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Proceedings / November
Looks Can Be Deceiving
The Soviet Northern Fleet Slava-class cruiser Marshal Ustinov and Sov- remennyy-class destroyer Otlichnyy called in Norfolk, Virginia from 21 to 25 July. Thousands of American visitors toured the ships and found them to be freshly titivated, shipshape in appearance, and apparently well maintained. The Marshal Ustinov, commissioned in 1986, carries the SS-N-12, SA-N-6, and SA-N-4 missile systems. The Otlichnyy, commissioned in 1983, carries the SS-N- 22 and SA-N-7 missiles. This plethora of missile systems as well as guns, torpedoes, and ASW rocket launchers on both ships gives them a capable and menacing appearance; however, everything is not as good as it looks.
Shortly before the visit of those ships to Norfolk, on 12 May, the military newspaper Red Star published an article entitled “Ships and Rubles” which discussed “. . .the problem of quality and reliability of technical equipment and armament delivered to the Navy by defense industry.” The article quoted a captain second rank deputy section chief in the Missile Weapons Administration of the Soviet Navy’s materiel establishment to the effect that:
“As soon as a ship comes into the Navy we immediately open a special file on it into which we collect all the complaint correspondence to the manufacturing plants. These files fill up quickly. The destroyer Otlichnyy recently brought 12 complaints at once . . . and the missile cruiser Marshal Ustinov has 32. And this was only for missile armament.”
These are not unusual circumstances.
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According to another officer interviewed:
“Although the tactical-technical equipment installed on ships is unquestionably high, their quality and reliability in operation do not always meet the high technical standards placed on them today. And so the need for repair comes more frequently then we would like it to.”
The article went on to report:
“The fact that industry has begun to repair the technical equipment it delivers to the Navy more frequently and at greater expense is explained partially by the fact that it is more complicated. While previously the Navy was quite capable of doing the repair work itself, now it can in no way get by without relying on industry and its great repair capabilities.”
Another reason for this reliance on civilian repair may be the situation in the Navy’s own ship repair yards. According to several articles in the May 1988 edition of the monthly naval journal Morskoi Sbornik:
“Since 1 January 1987 they [ship repair enterprises of the Navy] have switched to new management conditions. Preparations have been under way to switch ship repair yards and design-industrial organizations to full cost accounting and self-financing. In the course of this work, . . . difficulties have developed in satisfying the requirements of the fleets.
“Although there has been an increase in the volume of ship repair, there has not been a corresponding increase in the number of ships handed over [from the ship repair yards back to the fleet].”
Indeed, “the number of ships handed over from repair each year did not increase, but sometimes even decreased.” The result is that the Soviet Navy is becoming increasingly dependent upon “brigades in industry that are permanently registered in the Navy.” The author of “Ships and Rubles” described how:
“Recently I visited a nuclear missile cruiser and was simply astonished
by the number of civilians on boar ^ During the time it took me to from the ladder to the political 0 ^ cer’s cabin I saw in the ship s Pas^ ageways many more jackets a sweaters than 1 did jumpers or double breasted jackets of officers warrants. ...
“These industrial brigades that operational repair of ship equipnie for the Navy are a large item of penditure. Just one administration the Northern Fleet, the radio-technlC^ administration, paid an imme amount of money for their work year. . . . With the existing re*atl° between the Navy and industry, P ^ ment for the services of the brigade made, as a rule, simply for their p ence in the Navy. And the money paid to them regardless of hov» ^ brigade members are actually ployed, their qualifications, the q ity of the work they do, the techm f readiness of the materials, and o extremely important indicators.
After discussing the Soviet problem with representatives of both dustry and the navy, the author co only conclude that:
“There is no doubt that dc'fm industry enterprises that Pr0 equipment for the Navy have 1113 ^ complexities and difficulties- there it is important to keep priorl in mind. The Navy, not to go intop ^ ticulars, does not and cannot 1 ^ anything to do with the problem® industry. Nobody will listen to exP.(S nations from the Navy, not even to good excuses, including the imper tion of equipment delivered to >* ^
industry. If it fails to perform any the tasks for which it is responsi ^ the Navy and only the Navy bears sponsibility.”
The Sinking of the Mike: Part IH _____
The discussion of the sinking Soviet Mike-class nuclear subman Komsomolets continues. (See this c umn, August 1989, pages 114-116, a September 1989, pages 106-109 )
6 August the Soviet government comm sion investigating the causes and circ'u
... ...,198’
*tances of the sinking held a press confer- nce- The spokesman reported that: “Many research projects and experiments have been carried out in the sPace of almost four months.
• • • During this period everyone who Was in one way or another connected with the tragedy in the Norwegian Sea was interviewed.”
■ ^r°m its work, the commission con- uded that there were:
*• . . a whole series of technical ‘aults in various systems in the submarine [Komsomolets] which contributed to the accident. . . .
‘The most likely cause is thought lo have been a malfunction in the electrical equipment of the system controlling the boat’s pumps. This led *° the fire breaking out.”
(“That was compounded by] ineffectiveness of the use of fire-fighting equipment. The electrical circuits and certain systems were destroyed caus- lng the fire and gas to spread rapidly !° other compartments. A sudden rise ln temperature led to seal failures in fhe shock-absorption pipes, the cable seals, and the seals of mechanical devices on the pressure hull in compartment seven and some of the stem ballast tanks. Consequently, when the !lfe was put out and the pressure fell ln compartment seven, water started *° come in, and the stern ballast tanks, n° longer watertight, started to fill up at the same time. As a result, the submarine’s draft started to increase, as ‘hd its trim down by the stern, and the Komsomolets sank quickly, in a matter of minutes. ...”
tjJn addition, “A whole series of ques- a arose with regard to crew manning training.” Thus, “Proposals were ^Sgested that . . . [submarine] crews an'|Ul(J composed solely of officers to VVarrant officers. It is hard for sailors rj asa*milate all the subtleties of a subma- np ‘n just two years.”
Sn Urtflerrnore, “One solution is ... to metimes entrust servicing boats to in- tter^ ' ' ^'s w'ff make submari- s work easier and release people to s°Ive other tasks.”
the Conn?_________________________
si ^esP°ntiing to questions about the nking 0f tj,e Komsomolets, the Com- ander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, to ,ITl'raf Vladimir N. Chernavin, referred 0a deputy divison commander as being On .. rcf the submarine and being “sec- m command.” In other commentary,
this same officer was described as the deputy commander of a submarine divison who was the “ranking officer” on board or who was “serving as the senior officer” on board. (See “The Soviet View,” Proceedings, September 1989, pages 106-109.)
While in the U. S. Navy the presence of a senior staff officer on board ship in a role of authority (other than a flagship’s flag officer and staff) is exceptional, it is the rule in the Soviet Navy.
In a December 1988 Red Star article entitled “Who is the Boss on the Ship?,” a captain first rank said, “They now simply cannot let a ship leave base if there is no senior commander on board.” Another captain first rank cited the reason for this as, “According to regulations ... a ship must have a senior commander on board in order to go to sea to perform combat training tasks.” Nevertheless, he commented that, . . the requirement of having a senior commander on board ... is not always justified. The ship commander must be trusted more and changes must be made to the regulations in order to do this.” Following these and other comments, the author of the article noted that:
“Certainly there are objective reasons for increasing the monitoring of a ship commander’s actions at sea. On the one hand, the increased complexity of combat equipment prompts this and, on the other hand, is the youth of today’s commanders. An age of 3334 years is not exceptional for officers assigned as commanders of major combatants. Youth also means a lack of proper experience.
. . . But, if that is the case, perhaps early assignment of officers as commanders—when the Navy cannot actually entrust ships to them—proves to be false. You see, the large units actually have to look for experienced people to back up the young commanders. ...”
When serving as backups these: “Senior commanders . . . often actually interfere in command and control of the ship—by advising, prompting, or issuing direct instructions. And they do so even when it is not always necessary. A commander’s independence in such cases ends up being very, very relative.” Moreover, according to a deputy chief fleet navigator, this backup:
"... does not always bring the expected result. Statistics also attest to this. Almost all serious violations of rules of navigation which occurred last year and led to negative consequences were committed on ships which had senior commanders on board. One of the reasons for this is that the responsibility for ensuring navigational safety is seemingly eroded between the ship commander and the senior commander on board.”
The lack of experience that the Soviet Navy attributes to its commanding officers, and the perceived need to back them up with more senior officers, may be traceable to the commander’s earlier education and training as a watch officer. On 24 June 1988, Red Star carried an article by a captain first rank responsible for combat training. He asked a rhetorical question and gave his own answer.
“Who is the watch officer today? He is the one who must be responsible for a great deal on a ship at sea. Theoretically, he is the watch commander of the ship. And in practice? . . . The watch officer is an appendage of the intercom system. . . . Taking reports from the combat posts, he merely duplicates them for the commander. He rarely makes decisions.”
He attributed this, first of all, to a failure of the naval education system.
“Prior to 1949, the higher naval schools specifically trained watch officer, it was written on their diplomas. The lieutenants assigned to ships successfully performed the watch on cruise and were prepared for it practically and psychologically.
“Gradually, when, in connection with the scientific-technical revolution, more in-depth engineering training of officers became necessary, the course of navigation in the school curriculum was greatly squeezed by other disciplines.”
Another reason he gave was the failure of the Soviet Navy:
. . to compensate for the [educational] commissions by training on the ship. ... No good system has come about. . . . Thus, the mistrust of commanders toward watch officers has increased every year. It now is the norm that the ship commander hardly leaves the bridge during a voyage.”
Thus, according to this captain:
“. . . the commander . . . rather frequently performs the duties of the watch officer and the senior officer on board performs those of the commander. . . . This is why it is important to give back to the watch officer his rights so as to give back to the commander his place on the bridge.”
T°ceed
Sngs / November 1989
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