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CAST + TACTS
Better Close Air Support
By Commander George R. Root, Jr., U. S. Navy
Training for the close air support (CAS) of U. S. ground forces is a demanding tactical mission that requires significant coordination of assets to be successful. These assets—forward air controllers (FACs), marking teams, and tactical targets and ranges—are not routinely available. Therefore, CAS training (CAST) does not take place as often as it should, causing aircrew proficiency to suffer.
CAST assets available to tactical aircraft (TacAir) crews recently were assessed. The training system simulation of real-world scenarios was evaluated against the Soviet mobile integrated air- defense systems. The U. S. Navy discovered that CAS must be improved if we expect to maintain a viable Navy TacAir
CAS capability against upgraded enemy air-defense systems.
The combat CAS environment is more complicated than other combat environments for several reasons. Low-altitude navigation, attack, and weapons delivery are hazardous in unfamiliar terrain against defended targets. Communication between attacking and controlling units is difficult because terrain masking, radio interoperability, and antenna blockage are inherent to communications between high-speed, low-altitude, rapidly maneuvering ingressing aircraft and mobile surface units. In addition, locating and marking the position of targets is difficult because of the small size and mobility of the common CAS targets and the low- altitude, high-speed ingress of the attack
conducted in environments that indu the hazards associated with actual corn ^ CAS, except the possibility of gett,a“ shot down by the enemy. The CAS trai ing environment, however, is furt degraded by significant logistics Pr0 lems. . ,)
The political difficulties associa with acquiring new public lands lim'1
get areas authorized to support
ordnance drops and mortar- or r0C^j target marking, resulting in the repea ^
use and degradation of the same
rangc
areas. Aircrews also become unre cally familiar with the target areas. Long lead times are necessary to P
alis11'
the attack aircraft, the FACs, the m1
lortar-
site
ind
marking teams, and the ordnance on at the same time. Extraordinary c0StSw jt|i range down times are associated . explosive ordnance disposal ,ea “safing” of bombed and mortared Destroyed targets must be cleared, new ones built and inserted as new 1 targets. . #
There is merit in the concept ”tral}
you will fight,” but initially tra'nl!',e(j
• ul»l tlie mei>'
real-world and training restrictions ^ . tioned previously, is analogous to ie^ ing a child how to swim in pounding ^ In the ideal training scenario at , undergraduate level, the real-life llT . ^ larities of the CAS environment won ( }
at
ing aircraft. The FAC, with a limited amount of time to communicate this information, also has difficulty conveying the position and exact identification of the targets because he and the attack pilot view the terrain from different perspectives.
Most Navy TacAir CAS training is
introduced gradually, one or two ^ time. In this way, the tactician w°u more thoroughly and professi0 ,)f trained. Even if such gradua jt “ramped” CAS training were posst ^ would require much more range range assets than are now available- ^ sequently, a new method of CAS tra is needed.
The tactical aircrew combat-tra . system (TACTS) is one potential ^ tion. It reduces the number of real' ■.
dangers inherent to the CAS flight y0r ronment, reduces the requirernet1 extraordinary CAS ordnance groun port, and allows previously ‘ efted ment-restricted” airspace to be c°n.VeieC' into ideal CAS threat and tactica tronic-warfare training arenas. .
TACTS already has demonstrate^.^ fundamental TacAir training capab1^- Previously an air-to-air combat-rn jjie vering training system, now it is ca of providing equally successful tr in the air-to-ground, ground-to-ah’^yfS electronic-warfare environments.
102
Proceedings / Noven1
ibC
CoC|(pV^ntage. including the individual
Ptr|^"nes t*le contr°l' repeatability, and f|j ,0rrnance measurement clarity of gUl 1 simulation with the realistic and tjc lynching, physical demands of tac- piari "8ht. TACTS systems currently are N|avnet* or being installed on several traj Marine Corps, and Air Force t0(| ln8 ranges and the technology exists bi|jj^ to economically blend CAST capa- T'es ’nto these installations. ingCTS is essentially an aircraft-track- detaiyStem t*lat provides aircrews with to' ed replays of their air-to-air or air- Tbg °Und engagements (see Figure 1). replay can be viewed from almost
of the aircraft involved, fro- eye” view, or even the view I'tted *'e bore sight” of real or simu- jnSUfface-to-air threat systems. inga^ition to its air-combat maneuver- strike-training capabilities, pljCa . Potentially can reduce the com- envjrlng factors inherent to the CAST ti0n potent. The reduction or elimina- < ^ese factors in the introductory be raS "'ould allow the CAST program to 'be .. heti- The reductions would involve ft>llowrai8htforward combination of the CaPabiJn(8 ex*st*n§ TACTS modes and
•iojlj^r control: New TACTS installa- 't;‘l-ti*lr0V'de severa' modes of detailed 'be °r(^c control of the range, including ^issio Cstrat'on °f the electronic warfare §r°Unns and the firing activity of all the 1ari0 Jhfeats involved in a training sce- °rdina ”is control can be tailored to co- Xrc 3 spectrum of threat-activity 10s. ranging from iterative divebombing missions against only one or two threats to major air-wing (maximum 36 aircraft) strikes against dozens of threats.
In addition, major TACTS systems, such as the one installed at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada, will provide close control of a maximum of eight simultaneous, yet independent, missions.
Displays: The real-time TACTS display would allow the simulated forward air control of CAST flights without requiring the FAC, his equipment, or staff to be out in the field. A FAC-trained instructor could conduct the introductory levels of CAST from the control console where he could view a computer-generated display depicting the real-time CAS scenario. He also could select a view from the cockpit (Figure 2), a bird’s eye view (Figure 3), or a view from any spot on the range with a simple switch movement, and then slew to any other desired vantage (see Figure 4, instructor/FAC view). The current console would allow all three perspectives—bird’s eye, cockpit, or universal—to be displayed simultaneously.
Target marking: The physical target systems designed for NAS Fallon would allow the TACTS FAC instructor to selectively fire both the flying Smokey SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) to simulate hostile missile firings, and the “nofly” Smokey SAMs. “No-fly” systems instantly generate a significant amount of white smoke similar to that generated by the mortar rounds and rockets used in traditional CAS target marking. Using this system, the CAS instructor sitting at the control console would be able to mark his targets in areas where traditional marking ordnance is prohibited. The capability to mark targets without actually having to fire ordnance on the target would allow for the development of CAST target areas with numerous and varied target/threat scenarios, without the limitations and expense involved in fielding marking teams, ordnance-area certification, and periodic ordnance clearance operations.
Expanded threat emitters: Advances in threat radar-emitter simulation, including TACTS' ability to inject cockpit threat indications without an actual emitter in the target area, have significantly improved the ability to simulate the diversity and threat density of Soviet and Third
World “mobile front” SAM and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) air-defense systems. A combination of manned and unmanned emitters is being developed to provide a careful mix of realistic threat density and human countermeasures reaction measurement.
The threat systems are to be deployed in groups or nodes generally adjacent to the physical targets in the target areas. These nodes, or integrated warfare areas (IWAs), are located some distance from each other so they can be used as an independent set of emitters during the simultaneous training of other units. On the other hand, each 1WA has been located and structured so that it can be integrated with other IWAs to support larger striketraining scenarios.
Communications: The TACTS incorporates the automatic relay and recording of eight simultaneous radio frequencies, and synchronizes these recordings with mission playback. The remote relay capabilities assure low-altitude communication with the control console, regardless of the aircraft’s altitude or position on the instrumented range. In addition, the centralized nature of the communications system allows for convenient and easily controlled communications jamming. The TACTS computer also incorporates automatic communications links among the TACTS computer and each individual aircrew on the range. This communications system has been developed to provide synthetic voice cuing of a wide range of simulated events for which there normally would be no visual indication in the training environment. “Hung missile,” “no drop,” “dud bomb,” “missile kill,” and “you’re dead, frag” are samples of the transmissions that can be generated by the TACTS computer and heard only by the pilot concerned with the incident.
Integrated warfare area targets: The IWAs previously described were designed to be equipped with numerous inexpensive tactical target simulators. Each target simulator will provide several target signatures:
► Visual: The targets will be constructed, painted, and arranged to visually simulate the various radar vehicles, missile launchers, mobile AAA, communications and control vans, and other vehicles associated with Soviet and Soviet client
*<*di
ln8s / November 1988
103
state mobile ground forces. A limited number of U. S. armored vehicle simulators also will be constructed and deployed to complicate certain CAST scenarios.
► Infrared: Selected groups of targets will be equipped with heater systems that will highlight the specific vehicles for infrared-sensor acquisition and attack.
► Firing activity: Most “firing” target vehicles will be equipped with smokey SAM missile-firing simulators and/or AAA-firing simulators to generate the smoke and dust associated with the firing of their respective real-world weapons.
► Electromagnetic emissivity: The radar signatures of each simulated threat will be radiated by a threat-emitter simulator. Most of these emitters will be directly slaved to or directed by the TACTS. The emitters will appear to track target aircraft, illuminate aircraft radar-warning gear, provide jammer and countermeasures evaluation, and provide antiradiation missile targeting signals.
► Damage indications: Each target will be equipped with a black or gray smoke generator that will discharge smoke from the vehicle to demonstrate simulated damage incurred during attack. These visual signals will indicate to the pilots which targets are still active and which should be considered destroyed.
No-drop bomb scoring (NOBS) system: The NDBS system offers advantages to the CAST environment similar to those provided by the target-marking systems. The NDBS system allows the simulated delivery of a wide spectrum of tactical air-to-ground munitions. After an aircraft fire pulse is detected by the TACTS, the accuracy of the delivery is measured against the position of simulated threat targets. Levels of damage are derived from the TACTS computer system, which has been programmed with data from Joint-Munitions Effectiveness Manuals. When the computer determines a hit. the physical target system causes smoke to be expelled from the specific target hit and all firing activity from that target ceases. The NDBS system allows the scored, simulated delivery of numerous types of weapons against a wide variety of realistic tactical vehicles without a single real weapon being dropped. As with the target-marking system described earlier, this activity can take place without securing the use of more public land or expensive ordnance cleanup. The system measures arming versus time of fall, fuzing, frag patterns, and other variables that are critical in combat CAS but have not been measured during traditional, simulated combat training. NAS Fallon’s NDBS will not replace any of the current live-ordnance or practice bombing facilities, but will augment those capabilities by providing weapon training in areas and against targets that otherwise would not be available.
TacAir training facilities at NAS Fallon and other simulated threat complexes are being improved. The physical-target complex used with the IWAs has been expanded. The TACTS has been incorporated as a threat-control mechanism an will be used to improve mission debriefs- The TACTS console also could provide an ideal setting for introductory and inter mediate level CAST by improving 111
structor control of communications, van
tage, marking, and the target activity’ while at the same time reducing the coor dination and support requirements trad tionally associated with CAST.
The advanced levels of CAS training certainly will require the realism and t)P ical coordination, support, and conin'11111^ cation problems encountered with ground or airborne FAC actually on 1 range. But the TACTS' integration wi CAS could make the availability of roU^ tine CAST a reality against a wide rant-j- of threat systems and targets. With su routine CAST available, Navy TacA aircrews would be better prepared enter today’s complicated CAS com environment.
Commander Root, a light-attack aviator, cun®11 ^ attached to Naval Air Systems Command as 'l”; ’ ^.j desk officer for the T-45 (the Navy’s new bas'c ^ advanced training aircraft). He recently "jli’yj;- weapons officer on board the USS Enterprise ( y, 65). He served two A-7E operational tours, wlt^. tack squadrons (VAs) 94 and 56, was a trainiUr cer in the A-7E fleet readiness squadron with 122, and served as the tactical electronic warfare cer and the NAS Fallon TACTS fleet Pr°jcc‘,tack chairman on the staff of Commander Lighl" s Wing, U. S. Pacific Fleet. He received his 11--’j rC. degree in aeronautical engineering in 1974, a ^ cently was selected for aeronautical eng1I1L duty.
Closing the Gun Gap
By Second Lieutenant Fred K. Herrmann, U. S. Marine Corps
capability, coupled with the firepo
the 5-in/54-cal Mk-45 and Mk-42 g1
unS’
mis*10
tions, be they raids, assaults, or
“The firepower of the American warships and aircraft makes every landing possible.’’ —Lieutenant General
Tadamichi Kuribayashi, Commander, Japanese forces, Iwo Jima. 19451
The landing craft air cushion (LCAC) and the MV-22 tilt-rotor Osprey mark a new era in amphibious warfare. U. S. naval forces are now developing the capability of launching high-speed, over- the-horizon amphibious assaults. Unfortunately, however, today’s amphibious capabilities are being severely hindered by the Achilles’ heel of our current tactical doctrine—inadequate naval gunfire support. In 1965, Colonel Robert D. Heinl projected that the magazine capacity of the entire U. S. Navy of the 1970s would not be enough to support a single amphibious assault of World War II magnitude.2 It is doubtful that current naval capabilities improve upon this estimate, even with the return of the battleships to the fleet. Ironically, the technology that the Navy needs to remedy this situation is available. Moreover, it is nicely packaged in a series of cost-effective, easily adapted systems that would serve not only the Fleet Marine Forces in their conduct of amphibious operations, but also the surface navy in the close, heated environment that has characterized recent naval operations.
During World War II, on Guam, it took 1.76 tons of steel to inflict one casualty; in Italy, nearly 4 tons.3 In 1990, in a campaign against a well-equipped Soviet beachhead, with highly mobile defenders adhering to the doctrine of landing prevention, the figure likely would rise appreciably. Thus, the advantage in speed
we have gained may be wasted it gunfire support does not improve. a Some would argue that modern a>rC f
- ,wef is sufficient to support effective 0P^[)$
to remove personnel and/or equ'P^f, from hostile territory. In truth. ho'VL ^ aircraft are incapable of supply10? ^ necessary, dedicated force, and they^j, severely hampered by the natural v ronment. In addition, it is not tad1 ^ sound to deploy million-dollar assets may be taken out by inexpen^re. shoulder-launched Stinger missile ,s, and unnecessarily risk personnel in a ^ sion that can be more effectively aCC plished by other means.4 jjji-
Such limitations do not decry ^ portance or the necessity of air sup!
104
Proceedings / Noveni6er