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Iti
ficii
*s not news that there are serious de-
lencies in the Navy’s combat search "“d rescue (CSAR) capabilities. But the "’'Pact that these deficiencies could have 0,1 carrier battle group strike operations in
the
that
volatile Persian Gulf area demands we give CSAR more attention, before the Navy established a dedi- ^ated combat search and rescue capability l" Vietnam War, it lost one helicopter r every 1.4 survivors recovered and one ^AR crewman for every 1.8 survivors "turned. After commissioning a CSAR hadron, HC-7, the Navy did not lose a p.^gle CSAR helicopter to hostile fire.1
°ts and aircrew trained to complete the • ecific and demanding CSAR mission . flew aircraft modified to enhance e,r survivability in a combat environ. nt- The Navy can no longer make that
claim
today.
Navy is in danger of repeating its ,re'HC-7 Vietnam CSAR experience.
Ain
Pile
:ts
crews trained to excel in antisubma-
Warfare (ASW), operating helicop- HeS designed to fight the subsurface bat-
envj
. likely will fly in high-threat lronments and “cross the beach” in bi|y titajor conflict. Although the surviva-
%!
Jjes’ the aircrews themselves are not prered to execute the search and rescue
"dssion.
(j^atrier air wing weapons detachments 0 Provide invaluable CSAR training ^PPortunities for the carriers’ ASW heli- Vv-ler squadrons and the entire carrier air (lr §■ Unfortunately, there has been little no light helicopter antisubmarine m a<lron involvement in these detach- pionts- Recently, units preparing to defy y to the Persian Gulf area flooded
dy of aircrews and aircraft may be anced by using CSAR kits and pack-
fyj'jcoptcr Combat Support Squadron
l! 1 ■
n Weapons and tactics class. HC-9’s
tioi
°utst;
l_9 with requests for their mini-avia-
itig
Plai
and
°niy
anding classroom and airborne train- syllabus introduce pilots to CSAR flning, hostile-environment tactics,
night-vision goggles. However, after I'ow tW° wee'cs °f CSAR training, successful can we expect these air- er\v'S t0 'n a hostile high-threat
'fonrnent?
'he pl"e §rouP commanders operating in ersian Gulf today have the following
ass.
"its
;ets
. available to fulfill the strike rescue s'on:
CH-46
0rms
Sea Knights—Of all the plat-
available to the battle group com-
mander, the CH-46 alone has the internal capacity to insert or extract a five- to eight-man sea-air-land (SEAL) team for CSAR contingency operations. Its drawbacks include low endurance and its vulnerability in a high-threat environment because of its large size and poor speed.
► SH-2 Sea Sprite Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS) Mk-1 Helicopters— The SH-2’s small radar cross section coupled with good speed seem to make it well suited for CSAR. However, it has low endurance and a limited internal capacity.
► SH-3H Sea King— The SH-3H is the only battle group helicopter indigenous to the carrier and its air wing. Readily available and involved throughout the strike planning process, the SH-3 would seem to be a logical choice for a dedicated CSAR platform, needing only to be forward deployed hours before a strike. Its five-hour endurance capability and large internal capacity meet the criteria of a strong CSAR vehicle. Unfortunately, its low speed and large size preclude it from being a real contender to fulfill the battle group's strike rescue requirements. As the SH-3 is phased out and replaced by the SFT60F, the carrier air wing’s helicopter will have considerable potential to carry out the battle group CSAR mission.
►SH-60B Seahawk LAMPS Mk-III— The newest, fastest helicopter available to the battle group commander lacks only the ability to adequately perform a multicrew rescue (EA-6B, S-3A, E-2C) because of its small internal aft cabin.
y HC-9— The naval reservists of HC-9 maintain the Navy’s corporate knowledge of CSAR. Ready to deploy anywhere in the world in support of battle group operations, HC-9 can be on station within 15 days. Unfortunately, they can only maintain one two-plane detachment during a crisis. Future procurement of the HH-60 will dramatically increase the squadron’s potential to survive in any hostile environment. However, until these new aircraft join the fleet, the squadron continues to maintain and By aging HH-3A Sea Kings. In addition, HC-9’s inability to respond rapidly to a confrontation makes it an unsatisfactory answer to the CSAR problem in the highly volatile, politically unstable Persian Gulf theater.
In order to execute successfully a naval
strike against a hostile target, the battle group commander requires an all-weather CSAR vehicle with these capacities:
►Long legs, approximately four- to five- hour endurance
►The power and cargo capacities to lift and carry a five-man SEAL team and 400 pounds of cargo
►Sufficient internal cabin space to accommodate four rescued aircrewman
►Threat countermeasure capabilities (chaff, flares, infrared jammers, etc.)
►A forward-firing capability for selfdefense and suppressing hostile forces
►A night-vision goggle capability for all-weather, low-level ingress/egress
►A reliable navigation computer (Global Positioning System)
►Speed in excess of 150 knots
►Airframe survivability features Although interim aircraft modifications have given the Navy a limited CSAR capability in the Persian Gulf today, a long-term solution to its CSAR problem is needed. A realistic solution that would enable carrier air wings to deploy with a genuine indigenous CSAR capability would be to complement SH- 60F helicopter squadrons of six aircraft with two additional H-60 utility/CSAR vehicles. Considering the deck loading of eight H-60s is comparable to that of a six- plane H-3 squadron, deck space should not present a major problem. With a projected maintenance-man-hour-to-flight- hour ratio approaching 16 for the H-60 and more than 30 for the H-3, and the mean flight hours between critical (mission abort) failures for the H-60 being 128 versus 37 for the H-3, the additional H-60s would provide more reliable maintenance-free assets.2
In any hostile, high-threat environment, a battle group must respond quickly and decisively to meet and defeat the threat. In order to efficiently complete a strike warfare package, a survivable CSAR aircraft is required. The Navy needs that CSAR aircraft today.
'Information provided in HC-9 Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group, Pacific Mini- MAWTS training syllabus.
2“USN Accepts First CV Helo,” Defense Helicopter World, Vol. 6, Num. 4, August-Scptember 1987, p. 64.
Lieutenant McCartin is currently attached to Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron 14, Carrier Air Wing Two, which recently returned from a successful deployment to the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area.
r°^dt
llngs / February 1988
109