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Small, inexpensive satellites with simple payloads, launched singly or in constellation systems, could provide timely, service- tailored tactical information to local warfighting commanders, and, if destroyed, would not damage war-fighting capabilities as would the loss of today’s expensive, multimission satellites. Unfortunately, the greatest obstacle to this revolutionary money-saving concept is traditional thinking.
SPINSATs, LIGHTSATs, and CHEAPSATs are terms that have been used to describe a related concept: lower cost, lighter weight, special-purpose satellites, probably manufactured by mass-production techniques and operated either singly or in constellations under military control and tasking, that provide timely informa- hon to war-fighting commanders.
A term increasingly used by the military to emphasize Ihe concept of simple payloads, SPINSAT stands for spe- dal-purpose, inexpensive satellite. The term LIGHTS AT ls used by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for its advanced technology program mvolving satellite payloads and launchers, and CHEAP- SAT is a now-derogatory term that contrasts this class of stellites with current, more expensive satellite systems. The special-purpose nature of a SPINSAT should ward all attempts to pile on requirements that ultimately might drive up the final cost. The term SPINSAT refers [mly to the satellite payload and carries no connotation of u°w many satellites will be needed to do the job, or of how the remaining parts of the satellite system will be empl0yed. DARPA started to fund a related program called LIGHTSATs, which emphasized the development °f new technologies, communications payloads, and small ^atellite launch systems and architecture, but its funding °eyond the fiscal year 1989 still may be a problem.
SPINSATs offer the military a number of desirable featUres: direct applicability to detection, identification, Tacking, and/or targeting; stress on timely information Tansfer to military users; emphasis on user tasking; and the appearance of being organically responsive to local force commanders.
Constellations of SPINSATs may mean, imply, or lead :0: smaller, less expensive space system payloads and launchers; easier storage of payloads and launch vehicles; T*e possibility of quick, multiple satellite launches; economies of cost with quantity purchases; and cost reductions that result from fitting their outputs to existing, planned, °r otherwise simple ground terminals.
These new individual SPINSATs now under discussion Promise to be more affordable so that individual services may be able to design, build, and use them as they now do tanks, aircraft, and small ships. A new emphasis on spe- C|al-purpose use probably will mean that individual series will be able to tailor space system design for singleservice use. This represents a new way of viewing the role °f space systems. But if these systems are to be low in cost ar,d “service-agile,” the services will need to be able to design them for their own use, operate them, and offer the Products to others. Single-service design should lead to smgle-service purchase and operational responsibility, y>th the added advantage that other services may use the information at their own cost, with general Commander- m-Chief U. S. Space Command (CinCSpace) oversight.
To keep the cost of the satellites and their respective Payloads low and affordable, each service probably will ele« to meet only the most basic requirements for each sPace system it designs, emphasizing dollars spent per requirement met. That means that the services will not attempt to satisfy multiple or detailed requirements. The advent of simpler satellites that are easily launched and modified means that better, more rapid space-system evolution and improvement will occur because it is easier and quicker to use simple systems than complex systems.
We should expect to see first the deployment of one-of- a-kind, simple satellites to test mission usefulness and the general concept of operations. These first satellites will meet only basic requirements, but they will evolve quickly into more efficient systems that will be fine-tuned to superior service-performance specifications. Later we may see affordable military constellations of space systems in orbit that will yield more timely information to war fighters. Some types of SPINSATs will evolve from the research and development (R&D), one-of-a-kind type to operational, many-in-a-system versions. Others will remain useful in systems of only one or two satellites.
In the service perspective, we would treat SPINSATs as we now treat ships, tanks, and aircraft, the functions of which are expected to endure as a system and not as individual system components. According to our traditional way of looking at satellites, the issues of service control and operation are controversial. But, again, if these systems are to be developed for low cost and service-agility, each military service should be able to design them for its own use and then offer the products to others at cost.
System Endurance, Not Satellite Survivability
In the past we have emphasized—properly—the survivability of space systems, but we have usually stressed that they must be survivable individually because they are so expensive. However, if we were able to place large numbers of spacecraft in orbit, the survivability issue becomes one of system endurance rather than individual satellite survivability. Two analogies illustrate this point. First, when the remote battle-group commander contacts his land-based superiors, he does not insist that a particular communications satellite must survive for him to maintain that contact. He insists only that the system of communications satellites endures sufficiently to get his message through. Second, we do not insist that individual tanks, frigates, or aircraft survive in a conflict. We insist only that sufficient numbers survive to get the job done as a system. The same arguments should be made for military satellites. Lower costs per satellite should enable us to employ more satellites in a constellation, leading to slower degradation and better system survivability in conflicts. The total cost of a system of SPINSATs may not be lower than the total cost of a system of fewer, more complex satellites; the military merely gets more for the same total cost, and simultaneously achieves timeliness, responsiveness, and system endurance.
In full constellations of SPINSATs, space-system endurance is enhanced by the relatively large numbers in orbit and the ability to launch on schedule from a shuttle or expendable launch vehicles to keep viable numbers active in peacetime, and to surge on demand from expendable launch vehicles during wartime. Low weight leads to quick, easier launches, allows for stacked, multiple launches, leads to lighter-weight launchers, and may has-
SPINSATs’ low cost and small size require comparable launching systems, which means SPINSAT systems could be reconstituted faster than current satellites and launched from a variety of platforms, ensuring a steady flow of tactical data to fleet war fighters, such as those in the combat information center of the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71).
ten the incorporation of mobile launchers that will, in turn, lead to lower vulnerability and greater system survivability. In addition, full constellations of satellites degrade more slowly, adding to system endurance.
Reconstitution: Should full constellations of SPINSATs be placed in orbit by the services, reconstitution—the ability to replenish individual satellites in their proper constellations—is enhanced by:
► Easy storage of the small satellites and launchers, and simple mating of payload launcher
► Fast preparation for launch
► Rapid surge capability
► Good probability of having multiple or stacked payloads in the launches
► Fast check-out times in orbit resulting from the advent of simple systems
Concepts and Uses
Constellations of SPINSATs should be used to satisfy standing military requirements. The uses to which SPINSATs can be put are broad and varied, but only a few are included here. They could be used for the storage and forwarding of communications, and for updating data bases that could be provided quickly to users located around the world. Simple, low-resolution imagery at a variety of wavelengths might be possible with low-cost, light-weight, single-purpose systems. Sensors located in remote regions of the globe might be interrogated by SPINSATs, and munitions might be activated or deactivated by simple orbiting satellite systems.
Some Positive Features'. Heretofore, satellites have tended to be complex and expensive, and a single service has had difficulty affording them alone. The necessity t0 share costs among service users tends to result in missi°n compromises, often to the detriment of the service that first proposed the system. Rarely will the resulting system offer the mission effectiveness and timeliness that the pr0' posing service requires.
If the proposing service incorporates the SPINSAT approach into its future space system needs, each service will be better able to adapt its own space solutions to ds unique requirements, opening the possibility of a new era for military space. Perhaps the most powerful case f°{ SPINSATs is that with full, affordable constellations of these satellites under the control of CinCSpace and the military services, they will be able to increase the timeliness of information transfer to combatants, which will enable us to be better prepared to defend, to shoot first m an engagement, and to save ships and lives. Service control with CinCSpace oversight will enhance the effectiveness of each service’s destiny in space.
Increasing the compatibility of the output from the satellite system with the input to existing and planned ground terminals will further redeem the investment. Overall system costs can be further reduced by making the potential user responsible for the funding and acquisition.
While individual service use and responsibility appear to fight the tide of service asset-sharing, if any war-fighting system is sufficiently inexpensive, there are overwhelming reasons for individual service procurement and operational responsibility. Should war occur, space assets will revert to CinCSpace control. Having already optimized the performance of a service-centered SPINSAT system and provided for the sharing of its products with
| e other services, CinCSpace and the services are assured at lhe nation has the best war-fighting space mix for the ava,lable space dollar. And that mix includes space assets Under military control.
Some of these features are admittedly controversial, but ney may be the only rational way to incorporate these yPes of satellites into a practical, working set of space systems. The services have developed good defenses Against threats from the air, surface, and under the seas, ut we need to develop more effective defenses against space threats, and develop and use military space assets to °ur own advantage.
Some Problems-. As with every new concept, there are °ubts about SPINSATs’ ultimate military usefulness. It reniains to be demonstrated that there are indeed low-cost Puyloads that will be militarily timely and relevant. These °ubts occur particularly among our senior military decision makers. There needs to be more dialogue between ,ern and the technical community in industry to clarify e doubts. The military must develop generic requirements that can be satisfied by SPINSATs, and industry (must propose specific SPINSATs and SPINSAT systems 0 lhe military that will satisfy those requirements, with uosts attached. The emphasis should be on probing indus- y capability. Industry has had a close working relation- u'P with the military for many years. Industry is uniquely Qualified to match the military requirements derived by °Ur war fighters to their individual company expertise to meet those requirements. The military should not settle on sPecific SPINSAT missions and detailed requirements uati] they know the depth of that industrial capability and Until industry says what it can deliver at what cost. Other- W|Se, a rapidly produced, prioritized list of military recrements might lead to a mismatch between costs, in- strial capability, and military requirements. This Procedure is qualitatively different than the way we now £°nduct our procurement. Our naval laboratories can be ey players in the development of SPINSATs as they have Wlth other modern naval equipment.
The concept of operations for these types of satellites is st|H not well developed. In general, satellites are still so new and so untried in major warfare that their roles and Potential are still not well understood. We will be chal- etlged to specify concepts of operations for this class of sPace system until we know the uses to which they will be Pot- The development key is to build a proof of concept, aunch it into orbit, improve it, and then deploy the final Version of the improved system for fleet use-—just as ships an(l aircraft are now proposed, built, tested, and refined. n any new endeavor there will be vested interests in the Status quo. It is difficult to overcome experience and tradi- l0n> and there will be a perceived competition with the r°le of funding of current space systems. This is unfortunate, because in the space age we need both approaches— Pe complex space systems to provide us with treaty verification, and SPINSAT-like systems to provide the military "Pft timely information.
In addition, there will be many difficulties making the ransition from single-satellite proofs of concept to full c°nstellations of useful satellites. Relaxations in failure- rate requirements that may be necessary will present problems in making the transition to new ways of doing things. We will need to develop more responsive and less costly procedures so that procurement costs will not dominate total system costs.
Current Initiatives
In spring 1987 DARPA proposed a plan to cost-share proof-of-concept demonstrations for lightweight satellites in support of the military services. This cost-sharing initiative was designed to produce and launch one-of-a-kind LIGHTSAT payloads to test their military relevance either as stand-alone single satellites or as one component of a multisatellite constellation. This DARPA initiative, first tailored to communications applications and now evolving into technology development, tends to ease the military’s budgetary load, making it more reasonable for the services to participate in the development of small satellites. This program attempts to provide the services with the catalyst needed to break the “Catch-22” that has made proposed satellite systems unaffordable as research-and-develop- ment initiatives, but which have not obtained funding as final systems by military operators because they have not undergone adequate development and testing. The DARPA LIGHTSAT program is developing one communications proof of concept for the Army, but the program may still meet funding difficulty beyond fiscal year 1989.
From 1984 through 1986, Applied Research and Technology Directorate (Code 12) in the Office of Naval Research (ONR) cooperated with DARPA on the global low- orbiting message relay (GLOMR) satellite, providing contractual and technical management. The GLOMR satellite has been termed the “PC” (personal computer) of satellites and is a typical SPINSAT prototype. Code 12 continues to remain in the forefront of SPINSAT technology, with current efforts under way to develop an integrated stack of three SPINSATs. In spring 1988, ONR committed Navy funding to a competitively procured SPINSAT. These ONR initiatives will encourage SPINSAT ideas to be developed from our naval laboratories and from industry. That funding promises to provide the naval services with some in-orbit demonstrations that can be tested, improved, and incorporated as new naval assets in space.
The Defense Support Project Office has been working with the services for several years to investigate low-cost satellites that will meet service requirements, and that effective dialogue is continuing.
CinCSpace Involvement: In peacetime it is the responsibility of the services to plan, fund, procure, and operate war-fighting assets. This is accomplished under the watchful eye of the CinCs, who have responsibility for coordinating and operating those assets in the event of war. Most of the CinCs operate in a geographically localized theater of operations; the methods and techniques of interCinC support and cooperation have been worked out in time. However, CinCSpace is a new command, operating globally, in a new dimension of war fighting. Space assets pass from one theater of operations to another in minutes. For our space assets, traditional methods of CinC support will require close review and modification brought on by the globally collected information that will require new CinC interfaces and operational ground rules. If and when SPINSATs become operational, new, workable CinC guidelines will be needed for good service participation as well as optimum theater-CinC support.
CinCSpace, who has the interservice coordination responsibility for space systems, will need to review current methods of acquiring satellite systems to assist in determining the types of changes that will be needed to make a transition to simpler, less costly acquisition procedures. Low-cost satellites should be matched to low-cost, low- weight-of-paper procedures for determining requirements, selecting SPINSAT concepts to be funded, procured, tested, and operated.
Challenges
Top among the many challenges that face SPINSAT proponents is to identify practical, low-cost payloads. The challenge to the military is to establish meaningful but general requirements and operational concepts for SPINSAT use. The challenge to industry is to propose solutions and costs. The military’s next challenge is to streamline the procurement process to reduce the time and cost before contract award, receive proposals from industry, and fund the ones that provide the best bang for the buck in satisfying a military requirement.
As SPINSATs are developed, we must improve the ways we place them into orbit. We must develop or adapt them to low-cost launchers or to methods of launching sets of SPINSATs into orbit, several at a time. Launch and payload compatibility must be assured.
It will be a challenge to meet the funding competition posed by service priorities. Satellites have not been time- tested in major battles, and SPINSATs are even newer. The DARPA and ONR initiatives promise to ease some of the problems posed by this newness by providing seed money for concept development. But eventually it will be necessary for military decision makers to make tradeoffs among traditional military assets and space system support and countermeasures. Our military decision makers must assure that the fighting mix they order today is matched to the threat at the time that mix becomes operational. Space is contending for a leading role in that fighting mix. Because the major attributes of SPINSATs are the operational timeliness and the better hands-on control and use they provide to military commanders, the boundaries of the “zero-sum game” probably should include the service budgets, but not the budgets from which the large satellites come that are used for treaty verification.
Because the technical details of SPINSAT operation and the operational capabilities of these systems are necessary before SPINSATs can be fully developed, proper teams of R&D personnel and war fighters must be built to work these issues. Engineers, technicians, and operators will be indispensable elements in the SPINSAT solution.
Complex satellite failure and efforts to recover from those failures are very costly. Because the unit cost of SPINSATs is relatively low, their tolerable failure rate can
be somewhat higher compared to current satellite failure rates. The cost of a higher tolerable failure rate for SPIN' SATs probably will be offset by constructing them with less expensive components, but that does not necessarily lead to lower lifetimes of individual SPINSATs in orbit. The challenge will be to strike the proper balance between the total system cost of payload, launcher, and groun support system, and the individual satellite and launc failure costs.
SPINSATs should not impinge upon our traditiona means and methods of using satellites for treaty verification and other purposes, nor should they affect funding fof those types of space systems. As SPINSATs are deve - oped, we must seek nevertheless to achieve the best mix o verification and tactical space systems.
One of our greatest challenges will be to overcome traditional modes of thinking.
Recommendations _
Because the involvement of industry is critical to SPINSAT development, we must encourage industry’s sugges' tions to assure early and effective participation. To that end, the Army and the Navy have derived sets of military space requirements that industry can use to match their talents and capabilities to service needs. Once industry decides to compete, companies will be encouraged to discuss their SPINSAT proposals with DARPA, the Defense Support Project Office, and ONR. It is anticipated that DARPA and DSPO will work closely with the other services when it comes time to commit funds to the most promising proposals. ONR is already seeking promising naval concepts for funding.
The SPINSAT selection process should be service- centered and emphasize the identification and implementation of useful, low-cost payloads. The selection process should be guided by CinCSpace so that service and CinC interconnectivity issues are addressed effectively. Each military service should be permitted to seek its own set ot low-cost solutions with a requirement to share derived information with other services at cost. Finally, we must emphasize the concept of “percent of requirement met pe^ dollar spent,” and not merely stress the satisfaction ot requirements as we have done in the past. A successfu operational solution to the military’s need for timely, user- tasked global information gathering from all future space systems will depend on the active cooperation of industry and government and on the close cooperation of individuals—service operators and civilian engineers and technicians. The need is there; it remains to see how the Navy and other services will address it.
Author of the April 1988 Proceedings article “Future Satellite Capabilities,” Dr. Howard is Technical Director for the Naval Space Command- He has worked with: the Central Intelligence Agency as the senior intelligence analyst for the Space Systems Division; the congressional Office of Technology Assessment; as Director of the National Science Foundation’s Division of Astronomical Sciences; at the National Radio Astronomy Observatory; and as Associate Professor of astronomy at the University of Michigan. He holds PhD and master’s degrees from Harvard University.