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pects of recent ASW development support the premise
Nothing lasts forever, particularly at sea. Winds shift, tides ebb, storms abate, ships and aircraft age and pass from the scene.
So too does an era of supremacy of a naval combatant type. One may arrive faster, serve longer, or fade away more gracefully than the next, but none has yet established any claim on immortality.
During this century alone, the steam-powered battleship, the supercarrier, and the nuclear-powered submarine have each enjoyed, in turn, the pinnacle of naval warfighting supremacy. From the Japanese destruction of the Russian fleet at Tsushima in 1905, to the British victory over the German fleet at Jutland in 1916, and throughout three decades of gunboat diplomacy, the primary measure of any of the world’s navies was battleship strength. Current inventories notwithstanding, that era was ended by Japanese carrier aircraft in late 1941. Despite the recent commissioning of the mighty USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), historians will probably date the beginning of the end of the aircraft carrier’s reign somewhere in the mid-1960s, when significant numbers of Nautilus (SSN-571) descendants were first joining fleets.
Nuclear power brought not only a more efficient way to boil water to surface ships, but opened up a whole new plateau of combat capabilities in undersea warfare. Within a decade, the submarine had become both the master of the tactical seas and the pillar of U. S. strategic defense. International maritime clout now depends more upon inventories of nuclear-powered submarines than that of aircraft carriers.
Navies, traditionally high-tech, are perhaps affected most by scientific and technological breakthroughs. Among naval warfighting systems, the nuclear-powered submarine exploits masterfully the greatest technological achievement of its time—control of an atomic reaction. But today, in the wake of numerous other scientific discoveries now ripe for naval exploitation, the longevity of the once-invincible submarine must be considered at least suspect. The usurper, not necessarily its successor, is ASW (antisubmarine warfare), a broad descriptor for a broad assortment of sensors, systems, and weapons cat' ried on board a myriad of surface ship, submarine, a,r' land, and space platforms.
Neither submarine warfare nor ASW have been rig°r' ously tested by combat since World War II, when the le' thality of an enemy submarine was measured by 2,0$' yard torpedoes, and a navy’s ASW capability by binocf' lars, crude radars and sonars, and simplistic dep1*1 charges. Numbers made a big difference. ASW aircraft"'' once enough of them were available—proved very usefu*' primarily by extending the horizons of visual searches The overall fight was about even. German U-boats alm°8j won the war, but once the flood of Allied escorts, pah0 planes, and carrier-based aircraft entered the Battle of the Atlantic, the tide turned. In the Pacific, after some eafty submarine successes, the Japanese were simply unable 10 field the numbers of ships, submarines, and aircra needed to either defend their own crucial maritime suppW lanes or keep U. S. Navy carrier task forces at bay-
Things were changed dramatically by Admiral Hy11)2" C. Rickover. Nuclear propulsion provided the submari'11' with a wealth of new tactical advantages. It no longer ha to surface periodically, and it could dive deeper, rUl1 faster, roam farther, and endure on station for longer pefl ods than even its hardy crews. ASW has been a frant'0 game of catch-up ever since. Despite notable progress an | technological advances, such as sonar-dipping helic°Pj ters, ultra long-range patrol aircraft, brutishly powerf" sensors in surface warships, hunter-killer submarine8; fixed and towed arrays, and the dedication of larger share8 of naval budgets to ASW forces, nuclear submarines ha'1, remained essentially untouchable. , I
Over the years since the Nautilus, with the carrier* military value proven again and again in small wars an international crises, and the submarines’ never having 10 fire a single shot in anger, the early carrier-versus-subm2 rine issue has subsided. This is probably just as well, he cause the entire question will soon be extraneous. In li? of the current East-West arms race and the world-''1' proliferation of nuclear weaponry, the submarine-versn8 ASW situation has far more profound implications.
In spite of formidable submarine construction progra"1 on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the following four a*
problem, s, called m0*' uses a so°n
submarine supremacy is on the wane.
► Sensors: Customarily, ASW sensors are categorized as passive-acoustic, active-acoustic, or non-acoustic, probably because sound has thus far provided the primary means for pushing signals through water. Passive acoustics implies listeners, hydrophones, underwater arrays, and the “brains” (usually human) to pick some faint murmur of submarine machinery out of the incredibly noisy undersea environment. At short ranges, fairly good signal bearings can be established, and with several bearings, an estimate of range can be made through basic triangulation. At the longer ranges needed for modem ASW, this gets to be a dicey game for an operator, and a complicated one for an automated system of black boxes. (One of the principal issues concerning passive acoustics of the future is the degree of automation that should be sought in listening equipment.)
In the shallows, the noises can bounce off the bottom, reflect from the surface, and get very confused within themselves. Down deep, there is the ocean bed, crazy temperature changes, all sorts of uncharted, varying underwater “rivers” of water flowing this way and that, and some deep-sound channels, which more or less capture a sound and keep it traveling within a long, sinuous pipe that may extend over uncounted miles. Whales are known to use these channels as long-distance telephone lines, but humans and their modem technologies are still groping to understand how they work, much less where they might be found at any given time in any given area.
The use of passive acoustics, while fundamental to ASW and undergoing constant improvement, still remains more an art than a science. By itself, it is no magic weapon, nor is it ever expected to be.
Active acoustics, most often employed in following up on passive detections, use echoes of a manufactured sound source that reflect off a target. At least in theory, the ranges achievable using active acoustics are less tha° those expected using passive. However, in practice, active devices can be made useful at very long ranges for making initial detections of submarines. Massive underwatef sound sources, booming out with fish-killing intensity8 that can make even sponges reverberate, are now possible- The kind of noise emitted is important, however. It has t° be more than simply a massive firecracker to generate us®' ful echoes. And the depth at which the noise is emitted *s critical, varying with such factors as underwater geogta' phy, time of day, and water salinity and temperature-
A major problem with active acoustics is the need 10 properly position a noise source. If the emission emergeS from a ship’s sonar dome, it is often too shallow. Placid the noisemaker right on the ocean’s floor may be too deep' and is inherently an expensive, relatively inflexible prop0' sition. Employing aircraft, such as a helicopter with a teth' ered, variable depth, easily recoverable boomer, introduces a number of operational limitations such as range’ speed, hover-times, etc.
Aside from these physical considerations, tactical fac' tors also weigh heavily. Active acoustics can be expecte to alert immediately all potential targets, opening the do°r to deceptive countermoves, decoys, even to counter*11' tacks on the source itself. So active acoustics, in then1' selves, are no panacea. But they can be deadly effect1'1" against targets at short ranges and are now beginning t0 bring new help to the long-range detection
Combinations of active and passive device tistatics, hold great promise. This approach source and a number of silent receivers that are indepe° dently positioned but cooperatively netted and operate0- Multistatics require very sophisticated levels of tactic3 coordination, where sensor placement, timing of emlS' sions and receptions, detailed knowledge of water cond1 tions, and rapid evaluation of numerous signals beco^e critical parameters. All the data processing and tactic3 repositioning must be accomplished quickly enough 10 negate likely countermeasures. The use of multistaticslS
^finitely not a casual affair, but it does present some Interesting new possibilities, particularly when the new reed of high-speed, high-capacity computers are applied to the data processing.
Non-acoustic sensors are just that. There are a number Possible ones, from human eyeballs, through trained Porpoises, to blue-green lasers. Some of them, such as Magnetic anomaly detectors (MADs), exhaust sniffers, P^scope detecting radars, infrared sensors, and water Pressure devices have been in service for years and are constantly being improved. While useful during certain Phases of submarine hunting, none has thus far provided ^ther the degree of acuity or the volume of scan required 0 become a practical searching device. MADs are subject 0 all sorts of geological, physical, and tactical quirks. Offers and radars need a cooperative target. Infrared and Pressure sensors are pretty flaky affairs. Lasers and some her new-fangled nuclear gizmos are shrouded in classi- eh documents and secrecy.
On the other hand, with galloping technological progress shaking almost all branches of physics and chemistry, early development of a practical non-acoustic detec-
the
hon
as well as noise. The task for the new sensors is to
sensor seems inevitable. The goal of the ongoing reSearch aimed specifically toward this end is not necessar- ^ a “Buck Rogers” death ray emerging from a manned . tal space station, but merely some form of scanning, 'reraft-mounted device that “sees” through a few thou- ^and feet of water with sufficient acuity to pick a subma- ^lne out of the murky depths.
j Processing: Computational capacities are grow
ls by leaps and bounds and have been doing so for at .east ten years. Some of the new capabilities, like artificial atclligence, are almost too complicated for an average 0rtal to even imagine, much less understand. For ASW UrPoses, increasingly capable computer memories will . °re and easily access countless millions of bits of data on j. ater» weather, ocean currents, deep sound channels, a'nt acoustic echoes, etc., work them through thousands 'ntricate screening programs, and come up with a posi- js°n °f a submarine that is highly probable. In ASW, this a °°sely referred to as “data processing,” which is now inCOrnPlished in part in tiny sensors, in aircraft and ships, tfCornplex shore operations centers, and even in “elec- °\x'C Cranes,” filled with operational histories, jjl 'N'di the newer computers, all the data can be accessi- ce 'v'thin microseconds. Modem submarines are complied targets; they have large nuclear reactors, replete with tr eps, motors, gears, tubing, and cables, with massive aiisfers of energy from nuclear to thermodynamic to ^Cchanical, electrical, hydraulic, and hydrodynamic aalteS constant|y taking place. They emit all sorts of sig-
ect more of these signals. The new computers are the ^ y to sorting them out for practical ASW.
(Q3 °mmand, Control, Communications, and Intelligence dj /' The “lone wolf” approach to ASW, exemplified by js? 'ilustrious PBY Catalina flying boats in World War II, thc°n8 passe. Now, more so than ever before, teamwork is pename of the game. The team members are thousands of P*e positioned in numerous sites ashore, afloat, and airborne, each contributing to the outcome of the overall effort. Computers and modem displays make large contributions, but only in support of the humans.
Probably the greatest single need in C3I is to expand and improve the teamwork required. The process starts with basic military intelligence, uses all available sensory inputs and a lot of historical and environmental information, relies heavily upon good communication links to feed the data processing banks at controlling facilities, and demands, throughout the whole system, the broad exercise of sound judgment. The Navy is getting much better at this as time goes by, but it still needs more equipment, data, processing procedures, and intensively trained people, all properly linked to provide real-time support to the onscene operators. Among the ASW professionals, the feeling is strong that they now have a good handle on the problems. They know how to fix them, given adequate resources.
► The Osprey: The Bell-Boeing V-22 tilt-rotor Osprey, scheduled to first take to the air in mid-year, is further evidence of better days ahead in ASW. The Osprey is an aeronautical chameleon which can fly as either a helicopter or a fixed-wing aircraft, and can switch back and forth between the two flight modes at almost any time. The full impact of the dramatic changes it will bring to ASW are not yet widely appreciated.
Initial plans for sea-basing an SV-22 ASW Osprey call out the big carriers, which carrier sailors do not like. Their forte is offensive warfare—carrying the fight right into the enemy’s back yard. Defensive aircraft, such as those used in ASW, are only tolerated when absolutely necessary. Carrier sailors argue that there is no real necessity for including the Osprey in its air wing, and that it should be sent to other ships or even based ashore to “commute” to its ASW job. If that is not feasible, an amphibious warship, tanker, or even a hastily converted merchant contain- ership suggest themselves as handy temporary bases.
Irrespective of whatever basing scheme will eventually be used, the true significance of the Osprey in ASW will
come from its ability to fly economically for long periods of time, and to hover when appropriate to gently insert or withdraw sensors and weapons at the places and times they are most needed. From another point of view, the Osprey promises to become a catalyst for all ASW, permitting more effective sensors to be developed and more effective tactics to be used in their employment. It can handle a dipping sonar, regular sonobuoys, weapons, large, recoverable buoys, net-tending chores, and a number of routine tasks, like aerial tanking, surveillance, C3I, search and rescue, and utility missions. Further down the pike lie some tilt-rotor designs for both larger and smaller Osprey offspring to be used across almost all warfare areas, ashore and afloat.
The ASW plateau that these developments are building will soon overshadow the era of the submarine. Aside from its stealth, the submarine has not much going for it in terms of naval warfare. It is fragile, cumbersome, and essentially unaware of what is going on near to and above the surface. It is inherently noisy and “blind” when using speed, and cannot really fight off a determined attack. Returning fire against the enemy tends to be a losing tactic, since it may only attract more lethal enemy actions. Even today, once a submarine is located with enough precision to get aircraft into the battle, it’s a dead duck—and a very expensive one!
Good uses will undoubtedly remain in naval warfare for the submarine, just as they now do for both battleships and supercarriers, but it will no longer reign as “King of the Seas.” Its future role will probably take the form of much smaller, deeper-diving, faster boats for specialized fleet missions, carrying more sensors and few or no weapon As a strategic platform, its mobility will not help much oul at sea, leaving it in the category of a very expensive- highly vulnerable nuclear-powered missile silo.
The profound implications of future submarine stripped of their invincibility provide food for deeP thought on both the national and naval levels. More real's' tic strategic defense policies will be needed. The heaV emphasis placed by the Reagan administration on the Stt*' tegic Defense Initiative represents an initial, possibly 'n' tentional, move in this direction.
Wholesale rewriting of maritime strategies and naV tactics is in store. Fleets and battle groups will be drama11' cally different in most respects, with elements designed to exploit cooperative, instead of individual capabilities, an emphasizing far more integration between air, space, suf face, and sub-surface platforms, significantly wider dj5' persal of all naval forces, fewer sailors manning miss'1 batteries afloat, and more sailors manning computer bank5 ashore. The successor in supremacy to the nuclear subma rine is far more likely to be a national “naval system than a single warship type.
A 1944 graduate of the Naval Academy, Captain O’Rourke command several all-weather fighter squadrons, an ammunition ship, and the V Independence (CVA-62). Prior to retirement from the Navy in 1974. directed the Navy Fighter Study Group. Captain O’Rourke is a f°rn’, member of the Naval Institute’s Editorial Board and a frequent contnn tor to the Proceedings. Currently, Captain O’Rourke is involved in 1 fense-related studies.
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