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By Colonel W. C. Gregson, U.S. Marine Corps
In today’s Navy-Marine Corps strategic spectrum, it is the only color. The littoral character of the Persian Gulf region demands an integrated blue-green team, especially for coordination of amphibious operations using air-cushion landing craft— here, the LCAC-9—with fixed-wing and helicopter air support.
The national strategy is changing, and our concepts of naval strategies and sea power should change with it. Old frameworks, dividing responsibilities at the high water mark between the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, are crumbling under the pressure of modern technology and emerging military requirements. We must move beyond old, inherited ways of thinking.
But our force structure is tough to change. Ships last more than 30 years. We need conceptual bridges. An updated maritime—or naval—strategic concept, mission integration, and recognition of the littoral theater all can be such conceptual bridges.
The goal is to establish practical future force structure and naval strategic concepts. How well we do will have an impact perhaps as great as the development of amphibious warfare and the aircraft carrier.
Our departmental organization, the service headquarters organizations, our mental processes, and our current logic patterns are conditioned by our institutional memories and histories. In Vietnam, we fought according to a continental campaign concept of war—large in-country presence, major troop formations, and a firepower/attrition orientation. We tried to fit the war to a preferred European warfare concept without effective war termination objectives or strategies. The Marines fought alongside the Army. The I Corps area meant a lot of positional warfare along the demilitarized zone—Khe Sanh, Cam Lo, Con Thien, Dong Ha, Quang Tri, the Rock Pile, etc. The III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) could maneuver subordinate organizations, but III MAF and the Seventh Fleet, as commands, could not maneuver as elements of mobile sea- power. Early in the Korean War, with much less total force available, major commands maneuvered strategically throughout the theater by exploiting our mobile sea- power.
The Navy fought alongside the Air Force, essentially as a provider of additional aircraft. Carriers operated in the same general location for eight years and sent Alpha strikes (28-32 planes and 5-7 support aircraft concentrated on one target) regularly into the fiercest air defense known to that date, which was a far cry from the wide- ranging lightning strikes favored under naval concepts seen in the World War II Pacific, and the first six to eight months of Korea. We launched untold numbers of high explosive rounds into the Vietnamese jungle that fell unobserved—“harassment and interdiction” fires. It was an attrition strategy, north and south. After we finally applied sea power properly, cutting the vulnerable logistics jugular by mining a relatively accessible harbor instead of attacking hard-to-hit trucks on well-defended, well-camouflaged trails, the North Vietnamese sued for peace.
Vietnam threatened to amputate Marines from our naval roots. We raised a generation of Marines who never made a “feet wet” landing, and who understood and appreciated little else about naval warfare. To a large extent a distinct lack of understanding of naval forces and concepts still prevails. The Navy also departed from its own concepts and slid into a parallel decline in appreciation for the Marine Corps contributions to naval warfare. We wrote the Maritime Strategy and the Amphibious Strategy in separate headquarters. Now, under new pressures, we need to come back together quickly.
Mission Integration Principles
One conceptual bridge can be “Mission Integration,” as discussed in the unification legislation. A “navalized” revision of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) language for “mission integration” might look like this:
I S. NAVY
“Integration of distinct military capabilities of the Sea Services to prepare for and conduct effective unified operations in fulfilling major U.S. military missions.” (Paraphrased from the Professional Staff Report to the SASC, October 1985.)
It is important to note that nothing being integrated loses its separate identity. Integration does not mean homogenization of the Navy and Marines.
No threat to the existence of the Marine Corps as a separate service comes from within the Department of the Navy. The demands of warfare require the devotion of separate services to the highest order of expertise in separate combat realms. The separate services also prevent entrenchment of institutional monoperspective dogma that fails to keep pace with changes in international relations, Politics, and technology and that can affect decisively the conduct of warfare.
Forces on land and sea can affect each other far more now than ever in the past. Forces ashore and forces afloat must be far more integrated and mutually supportive than ever before. Modern technology, particularly the range of detection means and weapons, and the agility of command and control networks require the highest degree of detailed coordination and integration, at the tactical level, among forces operating in the separate realms ot land, air, space, sea, and undersea. When we are part of a multiservice, multinational coalition such as Operation Desert Storm, such detailed mission integration greatly magnifies the combat power of the combined forces along the high- Water seam and multiplies the effects of all naval power far ashore. This is the foundation behind the littoral theater concept—the second conceptual bridge.
Each situation involving use of military forces will be unique in its demands and responses. This places a premium on forces that are strategically and tactically mobile, flexible, self-contained, and relatively invulnerable. Modern politics places a high premium on precise and discriminate military operations. Domestic opinion will not tolerate heavy casualties in pursuit of vague or shifting objectives. International opinion will not tolerate severe collateral damage or heavy casualties among innocent civilians in the contested area.
Both the Navy and the Marine Corps will prosper to the extent that both are mutually reinforcing and enhancing. Conversely, both will suffer when treated separately and uniquely, as, for example, in the planning, programming, and budgeting system database that divides Marines into “land forces” and “tactical aviation,” like a small army and air force. While the unique capabilities and qualifications within each service must be retained, the highest possible mission integration, yielding the highest possible synergism and interoperability, is essential.
Common equipment means economy. Where unique attributes require unique equipment, economy lies in collateral roles and functions of uniquely equipped units. This can apply to Marine aviation—particularly helicopter unjts—assigned to fleet defense roles, including: antisubmarine warfare; Aegis and Marine aviation command and control systems (MACCS) in antiair warfare and air defense; Marine air-ground task forces operating within the composite warfare concept; and Marine maintenance at expeditionary fields for Navy-unique aircraft. These will be difficult, but we have solved more difficult problems before. A good example is the omnibus agreement with the Air Force on control of aviation.
What Will We Do Next?
Our strategic concept, the third conceptual bridge, will shift from winning control of the sea to the exercise of sea control and sea-based power. This will affect both operations and force structure. It will have an even greater effect on our self-image and how the administration, Congress, and the public perceive us.
We last faced a similar situation at the end of World War II. The greatest fleet in history sailed in virtually isolated splendor, with—according to conventional wisdom— nothing to fight.
Proceedings / April 1991
55
■ .
In the beginning we were a continental power—on our own continent. After we 'acquired overseas interests, the threats to our security changed. Alfred Thayer Mahan described the only proper role for the fleet as gaining command of the sea by destruction of the enemy’s fleet. The war in the Pacific was that theory’s ultimate expression.
The victory over Japan suddenly eliminated the threat to sea control. The Navy appeared to have no purpose. Compounding the problem, nuclear weapons carried by the U.S. Air Force promised a quicker and cheaper way to victory. Conventional wisdom held (again) that carriers and fleets could not survive within range of hostile shore- based aviation. Moreover, our most likely adversary was not vulnerable to interruption of its ocean-borne com-
The Korean War’s unsung hero, Vice Admiral P. D. Struble (inset), surveys the horizon from the bridge of the USS Rochester (CA-124), about a month before he orchestrated the coordinated sea and air support—including Marine Corsairs—for the daring amphibious landing at Inchon on 15 September 1950.
U.S. NAVY
merce. The unification hearings threatened to make all the strategy and doctrinal debates moot under an Army-Air Force-dominated defense bureaucracy. One U.S. Army Air Corps officer was quoted as saying in 1954:
“Why should we have a navy at all? The Russians have little or no navy, the Japanese Navy has been sunk, the navies of the rest of the world are negligible, the Germans never did have much of a navy. The point I am getting at is, who is this big navy being planned to fight? There are no enemies for it to fight except apparently the army air force. In this day and age to talk of fighting the next war on the oceans is a ridiculous assumption. The only reason for us to have a navy is just because someone else has a navy and we certainly do not need to waste money on that.”1
the regular Army and make efficient soldiers out of
them.”2
Admiral Forrest Sherman, from his position as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations during 1946-1947, provided initial guidance to the development of postwar strategy. In the absence of a serious fleet to fight, the principle emerged (or re-emerged in the historic view) that naval forces exist to apply power to the far shore. The basic Weapons of this “new” navy proposed by Admiral Sherman and others were those that made it possible to project Power far inland. This meant “carrier-based naval air Power, fleet-based amphibious power, and naval artillery.”3
The strictly Mahanian concept of naval forces existing Primarily to defeat enemy fleets and destroy seaborne commerce had been overtaken by advances in technology, industry, politics, and international relations. Winning control of the sea from an enemy may be a first necessity, hut unchallenged possession of such control emphasizes, rather than diminishes, the need for and utility of naval forces.
Our unchallenged post-World War II sea control and nuclear weapons changed the entire model of proper use of force. Winning control of the sea, as practiced in World War II, meant high-intensity conflict with no substitute for victory. Exercising such control in the nuclear-dominated World required, and still requires, dampening conflict with a minimum of violence.4 We did not recognize the difference at the time, and to a large extent we still do not.
The first six to eight months of the Korean War were Primarily naval in character. Politically, unlimited warfare and “no substitute for victory” operations were not possible. The naval character of the war grew initially out of °ur national lack of readiness. Naval forces, with their inherent mobility, self-contained logistics, and relative invulnerability, ranged up and down both coasts during the initial movement phase of the war, providing “the foundation for successes and repeated salvation against disasters.”5
The spectacular successes of the war were littoral, the third conceptual bridge, with an amphibious subset. The disasters redeemed were also littoral (as at Chosin- Hungnam, and a less-publicized Eighth Army evacuation from Chinnampo on the western coast). Both successes and redemption efforts, especially in the fluid first six months of the war, were directly related to seaborne logistics, and extraordinary sea-air-ground command and coordination. Vice Admiral P. D. Struble, commanding the Seventh Fleet, was an unsung hero of this war.
Unconsciously, we had miniaturized the Okinawa model of full-blown, unrestricted power projection. Seaborne logistics projected just enough power ashore, especially in the war’s first six months, to maintain (eventually) the status quo. In 1964, by contrast, the President conceptually reached back more than a century to send the Marines ashore beside the Army, supported from massive bases ashore.6
Following Vietnam and the 1970s nadir, a consensus formed over the need for robust military and naval forces.
During the Ronald Reagan/John Lehman era, popular perception viewed naval forces in an essentially Mahanian sense, that we existed to win command of the seas from an opposing naval force.
Now, with the absence of any fleet to fight, we are again back to post-World War II, with one important difference. Our primary enemy of the postwar era is presumed to have abandoned the field. We must define a concept that describes our purpose without a fleet to fight, and without a global war enemy.
Logically, we will return to our historic roots, expressing our strategic concepts in terms of the exercise of sea control, presence, and power projection in a world that demands discriminate deterrence and precise, discriminate use of military power. The diffusion of power to different regions of the world, U.S. economic interests, and the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons will place a premium on our ability to prevent conflicts. If prevention fails, we must contain and quickly suppress conflicts. This completes a circle, returning to the principle first enunciated after World War II, that the ultimate purpose and utility of naval forces is to apply power to the far shore from a secure, mobile, base. In an era that portends less U.S. military presence based overseas, this utility will grow.
Strategic Frameworks
Accepting these four premises—that the demands of naval warfare require separate services devoted to the highest order of expertise in their respective specialties; that our strategic concepts will be redefined in terms of the exercise of sea control, presence, and power projection; and that the littoral theater will grow in importance we have a framework for future strategic and force planning. The following naval aviation example illustrates what this might mean.
A naval historian, speaking of the Navy squadrons on the first aircraft carrier to join the fight in Korea, said:
“The fighter squadrons had enjoyed considerable jet experience prior to receiving their Panthers and moving aboard ship; the group as a whole had conducted extensive training in close support of troops with the Marines at Camp Pendleton, California.”7
Navy and Marine aviation must take advantage of the unique capabilities and qualifications within each service and, through changes in deployment patterns and training orientation, enhance the capabilities of all naval aviation.
The complexity of modern aircraft and the limits on training flight hours make it impossible to train all aviators or squadrons across the spectrum of roles. The Marine Corps must retain its training orientation and optimize its equipment for the six functions of Marine aviation.8 This includes the ability to operate from expeditionary airfields using mobile maintenance facilities capable of supporting all naval aircraft. It must further include Marine aviation command and control systems, equipment, and doctrine that are interoperable with other national and international
systems. Through these systems, powerful seaborne capabilities, such as Aegis, can link with networks ashore. Other matters include traditional expertise in support of ground forces.
The Navy must maintain its training orientation and optimize its equipment for the full spectrum of land- and seabased operations in support of the battle force and national efforts such as antisubmarine warfare and strategic deterrence.
Integration of training and deployment cycles of the fleet and the Fleet Marine Force can enhance capabilities across naval aviation. Force structure permitting, each carrier air wing should deploy with at least one Marine squadron. Similarly, each Marine deployment should include at least one Navy squadron. Barring full squadron participation, a properly configured detachment (perhaps four F/A-18Ds) of Marines on board the carrier would provide similarly improved capability, as would an appropriately sized Navy detachment with the Marines.
This involves much more than cross-training, although that is an included benefit. It allows for expertise and capabilities not now available to the carrier battle forces and the MAGTFs, multiplying the flexibility and interoperability of each and broadening and leveraging their joint capabilities across the spectrum of naval operations. No amount of theoretical knowledge or contingency planning
can replace this personal coordination and confidence, especially under pressure.
Marines afloat reinforce the Navy-Marine Corps team concept. As the carrier battle group works up for a deployment in concert with an amphibious ready group, Marines afloat provide a resident core of experts to support the carrier group when it integrates its assets (aircraft, submarine, and surface ship weapons) into systems ashore. The Marines get a cadre of carrier-wise aircrews, well versed in battle group capabilities and limitations.
Assigning Navy squadrons as part of Marine deployments is successful now. By deploying to Iwakuni and other places during such cycles (i.e., Korea for Team Spirit, the Philippines for Cope Thunder and others), ' Navy squadrons learn Marine capabilities and limitations. The Navy gets a cadre of aircrews skilled in support of forces ashore and interoperability with other U.S. and allied armed forces. It also provides a break from the carrier cycle, and offers opportunities for squadrons from ship [ and shore to cross deploy.
As carrier wings, each with an integral Marine squadron, move through predeployment training, they train with the Marines of the amphibious ready group that will deploy in company with the carrier battle group. The Marine squadron of the carrier air wing is the source of the forward air controllers (FACs) within the amphibious group.
While training, all pilots become accustomed to the same FACs, and the ground forces gain confidence in the support provided by the air wing.
The amphibious ready group assumes search and rescue for the battle group and the amphibs. Practicing this during the workup provides, as with the FACs, the interpersonal contact and confidence so essential in an emergency.
Fleet defense and contingency roles for unpredictable Third World situations—Operation Desert Shield/Storm as the latest enduring example—becomes a naval aviation
function, often requiring Marine rotary-wing augmentation of battle force units. Similarly, Aegis integrated across the littoral with Marines ashore offers opportunities for expanded air command-and-control, air defense, antiair warfare, and greater battlefield depth.
Ashore, the Marines must be capable of servicing and maintaining all naval aircraft likely to operate from expeditionary fields. Where the Navy and Marines operate common aircraft, such as the F/A-18, that support is available now from mobile, and expeditionary, maintenance vans. Expanding this expeditionary maintenance capability to include aircraft such as the F-14 and S-3 extends the reach and flexibility of all naval aviation. Prosecuting antisubmarine warfare from expeditionary bases ashore, with S-3s and other ASW aircraft protected by Marines, in the air and on the ground, greatly increases battle group security and flexibility.
All areas of naval warfare are responsive to similar mission integration efforts. Littoral theater dimensions perhaps as much as 600 miles at sea to 600 miles ashore and modern political and warfighting demands require detailed, tactical-level integration between forces under the sea, on the sea, in the air, in space, and on land.
An aggressive doctrinal development effort that places all naval forces under a single operational and strategic concept, and that challenges existing assumptions and methodologies, should be the first priority. This will identify appropriate areas for greater operational mission integration. The goal must be unfettered operations close to land within the littoral theater and enhancement of our ability to project political influence—explosive and otherwise—ashore. In turn this leads to training base and ofli- cer education changes.
Organizations that fail to recognize changing conditions fail to adapt and eventually lose their viability and effectiveness. Military history is littered with such misfortunes. Foremost among the many changed conditions is the tension among declining resources, the changing national security environment, and the demands of the new battlefields. Less of the same clearly won’t work. But change is hard. Are we up to it?
'As quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy”; U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. May 1954, p. 484.
2BGcn Frank A. Armstrong. USAAF, 11 December 1946.
■'Michael A. Palmer. Origins of the Maritime Strategy. American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade: Naval Historical Center. Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C.. 1988, p. 32.
JRusscll. William I!.; “Maritime and Amphibious Alternatives”; Marine Corps Gazette. Marine Corps Association, Quantico, Virginia, December 1989, p. 15. 'James A. Field, United Slates Naval Operations, Korea. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1962, p. v.
"Russell, p. 15.
7Field, James A., speaking of the Air Group of Valley Forge, first carrier into the Korean War, p. 49.
"Antiair warfare, offensive air support, assault support, tactical reconnaissance, control of aircraft and missiles, and electronic warfare.
A 1968 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Colonel Gregson has seen extensive service in reconnaissance and infantry units, including duty in Vietnam, the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, as a United Nations observer. Prior to assuming the Military Fellowship in the Washington, D.C., office of the Council on Foreign Relations, he was the Secretary of the Navy’s Deputy for Marine Corps matters (Office of Program Appraisal).
_________________________________________ One of Ours______________________________
During the first days of the Peleliu invasion, the coral reef off Orange Beach presented a formidable barrier to our vehicle and personnel landing craft. All material had to be transferred laboriously to Marine amphibious tractors. The construction battalions (seabees), those folks that could solve any problem, soon came up with powered pontoon barges capable of mounting medium-sized cherry pickers. One or two at a time, we would secure our boats alongside the barge, while the crane lifted out cargo nets of material and deposited it in waiting tracked landing vehicles.
Always interested in seabee ingenuity, I stepped over on the barge for a closer look. The skinny little guy operating the rig had been ignoring the occasional sniper round that ricocheted off the boom. For some slight protection against serious mortar fire, the top had been removed from the pontoon unit directly beneath the crawler type machine and the resulting hole lined with sand bags. Quick access was gained by climbing in between the wheel tracks.
As I bent over to examine the foxhole more closely, 1 felt the heat, concussion and then the sound of two or three powerful explosions. With the quick reflexes of youth, I dove headfirst into the hole.
When finally I summoned up enough courage to peek up over the edge, the crane operator was squatting at the entrance with a grin on his face. Calmly, he said, “you can come on out son—that was our own cruiser firing.’
As I sheepishly climbed out, there in all her glory was the beautiful old Indianapolis (CA-35). She had been firing, armor piercing shells, flat trajectory, point blank, at a Japanese heavy gun emplacement and was standing in so close, she virtually had to shoulder the tank landing ships and other landing craft out of the way to gain position.
R. E. Larkan