrier qualifications-sup- s?n Platform. Table 3 lists the average tempos for this f err>e. The workup carrier would have to be rotated every 2, years to even out ship life for all carriers, bis sliding schedule provides the on-station time of
seven carriers and seven crews and air wings on current cycles with just four carriers, 5.2 crews, and five air wings. With ship OpTempo just 25% higher than under current cycles, even after taking into account overhaul and ship- life adjustments, it still leaves a sizable improvement in
required resource levels. A notional eight-carrier, ten- ship crews, and nine-air wing Navy could actually provide as much forward presence as a conventionally deployed 12-carrier and 11- air wing fleet for no increase in individual Per- sTempo.
The same sliding concept could even be applied to a swapout of personnel on station. Much transit time could be avoided completely as a new crew takes custody of everything from the ship herself to the airplanes, support equipment, and tools. Only personal gear and bodies would be involved in the airlift to a forward port such as Diego Garcia or Naples. Figure 2 lines out the schedule for this scheme. A triple cruise would be the limit for each ship because of upkeep requirements. Carriers would observe a 32-month cycle consisting of a 17-month deployment and a 15-month mix of upkeep and workups and carrier qualifications (six months of which would be at sea). Crews and air wings would have a 16-month cycle with a cruise, seven months of leave and training, and three months of workups and carrier qualifications (two months of which would be at sea). Table 4 presents the tempos for this plan. Note the twofold increases in on-station percentages, even when subtracting the two-week on-station turnover periods as “nonavailable” time.
The on-station swapout option has the additional advantage over the homeport swapout plan of operating in modules of just two aircraft carriers and three crews and air wings. This allows more flexible scheduling in the face of overhaul delays as well as permitting surges during crises without a debilitating impact on the overall crew rotation flow. This option enables two carriers and three crews and air wings to provide the current forward presence of four carriers and air wings. Accounting for overhauls and ship-life, just nine carriers, nine air wings, and nine crews could match the current on-station time of 13 ships and crews and 12 air wings. This plan should be adopted quickly for the Mm/fz-class ships on each coast.
Given the range of new forward-deployment patterns in response to “how often," the question of “how” to use
The cavernous hangar deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) accommodates evacuees during Operation Fiery Vigil, after the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines.
the carriers must be addressed. As with any military force, the decision of what individual elements will be included in a carrier battle group along with the carrier herself depends on just how the carrier will be used.
As Secretary of Defense Les Aspin stated in his confirmation hearings, “Our naval forces should be sized and shaped not only for armed conflict but also for the myriad of other important tasks we call upon them to do. Forward presence is certainly a key ingredient of this mix, along with such missions as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, deterrence, and crisis control.”10
As well as considering the non-traditional mission requirements of an interest-based strategy, shaping the composition of a carrier battle group must also consider the appropriate level of defense in view of near-term threats. The open-ocean threat of coordinated Soviet air, surface, and subsurface attack is no longer an everyday worry, and routine deployments face only tactical air and limited surface and subsurface threats. The traditional mix of supporting combatants and aircraft for layered defense is wasteful overkill in today’s glaring reality of scarce resources.
Routine defensive needs of the carrier battle group now could be handled with a mix of one CV/CVN, one Aegis guided-missile cruiser, one guided-missile destroyer, and one destroyer or guided-missile frigate. With an added single, dedicated combat-logistics-force (CLF) ship, this still frees two or three surface combatants and another CLF hull for independent or coordinated use. More missions, more presence, and more water can be covered.
To some extent, this concept is being tried. In the Sixth Fleet during 1991 and 1992, Vice Admiral Owens split off an Aegis cruiser, an escort, and a nuclear-powered attack submarine from deploying CVBGs and teamed them with an alert P-3 aircraft and an E-3 airborne-warning- and-control aircraft to form a maritime action group.11 Though emphasizing the synergistic advantages of this split carrier battle group in the war-fighting arena, Vice Admiral Owens noted that, “Using our assets flexibly can compensate for force reductions and, in some cases, may even generate more effective capabilities for specific missions.”12
The mix of forces embarked on the carrier herself is also a candidate for innovative and constructive change. Optimized for the Cold War, the standard carrier air wing reflects an emphasis on fleet air defense and strike warfare, a structure which leaves our capital ship woefully unprepared to carry out the new, non-traditional missions.
Certainly, power projection and war fighting must remain the primary mission of a carrier; however, “primary” mission does not equal “most frequently assigned” mission. A balance must be struck that keeps a good deal of
punch and parry aboard the carrier while allowing it lf fulfill the other roles to which it is or should be assigned
A first step toward such a new carrier loadout was a1' tempted in early 1993. The USS Theodore Rooseve\ (CVN-71) removed one F-14 squadron and its S" squadron and embarked a 600-man Marine air-ground tas^ force in their place.13 They practiced missions such as1 non-combatant evacuation operation and an air-assaal[ raid. While the lessons learned are still being studied the on-scene commanders were positive about the exe( cise results.
This test was a perfect example of broadening the ship1 mission flexibility by trading away some of its defensh* capability. Other candidates as elements of a carrie' loadout might include medical teams, Seabees, Army civif affairs detachments, SEAL platoons, and logistics hel‘‘ copters. Such forces are useful in humanitarian assistant' nation building, disaster relief, security assistance, a” good will port visits. Carriers have not been used for su^ non-traditional purposes in the past precisely because the' were not equipped to perform them.
The new nature of presence must be kept firmly in mi111 when deciding how to use a deployed aircraft carrie( While the National Military Strategy notes the advanta? that “Forward presence forces ... are often the most f sponsive in cases of natural disaster or regional crisis’ forward presence should not be considered just preenif five crisis response.[1] .
Often taken to such an extreme in the past, our caff ers were stationed reactively and not proactively. The rier battle group was used as a big stick to threaten a trOu blemaker while ignoring the silent majority of counts that were trying to improve their lot. Such “coercive pfe> ence” should no longer limit our carriers but must g*v. way to periods of “conducive presence” where strate?1' friendships are nurtured.
Again, steps are being taken by our leaders in the rir. direction. As the current CinCLant noted, “Our carrief
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are tied no longer to traditional deployment hubs. . ,”15 This concept, known as “tethering,” allows more freedom of motion for the carrier battle group, and the leash should continue to be lengthened. Our carrier groups need to exert positive worldwide presence. Just what form might this proactive, positive, conducive presence take? Two examples of proactive carrier employment are port vis- hs and military-to-military contacts.
At some point between the tour of the Great White Fleet and today, the distinction between a “port visit” and liberty call” was lost. It is time to regain the flag wav- ■ng focus of that former era. We need to drop anchor with a plan. Preparation for a port call should not consist of reserving a block of tee times. The rebuilding of schools and orphanages should not be relegated to the chaplain and 20 volunteers. Instead, the specialized elements advocated earlier—medical teams, Seabees, and civil-affairs detachments—along with the general crew, could help and befriend the country visited. Good-will teams could be 'eft ashore for a few weeks when feasible, with the career returning to reembark them after some other exer- c'se in the region.
These new style port visits naturally should be at places npt traditionally frequented by our carriers. Save Perth, Singapore, and the Riviera for occasional liberty; we need to call on the towns and cities of Africa, South America, and Southern Asia as well. If we do not want to be the World’s policeman, we need to become the world’s part- hrtie volunteer social worker.
Establishing a close relationship with a foreign armed °rce goes far beyond enhancing interoperability should We be allied in a future conflict. We should maximize ^'litary-to-military contacts. These same good-will port Vls‘ts also should include direct practical and classroom Gaining provided by embarked Marine and SEAL forces, r°undtable seminars and social gatherings for mid-grade officers, and small bilateral exercises when arriving and °eParting. The focus must be on serving the training needs the host-country force, not on using their few ships j'ad aircraft as skunks and bogies for our own training.
. a carrier steams back over the horizon smug in its miliary superiority, our strategic interests will not be served. **owever, if the carrier departs and leaves behind per- s°nal friendships and professional respect, both nations benefit. In fact, a positive military-to-military rela- l0nship may be the deciding factor in whether or not the °reign nation becomes an ally at all. Furthermore, im- pQving their professionalism through exercises or face- °~face training may aid in political stability, and such c°ntact with U.S. forces may help imbue an American ^edo of apolitical subservience to civilian leadership, Us possibly enhancing democracy and precluding fre- °Uent coups.
c dEe unified CinCs and the Chief of Naval Operations an no longer address domestic fiscal constraints and anging strategies for a multipolar world as separate is- es- As diverse as those subjects might be, with few of- Cers or academics well versed in both, each is equally J'hcal in determining the best peacetime employment of aircraft carriers. Even as their numbers decrease, these
capable ships must adapt to better serve our national interests.
Radical changes in deployment patterns are ideas whose time has come. The Nimitz-class carriers should operate under multiple-crews schemes, while the remainder of flattops should adjust their deployment cycles. The traditional air wing should be cut back to allow room on board for other types of forces that can perform new, non-traditional missions, and the supporting screen of surface combatants in the carrier battle group should be similarly reduced. The carrier battle group must be more actively involved in building positive relations throughout the world instead of being typecast as a threatening, coercive presence.
Only a fundamental change in the employment of our aircraft carriers will convince the Congress of their worth in this new post-Cold War strategic landscape. As our new governing vision,“ . . . From the Sea,” noted, “The challenge is much more complex than simply reducing our present naval forces. We must structure a fundamentally different naval force to respond to strategic demands, and that new force must be sufficiently flexible and powerful to satisfy enduring national security requirements.”16 As our carriers steam into a new era, we truly must use them or lose them.
'Senate Armed Services Committee Report on the FY-1993 Defense Authorization Bill, S. Rept. 102-352 (Washington: 1992), p. 272.
-Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington: February 1993), p. xxvii. ’See for example D. F. Wood, “Going to WestPac Will be Different," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1993, pp. 84-86.
This nominal cycle was cited on 30 March 1990 by Navy officials in briefing congressional analysts. It should be recognized that actual schedules are flexible. See R. O’Rourke, “Aircraft Carrier Force Levels and Deployment Patterns,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 9I-516F (Washington: 28 June 1991), pp. 3-4.
SR. O'Rourke, “Naval Forward Deployments and the Size of the Navy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 92-803F (Washington: 13 November 1992), pp. 13-15.
6R. O’Rourke, “Navy Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier (CVN-76),” Congressional Research Service Issue Brief IB92042 (Washington:19 October 1992), p. 9.
’R. O’Rourke, “Aircraft carrier Forward Homeporting,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 92-744F (Washington: 2 October 1992), p. 5. ■Senate Armed Services Committee Report on the FY-1993 Defense Authorization Bill, p. 271.
The sixth Nimitz-class aircraft carrier was commissioned in 1992, and two more are in the pipeline. A reduction to ten deployable carriers would mean that, by 1998, all but one of the CONUS-based carriers would be of this class. See T. W. Trotter, “The Future of Carrier Aviation,” Naval War College Review, Winter 1993, pp. 22-44.
“As reported by R. Maze, “Aspin is Not Firm on Cutting to 340 Ships,” Navy Times, 1 February 1993, p. 4:4-5.
11 F. D. Kennedy, Jr., “Diffusing Naval Power,” National Defense, July/August 1992, pp. 34-35.
I!VADM W. Owens, “Mediterranean Fleet: A Test-bed for Navy's Future," Armed Forces Journal International, July 1992, p. 33.
'C. Lawson, “The Corps Carrier Roosevelt,” Navy Times, 8 February 1993, p. 22:2-4.
“Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy (Washington: January 1992), p. 14.
“ADM P. D. Miller, “Doing the Job With a Smaller Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1992, p. 56.
“Secretary of the Navy, . . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century, White Paper (Washington: September 1992), p. 2. [2] 14
[1] squadron, this fall. This essay recently won the Naval War College’s President’s Award for best essay dealing with maritime strategy or the operational level of warfare.
Commander Oliver recently graduated from the Naval War College and is in the training pipeline to become Executive Officer of VF-51, an F-