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Table 1 U. S. Navy Planned Shipbuilding and Conversion (SCN) Programs
| FY 87 FY 87 Request Actual | FY 88 PROJ In FY 87 | FY 88 Request | FY 88 Actual | FY 89 PROJ In FY 88 | FY 89 Request | |
New Construction/Class Ohio (SSBN-726) | i | i | 1 | i | i | 1 | 1 |
Nimitz (CVN-68) | — | — | — | — | 2 |
| — |
Los Angeles (SSN-688) | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
Seawolf (SSN-21) | — | — | — | — | — | 1 | 1 |
Ticotideroga (CG-47) | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4(+l) | 2 | __ |
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | — | 3 | 3 |
Wasp (LHD-1) | _ | — | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) (Cargo variant of Whidbey Island [LSD-41]) |
|
| 1 | 1 | 1 |
|
|
Avenger (MCM-1) | — | — | 3 | 3 | — | — | — |
Cardinal (MSH-1) | 4 | — | 4 | — | — | — | — |
Osprey (MHC-51) | — | — | — | — | — | 2 | 2 |
Henry J. Kaiser (T-AO-187) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
T-AGOS-19 (SWATH) | 3 | 4 | 3 | — | — | 3 | 3 |
AE-36 | — | — | 1 | — | — | — | — |
Supply (AOE-6) | 1 | i | — | — | — | 1 | 1 |
Safeguard (ARS-50) | — | _ | — | — | — | — | — |
AGOR-23 | 1 | 1 | — | — | — | 1 | 1 |
PXM | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Total New Construction | 21 | 18 | 24 | 16 | 15 | 19 | 17 |
Conversions CV SLEP |
|
| 1 | 1 | 1 |
|
|
Cimarron (AO-177) (Jumbo) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
T-ACS (C) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | — |
Total Conversions | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
Total SCN | 24 | 21 | 28 | 20 | 19 | 23 | 19 |
budget of $283.2 billion ($20.1 bill‘d less than the President had requeS nearly 12 months earlier), the fiscal )e‘ 1988 shipbuilding and conversion count amounted to a real increase of® than 52% compared to the 1987 fund level. No other major DoD account ^ joyed such outrageous good fortune- most observers’ eyes, however, the gess would be short-lived, in that^_ massive increase resulted from the erration” of both nuclear carriers b® funded in a single fiscal year—'.J more,” in the words of one profess1 . staffer on the Hill. But they said that when CVN-72 and CVN i
5 deal',
In late November 1987, while the outlines of the compromises on 11 ^ year 1988 were still not clear, Jp®Pjy
to
son*
lucci, Webb refused to cave m
The Reagan administration requested only 16 new ships for authorization in fiscal year 1988—a reduction from the 24 planned only one year before—and just four conversions. And if the actual requests for fiscal year 1988 were compared with the proposals in the President’s five-year plan for 1984-88, it was apparent that the administration had emasculated the shipbuilding and conversion accounts—a draconian reduction of nearly 60% in projected funding and loss of 11 projected ships. However, the fiscal year 1988 request did attempt to keep apace of inflation in the hard times of the “Gramm-Rudman Environment,” because it called for a roughly 4% real (after inflation) increase in funding when compared with the $10.2 billion approved for fiscal year 1987. (See Table 1 for a comparison of the FY 87-89 shipbuilding and conversion [SCN] programs.)
The eventual denouement of the debates and backroom deals on the Navy’s SCN request was astounding, especially the horse-trading in the waning days of 1987 as the Congress and the administration struggled to agree on authorization and spending bills before a threatened Christmas Eve shutdown of the government. The authorization bill that eventually passed on 4 December approved only 13 new ships and four conversions costing $9.9 billion. However, the final $605 billion catch-all continuing resolution/ appropriation bill signed by the President on 22 December—nearly three months into fiscal year 1988—funded 15 new ships and the four conversions. Perhaps most incredible was the $6.3 billion approved for fully funding two nuclear- powered aircraft carriers (CVNs).
Totalling some $16.2 billion out of the approved Department of Defense (DoD)
in 1982,
were approved in a single “package ot“j
TM Infa 1 00*7 tvrkill^ th6 * j
esc*;
........................................ DePu,'
Defense Secretary William H. TafG#. ordered the military services to re r their fiscal year 1989 requests in l*8n , the fall administration-Congress ”hu summit” and congressional action °n administration’s request. The service-^, retaries were told to come up with nt ^ $31 billion in reductions for ^scaL?] 6 1989; the Navy’s share in that was $ ^ billion out of its original (January * -|, fiscal year 1989 request for $ 108-' (
lion. Taft told the services to emph^,,, program terminations rather ^ stretchouts, and consideration was t0 given to force-structure reductions_ Frustration over Department ^ j( fense budget battles eventually resuj^j. Secretary of the Navy James Webb s ignation, announced on 22 Feb ,v 1988. In a 10 December 1987 menl0^f. dum to Secretary of Defense Frank
mands for what he considered unreas ^ parsimony. Webb remarked that ^ need to look across the board in art1 y at reductions which don’t create >n0f area more than an acceptable ^ev! ^ risk.” Webb, moreover, justified m1’ c. the DoD-mandated $11.6 billion r® ^ tion target by raising the specter 0 post-Vietnam war defense malaise- ^ The President’s revised fiscal J ^ 1989 defense budget was revealed February, and confirmed Webb s p fears. Calling for $290.8 billion in jo ®et authority, a $32.5 billion reduc- n from the administration’s original i,,, st as Part of a two-year submission Vjf)anUary 1987, tf>c budget included just -437 billion to support the Navy’s |..(1"rams. The Secretary of Defense al- ari^e<4 the Navy to request 17 new ships « funds to convert two others during frCa* year 1989, a reduction of four ships ao°om W^at had been planned just one year
. critical areas, for example, Aegis foyers, the amended program fell n of meeting established require- retjntS 'A’nc'’ the Navy will be forced to frjre ruuch earlier than planned 16 older ^gates—io Garcia (FF-1040) and 6 con 6.(FFG-1) ships—because of fiscal theStraints. These are but symptoms of Underlying problem which led to
AlfcCRAFT CARRIERS
Webb’s resignation and stinging rebuke of poor leadership on the part of Carlucci.
As the Navy approaches the 21st century, block obsolescence of much of its surface combatant, aircraft carrier, tactical aviation, and submarine forces looms on the horizon. Many “revolutionary” weapon systems and platforms either have been or soon will be introduced into the fleet. These systems and their supporting technologies offer the prospect for revolutionizing the technical aspects of naval warfare. The first signs are now apparent in surface warfare’s “Revolution at Sea” initiative. Nevertheless, declining budgets and the potential for uninspired leadership within the Navy’s civilian hierarchy ensure turbulent times ahead for the fleet.
The “re-arming” of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction act, which was reluctantly signed by the President in late September 1987, and the actions on the Navy budgets for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 are harbingers of shoal waters ahead for the Navy. Many analysts are now forecasting level spending, if not further reductions, in Navy budgets during the next decade and into the next century. If these forecasts hold true, all of the Navy’s plans to maintain current force levels will be frustrated, and the “15 carrier battle group/600-ship Navy” will be relegated to the dustbin of history. This would bring into serious question the Navy’s ability to carry out the operations that underpin its stated Maritime Strategy.
As
recently as the late summer of CVn’ lhe Navy had planned to order (CV*. a “modified-repeat” Nimitz 1954’''h8)-class carrier in fiscal year qu ’ w*th long-lead funding to be re- c4 in fiscal year 1991.
(iuri°Wever, this strategy was changed btr § the next few months, and in Octo- Leh former Navy Secretary John tary,,'an began lobbying Defense Secre- tw0 ,asPar Weinberger to agree to order start S*liPs as fiscal year 1990 and 1993 tieC(j j, "' he new strategy focused on the gt^ °r a “heel-to-toe” acquisition proOrder '°r these and future carriers, in ti0nto ensure highly efficient producing (^ates at Newport News Shipbuilding f0rce "Maintain the 15 carrier battle group ACceve* with modem, capable ships. Sens ,,1:ug to the Navy’s “good business CV)q 7ar8ument, buying CVN-74 and $6 ^7in this fashion, at a total cost of Payer billion, would save the U. S. tax- < s°me $3 billion compared to two 1994te~ship procurements in fiscal years
and 1996.
6 N’avy consciously did not attempt, Mra. er’ to replicate the procurement lrUe ^ f°r CVNs-72/73, which was a tVere f.tWo'Ship buy” in that both ships that • U"y funded in a single year. Had PProach been taken for CVNs-74/ tfUcecj6 Navy knew it would have pro- havv,even more impressive savings. The NievS *eadership in late 1986 simply l^at fbe prospects for fully fund- too rea ships in fiscal year 1988 were far % ote *n the political and fiscal envi- ship and chose, instead, to have each PaotCUrec* individually but as a single Kage deal.”
More surprising than the President’s request for the two carriers was the congressional reaction. The eventual omnibus continuing resolution signed by President Reagan in December fully funded both ships at an estimated total cost of $6.33 billion. The “good business sense” argument worked far better than had been foreseen.
Not all of the Navy’s carrier news in 1987 was so bright. The addition of blisters intended to improve the stability of the USS Midway (CV-41) had an adverse effect on the ship’s roll period that was not predicted. During trials after her shipyard period, the modified Midway's roll proved to take as little as nine seconds, compared with a 20-second roll experienced by the larger Forrestal (CV-59)- and Nimitz (CVN-68)-class ships, and in certain conditions was shown to be highly unpredictable. Initially these problems affected flight operations, with launches and landings curtailed in specific situations, and created hazardous conditions
The big carriers continue to be the big cards in the budget game. Here the flags fly during the Abraham Lincoln's recent christening.
for parked aircraft and other equipment on the flight deck and in the hangar. The Navy’s review of the necessary modifications led to a Midway “get-well” proposal, costing approximately another $80 million.
This prospect, when coupled with the Navy’s request for CVN-74 and CVN- 75, led the Senate Appropriations Committee to include language in its appropriations report mandating that the Midway be retired five months after the bill was signed into law. The resulting House/ Senate conference fiscal year 1988 appropriations bill, however, excised the requirement to retire the Midway. As it turned out, operational experience gained since April 1987 showed how the Midway's roll can be managed and predicted.
SURFACE COMBATANTS
The Navy’s battleship, cruiser, destroyer, and frigate programs in 1987 were focused on consolidating existing efforts and planning for the future. Both the Iowa (BB-61)-class reactivation program and Aegis cruiser program proceeded without significant technical difficulties throughout 1987, although late deliveries and potential cost overruns on the Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruisers raised concerns in the Navy and on the Hill. And, from the start of the hearings on the fiscal year 1988-89 surface combatant programs, several political and fiscal problems were evident, especially with regard to the program for the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Aegis destroyers.
Work continued at Ingalls Shipbuilding on the reactivation and modernization of the battleship Wisconsin (BB-64). She arrived at Pascagoula in mid-August 1986, and by November 1987 her work package was about 67% complete. The
The Aegis cruiser Princeton (CG-59), launched in 1987 in Pascagoula, Mississippi, is the sixth Navy ship to carry the name.
Wisconsin is expected to be delivered in late October 1988.
Congressional hearings held on the fiscal year 1988-89 shipbuilding programs revealed high interest in the progress of the Aegis cruisers built at Bath Iron Works. For example. Representative Bill Chappell (Democrat—Florida), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Defense, demanded to know how many of the Bath cruisers “are behind schedule and how many months are involved.”
The congressional interest in Bath was piqued, in some observers’ opinions, by the high level of publicity surrounding a three-month strike at the shipyard during the summer of 1985 and subsequent charges by some union members of shoddy work undertaken by shipyard supervisors during the strike.
There were also concerns regarding significant cost growth in the cruiser program, for which requests for equitable adjustment (claims) totalling $121 million were submitted. The Navy recognized that part of this amount was “not in contention,” but reserved comment on the remainder.
Despite the controversy at Bath, the
Navy awarded a fixed-price contract one of the fiscal year 1987 cruisers
for
to the
$236 million, while Litton/Ingalls was awarded contract for the other two ships under fixed-price contract for $367.9 milh® Ingalls and Bath are the only two s >K yards building Aegis cruisers, and Bat the lead yard for the Arleigh Burke-C , destroyers. Ingalls has been awar contracts for 16 Aegis cruisers; Bat»> total of seven. . ^
Bath was also awarded the contract the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51), author12 and funded in fiscal year 1985, and galls won the privilege to build DDL" That decision to give the Aegis dcStIj,, second-source contract to Ingalls hotly contested by Lockheed Shipb111 Avondale SWP
Maine shipyard, at a cost of
ing, Todd Shipyards, /wonuiuv - , yards, and National Steel and Shipbul
Company. The Navy prevt01
,usiy
mg
announced that it will have shipyards build the Aegis destroyers■. the award to Ingalls was seen by the .. ers as their “corporate death-kne. , Lockheed later announced it was se jj its shipyard. The award for the seC q, fiscal year 1987 Aegis destroyer,
53, was awarded to Bath, but only a^j some controversy over the bids recei Ingalls reportedly underbid Bath by st; $90 million, which forced the Navy 1 ^ “intense” negotiations with Bat lower its bid.
only 1
an0
r§y
The greatest amount of control jn over the Navy’s surface combatants 1987 was over congressional active , many Navy observers called it jS dling”—in essence revamping the A combatant programs. Although the ^ had requested only two CG-47 CI\lgg, and three DDG-51s in fiscal year ^ the House Armed Services Commits ^.|| April reported out an authorization , that deleted all of the Arleigh Burk?s1 g closed out the CG-47 line by auth021^ the remaining five ships in the 2< j(, class; the Senate Armed Service Con1 of tee followed suit the next month. h° ...
if
,flgs
from more efficient procurement of rials for the five ships were a major ^ in Congress’s decision to authorizing remaining Aegis cruisers as a s ’ package. ^ ^$1
Congressional testimony during ^
ah°u
Bath’:
ules
feted
del; was 37
ay in the delivery of the Arleigh Burke
^Mh'6 t*1C Nayy’s wholehearted support n'°r Navy flag officers have gone on
°cacy on the Hill, apparently Con-
as a whole remained unconvinced. “ Navy has requested for fiscal year the three DDGs “zeroed” in the reta Pr°gram. “Unfortunately,” as Sec- °t Defense Carlucci recognized,
1989
'988
Pace fate production will not keep ^AyL,WltB Projected retirements of older le„ *hips, resulting in a shortfall of at
ability to meet contractual sched- °n the lead DDG-51, and this trans-
j ln'o further “meddling.” These a?U ,ts were not assuaged by the Navy’s j ,russ'°n in April that the estimated aL weeks and that “cost growth” Th°Ve • tarSet approached $38 million.
ls’ in addition to near-incessant criti- f0m ^roni several self-styled naval re- that the Arleigh Burke destroyer ' too little ship for too much del C’V’ ' was one cause for the actions Cn8 the three DDG-51s from the [v . authorization and funding bills.
Arleigh Burke design—several
arg°rt* ^at the Arleigh Burke destroyers Navv'XCellent ships and comprise the ant'l S S°*e sur'acc combatant program adj *ate 1990s—and some strong
gress Thi
C0 . * ships throughout the next decade, live /!1UCd Production below the rate of thi, , e®ls ships per year will exacerbate
'* shortfall.”
(|:f;(.e7last of the 51 Oliver Hazard Perry 6() '1 frigates, the Ingraham (FFG-
of i’qS?8 unclcr construction at the close Win ' Blal'ke her sisters, the Ingraham Possess a new combat system developed by Sperry: a Mk-92 Mod-6 fire control system with the SYS-2(V)2 automatic tracking system, and the SPS-49(V)5 digital radar with an enhanced electronic countermeasures capability. In the wake of the May 1987 attack on the Stark (FFG-31), some critics of the Oliver Hazard Perry FFGs commented that similar upgraded systems should be backfitted into the other 50 ships of the class. This was rejected on the grounds of prohibitively high cost. The question of frigate vulnerability aside, the major issue confronting the Navy’s frigate force, particularly in light of the Defense Department’s February 1988 decision to retire 16 Garcia and Brooke frigates early to save valuable operations and maintenance funds, was: What now?
One possibility would be to embrace the multinational NATO Frigate Replacement program for the 1990s (NFR-90). The NFR-90 program began under auspicious circumstances in 1979 as several NATO members recognized that there would be within NATO a multinational “block obsolescence” problem in the mid-7990s. After some study, the original seven nations (Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States), later joined by Spain, determined that a common frigate could be designed using a common hull to accommodate modular weapon and sensor systems, allowing each country to “customize” the ships to its specific requirements. Assuming a 50-ship program for all NFR-90 members—the U. S. future frigate (FFX) program killed in April 1986 had itself an objective of 50 ships—the NATO consortium estimated the NFR-90 frigates could be procured at a cost of $300 million each.
Although there are some analysts who see the “possibility” that the Navy may buy some of the NFR-90 ships, many others reject this. Some see the NFR-90 ships, if the NATO partners can agree on a memorandum of understanding for their future development, as an elegant means to solve the U. S. Coast Guard’s future medium-endurance cutter shortfalls and to enable that service to carry out its wartime functions better. Nevertheless, the U. S. Navy’s future frigate plans have essentially been dead in the water since the spring of 1986, perhaps waiting for the revised surface combatant force-level plans and alternative procurement/retire- ment strategies resulting from the Revolution at Sea to point the way. (See Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, USN [Ret.], “Revolution at Sea,” Proceedings, January 1988, pages 34-39.)
One other program of note is the new- design patrol craft (PXM) program, which will produce off-the-shelf, low- risk designs for small surface combatants “to provide additional anti-surface capability in the Caribbean.” (According to one Navy source, the bulk of this mission used to be carried out by some of the 16 frigates slated for retirement.) The Navy’s program requires only about $13 million in research and development funds through fiscal year 1989, and will request the first of five PXMs in fiscal year 1990 and another four in fiscal year 1992.
S|JB]VIARINES
'fh
(Ssg^, Navy’s program for the Ohio hiari "726)-dass ballistic missile sub- 'b>OoCS *!as stabibzed at the rate of one l®90s W Pcr year through the early 24 s , ‘ Although there are at present only the N"1annes in the Ohio-class program, has h,aV^ s force-level goal for SSBNs irig thCCn stated as “24-to-40,” present- roay Possibility that additional Tridents fete p acquired in the future to compen- SSgisi °r the retirement of Poseidon feewnS’ Ihc Navy successfully enticed hock o" Bfews Shipbuilding and Dry- *988 T°mPany to bid on a fiscal year there)) F'dent submarine in late 1987, tcUJati^ ^ringing competition into the hlectr°n Previously dominated by the Pamic‘sC ®°at Division of General Dy- Pop ^' phat being said, however, New- eWs was unsuccessful in its apparently reluctant endeavor, and Electric Boat was awarded the contract for SSBN- 740 in January 1988.
Perhaps the most controversial submarine program in recent history is the $32 billion Seawolf (SSN-21) program for 30 “submarines for the 21st century.” The Navy received long-lead funding for the first unit in fiscal year 1987, despite constant criticisms that the submarine is too big, cannot meet requirements, and will cost far too much ($1.6 billion in fiscal year 85 dollars) in the constrained fiscal environment of the late-1980s and early 1990s. During a year of acrimony the Research and Development Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee denied all funding for the Seawolf— only to be overruled later by the full committee—on the grounds that the new submarines would not offer enough advantages over Soviet submarines of the mid-1990s. The Seawolf program was blasted in early 1988 by a senior House Armed Services Committee professional staffer as an egregious waste of resources. Anthony R. Battista, who led the fight against the Seawolf in the House, said the submarine is not good enough to combat the undersea threat posed by recent Soviet advances. Remarking that the Soviet Akula attack submarine “is the best submarine in the world today,” Battista urged the Navy to scuttle the program and start with a clean sheet and no prejudices.
“Balderdash!”-(or words to that effect) retorted the Navy Secretary' in mid- January 1988. Speaking at a National Press Club luncheon, Webb claimed that the submarine’s design “will allow for technological leaps we’re going to have well into the next century to stay ahead of the Soviets.” Yet the Congress was apparently unconvinced, or at least a bit schizophrenic, on this issue. For while it did approve all funding requested for the Seawolf in fiscal year 1988, Congress added $100 million to the Navy’s antisubmarine warfare (ASW) budget to investigate advanced submarine technology and to study additional ways to improve further the SSN-688 submarines. Adding an insult to this ASW windfall, Congress in effect repudiated the Navy and transferred control of these efforts to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). One congressional source familiar with the issue commented that Congress just did not trust the Navy: “The whole thrust was that Congress felt that the Navy was not pursuing alternative advanced technologies. There is a built-in Navy bias against doing that.
Congress was worried that if the Na'V controlled these funds, it would not P them into advanced technologies but in existing programs.”
For now the Seawolf and its Pr0®f'j appear safe. Congress, however, planned to hold a series of hearings on submarine and ASW issues during 1* ’ in effect reopening wounds that have y to heal completely.
MINE WARFARE SHIPS
‘build-U. S.” mandate.
The Navy accepted the first of its Avenger (MCM-l)-class minehunters in September 1987, and she successfully completed her sea trials in December. Two more of the class may—if all goes well—-join the fleet in 1988. But these craft are plagued by incessant reports of continued design and engine problems, construction delays, and cost overruns. Finally, the Navy voluntarily withdrew three MCMs from the budget because of the construction delays. Special hearings devoted to the Navy’s surface mine warfare programs were held in July and September, and several congressmen were adamant in their calls for reopening the competition for the last three ships. Car- lucci alluded to this in his fiscal year 1989 posture statement, noting that “We will examine this program ... in order to determine how to proceed with procurement of the remaining ships.” Congress also modified the Navy’s plans for its replacement coastal mine- hunter program. Seventeen Osprey (MHC-51)-class minehunters are planned, and the lead unit was funded in fiscal year 1986 with funds originally approved for the aborted Cardinal (MSH-1) surface-effect ships. The MHC-
The long-awaited mine countermeasures ship Avenger (MCM-1) was commissioned in September, four years after her keel was laid down.
51s are based on a modified Ita'.s Lenri-class design, and the first untf being built by Intermarine USA, a u' company (a joint venture of the na firm Intermarine Spa. and Hercules Y der Company of Delaware) founde build the ships in a U. S. shipyard, a quirement of the fiscal year 1987 y appropriations bill. There’s the throughout the 1987 hearings °n£|) MHC program, numerous congress , supported by the Shipbuilder’s Counc*^ America complained that the Navy circumvented the “spirit” of Congre
the
create difficulties for the program- ^ Congress would not be denied, and fiscal year 1988 appropriations bil^ dered the Navy to qualify a second so in fiscal year 1988 and to compete j. two ships requested for next year. 6 tive to funding issues, Congress did (0 mark $27 million in prior-year fun qualify the second-source shipbuild •
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS
The first of the new amphibious assault ships, the Wasp (LHD-1), was launched on 4 August 1987 and is expected to be delivered next spring. The second and third ships of the class, the Essex (LHD- 2) and Kearsage (LHD-3), were ordered from Ingalls in September 1986 and December 1987, respectively. The contract with Ingalls for LHD-3 also provides for $26 million in long-lead funds for LHD-4 (a fiscal year 1989 ship). The Navy’s plan calls for another LHD to be requested in fiscal year 1991, and additional ships will be required “in the outyears” to offset retirements of the I wo Jima (LPH-2)-class amphibious assault ships beginning in the mid-1990s. Defense Secretary Carlucci’s fiscal year 1989 posture statement reiterated the goal to achieve by 1996 sufficient amphibious lift capacity to carry the assault echelons of a Marine expeditionary force and a Marine expeditionary brigade.
The Navy in fiscal year 1987 awarded
the contract for LHD-2 on a mul11'^, competitive basis, resulting in a sun | tial difference between the cost of L ^ and LHD-2, some $475 million. ThlS .j. attributed principally to competitive ^ ding by shipbuilders in what son,ent.’' servers call a “cutthroat environme Further cost reductions, none s° ^ matic, however, are expected f°r remaining ships in this class. /j-
The experience with the WhidbO land (LSD-4 l)-class dock landing s
j9>*
gre n0t been so sanguine, with the Con. s vexed by reports of cost overruns
L$DV°ndale on LSD'41’ LSD-42’ and
t, '43- The Navy last year projected 0verruns to amount to some $75 JU°n- The Fort McHenry (LSD-43) sbo Cornmissioned on 8 August 1987, (he u*tWo months late, and Avondale laid a J^els for the Gunston Hall (LSD-44) j;EOfnstock (LSD-45) in June 1987 and hJfy 1988, respectively. After some n questioning of Navy witnesses, car ®ress appropriated funds for the |8° variant (CV) of the LSD-41 design, cl Wn as the Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) antj'n fiscal year 1988, and the Navy botl^'Pates approval of one LSD(CV) in hv0 , Cal years 1990 and FY 1991, and ^D(CV)s in fiscal year 1992. Citing “fiscal constraints,” the Secretary of Defense in February 1988 had to admit that the sixth ship of this class had to be dropped from the amended five-year plan, meaning that the Navy-Marine Corps’s lift objective would not be met until at least 1997, later than hoped by the Reagan administration when it embarked in January 1981 on its program to achieve maritime superiority.
The Sea Viking special warfare craft- medium (SWCM) program has suffered from numerous problems—bankruptcy of the original builder, unfinished first prototype, and an uncertain future. Congress approved $19 million for this program in fiscal year 1987, and directed that the first craft be completed quickly and a second source identified. On 20
The amphibious assault ship Wasp (LHD-1) sits on the launching platform at the Ingalls yard in preparation for becoming waterborne on 4 August 1987. She will join the fleet in 1989.
January 1987, however, the Pentagon’s Program Review Committee suspended the use of most of the fiscal year 1987 funds and limited research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) spending to only $1 million that fiscal year. The Navy also began a new look at the requirements for the SWCM, and the top- level requirements document and test and evaluation master plan were revised significantly, with the intention of eventually proceeding with the program for 19 SWCMs. The Navy’s revised fiscal year 1988-89 shipbuilding plan, however, included no mention of this program, and Carlucci’s statement to Congress likewise had nothing to say about SWCM.
The Navy in 1987 finally awarded contracts for 17 landing craft air cushion (LCAC) vehicles approved in fiscal years 1985 and 1986, following the successful completion of operational testing in the spring. Although 12 LCACs have been delivered, further production was held up pending review of reliability problems experienced in the first several LCACs built. The most severe problems appear to have been associated with extensive erosion in the gas turbine engines and cracked lift fan shafts, both of which have been corrected. The Navy and Marines have established a requirement for “at least” 90 LCACs to satisfy assault echelon lift requirements.
^Eet auxiliaries
auXj,ni0st complete responsibility for lie ary ships now and in the future will W h the civilian mariners of the Mili- Pro„ eahft Command. The only Navy <rafms are for the Supply (AOE-6)- iinjtf ast combat support ships, the first bunt hUnded m fiscal year 1987 and being Wj,h y National Steel and Shipbuilding, yearsatUre units to be requested in fiscal 0fa ^89 and 1991, and for a new class
Pr°gr nit'°n ships’ AE-36- The AE'36 l°'ved ^ *or several years has been al- ttalcg t0 si'P" in the five-year plan to grarn f')0m for “higher priority pro- Vp’ Respite Defense Secretary Car- shipsS rernark that “These ammunition
are urgently required to provide the
combat sustainability required by our newly expanded fleet.” It is difficult to imagine more important programs than ships that will allow the battle fleets to undertake the operations the Maritime Strategy indicates will have to be carried out in a future conflict. But, as is almost always the case in peacetime, logistics programs are ignored only to be despaired in war.
Also included in the Navy’s plan, for the out-years, are a salvage vessel (ARS- 54), one in fiscal year 1990; and a total of seven new-design oceanographic research vessels (AGOR-23) to be requested from fiscal years 1989 to 1991. The prototype of this class was authorized in fiscal year 1987. The Navy has carried forward its program for “jum- boizing” the Cimarron (AO-177) fleet oilers, with the first and second ships approved in the fiscal year 1987 and 1988 programs and the remaining three planned for fiscal years 1989 and 1990.
Other “cats-and-dogs” ship programs are the new-construction for the Military Sealift Command of seven T-AO-187 oilers (two funded in fiscal year 1988); and the T-AGOS-19-class surveillance ships, including the SWATH (small waterplane area-twin hull) variant. Three of the four T-AO-187s funded in previous years and being built have encountered schedule and cost problems.
STRATEGIC SEALIFT
America’s ability to fight an extended war in Europe, Southwest Asia, or the Far East is critically dependent upon the ability to move quickly and safely many thousands of tons of equipment and material from U. S. ports to the operational theaters. Retired Vice Admiral Tom Hughes, former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics (OP-04), was tireless in his efforts to convince practically anyone who would listen that sealift will play a “crucial role” in any conflict involving the United States. But, as the President’s Commission on the Merchant
Marine and Defense has, not surprisingly, rediscovered last year, the U. S. Merchant Marine has atrophied to a point where it is incapable of meeting U. S. defense needs.
The Navy’s Strategic Sealift Division (OP-42) and the Military Sealift Command have recognized the difficulties for some time, and have managed to keep a two-pronged program afloat even in times of “fiscal constraints”: (1) acquisition and conversion of sealift ships— Ready Reserve Force (RRF) vessels, maritime prepositioning squadrons, fast
sealift ships, and specialty ships—-to o set the lift capacity not available ff0 ^ commercial sources; and (2) design a acquisition of related sealift support sv^ terns and equipment—for example- SL sheds, flatracks, elevated causeways- the like—necessary to enhance the n11 tary value of merchant ships and 1 move/offload cargo from ships offsn° ' The RRF has continued to benefit tr°^ congressional attention, and will 'ncr?t0 from 90 ships on 31 December 198' 120 ships by 1992.
U. S. COAST GUARD
In a personal interview with the author last September, Admiral Paul Yost, Jr., Commandant of the Coast Guard, bitterly complained about the fiscal year 1988 budget process and the prospects for “devastating” cuts in the service’s budget. The recently released House Appropriations report had shorted some $150 million from the Coast Guard’s request of $1.9 billion, and Yost felt like he “had
just stepped out of the ring with Joe Louis.” He was clearly worried that in a budget that is 70% operating expenses, a cut of $150 million would have a drastic effect on the Coast Guard’s ability to carry out its missions. The “culprit,” in his judgment, was “Function 400,” that section of the federal budget that funds the Transportation Department. The fact that the Coast Guard is but one aspect of
early 1988. fe.
Because the Coast Guard had ^ quested no new ships or conversion8 fiscal year 1988 that aspect of the 8^ vice’s operations has not been affcc j yet. However, several cutters and P j boats may have to be retired early- plans included in the Senate fiscal ,
ue^
iction
1988 authorization bill, but not req by the Coast Guard, for the constFJ' ^ or lease of new icebreakers if built in United States, were later rejected du ^ the appropriations process. (Yost ^ gone on record stating that the ice^[ j
Gua‘
;oine
COAST GUARD
ers were not central to the Coast role and really should be funded by s other government agency.) .ei
During 1987 the Coast Guard aCCCjgfs two medium endurance cutters (Wi* | 907-908) and six Island-class Pa boats (WPBs 1312-1317). One breaker (WTGB-110) was deleted ^ the program, and work continued °n .. four remaining medium-endurance .
ters and 20 WPBs still to be delive^jyi Looking to the future, however aar contract design work continued on (£)
I class’
120-foot Heritage-class patrol b°a^ follow the problem-plagued Island c
The cutter Escanaba (WMEC-907) drew a crowd of 6,000 to her official commissioning in August 1987 at Grand Haven, Michigan, then drew the LAMPS I helicopter shown here in a demonstration of Navy-Coast Guard interoperability.
DoT’s myriad operations means intense competition for very scarce funds; his experience on the Hill confirmed that in a competition between Amtrak and the Coast Guard, Amtrak wins.
While his worst fears were not confirmed last year. Yost has had to accommodate a net $105 million reduction in his request. Aircraft and cutter patrols were cut to minimum essential levels, and staff reductions were imminent in
I I C . i| |U
(Reportedly there is great interest9O
ture WMEC design based on the N
concept, as it is seen by some in
Guard as an ideal answer to 1
am
■theC20
i
military missions for the Coast G1111 wartime mobilization roles.)
d M**11
Dr. Scott C. Truvcr is Head of the Naval an ^ time Policy Department, National Security a ^ jul- fare Analysis Group, at Information Spec* ^ ^v. He is a frequent contributor to the Proceedi^^^v ing written on Navy aircraft carrier, surface ant, mine warfare, and budgetary issues.
It*8
| Name | FY Program Builder | Status | |
v , ISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES |
|
| ||
| Tennessee | 80 | Electric Boat | Lau. 13 Dec. 86 |
s | Pennsylvania | 81 | Electric Boat | K.L. 2 Mar. 87 |
s | West Virginia | 84 | Electric Boat | Ord. 21 Nov. 83 |
| Kentucky | 85 | Electric Boat | Ord. 13 Aug. 85 |
s | Maryland | 86 | Electric Boat | Ord. 14 Mar. 86 |
s | Nebraska | 87 | Electric Boat | Ord. 26 May 87 |
|
| 88 | Electric Boat | Ord. 4 Jan. 88 |
, '^MARINES |
|
|
| |
bC |
|
|
|
|
| Key West | 80 | Newport News Comm. 4 Sep. 87 | |
4 | Oklahoma City | 81 | Newport News Lau. 2 Nov. 85 | |
ra | Louisville | 81 | Electric Boat | Comm. 8 Nov. 86 |
s | Helena | 82 | Electric Boat | Comm. 11 Jul. 87 |
,'i | Newport News | 82 | Newport News Lau. 15 Mar. 86 | |
| San Juan | 83 | Electric Boat | Lau. 6 Dec. 86 |
!j | Pasadena | 83 | Electric Boat | Lau. 12 Sep. 87 |
’I | Albany | 84 | Newport News | Lau. 13 Jun. 87 |
| Topeka | 84 | Electric Boat | Lau. 23 Jan. 88 |
■< | Miami | 84 | Electric Boat | K.L. 24 Oct. 86 |
| Scranton | 85 | Newport News K.L. 27 Jun. 86 | |
| Alexandria | 85 | Electric Boat | K.L. 19 Jun. 87 |
| (ex-Asheville) |
|
|
|
| Asheville | 85 | Newport News K.L. 14 Jan. 87 | |
\ | Jefferson City | 85 | Newport News K.^. 6 Jul. 87 | |
| Annapolis | 86 | Electric Boat | K.L. 2 Jan. 88 |
. | Springfield | 86 | Electric Boat | Ord. 21 Mar. 86 |
•1 | Columbus | 86 | Electric Boat | Ord. 21 Mar. 86 |
| Santa Fe | 86 | Electric Boat | Ord. 21 Mar. 86 |
|
| 87 | Newport News Ord. 6 Feb. 87 | |
|
| 87 | Newport News Ord. 6 Feb. 87 | |
|
| 87 | Newport News Ord. 6 Feb. 87 | |
|
| 87 | Newport News Ord. 6 Feb. 87 | |
|
| 88 |
|
|
i |
| 88 |
|
|
|
| 88 |
|
|
:1carRiers |
|
|
| |
| Abraham Lincoln | 83 | Newport News Lau. 13 Feb. 88 | |
| George Washington | 83 | Newport News K.L. 25 Aug. 86 | |
|
| 88 | Newport News |
|
|
| 88 | Newport News |
|
iNle | CRUISERS |
|
|
|
| Thomas S. Gates | 82 | Bath Iron | Comm. 10 Aug. 87 |
|
|
| Works |
|
■ | Mobile Bay | 82 | Ingalls | Comm. 13 Feb. 87 |
’l | Antietam | 83 | Ingalls | Comm. 6 Jun. 87 |
■ | Leyte Gulf | 83 | Ingalls | Comm. 26 Sep. 87 |
| San Jacinto | 83 | Ingalls | Comm. 23 Jan. 88 |
| Lake Champlain | 84 | Ingalls | Lau. 3 Apr. 87 |
| Philippine Sea | 84 | Bath Iron | Lau. 12 Jul. 87 |
|
|
| Works |
|
| Princeton | 84 | Ingalls | Lau. 2 Oct. 87 |
| Normandy | 85 | Bath Iron | K.L. 7 Apr. 86 |
|
|
| Works |
|
| Monterey | 85 | Bath Iron | K.L. 19 Aug. 87 |
|
|
| Works |
|
| Ghancellorsville | 85 | Ingalls | K.L. 24 Jun. 87 |
| Gowpens | 86 | Bath Iron | K.L. 23 Dec. 87 |
|
|
| Works |
|
| Gettysburg | 86 | Bath Iron | Ord. 8 Jan. 86 |
|
|
| Works |
|
| Ghosin | 87 | Ingalls | Ord. 8 Jan. 86 |
| Hue City | 87 | Ingalls | Ord. 16 Apr. 87 |
eef*ings / Naval Review | 1988 |
|
|
FY
Type/Hull Number | Name | Program | Builder | Status |
CG-67 | Shiloh | 87 | Bath Iron | Ord. 16 Apr. 87 |
|
|
| Works |
|
CG-68 | Anzio | 87 | Ingalls | Ord. 16 Apr. 87 |
CG-69 |
| 88 |
|
|
CG-70 |
| 88. |
|
|
CG-71 |
| 88 |
|
|
CG-72 |
| 88 |
|
|
CG-73 |
| 88 |
|
|
GUIDED MISSILE | DESTROYERS |
|
|
|
DDG-51 | Arleigh Burke | 85 | Bath Iron | Ord. 2 Apr. 85 |
|
|
| Works |
|
DDG-52 | Barry | 87 | Ingalls | Ord. 26 May 87 |
| (ex-John Barry) |
|
|
|
DDG-53 | John Paul Jones | 87 | Bath Iron | Ord. 25 Sep. 87 |
|
|
| Works |
|
GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATES |
|
|
| |
FFG-60 | Rodney M. Davis | 83 | Todd, San | Comm. 9 May 87 |
|
|
| Pedro |
|
FFG-61 | Ingraham | 84 | Todd, San | K.L. 30 Mar. 87 |
|
|
| Pedro |
|
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPS |
|
|
| |
LHD-1 | Wasp | 84 | Ingalls | Lau. 4 Aug. 87 |
LHD-2 | Essex | 84 | Ingalls | Ord. 10 Sep. 86 |
LHD-3 | Kearsage | 88 | Ingalls | Ord. 20 Dec. 87 |
DOCK LANDING SHIPS |
|
|
| |
LSD-43 | Fort McHenry | 83 | Lockheed | Comm. 8 Aug. 87 |
LSD-44 | Gunston Hall | 85 | Avondale | Lau. 27 Jun. 87 |
LSD-45 | Comstock | 85 | Avondale | Lau. 16 Jan. 88 |
LSD-46 | Tortuga | 85 | Avondale | K.L. 23 Mar. 87 |
LSD-47 | Rushmore | 86 | Avondale | Ord. 11 Dec. 85 |
LSD-48 | Ashland | 86 | Avondale | Ord. 11 Dec. 85 |
LSD-49(CV) | Harpers Ferry | 88 |
|
|
MINE COUNTERMEASURES SHIPS |
|
|
| |
MCM-1 | Avenger | 82 | Peterson | Comm. 12 Sep. 87 |
MCM-2 | Defender | 83 | Marinette | Lau. 4 Apr. 87 |
|
|
| Marine |
|
MCM-3 | Sentry | 84 | Peterson | Lau. 20 Sep. 86 |
MCM-4 | Champion | 84 | Marinette | K.L. 28 Jun. 84 |
|
|
| Marine |
|
MCM-5 | Guardian | 84 | Peterson | Lau. 20 Jun. 87 |
MCM-6 | Devastator | 85 | Peterson | K.L. 9 Feb. 87 |
MCM-7 | Patriot | 85 | Marinette | K.L. 31 Mar. 87 |
|
|
| Marine |
|
MCM-8 | Scout | 85 | Peterson | K.L. 8 Jun. 87 |
MCM-9 | Pioneer | 87 |
|
|
MCM-10 | Warrior | 87 |
|
|
MCM-11 | Gladiator | 87 |
|
|
COASTAL MINEHUNTER |
|
|
|
MHC-51 Osprey | 86 | Intermarine USA | Ord. 22 May 87 |
FAST COMBAT SUPPORT SHIP |
|
|
|
AOE-6 Supply Steel | 87 | National | Ord. 22 Jan. 87 |
FY
TypeIHull Number Name Program Builder Status
OCEAN SURVEY SHIPS (Military Sealift Command)
T-AGS-39 | Maury | 85 | Bethlehem | Lau. 4 Sep. 87 |
|
|
| Steel |
|
T-AGS-40 | Tanner | 85 | Bethlehem | Lau. 16 Oct. 87 |
|
|
| Steel |
|
OCEAN SURVEILLANCE SHIPS (Military | Sealift Command) |
| ||
T-AGOS-11 | Audacious | 87 | Tacoma Boat | Ord. 30 Sep. 87 |
| (ex-D auntless) |
|
|
|
T-AGOS-12 | Bold (ex-Vigorous) | 87 | Tacoma Boat | Ord. 30 Sep. 87 |
T-AGOS-13 | Adventurous | 85 | Halter Marine | Lau. 23 Sep. 87 |
T-AGOS-I4 | . Worthy | 85 | Halter Marine | K.L. 3 Apr. 86 |
T-AGOS-I5 | Titan | 86 | Halter Marine | K.L. 30 Oct. 86 |
T-AGOS-16 | Capable | 87 | Halter Marine | K.L. 2 Jun. 87 |
T-AGOS-17 | Intrepid | 87 | Halter Marine | Ord. 20 Feb. 87 |
T-AGOS-I8 | Relentless | 87 | Halter Marine | Ord. 20 Feb. 87 |
T-AGOS-I9 | Victorious (SWATH) | 87 | McDermott | Ord. 31 Oct. 86 |
OILERS (Military Sealift Command) |
|
|
| |
T-AO-188 | Joshua Humphreys | 83 | Avondale | Serv. 19 Dec. 86 |
T-AO-189 | John Lenthall | 84 | Avondale | Serv. 3 Apr. 87 |
T-AO-190 | Andrew J. Higgens | 84 | Avondale | Serv. 22 Oct. 87 |
T-AO-191 | Benjamin Isherwood | 85 | Penn Ship | K.L. 12 Jul. 86 |
T-AO-192 | Henry Eckford | 85 | Penn Ship | K.L. 22 Jan. 87 |
T-AO-193 | Walter S. Diehl | 85 | Avondale | Lau. 2 Oct. 87 |
T-AO-194 | John Ericsson | 86 | Penn Ship | Ord. 27 Feb. 86 |
T-AO-195 | Leroy Grumman | 86 | Avondale | K.L. 6 Jul. 87 |
T-AO-196 | Kanawha | 87 | Penn Ship | Ord. 12 Feb. 87 |
T-AO-197 | Pecos | 87 | Avondale | Ord. 12 Feb. 87 |
T-AO-198 |
| 88 |
|
|
T-AO-199 |
| 88 |
|
|
USCG MEDIUM ENDURANCE CUTTERS
WMEC-907 | Escanaba | 80 | Derecktor | Comm. 3 Feb. 87 |
WMEC-908 | Tahoma (ex-Spencer, ex-Legare) | 80 | Derecktor | Serv. 12 Aug. 87 |
WMEC-909 | Campbell (ex-Argus) | 80 | Derecktor | Lau. 29 Apr. 86 |
WMEC-910 | Thetis (ex-Tahoma) | 80 | Derecktor | Lau. 29 Apr. 86 |
WMEC-911 | Forward (ex-Erie) | 80 | Derecktor | Lau. 22 Aug. 87 |
WMEC-912 | Legare (ex-McCulloch) | 80 | Derecktor | Lau. 22 Aug. 87 |
WMEC-913 | Mohawk (ex-Ewing) | 80 | Derecktor | K.L. 18 Jun. 87 |
USCG ISLAND-CLASS PATROL BOATS
WPB-1317 | Attu | 86 | Bollinger | Serv. 5 Feb. 88 | |||||
WPB-1318 | Baranof | 86 | Bollinger | Del. 12 Mar. 88 | |||||
WPB-1319 | Chandeleur | 86 | Bollinger | Del. 16 Apr. 88 | |||||
WPB-1320 | Chincoteague | 86 | Bollinger | Del. 21 May 88 | |||||
WPB-1321 | Cushing | 86 | Bollinger | Del. 25 Jun. 88 | |||||
WPB-1322 | Cutty hunk | 86 | Bollinger | Del. 30 Jul. 88 | |||||
WPB-1323 | Drummond | 86 | Bollinger | Del. 3 Sep. 88 | |||||
WPB-1324 | Largo | 86 | Bollinger | Del. 8 Oct. 88 | |||||
WPB-1325 | Metomkin | 86 | Bollinger | Del. 12 Nov. 88 | |||||
|
| FY |
| jpld |
| ||||
TypeIHull Number | Name | Program | Builder |
|
| ||||
WPB-1326 | Monomoy | 86 | Bollinger | pel 17 j*' Dei-21(■ Dd.250.. S& ssi- SJS- De <>1' Del-Z* • i Del-2 ^ t Del- 61 |
| ||||
WPB-1327 | Orcas | 86 | Bollinger |
| |||||
WPB-1328 | Padre | 86 | Bollinger |
| |||||
WPB-1329 | Sitkinak | 86 | Bollinger |
| |||||
WPB-1330 | Tybee | 86 | Bollinger |
| |||||
WPB-1331 | Washington | 86 | Bollinger |
| |||||
WPB-1332 | Wrangell | 86 | Bollinger |
| |||||
WPB-1333 | Adak | 86 | Bollinger |
| |||||
WPB-1334 | Liberty | 86 | Bollinger |
| |||||
WPB-1335 | Anacapa | 86 | Bollinger |
| |||||
WPB-1336 | Kiska | 86 | Bollinger |
| |||||
WPB-1337 | Assateague | 86 | Bollinger |
| |||||
USCG ICEBREAKING TUGS |
|
|
|
| |||||
WTGB-109 | Sturgeon Bay | 85 | Bay City San |
| |||||
|
|
| Diego |
|
| ||||
CONVERSIONS/REACTIVATIONS |
|
|
|
| |||||
BATTLESHIP |
|
|
| Start'5** |
| ||||
BB-64 | Wisconsin | 86 | Ingalls |
| |||||
AIRCRAFT CARRIER SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM | Start |
| |||||||
CV-62 | Independence | 85 | Philadelphia |
| |||||
CV-63 | Kitty Hawk | 88 | NSY Philadelphia | Starts |
| ||||
|
|
| NYS |
|
| ||||
AUXILIARY CRANE SHIPS T-ACS-4 Gopher State | 86 | Norfolk |
|
| |||||
|
|
| SB&DD | . lift Stad 1 |
| ||||
T-ACS-5 | Flickertail State | 86 | Norfolk |
| |||||
|
|
| SB&DD | . 3^ Start-’ |
| ||||
T-ACS-6 | Cornhusker State | 86 | Norfolk |
| |||||
|
|
| SB&DD |
|
| ||||
T-ACS-7 | Diamond State | 87 | Tampa SB |
|
| ||||
T-ACS-8 | Equality State | 87 | Tampa SB |
| |||||
T-ACS-9 |
| 88 |
|
|
| ||||
T-ACS-10 |
| 88 |
|
|
| ||||
ACOUSTIC RESEARCH VESSEL T-AG-195 Hayes | 87 | Tacoma Boat | <*** |
| |||||
(ex-T-AGOR-16) |
|
|
|
|
| ||||
HOSPITAL SHIP |
|
|
| i I0* |
| ||||
T-AH-20 | Comfort | 84 | National Steel | pel ' |
| ||||
Sources: CHINFO, “Naval Sea Systems Command Monthly Progress RC’P and Conversion” (NAVSEA 250-574, 1 November 1987); USCG Mefl* Public Affairs Division (PBA); USNI Military Database and private
Commentary
By Commander John D. Alden,
U. S. Navy
(Retired
The past year produced more than the normal quota of surprises, contradictions, and negative publicity for the Navy. Even as its ships and sailors were being tested in the Persian Gulf, budget cutters in Washington were reducing its size. Yet, Congress calmly added billions for two new nuclear-powered aircraft carriers that weren’t being seriously considered a year previously. Then there were the successive replacements of top Department of Defense officials, implying policy changes and adding uncertainty about the future. These developments, and others
of equal or greater import that ^ made the headlines, will affect the s of the Navy more than will the launC and commissionings of new ships rently in the construction program'
The year’s biggest headlines wereF^ duced by events in the Persian Gul
oil Iran s cism
tankers, and the Navy’s response to mine warfare. While much criti-
i°W-tech i • -
albeit ■ lranian mines under control, Nl^QW'th considerable help from our
Gulf a*bes- The lessons learned in the terj^'H undoubtedly affect the charac-
naval powers.
The
°Wn ,, 3nal tinkering. Congress struck
lP- .
do-
Proba
cruisers instead. In terms of e combat capability, the cruiser
*lln>is
not asking for any cruisers at
■a thc
be
3|jS'^ at'ack on the frigate Stark (FFG- ... ’ the reflagging and escorting of the
byWas leveled at weaknesses disclosed surv' 6 ^!ar^ eP>sode, the demonstrated "ability of this “low-mix” frigate erateartening to ship designers and op- bart°rs,a'ike- Similarly, the Navy’s em- inp arSing|y undernourished minesweep- i. 0rce seems to have gotten the erai new ships during the next sev- to g ars‘ However, care will be needed
Whi^ U5e t*lat tbe aPParent ease with lenis • t le Navy has overcome its prob- Cencv'n does not lead to compla-
rank ofAfter aH’ Iran is not in the first ping ® budget process—with its overlap- rnittea'X'- disorderly congressional com- cal (jS.’ 'tterminable delays, and politi- Uiorea s is becoming, if anything, UnifiedCOcmplex than ever. Now that the feet; c°mrnanders have been given dican h/Ut to tbc budgeting process, they ness a Reeled to stress combat readi- than ^ 0Perational requirements rather rangere.search. development, and longing a J5 anning. Two-year program fund- The fCarS t0 be a dead issue, grarn, lscal year 1988 shipbuilding pro- co^'Mly survived rather well despite
Navy’s request for three Ar., - (DDG-51 )-class destroyers in
tion-,1 1U Prudently authorized three addi- 1 Aegis
Hotyev ^ bas an edge over the destroyer, bull an(?r> 'ts Spruance (DD-963)-class margin ,P°'ver plant have little remaining Uiotijj-: °r structural or weapon system bpe Rations, whereas the Arleigh Burke ciFicaji Startin§ with a new hull form spe- atid ty\Ldesigned for better seakeeping Etow^1 b a built-in margin for future brnitat' n or ^ years the cruiser’s Na°n.S- will be much more apparent.
: seen '^89 program, but it remains to j, whether the problems in the Ar- c0tpeUr*e program have been over-
T-AQQ^ess also added two SWATH-type bad nsurveillance ships that the Navy EresSj0ri ^quested. This reflected con- A$\y . concern over the so-called bly fe|(Crisis,” whereas the Navy proba- PerienU rnore pmdent to gain some ex- f°re maekWith the first SWATH ship be- case, lnS further commitments. In any e ultimate answer to growing
enemy submarine capabilities will not be provided by unarmed passive listening ships. It is more important to ensure funding for the Seawolf (SSN-21)-class attack submarine. While the prototype of the new submarine is in the fiscal year 1989 submission, each year it has been the target of serious sniping. Most recently, its detractors have argued that it does not represent enough of an improvement and should be skipped over in favor of a new model incorporating the maximum capabilities of every specialized Soviet type plus other advanced features still in the research stage. If Congress falls for this line of reasoning, it will be a classic case of “better is the enemy of good enough.” The history of submarine development is replete with examples of the folly of trying to go too far too fast.
The ballistic missile submarine program faces continuing uncertainty from proposed agreements to limit the numbers of long-range missiles. Congress has again insisted that older boats be laid up because of the existing unratified treaty. The more serious problems will come when'a new limit is agreed upon; the great number of Trident warheads carried by the Ohio (SSBN-726)-class boats is likely to affect the number of submarines allowed under the current “triad” deterrent policy. In this light, former Secretary of the Navy James Webb’s proposal to defer next year’s SSBN may have not been merely a political gambit. In any case, the failure of the Newport News bid for the 1988 Trident submarine contract means that Electric Boat will get the orders for all additional ones authorized.
Perhaps the most serious developments affecting the nation’s future defense capabilities passed almost unnoticed by the public. With the completion of the con- tainership Kodiak last November, U. S. shipyards were left without a single oceangoing commercial vessel on order. The distress of the shipbuilders has already been reflected in announced closings, bankruptcies, or divestitures by Dillingham Ship Repair, Todd Shipyards, Lockheed, Bethlehem Steel, and others. On the operating side, the decline of the merchant marine continues unabated. Although the President’s Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense identified a need for 12 new cargo ships per year for the next decade just to meet emergency military sealift requirements, its recommendations attracted little interest and no appropriations. The Navy’s ability to meet future emergency demands is clearly threatened by the erosion of shipyards, their supporting infrastructure of equipment manufacturers, and trained manpower resources from the nation’s mobilization base. Unfortunately, no relief appears in sight.
Because of the approaching national elections, few policy changes that would otherwise have resulted from the shuffling of personnel in Washington are likely to be implemented until a new administration takes office. It may be recalled that just before resigning as Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., issued his controversial “black Monday” directives, shifting many functions from the Chief of Naval Operations to the office of the secretary. These were put on hold by his successor, James H. Webb, who initiated his own set of studies. Then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was replaced by Frank C. Carlucci III, who was clearly determined to cut the budget. His decisions overruling the Navy’s recommendations prompted Webb to revive the fine old tradition of resigning in protest. The appointment of William L. Ball III in his place probably means that changes initiated under Webb will, like Lehman’s legacies, be deferred or set aside.
One change, however, has clearly occurred: the fiscal year 1989 program submitted by the administration is smaller than envisioned a year ago. The proposed missile hydrofoil (PXM), the airship program, and some special warfare craft have been dropped; Carrier Air Wing 10 is decommissioned; and other cuts can be expected. Comparison of successive five- year programs will undoubtedly show further growth in the “lost squadron” of ships cancelled or delayed. Part of the price for the two new carriers approved by Congress appears to be earlier retirement for the Midway (CV-41) and possibly other older carriers. Although the Navy has hastened to order the reactors for the new carriers, one or both of them could still meet the fate of the United States (CVA-58), which was cancelled in 1949 even though the keel had been laid.
When Defense Secretary Carlucci ordered the retirement of 16 aging frigates, the era of the “600-ship” fleet was effectively ended, even though President Reagan himself said that reaching the target was only delayed a year or so. As a New York Times editorial put it, “the number 600 is a slogan, not a strategic concept.” Nevertheless, slogans can be meaningful, and it is clear that the impetus represented by the target figure has been lost. The initial cuts may have appeared minor, but the Navy is now in the position of the downstairs lodger waiting until “the other shoe is dropped.” The next few years should be crucial in determining how serious the damage will be.