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Robert F. Dunn
Vice-Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Power Projection:
Back on top, but...______________
Admiral Frank Kelso, the Chief of Naval Operations, has been heard to say that “Power projection is the Navy’s number one Priority.” After the years of ASW’s primacy, the change should have caused quite a stir. Yet the news seems to have caused no more than a ripple.
Some might say it’s about time. After all, the last hostile submarine to seriously threaten U.S. forces fought in World War II. Since then, through two wars and numerous other actions and contingency operations, it was the Navy’s conventional power- Projection capability that was called upon—not ASW forces. It
Was the nuclear retaliatory capability of naval forces that was the nation’s primary deterrent to nuclear war—not ASW forces.
For the last 45 years projection forces—the carrier battle groups, the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious forces—and the fleet ballistic missile submarines have been the Navy’s main contributions to national defense. Yet, emphasis—nay, priority— continued to be placed upon ASW; needed improvements in power projection were sacrificed to fund defenses against a submarine threat that never materialized and that became hard to accept as real.
On the other hand, the potential enemy did have the capability to strike our homeland with submarine-launched, nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. The location, tracking, and monitoring of these nuclear-powered, ballistic-missile submarines had to be high national priorities. Also, the potential enemy did have other capable submarines that could threaten the effectiveness of our SSBNs. Enemy submarines had the ability to attack our aircraft carriers and amphibious shipping with missiles and torpedoes. Successful submarine attacks could have crippled the fleet. It Would have been irresponsible to disregard ASW.
In any event, ASW became the Navy’s number one priority. Now that has changed. Should the Navy now downplay ASW? Hardly. It’s one thing to advocate a position and win support it’s quite another to decide how best to deal with the threats facing the nation.
One of the most serious problems confronting planners today is the real and growing threat posed by Third World submarines. These submarines, which can launch missiles and torpedoes, are getting quieter. Over the horizon, the Soviet Navy s SSBNs still threaten our entire continent. The shift in priorities is no message to abandon ASW. On the contrary, the Navy must reemphasize the importance of ASW in power-projection calculations requirements, weapons, planning, and operations.
Flexibility must be maximized; ASW in support ol carrier and amphibious groups must be conducted by ships and aircraft that have other capabilities. Too often, while it was number one, ASW became an end in itself; it was not integrated with fleet operations in the real world. A smaller U.S. Navy emphasizing power projection cannot afford to repeat that error, and power projection must not become an end in itself.
Control of the battle space in three dimensions is required for sustained power projection. Missiles and torpedoes launched from submarines undoubtedly will be the principal threats to the Navy’s forces at sea. The submarines themselves will be older diesel-electric boats, newer nuclear-powered craft, or modern conventional submarines with air-independent propulsion systems. All blend easily into the background noises of the world’s oceans and make passive detection an exercise in futility.
Sophisticated computer systems have delayed the demise of passive listening systems. Advanced computers eventually may enable passive systems to regain their edge in ASW, but now, and for a long time to come, active sound-ranging, supplemented by intelligence and a variety of non-acoustic systems—all linked by reliable communications—will be required to control undersea warfare. Vehicles that employ such systems must have endurance, speed, mobility, and flexibility. Fortunately, the Navy has such a combination in the carrier battle group s cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and aircraft carriers—and their aircraft.
Unfortunately, the carrier battle groups’ offensive ASW capabilities have yet to be exploited fully. Their reputation has come from their power-projection role, and their leading advocates have extolled the carriers’ virtues of prompt reaction to crises while too often neglecting their inherent ASW capability. Sometimes, this happened because of mere lack of knowledge; at others, it was blatant parochialism exercised in the competition for budget dollars. Regardless, the carriers’ ASW capability always existed. It must not be overlooked—indeed, it must be underscored. As the fleet’s size shrinks, as commitments remain widespread and the emphasis shifts to the power-projection forces, the Navy’s leaders must focus more than ever on the training, tactics, and sensor development needed to gain and maintain undersea superiority.
Cynics may see this as a road-to-Damascus conversion lor erstwhile power-projection advocates. I disagree. It’s easy to carp about priorities when you’re a back-bencher—it’s a different and heady responsibility to find yourself on top. The Navy s power-projection advocates must accept that responsibility.
Admiral Dunn commanded the USS Saratoga (CV-60), Carrier Group Eight, and Naval Air Forces, Atlantic. He was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Air Warfare (OP-05) when he retired in 1989.
Proceedings / February 1991