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each side simply declares how many SLCMs it will build each year. Of course, the United States in essence does that today—it’s called the leg>s*a tive process. A declaratory policy, though, would be worse than no p°l" icy. In the absence of policy, at least you know there is uncertainty and can plan for breakouts. A declaratory Po1' icy offers a false sense of security an > unfortunately, an excuse for some to cut funding. It should also be remembered that the Soviets are not eliminat ing “their” advantage, which is w short-range nuclear weapons, the km that would probably be used for any nuclear war at sea.
The SLCM was not part of the seven-year negotiations, so it should not be used as an excuse to kill START. After all, both sides agreed that SLCM limits, if any, would remain outside START. “Kicking the
can” along for a few more years
By James L. George
Why shelve the SLCM?
According to news accounts, a main obstacle to a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) this year is the question of limiting the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM)—the Navy’s nuclear Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (TLAM-N). This is surprising.
Although the START talks have been under way for seven years, the issue did not arise prominently until the 1987 Washington Summit, when negotiators agreed that some limits would be set “outside” any START treaty. Still unsettled is what those limits will be and how compliance will be verified.
Setting limits might be solvable; verification may not. There are four verification problems. First, SLCMs are relatively small, and thus easily hidden. Second, most are housed internally (for example, in submarines or in “boxes”). Third, it is difficult to distinguish the nuclear from the conventional variants. And, finally, they are all mobile, which makes them hard to track. In short, any verification regime would have to be terribly intrusive, beyond current national technical means, to avoid cheating or any so- called breakout problems.
How can the United States solve the SLCM situation? There might be a relatively simple solution, one with precedent? in both SALT I and II. The answer is to shelve the SLCM—just do nothing. Or, to use the current Washington idiom, “kick the can” to the next negotiations.
This is exactly what happened in both SALT I and II. SALT I postponed agreements on long-range bombers, forward-based systems, the multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) question, throwweight, and cruise missiles. Thus, SALT I simply froze existing intercontinental and sea- launched ballistic missile systems. In SALT II, the cruise missile issue was explicitly kicked down the street. It was agreed that there would be a moratorium on long-range cruise missiles for three years. Some limits were also decided. A long-range bomber with air- launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), for example, was considered a MIRVed system.
Thus, precedents exist for postponing the SLCM question. It should also be kept in mind that two of the three legs of the “cruise missile triad” are being restricted. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty eliminated the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) and START will limit ALCMs. Thus, for arms controllers, two-thirds of the problem has been already solved.
Shelving the SLCM offers advantages to both sides, consistent with the familiar U. S.-Soviet “qualitative- quantitative” dichotomy. The United States has deployed the accurate TLAM-N for several years now. The Soviet Union is just starting to deploy its cruise missile, the SS-N-21, which presumably is not quite as good—but the Soviets are also testing a new mode, the SS-NX-24. The Soviet Union has more platforms than the United States, but both sides are really just starting deployment, so any arms agreement delay would not be felt for many years. And cruise missiles are “slow flyers”—not the type of weapon suited for a bolt-out-of-the-blue first strike—so the question of attaining a strategic advantage is moot.
From a U. S. viewpoint, the true value of the Tomahawk remains unknown. The TLAM-N has been criticized as a “weapon in search of a mission” and apparently, there is, or was, some truth to that. In essence, the technology drove the weapon’s development. However, that criticism was pre-INF and definitely pre-START.
With the INF treaty eliminating Pershing IIs and GLCMs in Europe, the only long-range theater system available for “extended deterrence” is the SLCM. Both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, have testified that the SLCM will be available for deterrence in Europe.
START could also make the SLCM more important. The SLCM could well become the only single-warhead nuclear weapon in the U. S. inventory. It appears that the single-warhead Midgetman will not be built, leaving only the aged, inaccurate, early 1960s- era Minuteman II as the country’s single-warhead weapon. SLCM could be critical for any type of escalatory control. In short, the real importance of the TLAM-N has not been properly evaluated and probably will not be fully known for five to seven years, when the effects of both INF and START will be more apparent.
Once again, it appears the Soviets have outsmarted U. S. negotiators (a view, incidentally, shared by some of those involved). Although the SLCM question has been raised for years, it was always considered a side issue. The Soviets ambushed the United States at the Washington Summit (as they did at the Reykjavik Summit on other issues). Now, as always happenS' the Congress, State Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs, White House, and Navy are negotiating amongst themselves. In short, U. S. officials are doing the Soviets’ work.
According to one news report, the State Department even proposed a no- SLCMs “solution” to the problem- According to another story, there Win be a “declaratory” policy in which
will
allow a thorough, unrushed study ot verification—and, more important, w allow the United States to study the real importance of the SLCM in the post-INF and -START world.
Dr. George is a former assistant director of t c Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He ** frequent, prize-winning contributor to Procee
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Proceedings / December