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At $6.6 billion, the future of the Marine Corps’s new amphibian, now in the development pipeline, is under fire. But the new amphibian is necessary because, with the LCAC and the Osprey, it will give the service a true over-the-horizon assault capability.
Among the familiar problems our amphibious forces will face in the next 25 years—lift shortfalls, block obsolescence, shallow-water mines—arises a new and costly requirement that we can postpone no longer. The aging AAV-7A1 family of assault amphibians must be replaced by a surface assault capability that can truly be launched from over the horizon (OTH). We are kidding ourselves to say we have a full OTH amphibious assault capability now. In truth, we shall have to be unusually skillful, cooperative, and innovative to attain that capability by the turn of the century.
This is but the opening bell, not yet an alarm claxon. In fact, now is an excellent time to review the acquisition and . operational issues surrounding this unique program. The advanced amphibious assault (AAA) system is currently in the concept exploration phase of the defense acquisition cycle. The program itself was formally approved for Milestone 0 (Program Initiation) by the Defense Acquisition Board in 1988. The ultimate goal is to place the system in service by 1999, with an operational life expectancy of 20-25 years. But the next several years will be a programmatic roller coaster ride for the AAA system. Now, more than ever, is the time for sea service planners and decision makers to reflect on where we want to go with the next generation of the surface ship-to-shore assault.
The AAV—Drifting into Obsolescence: The assault amphibian was known for its first 40 years of military
service by the acronym “LVT,” for “landing vehicle- tracked.” This common parlance gave way about te11 years ago to the more officious “AAV,” or “assault amphibious vehicle”—but the generic term “amtrac,” g0'11- back to World War IPs amphibious tractors, PerS’S^ around the well decks. The tag on the conceptual system, “AAA,” is a healthy move away from PreC°n ceived solutions to difficult engineering problems- moving the “V” for “vehicle” from the acronym Pre' sumably leaves the door open for any surface-borm’ system to qualify for consideration. .
The AAV provides the Marine Corps with its princ‘Pa means of tactical surface mobility, both during the dif 1 cult ship-to-shore assault and throughout subsequent com bat operations ashore. It has three distinguishing charac teristics: First, it is a direct assault, combat system''' designed to deliver the initial troops on the objective w>m the first waterborne assault waves on D-Day. Second, 1 must provide light armored protection, sea-keeping , ity, cross-country mobility, and offensive firepower. An third, it is a true amphibian—not a mere mill-pond floatC- but a legitimate, blue-water sailor. Regardless of its com bat requirements ashore, the system must possess the requisite buoyancy, stability, power, and watertight integrd; to negotiate the open ocean and survive plunging slir 1 This is the overwhelming operational imperative. As a m suit, all AAVs have been engineering hybrids with hist°rl cal limitations; they are slower and less maneuverable tha naval landing craft afloat, and less mobile and lethal tha traditional Army infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) ashore- Nonetheless, no other surface mobility system in the m>1 tary world serves both environments so adequately- The Marine Corps launched its AAA program becaus of the ultimate retirement of the current system, the AA 7A1, in 1999. The AAV-7A1 is arguably on borro^e time already. Designed and developed in the 1960s, its I» expectancy was originally set for ten years. The system * extended usefulness resulted from a series of product im provements, as reflected in the A-l designation and a i°r'
Glancing Back at the AAV-7
If the past is indeed prologue, there is every reason to be optimistic that the Navy-Marine Corps team will make the right operational and programmatic choices in time to produce a suitable, affordable replacement assault amphibian. This history of candor and cooperation has been successful ever since sea service planners were energized by a 1937 Life magazine article about Donald Roebling’s “Alligator.” The direct results, less than five years later, were the archetype tracked landing vehicles (LVTs) that successfully negotiated the coral reefs under galling fire at Tarawa.
The development program that produced the current AAV-7A1 was a model of this kind of imaginative planning and cooperative discourse. In essence, a handful of Marines in Quantico, Arlington, and Camp Del Mar, assisted by engineers and naval architects from the old Bureau of Ships, somehow coordinated a major acquisition program that went from concept to initial operating capability in less than eight years, finishing ahead of schedule, slightly under cost, and fully within performance objectives. This is not to say that the entire program was all
tank mines readily pierced the
neath the deck of the troop C<T partment, a vulnerability quic*' recognized by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units- Their command-detonated anti
terns, the AAV-7 reflected the operational deficiencies and combat misadventures of its predecessor, the LVTP-5 (P-5), which was huge, fragile, and potentially deadly to the troops.
While unquestionably the best surfing military vehicle in the world, it was a real liability beyond the high water mark. Once ashore in Vietnam, the too frequently caused more case alties among its embarked Ma_ rines than it inflicted on the enemy. The vehicle carried 4- gallons of gasoline directly be-
sweetness and light, or that the final product was categorically flawless—far from it! But here lies a reassuring recent example of a tough development program squarely in the seam of Navy- Marine Corps relations, which was accomplished to the satisfaction of both services.
Like many new weapon sys-
mal service life extension program. The old “Wart Hog” will have accumulated 27 years of hard use by 1999, however, and sustaining its further employment would become prohibitive.
Age is not the sole factor driving the need to produce a new assault amphibian. The AAV-7A1, while still useful, has a rapidly diminishing value. It is underpowered and outgunned. The vehicle’s high silhouette; unmistakable signature (aural, infrared, and radar cross section); and marginal nuclear, biological, chemical, and electromagnetic protection portend increasingly poor battlefield survivability. Most unforgivable of all is the vehicle’s slow speed in the water, which is advertised at 8.7 knots but is in practice about 6 knots. Moreover, the combination of heat, noise, fumes, and motion make for a very rough ride within the troop compartment during waterborne operations. Troops cannot be expected to retain fighting effectiveness after more than about 30 minutes afloat in the current amphibians. Hence, the horizon for the AAV-7^ is frequently only 4,000 meters offshore.
fly
The AAA’s Role in Amphibious Operations: An eJ^( draft of the AAA required operational capability docuffl states future requirements aptly: “The next generation sault amphibian must possess requisite mobility- 1 power, survivability and armor protection to provide Marine Corps with the capability to conduct amphib*0 forcible entry and ground combat operations into the s ond decade of the 21st century.”
But replacing the old system is not really the issue, loaded questions the Department of the Navy must face()f the months ahead will concern the cost-effectiveness introducing a major new amphibious assault system ^ some perceive to be a costly duplication of other exp sive acquisition programs—specifically the MV-22 ^ prey tilt-rotor assault aircraft and the landing vehicle '
^as tanks, producing horrible Urn casualties. Combat standard Operating procedure was quickly vised. Carrying troops inside e vehicles was forbidden, so °r the rest of the war Marines Ustered topside, hanging on pcariously as the vehicles Urched overland.
The P-5 was also notoriously ndergunned. We fought the hole war with a small pea- ooter, the hoary M1919A4 ^■caliber machine gun,
°anted in a hand-cranked tur- et- The weapon was not only l°° light for the job, it was ®§*stically incompatible with the '60 7.62-mm machine guns of ® supported infantry. That is hy surviving combat photo- ®raPhs reflect a motley hodge, ge of borrowed weapons aih°ng the topside troops— erything from recoilless rifles
to antiaircraft guns.
The vehicle was equally a liability in most marginal terrain, especially rice paddies and rivers at flood tide. For example, Operation Forsythe Grove in 1969 had to be canceled outright when eleven P-5s carrying the lead elements of Battalion Landing Team 3/7 across the Song Vu Gia River from Dong Lam, below Hill 65, to “Arizona Territory” became bogged down in the mudbanks of the flooded river. The vehicles were so badly stuck that they remained, immobile and exposed, for the next 72 hours! Unfortunately, there was no replacement available for the P-5; it remained the principal means of surface combat mobility for the Corps throughout the war.
The AAV-7 program was greatly influenced by these
memories. Troop safety, improved mobility, increased firepower, and greater agility afloat received priority. Prototypes were tested at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Alaska, the Canal Zone, Yuma Proving Ground, Camp Pendleton, and Camp Le- jeune. High-surf testing, still critical to the mission role, was conducted by the Marine Corps Amphibian Vehicle Test Unit north of Monterey, California, where the steep gradient and classic winter breakers provided sufficient ten-foot waves for evaluation.
The AAV-7 began its operational life at Camp Lejeune in 1972, and has been deployed literally around the world in the ensuing 17 years. It is found in active inventories of the armed forces of Argentina, Brazil,
Italy, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, and Venezuela. It has seen combat in Grenada, Lebanon, and the Falklands. Its performance overall has been steady and reliable.
Colonel Joseph H. Alexander,
U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)
The current assault amphibian, the AAV-7A1 (left), improved on the shortcomings of its predecessor, the LVTP-5 (facing page).
the
Prei
s% it will be well covered in Proceedings throughout
^shion (LCAC)—and, indeed, the continued usefulness amphibious operations in future warfare, j The validity of amphibious warfare in the 21st century I ’fiore properly the subject of a separate essay and doubt-
1990s. Suffice it to say that one either accepts the ( niises of the maritime strategy and its corollary long- rrr> requirement for an amphibious assault capability, or l^6 does not. I do. In fact, I find it difficult to conceive n°vv the United States can continue as a global maritime •C^er without possessing a credible, amphibious, forc- le-entry capability, whenever and wherever needed. ais particular issue is a decision for the National Com- and Authorities. For the record, the AAA program fully uPports the Defense Guidance and all its tributary retirements documents.
The real issue for most of us, then, is how to make our ^Phibious doctrine as practical as possible against the
proliferation of smart weaponry and sophisticated counterlanding tactics available to our potential opponents. The best bet, most planners would agree, is to make the OTH capability a reality instead of a myth. To give the amphibious task force the stand-off and maneuver room it needs, all elements of the ship-to-shore movement will have to negotiate the 30-50-mile run quickly, deliver their combat troops and equipment, and have the legs necessary to return to the task force for another cycle.
The Triad concept—the three complementary components of tilt-rotor aircraft, air-cushion landing craft, and something to deliver surface assault troops under fire—is key to this emerging doctrine. The Osprey, the LCAC, and the AAA are all needed to provide that capability. Right now—and for the next ten years—we are missing the third leg. Designated amphibious ships must still make a dangerously vulnerable approach to the beach, often as close as 4,000 meters, in order to launch the AAV-7Als.
and
LCAC. But the craft are simply too valuable, too few,
too vulnerable to be employed in a direct assault un e fire. Moreover, LCACs are only limited amphibia11^ They can whiz over low swamps and estuaries, but tn ) cannot climb hills, knock over trees bigger than saplmf ’ or breach obstacles higher than five feet. Nor should the) ■ Again, their great value is their employment in the hig ^ speed build-up of combat power ashore for the land's force.
But why could not LCACs be used to transport stan dard, slow-water-speed AAVs to the beach? Or, f°r j matter, why not buy into the Army’s IFV program_311 obviate the requirement for a seagoing, surfing amphin altogether? Let LCACs then deliver Bradley fighting ^ cles loaded with assault squads to the beach and let tn take off for the objective “feet dry.” Or, if LCACs indeed too valuable and vulnerable, why not invest in unsophisticated, high-speed sled that could deliver e» standard AAVs or Bradleys to the beach? These are %°° questions that have enormous fiscal and operational imp cations. They form the crux of the current debate.
The principal options produced by the Mission
ddi'
the
sion points represented by the various milestones. In a< tion, the assault amphibian program has always been largest principal end item the Corps has sole statutory 1 sponsibility to develop.
The Navy, of course, has a number of ACAT I systen1^ and the AAA program will have to fight for its priority the lineup. While certain elements of the Naval Sea $> terns Command and the David Taylor Research Cen have a direct and historic role in support of assault 3 phibian programs, the Chief of Naval Operations staff 311
That is barely past the seaward edge of the surf zone, much less over the horizon. The deficiency exists. The question is whether the AAA is the answer or whether the Osprey and the LCAC can do it all.
First, I do not believe anyone seriously considers the Osprey and the AAA to be competing operational requirements. They are complementary. The Osprey program embodies impressive new technology in time to replace the aging CH-46 helicopter fleet. The AAA would simply be the surface assault counterpart to the Osprey. Few amphibious assaults could be executed successfully using a single dimension (air or surface alone) to deliver a fully armed Marine Expeditionary Brigade against a hostile shore.
Could the LCAC not handle all surface assault requirements for the landing force? Is a multi-billion-dollar AAA system really necessary given the LCAC’s great speed, commendable payload, and demonstrated OTH capabilities? These are the first critical questions the Marine Corps must answer—within its own ranks, then within the Department of the Navy, and ultimately before the Defense Acquisition Board and likely before Congress.
Let us take a quick look at the LCAC. First of all—God bless it! We waited 20 years for the Age of Air Cushion to arrive. The craft has revolutionized amphibious warfare more than any single event since the helicopter’s debut. It is an invaluable component of our maritime strategy. But the LCAC is not an assault craft. Essentially unarmored, is vulnerable even to small-arms fire and light shrapnel- is more properly considered a logistics support craft-"3 this is not a pejorative label. Close combat and cornea support materiel are the most critical lift requirements du ing the first 90 minutes of an amphibious assault. An there is no better or faster way for the landing force com mander to get his tanks, heavy artillery, and their neceS sary ammunition ashore during that crucial time than ;
Are3
Analysis and being evaluated throughout the conceptv3^ dation phase appear to leave room for all proponents advocate their favored solution to the ship-to-shore pr0 lem. In a nutshell, here are the options: , f
► An improved AAV-7A1 delivered ashore by elt
LCAC or some new, high-speed craft ■
► A new, low-water-speed assault amphibian with °P^.
mized land combat capabilities, similarly delivered by ther LCAC or new craft ££j
► A high-water-speed (greater than 20 knots) advanc
assault amphibian capable of self-deploying from the O amphibious task force ,q
With its $6.6 billion overall price tag, including $ million in research-and-development funds, the AAA P; gram is easily the largest purely Marine Corps acquisn project. As such, the AAA is one of the very few Marine programs to qualify as Acquisition Categ0 (ACAT) I, which means the Secretary of Defense Pe. Def) and his large staff will be major players in the de
for
approval. The AAA test plan will receive a lot of visi-
reniember, however, that while the AAA must be able lu accompany the M1A1 main battle tank in any cross- c°Untry or urban environment, the assault amphibian is never intended to be a seagoing tank. The very words are a c°atradiction in terms.
, testing and evaluation take many forms in the defense acquisition process, but the most common are develop- Tental testings, which are used to assist in engineering
eet commanders may be casting a wary eye. Most Navy Planners will want to ensure that the conceptual new AAA be compatible with the new amphibious ships of the "99-2020 period, as well as the projected command, c°ntrol, and the navigational systems coming on line in at era. But there is no denying that the AAA program cause several contemporary programs to be subju- tated to opportunity costs, which is one great reason for ^rly and continuous dialogue between the Blue and the Oreen.
Testing the AAA System: A key component of the adVanced assault amphibian program, regardless of its final c°nfiguration, will be its test-and-evaluation program. By 0,v> the first working copies of the program manager’s est and evaluation master plan (TEMP) are being drafted •lity in Washington. First, as an ACAT I program, the , MP itself, and all subsequent revisions, must be Greened and approved by the SecDef staff. Second, as ^'fo any other major acquisition program, the national Pfess will be quick to monitor any perceived weaknesses ln foe prototypes. The Army’s experiences with the Ser- ?cant York and Bradley systems are instructive examples. fofd, like the Bradley program, the AAA system is re- Ijfored by law to undergo live-fire-vulnerability testing cfore approval for service use. Such dynamic testing will e a natural attraction for defense analysts, military report- and congressional staffers. This is healthy. For once " Parties agree: We all want the most affordable and sur- bvable system that is consistent with its mission. We need design and development and to verify technical performance specifications and supportability, and operational testings, which are field testings under realistic conditions to determine the system’s suitability for combat use by typical troops. The program manager is responsible for coordinating all developmental tests, but by law and common sense operational testing is essentially taken out of his hands. Responsibility for the latter becomes the primary concern of the director of Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA), who reports only to the Commandant. If the final arbiter of the combat worth of the candidate system is the individual Marine, then MCOTEA wants to hear his opinion, direct and unfiltered by the usual chain of command.
After all, the troops will ultimately ride the new AAA through the gates of hell when the next real D-Day occurs. The Corps has benefited from listening carefully to the men in the ranks in recent development programs (the M16A2 rifle is an excellent example), and we would be well advised to redouble our efforts in this vital area. From my experience, the troops’ best, most candid advice for the AAA designers, developers, engineers, and managers would probably be this: “Make it operationally safe and tactically lethal! Forget about designing a 100% perfect AAA on the drawing board—there ain’t no such animal! Make it good enough, instead—then get it to us in the field! Soon! We’ll tell you then what few product improvements we may need to keep it in fighting fit throughout the next quarter century!”
Colonel Alexander was deputy commander for the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command in 1988; director of the Marine Corps Development Center in 1987; Chief of Staff, 3d Marine Division in 1985-86; company commander for 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Forces, in Vietnam in 1969; and AAV-7 Prototype Test Coordinator, Marine Corps Development Center, 1966-69. Returning to Asheville, North Carolina, he now builds houses for Habitat for Humanity and hiking trails for the Carolina Mountain Club.
__________________________________________ “Have gun, will travel”--------------------------------------------------
Several years ago I decided to renew acquaintances with a retired Marine sergeant major I had known as a lieutenant. A self-made man in every respect, to me he had always represented the consummate old Corps Staff NCO; decisive, forthright, and equally demanding of Marines— including young company-grade officers. As I telephoned him at his home, I decided to open the conversation with a bit of drollery. Disguising my voice I announced, “Sergeant Major, this is Captain Blatz from headquarters. Due to increased tensions in the Middle East you are being recalled to acitve duty. Report to the Commanding General, 2d Marine Division within 24 hours. Bring three sets of underwear and your own pistol.”
Without a split-second of hesitation he replied, “Colt or Beretta?”
Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Hoke, U. S. Marine Corps.
(The Naval Institute will page $25.00 for each anecdote published in Proceedings.)