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pseudo-operations force learn everyth’^
of
about the insurgent forces: their organl7‘l
Recently, the U. S. military has not had great success fighting in low-intensity conflicts. But in the latter part of the 20th century, this is precisely the type of warfare the U. S. military forces, particularly the Marine Corps, will be called upon to conduct. Even more disturbing, however, is that the U. S. military has neither developed new tactics nor studied existing tactics for countering insurgency. As the possibility of future U. S. military commitments to areas such as Central America and the Philippines looms high, the Marine Corps, with the most operational and bureaucratic flexibility of all the services, must initiate and develop appropriate low-intensity conflict tactics.
Pseudo operations, in which a counterinsurgent force completely mirrors insurgent forces, is one of these tactics. It is foreign to the U. S. Marine Corps and to the U. S. military in general. But throughout the 20th century, many counterinsurgency forces—including the British in Kenya, Malaya, and Northern Ireland—have used pseudo operations successfully. In Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), 69% of the insurgents who were killed died in pseudo-type operations.' Pseudo operations were also highly successful in the insurgency war in Mozambique’s war of independence and in the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines.
Definition and Missions: Pseudo operations should be used along with conventional tactics as part of a total counterinsurgency strategy. The purpose is to infiltrate the civilian communities or operational area with forces disguised as
The Rhodesian Selous Scouts, known as “armpits with eyeballs” for their long hair, had great success in infiltrating, turning (as seen here by the racial mix), and eliminating Mugabe’s insurgents.
98
insurgents who can develop background information on the insurgents and obtain tactical and operational information upon which to act.
There are four missions in pseudo operations: to gain information on insurgent forces; to penetrate, isolate, and eliminate insurgent forces; to disperse tactical operational information to friendly tactical units; and to destroy insurgent political infrastructures.
► Mission One—Gain Information on Insurgent Forces: It is critical that the
tion, tactics, weaponry, techniques political mobilization, and any idi°syn_ crasies of the local insurgent force t might distinguish the pseudo force tr° the real insurgent unit. In fact, the pseu force must be better at the art of insU gency than the insurgents themselves- The pseudo force has to be able ^ work within the local civilian corn11’ nity. This, of course, means that Psel1a| force members must be of the same racl‘
^en •ions.
most successful in pseudo opera- tl)r U- S. forces should isolate cap- p 6 'tsurgents and evaluate them for udo operations. This in itself is diffi-
especially for the evaluators, be-
(si1°uld become a member of an al- y Proven team before he is allowed to
lave J -- ----- — * V* |/uvwwv 1V1VV
*e 2, from the local ethnic group or ' *he leader of a pseudo force, for
CP'e’ may he an American, whose diffeC°*0r’ language, and other ethnic S es would probably prohibit him ' .Performing an actual pseudo-force
^ndrw lnsurXent Forces: Initially,
force
I. n ethnic origin as the insurgents, which
dually, but not always, the same as p the local civilian population, fro ersonne* h’r pseudo forces can come m the local populace; the host nation’s
J, ltary> paramilitary, and police units; ^ insurgents who choose to defect. wSults from the insurgencies in Kenya, •hat^3’ anC* Rhodesia strongly indicate
insurgents who have defected have
cult
off c Usually the security forces make noters to a captured insurgent that he can- taretf- C’ In Kenya, for example, a cap- ha_ . insurgent’s comrades had a prompt ipc ®ln8 awaiting him; in Rhodesia it was Ration or the death penalty. Most khal^ insurgents will not be good ma- reas ^°r Pseu<^° operations for various Swit0ns: the prisoner may be unable to ttavh a**e8'ance> his capture already iat]' aave been compromised to the civil- fnp^H’mnnity, he may not be able to lj j,IOn as a pseudo-force member, etc. caut-' f°roes should proceed strictly and gent10Usly in selecting captured insur- inSllS *or use in pseudo operations. An
tva;8ent who has recently defected al. vS shm.ia i i c __ _i
read
Preate. independently. By taking these hrJ0(i uh°ns, one can reduce the likeli- retu ”at fhe insurgent will escape and Pl 1 to the insurgency force. hjVe f^ail members of a pseudo force
e*a.
U|W- o---------- ,-----------
He ca°nal role in a Third World country. CaUip ° ’ hovvever, set up an isolated base horn 3llc* receive clandestine reports forCe Members of his functioning pseudo •ic,n ^ he leader can then relay informa- Securjtt0 his parent unit while in the bein„ y °f his base camp, without fear of Htj0nCornpromised to the civilian popu- an ex°r h)cal insurgents. This, in fact, is °Peratjrerne'y good method for pseudo rpaliy !°ns because suspicion would nor- Septs 6 ra*sed if the populace saw insur- equjp Carrying heavy communications Help e.nt with them—items normally t|'°veniln l^e armed forces of insurgent ^cCessCnts' The essential maxim for Practjcls t0 follow the techniques and ' ftfjsCs °f the insurgents.
^Wo—Penetrate, Isolate, and
can penetrate insurgent
<*inas / November 1988
forces by gaining acceptance into the civilian community. The individual “pseudo” operative can act the role of a fervent, would-be insurgent. If a pseudo force is pretending to be a stick or platoon of insurgents, communal as well as individual acting is necessary. Gaining the acceptance and confidence of the civilian population is important. During this acceptance period the pseudo agents must be gathering information slowly on the insurgents, their military operations, and their political infrastructures.
A pseudo force can operate independently within the civilian community for some time. In many cases, the civilian community will be unaware of the number and precise identity of insurgent units operating in their area. This works to the advantage of the pseudo force. Often, other insurgent units will not know the precise operating areas of adjacent insurgent units. This also works to the advantage of the pseudo force. When the civilian community is under the direct control of a political and/or military insurgent infrastructure, however, the pseudo force must penetrate the insurgent movement as individuals rather than as a unit.
The next step, isolating insurgent units, is essential for two reasons: first, to make it easier to capture or kill the insurgents; and second, to decrease the likelihood of compromising the pseudo force. The pseudo force must draw the insurgents to an area where they can eliminate them with the least amount of friendly tactical unit and pseudo-force casualties. The “bait” that will lead the insurgents to an area of elimination is left up to the resourcefulness of the leader and of the members of the pseudo force. One technique is to lure the insurgents near the base camp of the nontactical U. S. pseudo-force leader, who can have the immediate area surrounding him well plotted with on-call artillery fires and close-air support. In addition, he can act as a guide for friendly units called to encircle and eliminate the insurgent units. One of the major problems with isolating insurgent troops is separating and withdrawing friendly pseudo-force members from the insurgent forces. This can be achieved through coordination by pseudo-force members with the nontactical U. S. pseudo-force leader.
Although eliminating the insurgent forces may appeal greatly to the local friendly force commander, a “body count” mentality should be avoided. Capturing insurgents is of the greatest importance because recently captured insurgents will have the most up-to-date information on the political and military infrastructure; location of insurgent units;
new tactics, weapons, and policies of the insurgents; and current relationships with the civilian community, including the identification of informers within the civilian community who might be threats to pseudo operations.
In addition, the evaluation process of insurgents for their use in pseudo operations should begin with their capture. Not all insurgents are fervent ideologues; they have not all read the complete works of Karl Marx, Mao Tse-Tung, and Che Guevara; and they do not all intend to fight capitalism until death. In fact, the opposite is generally the case. Skilled interrogators can be of great assistance at this point. On the other hand, do not expect an insurgent to defect immediately. One should be leery of any insurgent who would immediately be willing to kill his former comrades and friends. When capturing the insurgents is impossible, Marines should use their superior mobility and firepower to eliminate insurgents.
One law that counterinsurgent commanders must follow is that no friendly troops can operate in the same zone of action as a pseudo force. Needless to say, U. S. counterinsurgency forces will find it hard to distinguish between friendly pseudo-force members and hostile insurgents. With the proper coordination, however, a pseudo-force leader can introduce friendly tactical units into a pseudoforce zone of action. This coordination will often take place when tactical units are needed to eliminate insurgent units.
► Mission Three—Disperse Tactical Operational Information: The lack of intelligence is the greatest complaint of unit commanders in counterinsurgency campaigns. Without any concrete information, unit commanders are forced to carry out large sweep patrolling for “clear- and-hold”-type of operations. Although unit commanders normally prefer these types of operations because they allow them to “be commanders,” the history of counterinsurgency campaigning clearly demonstrates that these tactics are ineffectual. The use of pseudo operations greatly accelerates the speed at which operational information can be dispersed to tactical unit commanders. This is the primary purpose of penetration, isolation, and elimination. After isolating an insurgent group, the operational information must be relayed not to higher intelligence bodies where it will be “quagmired,” but rather to the nearest tactical unit commander. The pseudo-force leader must have adequate communications to transmit rapidly to the “stand-by” or nearby tactical unit. The pseudo-force members having been withdrawn, the pseudo-force leader then allows the tactical unit to
99
Kitson believed that this need for Pjn point information was the same in m laya as it was in Kenya. And again, developed pseudo-gang operations ^ Malaya to obtain this needed operation3
,tio"s
me'y
enter his zone and eliminate the insurgent force. It is this rapid dispersal of tactical operational information to the tactical units that will lead to tactical “kills” and reduce the frustration associated with fruitless patrolling and ambushing.
► Mission Four—Destroy Insurgent Political Infrastructure: When pseudo operations have reached advanced stages, pseudo forces can proceed to dismantle the insurgency political infrastructure. The question of when to do this will always be a calculated risk. Capturing and eliminating insurgent political members greatly increases the chances that the pseudo force will be compromised and, moreover, can dry up operational information sources, especially in the case of informants. On the other hand, allowing the insurgents’ political infrastructure to continue may mean that additional members of the community will be wooed over to the insurgent cause. Destroying the political infrastructure is the last pseudo-operation mission because penetrating this area is often difficult. One has often heard the adage, “If you cut off the head, the rest of the body will die. ” It is a nice statement, but is seldom applicable to the realities of an insurgency environment, especially when considering the nature of pseudo operations. There have been manv insurgencies in which the
To counter these FRELIMO guerrillas in Mozambique trying to gain their independence, Portuguese commandos trained African soldiers in pseudo operations. With the help of guerrillas they were able to convince to defect, the unit—called “arrows”—blended in almost perfectly.
“head” has been removed and the insurgency movement has still be able to function successfully; Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau are just two examples. Flexibility and good judgment are critical in accomplishing this mission.
Historical Use: In post-World War II counterinsurgency efforts, several nations have used pseudo operations effectively. In both Malaya and Kenya, the British employed pseudo operations in combination with other conventional counterinsurgency tactics. In the Malay jungle wars of 1948-60, pseudo operations became a standard method British forces used in combating the Chinese communist insurgents. The Chinese insurgents who had defected were placed back into their former area of operation and reemerged into the community, locating insurgents and then directing the British forces to them. Likewise, in Kenya during the Mau Mau Uprising (1952-56), after much ineffective conventional counterinsurgency campaigning, pseudo operations were introduced and used successfully.
Sir Frank Kitson was instrumental in pseudo operations in both Malaya and Kenya. Kitson believed that the use of pseudo operations “played an important part in defeating the Mau Mau.”2 He considered the dispersal of tactical operational information to the army units to be critical to successful counterinsurgency warfare. Kitson has made special note on this process:
“If we could develop it for the army by using special methods such as pseudo-gangs all was well, but if
not the military mind stuck firmly 10 the large-scale hit-or-miss type 0 operation. .
“Above all . . . the key to fights terrorism lay in getting enough opeta tional information quickly.”3
information. Kitson’s pseudo opera! were highly decentralized and extrei effective.
The Portuguese used pseudo opel" tions in their insurgency wars in An1 ' They established their most success pseudo force, known as flechas or rows,” in their Mozambican war (* . ”j 74). The flechas were commando-tra1^ African soldiers who, like the guerrn1 operated in small, self-supp0^1" groups. In addition, because many 01 j flechas formerly had been members FRELIMO (Frente de Libertagdo Mogambique), the unit was able to 1 feet pseudo operations.
Probably the most elaborate and c ^ tainly one of the most centralized use5 pseudo operations was witnessed >n Rhodesian Civil War (1971-80). ^
Rhodesian Army established a regin12
■ rM n1’5'
the Selous Scouts, whose primary jf sion was pseudo operations. Despit2 ^ much-publicized cross-border ram- ^ insurgent training camps, the Scouts continued pseudo open' throughout the entire insurgency were considered the most effective desian unit. In fact, when insurgent ^ ert Mugabe came to power, he im
100
Proceedings / Novem^
felyiiP 0n a highly centralized system SoUr„8 on relatively high-grade-type °pCrJ;v informants—whereas pseudo leu '°ns work on a decentralized sys- the nrely on many low-grade sources-
> v ^uumujr iuw-g,iauvsuuivca-----------------------------------------
,rends*5U*aCe’ hacking, local and current
Nth ’
$<C’and captured insurgents.5 The
'i0nsetfjy unfamiliar with pseudo oper- arin„ Herman H. Hannekan, a U. S. *is»H r. Sergeant and a captain in the Hai ‘endarme, successfully employee .onions in Haiti in 1919. They 3 lea,jee killing of Charlemagne Peralte, It cn ln t'le Haitian insurrection.
|[ | ating insurgency in post-World 1’1ilib„.0.w~!ntensity conflicts, the U. S.
‘"do completely avoided using
’rs. pj‘n military and bureaucratic fac- 'lr,lrri°ted’ °PPortunities for officers to be tian i are ^ewer when they cannot
kn ' ■ ^banded 'he Selous Scouts, ^ °wjng full well that they consisted of RhdnY °f his own insurgents whom the °desians convinced to defect, ad ^ ^e'ous Scouts became extremely P( at developing techniques, dis- adSeS’ an(^ P*°ys t0 mirror their insurgent ,_ll)VcrJar'es. One of the many skills at Ira'? they were highly proficient was asscklng. an ability that can be of great 'stance in many varied aspects of ^operations.
the Sp Ud-° °Perations were used during ^'hppine Huk Rebellion and were amplified by Force X, which was cretin the Philippine forces following Pur^ 'rustrat'on with U. S. advisers who '"effUeC* conventi°nal tactics that were ectual against the insurgents.4 ^“fing the Vietnam War, the U. S. |is>y used several tactics that estab- the6 . c°ntact between U. S. forces and F0rClv'l'an population. Army Special C0J?S training units, the Marine Corps’s •he ,i'nec* Action Platoons program, and $ev„C audestine Phoenix program were gtjja °f the tactics. The Phoenix pro- ps,eu .’ however, should not be viewed as First h 0Perati°ns for several reasons. the y- re was no attempt to impersonate thereletcong or Vietcong cells. Second, Caj Was '‘hie effort to disseminate tacti- Ur|its°^>erat‘onal information to tactical /“‘d third, the Phoenix program
Heco' ^'etnamese Army’s Provisional PcrSona‘Ssance Units, which often im- Cijrin ated North Vietnamese and Viet- the rriUri'‘s in Northern 1 Corps, played 'he y °st Pseudo-operations-like role in (f|'ctnam War.
c°rnni,^ri1Ca"y’ Id- S. Marines are not
M
N'q — gvi<un ana a captain in tne rni- j)seuci0eaclarrne’ successfully employed
5* has .
lo Cen„°'3erat'ons- This can be attributed torrnain
.“ttlTlanH —"w wamiu
9li°ns- ■ P'atoons> companies, and bat PCrCeiyeanc^ second, military hierarchies ^iidot an mhcrent “vulgarity” in actics. Kitson alludes to this gen-
Sergeant Herman H. Hannekan is the only U. S. Marine ever to have used pseudo ops. It was in 1919 in Haiti—and it worked.
eral reluctance by an officer corps to pursue this “dirty” warfare:
“Their [the officer corps’s] natural reluctance to grasp anything new was accentuated by their ability to see that promotion prospects were at best uncertain in a partisan force. Furthermore the whole idea was a little vulgar.”6
The history of pseudo operations, however, clearly demonstrates that they are an effective method of combating insurgency, especially when there are great racial and ethnic differences between combatants.
Needs of the Marine Corps: With the prospects of counterinsurgency warfare in the Third World again beginning to become a reality of U. S. fighting forces, the foremost U. S. light infantry, the Marine Corps, must begin to consider pseudo operations as a tactic. In addition to their already proven success in counterinsurgency warfare, pseudo operations offer several other strategic benefits. First, they allow U. S. forces to be committed to an insurgency environment in Third World areas, such as the Philippines and Central and South America, by creating a situation where the host nation does the bulk of the fighting. Second, pseudo operations can minimize Marine firepower and mobility in counterinsurgency operations. Third, there will be fewer Marine casualties and a generally higher morale in these Marine units than would be found in units conducting normal hit-or-miss operations.
The U. S. Marine Corps should study, program, and be ready to use this successful counterinsurgency tactic. The Corps should now establish a small research and fact-finding body comprised of several officers and staff noncommissioned officers who have had advisory experience in Third World countries and can readily adapt to pseudo operations. They must research and evaluate the concept and then, taking into consideration the mistakes and successes of the British, Portuguese, and Rhodesians, formulate a workable doctrine. In addition, they must study the art of tracking and tracking training. The suitable venue for this initial examination should be the Warfighting Center at Marine Corps Combat Development Center, Quantico.
The Marine Corps should establish a small, permanent unit of staff noncommissioned officers and officers to concentrate on pseudo operations. The unit could expand if U. S. Marines were ever committed to an insurgency war.
It was sheer folly during the last ten years for the Marine Corps to be lulled into an anticounterinsurgency philosophy. Totalitarian and communist encroachments have transpired through insurgencies in the Philippines and Central America. The light infantryman is still the primary weapon for defeating an insurgency. The key is to “outinsurgent” the insurgent, and the effective use of pseudo operations can help provide this key. Used as only one of many tactics, pseudo operations can be the single most successful tactic for counterinsurgency forces. Now is the time to establish plans to develop this tactic.
'Ron Reid Daly, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Cape Town, South Africa: Galago, 1982), p. 13. 2Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London, England: Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 49.
3Ibid., pp. 50 and 62.
4Paul Melshen, Pseudo Operations (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1986), pp. 44-47.
5Ibid., pp. 54-55.
6Kitson, p. 63.
Major Melshen is currently a lecturer and the Program Director of International Relations at Schiller International University in London and serves as a liaison officer for the Fleet Marine Force Europe, London. He has a broad background in low-intensity wars and operations. He participated in the evacuation of Vietnam, served as an adviser in the Philippines and the Middle East, and has observed conflicts in southern Africa. He is a graduate of the U. S. Army Airborne and Ranger Courses and graduated with highest distinction from the Naval War College.
101
'Ss 1 November 1988