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of
tt^ne countermeasure vessels
Sical improvements, including
erglass hull construction, inte- ®rated navigation and mine prose- Cafion system, mine-disposal vehi
and equipment capable of
riticism and advice on how to eal with the mines in the Persian bombard the naval community r°m every quarter. The United ta(es has to remain patient and use ayailable resources to its best advantage. Patience, however, is not a strong national trait, and many are demanding immediate corrective action in the Persian Gulf. Unfortu- aately, there is no “quick fix.” espite recent and continuing de- Ve'opment, the U. S. mine c°Untermeasure (MCM) capability ls still lacking in certain aspects.
. New MCM Platforms: Recogniz- lng the growing mining threat,
I^any nations have renewed their P CM efforts. In many ways, the Ur°peans have taken the lead.
In 1984, the Royal Swedish . avy commissioned HMS Qndsort, the first of its new class
JMCMVs). The Landsort is noted
,°r her many material and technolog! ■ J
fib.
cles
Pr°viding remote control to unmanned minesweeping platforms.
The West German Navy devel- °Ped the concept of using remote- 5p°ntrolled unmanned vessels in its ^r°ika system. This consists of a ^ndau-class control ship trailing cchanical sweep gear as it is led r°ugh a minefield by three un- anned sweep craft. These un- anned craft simulate the magnetic I acoustic signature of a much ar§er ship in order to detonate in- ,Uence mines before the manned n'P enters the area to cut mooring bles in its mechanical sweep mode.
Elsewhere in the European comity, Britain has delivered units s, ,'ts Hunt- and River-class MCM I Ps and has also developed a new ass of single-role minehunters.
The Italians have also built a new class of minehunter, the Lerici.
The United States recently decided to build ships of this class for the U. S. Navy.
Further evidence of Europeans’ commitment to MCM is presented by their continued cooperative efforts. The multinational Standing Naval Force Channel (StaNav- ForChan) recently celebrated its 14th anniversary as a permanent NATO minesweeping command dedicated to assisting the Commander-in-Chief Channel (CinChan) in protecting merchant shipping in the English Channel and North Sea. Comprised of units from the NATO nations that have operational interests in the Channel area, Belgium, Holland, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, the force also receives units on temporary assignment from Denmark, Norway, and the United States. In addition, StaNavForChan recently visited Spain and Portugal to help those
nations reappraise their mine countermeasures capabilities.
Not all cooperative efforts have been restricted to Europe. The Australians worked with the Swedes to develop the Australian Bay-class inshore minehunter with its innovative catamaran hull constructed of a foam sandwich material taken from the Swedish Landsort-class MCMV. Many Asian nations have expressed interest in acquiring the Bay-class minehunter. These include Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Burma, Singapore, and Turkey.
New MCM Equipment: As platform development has advanced, so too has the development of new MCM equipment. Modern mine technology, such as pressure sensitivity, plastic construction, and mobile mines, has made mines harder to sweep. Therefore, minehunting and weapon-by-weapon neutralization are prominent in MCM. This new emphasis has spawned the development of many high-tech sonar systems aimed at increasing the effectiveness of minehunting.
Other surveillance equipment, some of which originated in the offshore petroleum industry, is under development. One system,
the submersible robots, generally fit into one of three categories: remote-operating vehicles (ROVs), which are tethered; radio remote- controlled vehicles (RRCVs); and autonomous remotely controlled submersibles (ARCSs), which are battery-powered and programmed to carry out preassigned tasks. While these units show promise, their deployment in the MCM force will be years in coming.
Another area of equipment development involves submersible, self- propelled delivery vehicles designed to receive guidance from an MCM platform and to place a mine- disposal charge within kill range of the targeted mine. This type of system has deployed with European MCM forces and warrants further study and development.
MCM Prosecution Techniques: Just as platform and equipment developments in MCM have advanced, so too have MCM prosecution techniques. “Bottom conditioning” and the development of “Q-routes” greatly increase opportunities to monitor the appearance of mine-like objects on the ocean bottom. Portable, digitalized navigation systems can accurately pinpoint mine locations and identify transit routes through minefields. Suggestions exploring the possibility of using nonmilitary hydrographic surveyor assets to assist in bottom conditioning have surfaced. These assets would provide both an initial study of the bottom configuration and a regular surveillance.
These techniques, while helpful, do not change the unpleasant fact that mines, once in place, are very difficult to handle. Mines tend to be designed with a sensitivity to several different influences: magnetic, acoustic, and, most difficult, pressure. This sensitivity to the pressure impulse that all ships generate constitutes a major threat to our minesweepers. Helicopters are in place and research toward increasing the ability to prosecute pressure mines with these airborne assets continues, but airborne time-on-station limitations continue to be a major drawback. The issue of pressure-sensitive mines remains a thorny one, especially when considered in the context of normal minesweeping operations conducted by the major U. S. asset, the ocean-going minesweeper (MSO)-
Against the pressure-sensitive mine, the MSO’s only option is to conduct minehunting operations. This time-consuming method of using sonar to search the ocean bottom restricts the ship to prosecuting one mine at a time. Once it locates a mine, the MSO must neutralize it—another time-consuming and technically archaic process. To neutralize the mine, the ship’s boat lowers a heavy detonation device to the bottom in the vicinity of the mine. When the boat is safely clear, the charge detonates and destroys the mine.
The new class of MCM ships, the Avenger (MCM-1) class, has no improved capability to deal with pressure-sensitive mines. The new coastal minehunters (MHCs), currently planned, will, like the Avenger class, be quite expensive and potentially vulnerable to the pressure-sensitive mines.
A more economical approach being explored is the craft of opportunity (COOP) program, which uses off-the-shelf sonar equipment fitted to available platforms that law enforcement agencies have confiscated. With this combination, a small contingent of Naval Reserve personnel can conduct bottom surveillance operations in support of the fleet units. A variation of this approach being considered ist0 form small units of personnel equipped with portable equipment and organized so that upon short notice they can report on board an available craft, set up their equipment, and quickly begin operations- But the COOP program, while showing a degree of promise, does not solve the difficult problem of neutralizing the mines once they are located. While underwater deI11' olition units have been used to destroy mines, these assets are very limited and are therefore better employed as support units.
Another development derived
[r°m the COOP program is the
ihei
fro;
built
' 1950s, when 90 MSOs were
^aused the delay of the Wonsan tephibious operation.
.
Annette Marine Corporation’s j^w design of the coastal mine- unter (CMH). Described as filling ® niche between the “make-do °OP craft” and the new genera- ll°n of MCM platforms, the CMH a smaller platform from which minesweeping and minehunt- operations can be conducted, oovvever, at 122 feet in length and a superstructure two decks P§n. this unit is far from compact. Urther evaluation of this craft is re<luired.
The sheer numbers—as high as 90,000—of mines available to the Soviets and to Third odd countries exacerbate the ?'ne threat. While the United teles and its European allies have n°Wn the commitment necessary 0 Provide an MCM capability in °nie waters, the same cannot be of prosecuting the mine threat ln the rest of the world.
future Options: The options for ,ealing with these problems range r°m accepting the risk as it pres- ®ntly exists to expending the re- °Urces necessary to provide a fool- ™°f system that guarantees Ccurity from the mine threat. Nei- r extreme is viable: the risk ltTl mines is too grave to be tolerated, but neither does it seem readable to provide a gold-plated ^oluiion similar to that attempted in 'n response to the mining that
leased on the variance of the Possible locations and situations, j. e United States should build a d* with flexible capabilities that n adjust to specific contingencies. (Wing this to continental United ates (CONUS) harbors suggests cjat die United States should °Sely analyze each critical area id tailor MCM forces to it. Work under way on this, and on de- gning an organization to protect e Maritime Defense Zone.
Other options would examine the ed for more rapid response to ussible overseas MCM require- ents. The U. S. Navy could retain some of the new MCM platforms in the active-duty force and deploy them to Asian, Mediterranean, and Latin American locations, where it would take much less time to move them to remote areas.
The emergence of minehunting as the preferred method of mine prosecution means that MSOs and MCMs in this mode of operation must commit a lot of manpower and material assets to dealing with mines individually. For more efficient use of available resources, then, the Navy needs to develop smaller MCM platforms, manned by fewer people.
The COOP program moves in this direction, but the nonstan- dardized nature of these platforms raises questions of dependability, lost operational time due to down time, and lack of support opportunities through normal supply and maintenance channels. In addition, the COOP program, despite its obvious value as a CONUS-based asset, does not solve the need for a rapidly deployable MCM platform.
As for the various smaller-sized MCM platforms currently in development and/or production—both U. S. and European—they all have advantages, but each can be expected to absorb major procurement and manpower resources.
The Minehunting Craft: It is therefore suggested that we undertake research to create a truly compact craft capable of minehunting and prosecution, possibly designated MCHC (minehunting craft). The MCHC would provide a better resource-to-mines-prosecuted ratio and would likely solve the problem of timely deployment, because its smaller size would facilitate movement. The new craft should be designed to conduct bottom surveillance and mine neutralization. This may require either developing new sonar equipment or adapting existing technology. A new wire-guided or remote-control delivery device will be needed to place a detonation charge within kill range of a mine.
Each MCHC would require only small crews—say, four enlisted specialists (a boatswain’s mate, quartermaster, or signalman; an engineman; a sonar technician; and a gunner’s mate), who would rotate in three or four sections—to maintain around-the-clock operations.
The MCHCs’ small size would also allow them to work without fear of influencing pressure-sensitive mines. But that same size limitation may restrict the MCHCs’ usefulness in severe weather. Designers will need to identify and reconcile tradeoffs.
Craft design should also take into account present amphibious platform capability so that the minesweeping squadrons could be deployed to support amphibious operations. Similarly, designers should consider the possibility of airlifting these minehunting craft to potential hot spots.
The majority of the Navy’s minesweeping assets should continue to be staffed by Naval Reserve personnel located inland, and by coastal personnel most often used to staff Naval Reserve Force platforms. Because of the small crew size, inland personnel could train in small units at remote Naval Reserve Centers and spend regular weekends (say, quarterly) at their mobilization sites on the coast.
Used in conjunction with other MCM platforms, the MCHC would offer an economical (in terms of manpower and anticipated procurement cost) increase in existing U. S. MCM capabilities. MCHC squadrons could be tasked to provide MCM services for a particular CONUS location while also being trained to serve as a deployable MCM asset to satisfy overseas MCM requirements.
The final configuration of the MCHC platform and its composite force structure will depend on many design considerations. Active- and reserve-duty naval personnel within the mine community should play a significant role in the design of these units, lending their wealth of operating experience to the effort.
Commander Marke R. Shelley, U. S. Naval Reserve